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FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:




L. V. WARNER
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COMMAND REPORT
HEADQUARTERS EUCOM/USAREUR
1952



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CHAPTER 1

Commander in Chief's Evaluation

1. Major Organizational Changes

The command underwent three major organizational changes in 1952: a redesignation of command, a reorganization of subordinate area commands, and the creation of a new tactical headquarters. The last of these changes is discussed in paragraph 3, in another connection.

a. Redesignation of Command. Until the middle of 1952, the European Command (EUCOM) was the senior U.S. military headquarters in Europe. It was a joint Army, Navy, and Air Force command, originally responsible for administration and operations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), but since 2 April 1951 responsible for operations to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE). The exact degree of responsibility to SHAPE was not specified, but in practice it was understood to mean subordination of the EUCOM combat elements only, and, except for planning aspects, only in time of emergency. In the summer of 1952, when General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower was succeeded as SHAPE commander by Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, plans were being made for the appointment of the latter as commander in chief of all U.S. forces in the European area, with certain exceptions. This centralization of authority over several U.S. commands required a new headquarters, which was created 1 August 1952 under the name of U.S. European Command (US EUCOM). The new headquarters was temporarily established at Frankfurt, Germany, under a deputy commander in chief, Gen. Thomas T. Handy. EUCOM, at the same time, was redesignated U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR). General Handy remained as Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe (CINCUSAREUR), in addition to his duties as deputy commander in chief, U.S. European Command, until 15 August 1952, at which time he was replaced as commander of USAREUR by Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy, former commander of the Seventh Army. Command of the Seventh Army was assumed by Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolte. Planning for a clear differentiation of the responsibilities of the two headquarters, US EUCOM and USAREUR, continued throughout the remainder of 1952. Upon its establishment on 1 August 1952,

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US EUCOM assumed from the former EUCOM the functions of the U.S. Military Representative for Military Assistance in Europe (MILREP), the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Representative, Europe (JCSRE), and the executive agency for the co-ordination of off-shore procurement (OSP) among the three services in Europe. The latter function, particularly, had become a vital and comprehensive task. All authority not specifically transferred from EUCOM to US EUCOM was retained by USAREUR. Planning pointed to a broader operational role for US EUCOM in 1953.

b. Area Reorganization. Toward the end of 1952 the area organization of EUCOM/USAREUR was drastically revised. Since the creation of the system of military posts and subposts in 1947, the concentrations of troops and installations had been shifted drastically, particularly with the creation of the line of communications across France to a large supply base in the French Zone of Germany west of the Rhine River. Efforts to make the Seventh Army logistically self-supporting had served to lessen the importance of the support functions of the military posts and indicated that in the interest of economy the area organization of the command required revision. USAREUR, moreover, was under orders from the Department of the Army to lower the number of supporting troops in relation to combat troops. For these reasons, plans were developed for reducing the number of major areas in the command. The military posts were consolidated on 1 December 1952 into four large area commands, a Northern (NACOM), a Western (WACOM), a Southern (SACOM), and a Headquarters Area Command (HACOM). Not included in these four areas but considered as area commands for certain purposes were the Berlin Command and the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation (BPE), while Wiesbaden Military Post was excluded from the Northern Area Command since it was under the direct control of USAFE. Such former military posts as were not coincident with the new area commands were redesignated military districts and the former subposts redesignated detachments. In addition, minor shifts in territory were made and others were expected to follow.

2. Principal Logistical Activities

Logistical activities of the command increased greatly on account of troop augmentation, reorganization of the supply structure for a better strategic posture, the building up of strategic reserves, and the conduct of procurement activities in which the command as agent of the Department of the Army for the Army portion of the massive off-shore procurement program. The following activities were of particularly great importance.

a. Build-up of the Communications Zone. The extensive program for building up the communications zone (COMZ), begun in 1951, was barely under way at the beginning of 1952. In spite of the pressing need for a line of communications (LOFC) to Germany less vulnerable to attack from the east than the supply line from Bremerhaven, construction of the new line in France was seriously delayed by political conditions in France, the undeveloped conditions of sites furnished by the French Government, and the

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practical difficulties encountered in the letting and completion of contracts. Labor shortages and scarcity of building materials were among other causes of delay. Despite the delays a total of thirty-five major depots and subdepots in COMZ were ordered returned to Class I status as of 1 December 1952, signifying their readiness for operations. One important project, however, a petroleum (POL) pipeline to be built from the port of Donges on the Loire Estuary to Montargis near Orleans, was still under negotiations at the end of 1952.

b. Relocation of Supply Facilities. Until late 1951, the main supply depots of the command were scattered throughout the U.S. Zone of Germany, many of them near the eastern zonal boundary where they were exposed to capture in case of an attack. Late in 1951 a program was initiated for relocating the more important of these supply depots to points west of the Rhine River in the northern portion of the French Zone of Germany known as the Pfalz. Sites were acquired, a new military post with headquarters at Kaiserslautern was created, and construction was begun. By the end of 1952 nine major installations had been completed and all reserve supplies had been moved from the U.S. Zone to the new depots. No depots except those holding operational supplies for the Seventh Army remained active at any great distance east of the Rhine. Hospital, troop billeting, and dependent housing west of the Rhine were scheduled for completion in 1953.

c. Construction Program. The troop augmentation program, the build-up of COMZ, and the relocation of supply facilities made necessary an extensive program of construction in France and in the French and U.S. Zones of Germany. In Germany a troop housing project to accommodate 140,000 men in 121 rehabilitated or new casernes, begun in 1951, was virtually completed by the end of 1952, at a cost of DM 420,500,000. Bachelor officers' quarters and housing for 39,000 dependent families, scheduled for completion in 1954, was well advanced, with some 27,000 family units having been made available, mainly in the form of apartment houses. A third major construction program in Germany called for the provision of 9,275 hospital beds, including enlargements of hospitals to provide 4,975 beds east of the Rhine and construction of 1,000-bed hospitals to provide 4,300 beds west of the Rhine. At the end of 1952 the hospital rehabilitation program east of the Rhine was completed, and the program of new hospital construction west of the Rhine was well under way, several of the new hospitals being in use as temporary billets. The cost of the entire 1952 construction program in Germany, including the new depots in the French Zone, totaled DM 2.5 billion. The program for construction in France provided mainly for depot installations and such related facilities as warehouses, hospitals, and utilities, but also included provision for 23,000 troop billets, many in stand-by hospital buildings, and housing for 1,800 families. By the end of 1952, \$258,445,000 had been allocated and approximately one third of this amount actually spent.

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3. Participation in Western Defense

Emphasis on the portion of the mission of the command relating to participation in western defense continued to grow. Augmentation of the strength of the command by four full divisions in 1951 had the result that at the beginning of 1952 EUCOM had available a powerful force for the defense of Western Europe. In 1952 EUCOM/USAREUR was more closely integrated into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) structure.

a. Relations with SHAPE. At the beginning of 1952, EUCOM/USAREUR was under the operational command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), a relationship which it had assumed on 2 April 1951. SACEUR's command was exercised through an intermediate headquarters, Allied Land Forces, Central Europe (ALFCE). This relationship was made more concrete by the creation in 1952 of Central Army Group (CAG), including the U.S. Seventh Army and the French First Army, subordinate to ALFCE and with the EUCOM/USAREUR commander in chief as commanding general. After 1 August, the dual position of General Ridgway as SACEUR and Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command (US CINCEUR), assured closer co-ordination of USAREUR with the NATO headquarters, SHAPE. As a subordinate command, USAREUR prepared its emergency plans in co-ordination with those of SHAPE and ALFCE.

b. Relations with Allied Land Forces, Central Europe. As the year 1952 progressed, EUCOM/USAREUR was increasingly guided by ALFCE directives and increasingly committed to referring certain problems to ALFCE for solution. The Joint Central Europe Emergency Defense Plan served as the basis for CAG emergency planning, which in turn served as the basis for EUCOM/USAREUR emergency planning. As CAG commander, CINCUSAREUR was operationally directly subordinate to the Commander in Chief, ALFCE (CINCALFCE). Plans provided that in case of emergency USAREUR personnel would perform certain U.S. Army theater functions. The command's troop training program in 1952 included frequent combined operations with French components of CAG. A number of combined command post exercises were held, as well as field exercises and war games in which units of the French First Army and the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) participated.

c. Participation in the Mutual Security Program. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Representatives, Europe, the Commander in Chief, European Command (CINCEUR), until 1 August 1952, was responsible for co-ordinating policy with respect to U.S. military participation in planning under NATO, and also for the co-ordination of U.S. military policy and planning under NATO with the established plans and policies of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP). The command conducted purchases in Europe for the MDAP Off-shore Procurement Program, amounting in 1952 to \$415,219,401.

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4. The Integration Program

EUCOM initiated on 1 April 1952, in accordance with instructions from the Department of the Army, a program of racial integration designed to put an end to all segregation. Integration was applied first to combat units and then to service units. In spite of the difficulties arising from the shifting of personnel, the arrival of disproportionate percentages of Negro enlisted replacements, shortages of qualified Negro specialist personnel, and other problems, by the end of 1952 most of the combat units and 40 percent of the service units in the command were integrated units.

5. Morale and Discipline

In both Germany and France, morale and discipline of USAREUR troops varied widely. Adverse factors included a shortage of troop and family housing, too rapid integration of units in some cases, and a freeze on promotions. The most serious measure taken to improve discipline and morale during the year was a curfew instituted in August. The command as a whole experienced a slight decline in morale and discipline from the level reached in previous years as determined by certain criteria, but not to such a degree as to seriously impair combat readiness.

6. Relations with HICOG

Relations between EUCOM/USAREUR and the Office of the High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG), underwent sweeping changes during 1952 due particularly to the completion of the contractual relations negotiations with the Federal Republic of Germany. In anticipation of the eventual ratification of the contractual arrangements, long range planning was undertaken by EUCOM/USAREUR and HICOG for the change in status of U.S. forces in Germany from that of occupation troops to defense forces and for the transformation of HICOG to a normal embassy status. This transformation necessitated a new approach to the problems of support of HICOG, the command budget, housing, German-American relations, and other subjects. Despite planning for and the actual phase-out of certain HICOG activities, the failure of the signatory nations to ratify the contractual relations in 1952 made necessary the continuation of occupation status during the entire year, with HICOG retaining over-all authority in certain fields of relationship with the Federal Republic. Early in July 1952, Mr. J. J. McCloy, the U.S. High Commissioner since the institution of the Allied High Commission in 1949, was replaced by Mr. Walter J. Donnelly, formerly U.S. High Commissioner for Austria. The monthly HICOG-CINCEUR/CINCUSAREUR meetings attended by the heads of the major U.S. elements in Germany continued to deal with all problems which arose between the Armed Forces and the U.S. High Commission for Germany.

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activities were retained by HICOG until the effective date of the contractual arrangements and the consequent transition of HICOG to embassy status. Problems arising in the relations of the command with the Germans included the occupation cost budget, hunting and fishing privileges, requisitioning of German property, border customs control, the military use of public utilities, the evacuation of casernes, the use of certain evacuated casernes by German police units, family housing, and the release of war criminals. The S-5 sections were effective agencies at the local level, and by the end of 1952 most of the problems at that level were being solved on an amicable basis.

9. Relations with the Soviets

Relations between the command, on the one hand, and the Soviet authorities and the Soviet satellites, on the other hand, continued to deteriorate during 1952. The most sensitive areas were those along the international boundary with Czechoslovakia and the zonal boundaries between the Soviet and U.S. Zones of Germany, as well as the city of Berlin. Incidents arose during 1952 in the areas exchanged as a result of the Sexton-Askalepov Boundary Agreement of 1945 on the borders between the Laender of Thuringia and Hesse. Border incidents were frequent in 1952, in many of which Czech or East German police (Volkspolizei) fired shots across the border at West German border guards or American personnel, or invaded West German territory and kidnapped inhabitants of West Germany or members of the U.S. forces. Efforts by the East German authorities to seal off the border and to prevent the flight of refugees to the West also caused difficulties for the command. Harassment of traffic on the Autobahn between Berlin and the Western Zones evoked official U.S. protests, particularly the Soviet ban on the use of the Autobahn by courtesy patrols and service vehicles of the Western occupation forces. In a number of cases Western commercial or military planes were attacked or molested in the air corridors between the Western Zones and Berlin. Excessive Soviet annoyance of the EUCOM/USAREUR Military Liaison Mission to the Soviet occupation authorities led to the adoption of retaliatory measures by EUCOM/USAREUR during 1952 with rather good results. While not eliminating these annoyances completely, the retaliatory measures did serve to reduce them to the extent that the EUCOM/USAREUR Military Liaison Mission was able to carry out its mission on a wider scale.

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CHAPTER 2

Mission and Organization

Section I: Mission

10. Mission of the Commander in Chief

The principal mission of the Commander in Chief, EUCOM/USAREUR, in 1952 was essentially the same as in 1951. It included responsibility for military occupation of the U.S. Zone of Germany, support of U.S. policy in Europe, and the preparation of plans for meeting a general emergency. Support of U.S. policy in Europe implied maintaining the forces of the command in a state of readiness for participation in the defense of Western Europe against threat of aggression.¹

a. Commander in Chief, European Command. During 1952, the specific duties of the commander in chief reflected a trend long in progress toward reducing emphasis upon occupation tasks and increasing emphasis upon preparations for defense. In 1951 the activities of Headquarters, EUCOM, had revolved about problems having to do with the organization and distribution of the combat forces of the Seventh Army and their support through a new line of communications through France; support in the form of personnel and facilities for military assistance in Title I countries covered by the Mutual Defense Assistance Pact; co-ordination and direction of the MDAP program and the activities of the Joint American Military Advisory Group (JAMAG), which assisted in conducting the program; and administrative and logistical support of SHAPE. CINCEUR was also engaged in performing important functions in his capacity as senior member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Representative, Europe. CINCEUR carried over these specific duties into 1952.²

¹EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 28 - 33. SECRET.

²Ibid., pp. 30 - 31.

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b. Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe. When EUCOM was redesignated as USAREUR on 1 August 1952, the Commander in Chief, United States Army Europe (CINCUSAREUR), assumed responsibility for all functions previously exercised by the Commander in Chief, European Command (CINCEUR), except a few specifically transferred to the Commander in Chief, United States European Command (US CINCEUR). The functions transferred included those involving the unification of U.S. military service elements in continental Europe, the United Kingdom, North Africa, and Turkey; command of JAMAG, the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group to Greece (JUSMAG), and the Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JAMMAT); the conduct of off-shore procurement; performance of the duties of the U.S. Military Representative for Military Assistance in Europe, including joint planning; and action on behalf of U.S. military interests in Europe before all U.S. Government agencies, including those of the State Department. The residual responsibilities retained by USAREUR included the provision of troops for SHAPE and other NATO organizations; the exercise of responsibility for U.S. military affairs in Germany; performance of the functions of the senior U.S. Army headquarters in Europe; and command of the U.S. military headquarters for Germany.³

c. Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe, as Commander of a Component of US EUCOM. CINCUSAREUR (or his predecessor CINCEUR) participated throughout 1952 in planning aimed at specifying the functions to be assumed by CINCUSAREUR as commander of one of the major components of the new joint headquarters, US EUCOM. While this planning did not materialize in a definite assignment of functions until 14 January 1953, when US EUCOM issued an "Assignment of Functions to Component Commanders," it had become clear by the close of 1952 that USAREUR, while retaining its basic mission, was in process of becoming a major task force command with three tactical commands - the Seventh Army, the Twelfth Air Force, and U.S. Naval Forces, Germany - each partially supported by the USAREUR COMZ.⁴

11. Missions of the Major Commands

a. Seventh Army. The mission of the Seventh Army as the chief tactical ground arm of USAREUR was continued during 1952 from the preceding year. As restated by General Eddy, then Seventh Army commander, early in 1952, "Our mission then 1 January 1951 was the same as it is today: To be

³Cable SX-1884, CINCEUR to COFSA, 29 Jul 52. CONFIDENTIAL. NOFORN. In USAREUR SGS 322 EUCOM (1952), Vol. I, Item 84.

⁴Ltr, DCINC US EUCOM to CINCUSAREUR, CINCNELM, and CINCUSAFE, 14 Jan 53, sub: Assignment of Functions to Component Commanders. SECRET. NOFORN. In USAREUR SGS 322 EUCOM (1952), Vol. I.

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prepared on little or no notice to resist a Russian advance to the West on a 300 mile front, and to cover the evacuation of our dependents."⁵

b. USAREUR Communications Zone. The basic mission of COMZ also remained unchanged from that of 1951: to facilitate the development of the line of communications by co-ordination with all French agencies; to engage in continuous preparation of plans to expand the LOFC across France in order to meet the needs of U.S. military forces in Germany; to support logistically and to administer the LOFC with a minimum of funds, personnel, units, and equipment; to provide security for LOFC personnel, installations, facilities, and equipment; to represent CINCEUR/CINCUSAREUR as directed in negotiations with French governmental agencies; and to prepare, co-ordinate, and implement emergency plans as directed by Headquarters, EUCOM/USAREUR.⁶

c. Twelfth Air Force. The Twelfth Air Force continued in 1952 to perform the missions defined by CINCEUR early in 1951 at the time when the Twelfth Air Force replaced U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) in the EUCOM organizational structure. These missions included the following, in addition to those held in common by all EUCOM major commands; command, administration, and provision for the security of all exempt Air Force stations and installations within military posts; preparations for furnishing air support to U.S. Army elements as directed by CINCEUR; provision of logistical support to other elements of EUCOM as directed by CINCEUR; responsibility for commanding and administering Wiesbaden Military Post; maintaining readiness for emergency operations of the air portion of the U.S. section of the airlift organization and facilities in Berlin; and procurement, storage, issue, and maintenance of equipment and supplies for the support of USAFE except as otherwise provided in agreements or assignments regarding common joint servicing, or cross servicing at the level of EUCOM or the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.⁷

d. United States Naval Forces, Germany (USNAVGER). The mission of the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Germany (COMNAVGER), continued without change during 1952. The essence of this mission was to give naval support to the U.S. forces of occupation in Germany as directed by CINCEUR/CINCUSAREUR.⁸ COMNAVGER was also responsible for commanding, administering, and providing internal security for U.S. Navy installations in EUCOM, and

⁵(1) Comments at Seventh Army Comd's Conf, 7 Jan 52. SECRET.

(2) EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 33 - 34. SECRET.

⁶Briefing for Lt Gen Manton S. Eddy, CINCUSAREUR, 27 Aug 52, sub: Status and Problems of COMZ. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337 Briefings (1952), Vol. I, Item 19A, B/P.

⁷EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 33 - 35. SECRET.

⁸Interv, Capt E. K. Stewart, USAREUR Hist Div, with Capt W. C. Hughes, USNAVGER, 21 Apr 53. RESTRICTED.

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was charged with procuring, storing, and distributing all supplies and equipment secured through U.S. Navy channels for the support of U.S. Naval Forces, Germany.⁹

Section II: General Organizational Structure of the European Command and of United States Army, Europe

12. Organizational Structure of the European Command on 1 January 1952

On 1 January 1952 the European Command consisted of Headquarters, EUCOM; three major commands; seven subordinate commands; and seven units and agencies reporting directly to Headquarters, EUCOM.¹⁰ (See Chart 1.)

a. Headquarters, European Command. The composition of Headquarters, EUCOM, and organization chart are given in paragraphs 16 - 18.

b. Major Commands. The major commands of EUCOM on 1 January 1952, were the Seventh Army, the Twelfth Air Force, and the U.S. Naval Forces, Germany.¹¹ (For detailed composition and organization charts, see Section IV.)

c. Subordinate Commands. The subordinate commands, those units and agencies whose commanders reported directly to Headquarters, EUCOM were on 1 January 1952 the 32d Antiaircraft Artillery (AAA) Brigade; the 66th Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) Detachment; Special Troops, Headquarters, EUCOM; the EUCOM Communications Zone; the 7961 EUCOM Detachment; the military posts (excluding Wiesbaden Military Post but including Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation); and the technical and administrative services consisting of staff divisions of Headquarters, EUCOM, which had certain assigned and attached units under the command of the respective chiefs of service or directors.¹²

d. Units Reporting Directly to Headquarters. Units which were assigned to and reported, in some cases for certain functions only,

⁹EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 34 - 35. SECRET.


¹⁰(1) EUCOM Cir 124, 4 Apr 51, as amended, and 7 Apr 52. UNCLASSIFIED.
(2) EUCOM Organizational Chart and Directory of Key Officers, 15 Dec 51 and 15 Feb 52. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹¹EUCOM USAREUR Cir 124, 7 Apr 52, 27 Sep 52, and 1 Dec 52. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹²EUCOM Cir 124, 4 Apr 51 and 7 Apr 52 as amended. UNCLASSIFIED.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMAND

1 January 1952



* Excluding Wiesbaden Military Post, but including Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation.

** Staff divisions of Headquarters, EUCOM, having certain assigned and attached units under command of respective chief of division or director: Adjutant General, Provost Marshal, Special Activities, Armed Forces Information and Education, Finance, Chemical, Engineer, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal, Transportation, Medical.


*** Assigned to and administered by Headquarters, EUCOM, but reporting for operational purposes directly to U.S. High Commissioner for Germany.

**** Assigned to and administered by Headquarters, EUCOM, and reporting directly to Headquarters, EUCOM, on military matters but reporting directly to U.S. High Commissioner for Germany on such functions as are directed.

USAREUR AREA ORGANIZATION IN GERMANY

1 DECEMBER 1952

NOTE: BERLIN COMMAND AND
BREMERHAVEN PORT OF
EMBARKATION ARE NOT SHOWN



LEGEND:

— • — • — • — AREA COMMAND BOUNDARY
 - - - - - DISTRICT BOUNDARY

- ① HEADQUARTERS AREA COMMAND
- ② WIESBADEN MILITARY POST
- * AREA COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

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directly to Headquarters, EUCOM, were designated as EUCOM units. On 1 January 1952 these units were the 7755 Dependents School Detachment, the 7756 Audit Agency, the 7893 U.S. Military Liaison Mission to the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany, the 7950 Joint American Military Advisory Group, the 7792 Office of the High Commissioner, Germany (for operational purposes reporting directly to the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany), and the 7791 Office of the U.S. Commander, Berlin (USCOB) (reporting directly to Headquarters, EUCOM, on military matters but reporting directly to HICOG on such functions as directed).¹³

13. Major Changes During 1952

a. Designation of the European Command as United States Army, Europe. As already noted, in connection with the reorganization of U.S. forces in Europe incident to the appointment of Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway to the positions of Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and U.S. Commander in Chief, European Command (US CINCEUR), a new headquarters, United States European Command (US EUCOM), was created on 1 August 1952 to exercise authority over all U.S. forces in Europe and to serve as an intermediary headquarters and co-ordinator between various U.S. agencies and activities contributing to the defense of Europe and the North Atlantic community. The United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), was established simultaneously as the successor to the European Command without change of station, function, or mission, except as specifically provided (see par. 9). General Handy continued to serve as CINCUSAREUR, as well as Deputy US CINCEUR, until 12 August, when he was succeeded as CINCUSAREUR by Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy, formerly Commanding General, Seventh Army. The 7950 Joint American Military Advisory Group continued after 1 August 1952 to be assigned to and administered by Headquarters, USAREUR, and to report to it directly on military matters, but reported for operational purposes to US EUCOM.¹⁴

b. Reorganization of the Military Posts into Area Commands. Effective 1 December 1952, USAREUR instituted a sweeping change in the organization of the military post structure, designed to accomplish maximum savings of personnel, materials, and funds without lowering the quality of the support hitherto rendered by the several military posts. By this reorganization the USAREUR military posts and subposts were consolidated into area commands which assumed the mission and responsibilities of the organizations they replaced. The new area commands (Map 1) were as follows:

(1) The Northern Area Command, with headquarters at Frankfurt and with the commanding general of the former Frankfurt Military Post in command; it consisted of the former Frankfurt and Wuerzburg Military Posts and the Bamberg Subpost of the Nuernberg Military Post.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ USAREUR Cir 124, 27 Sep 52 and 1 Dec 52. UNCLASSIFIED.

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(2) The Southern Area Command, with headquarters at Munich and with the commanding general of the former Munich Military Post in command. The new command consisted of the former Augsburg, Garmisch, Nuernberg (less Bamberg Subpost), Munich, and Stuttgart Military Posts and Karlsruhe Subpost of the Heidelberg Military Post. The recreational activities at Berchtesgaden and Garmisch Military Posts were placed under the direct command of Headquarters, USAREUR, as Class II activities.

(3) The Western Area Command, comprising the former Rhine Military Post.

(4) The Headquarters Area Command, comprising the former Heidelberg Military Post, less Karlsruhe Subpost.

(5) Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation was continued without change. The former Berlin Military Post was redesignated the Berlin Command. The Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force, was requested to submit appropriate recommendations for the redesignation of the Wiesbaden Military Post. The reorganization was implemented in coordination with the new area commands. The commanding generals of the Northern and Southern Area Commands were instructed to submit by 1 January 1953 to Headquarters, USAREUR, detailed plans for the reorganization of their commands, to include an area organizational plan with assigned missions and functions for the area and subordinate headquarters, proposed tables of distribution and allowances, and recommended locations of area, district (formerly military post), and detachment (formerly subpost) headquarters. Area commanders were instructed to obtain through reorganization a reduction in the number of installations and in the requirements for manpower.¹⁵ The Military Posts Division, Headquarters, USAREUR, was discontinued on 15 December 1952 and its functions were assumed by the Operations, Plans, Organization and Training (OPOT) Division, Headquarters, USAREUR.¹⁶

c. Designation of USAREUR Communications Zone as a Major Command. On 1 November 1952, the USAREUR Communications Zone was announced as a major command, thereby giving it the same status in USAREUR as Seventh Army, Twelfth Air Force, and U.S. Naval Forces, Germany. No changes were made in the mission or responsibilities of the communications zone.¹⁷

d. Establishment of the Civil Affairs (U.S. Military-German Relations) Organization. Upon the phasing out of HICOG Kreis resident offices


¹⁵(1) USAREUR ltr of instr, 27 Oct 52, AG 320 GOT-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.
(2) USAREUR GO 27, 27 Oct 52. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) USAREUR Cir 84, 1 Dec 52. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁶USAREUR GO 40, 15 Dec 52. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁷Ltr, Maj Gen E. T. Williams, USAREUR COFS, to Maj Gen S. D. Sturgis, Jr., CG USAREUR COMZ, 1 Nov 52. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 COMZ (1952), Vol. I, Item 36.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE

1 August 1952



* Excluding Wiesbaden Military Post, but including Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation.

** Staff divisions of Headquarters, USAREUR, having certain assigned and attached units under command of respective chief of division, or director: Adjutant General, Provost Marshal, Special Activities, Armed Forces Information and Education, Finance, Chemical, Engineer, Medical, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal, Transportation.


*** Assigned to and administered by Headquarters, USAREUR, but reporting for operational purposes to US EUCOM.

**** Assigned to and administered by Headquarters, USAREUR, but reporting for operational purposes directly to U.S. High Commissioner for Germany.

***** Assigned to and administered by Headquarters, USAREUR, and reporting directly to Headquarters, USAREUR, on military matters, but reporting directly to U.S. High Commissioner for Germany on such functions as are directed.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE

31 December 1952



* Staff divisions of Headquarters, USAREUR, having certain assigned and attached units under the command of the respective chief of service or director: Adjutant General, Provost Marshal, Special Activities, Armed Forces Information and Education, Finance, Chemical, Engineer, Medical, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal, and Transportation.

** Assigned to and administered by Headquarters, USAREUR, and reporting directly to Headquarters, USAREUR, on military matters, but reporting directly to U.S. High Commissioner for Germany on such functions as are directed.

*** Assigned to and administered by Headquarters, USAREUR, but reporting for operational purposes to US EUCOM.

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(KRO) and Land commissioner offices in the first half of 1952, the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany and CINCEUR jointly assumed responsibility for the civil affairs functions performed by the offices referred to. The purpose of the new arrangement was to effect and maintain direct contact between U.S. military authorities and German governmental officials and agencies and German civilians in order to co-ordinate official business, promote harmonious relationships, and resolve problems of mutual interest. The Director, Civil Affairs Division, EUCOM, assumed responsibility for U.S. Military-German Relations formerly conducted by the Land commissioners at Munich, Stuttgart, and Wiesbaden. Military post commanders were made responsible for the conduct of these functions at the local levels. S-5 organizations, with offices established in such a manner as to be readily accessible to Germans, were established at post or subpost levels as determined by the military post commanders. Every effort was to be made to resolve problems involving U.S. military and German relations at the local level. When no solution could be reached on specific problems, the assistance of a EUCOM Land relations officer (LRO) could be sought in arranging the necessary contacts with the appropriate Land governmental official, but the LRO was not authorized to relieve the military post commander of responsibility for negotiations. Problems which could not be solved in this manner were to be communicated to Headquarters, EUCOM.¹⁸

14. Organizational Structure of USAREUR on 1 August 1952

When EUCOM was succeeded by USAREUR on 1 August 1952 all elements, including commands, organizations, units, schools, installations, and activities previously a part of EUCOM were continued as assigned or attached to USAREUR. Staff assignments of Headquarters, EUCOM, were continued in effect in Headquarters, USAREUR. All elements which hitherto had had as a part of their designation the term EUCOM were redesignated by substituting the term USAREUR for EUCOM.¹⁹ (See Chart 2.)

15. Organizational Structure of USAREUR on 31 December 1952

The organizational structure of USAREUR at the end of 1952 is shown in Chart 3.

¹⁸EUCOM ltr, 9 May 52, sub: Establishment of Civil Affairs (US Military-German Relations) Organization. AG 322.01 CAD-AGO. RESTRICTED.
¹⁹EUCOM GO 51, 31 Jul 52. UNCLASSIFIED.

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Section III: Headquarters, European Command, and Headquarters
United States Army, Europe

16. Composition of Headquarters, EUCOM on 1 January 1952

On 1 January the headquarters elements of EUCOM were composed of the Office of the Commander in Chief, the general staff, and the special staff.²⁰ (See Chart 4.)

a. Office of the Commander in Chief. The Office of the Commander in Chief consisted of the Commander in Chief, European Command, General Thomas T. Handy; the Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Daniel Noce; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Brig. Gen. Edward T. Williams; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration, Col. Edward J. O'Neill; the Secretary of the General Staff, Col. Howard McC. Snyder, Jr.; and the Political Adviser, Mr. R. F. Corrigan.²¹

b. The General Staff. The general staff of Headquarters, EUCOM, consisted of the following divisions and offices:

Personnel and Administration Division	Brig. Gen. John B. Murphy, Director
Intelligence Division	Brig. Gen. Mark McClure, Director
Operations, Plans, Organization and Training Division	Maj. Gen. Robert M. Montague, Director
Logistics Division	Maj. Gen. Aaron Bradshaw, Jr., Director
Civil Affairs Division	Col. Karl E. Henion, Director
Office of the Comptroller	Brig. Gen. John J. Binns, Comptroller
Military Posts Division	Maj. Gen. Charles D. W. Canham, Director ²²

c. The Special Staff. The special staff of Headquarters, EUCOM, consisted of the following divisions and offices:

Adjutant General Division	Col. Leo V. Warner, Adjutant General
Medical Division	Maj. Gen. Guy B. Denit, Surgeon
Signal Division	Brig. Gen. Rex V. D. Corput, Jr., Chief Signal Officer
Transportation Division	Brig. Gen. Bertram F. Hayford, Chief of Transportation
Ordnance Division	Brig. Gen. Ray M. Hare, Chief


²⁰EUCOM Stf Memo 1, 1 Jan 52, Sec. XXII, sub: Organization of Headquarters, EUCOM. RESTRICTED.

²¹EUCOM Organizational Chart and Directory of Key Officers, 15 Dec 51 and 15 Feb 52. UNCLASSIFIED.

²²Ibid. For changes in key personnel see par. 18.

ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS, EUROPEAN COMMAND

1 January 1952



* Reports to COMSTSELM Area, London.

ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE

31 December 1952




Chart 5

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Chemical Division	Col. Thomas H. James, Chief Chemical Officer
Engineer Division	Col. Willis E. Teale, Chief
Provost Marshal Division	Brig. Gen. William H. Maglin, Provost Marshal
Quartermaster Division	Maj. Gen. William H. Middleswart, Chief
Chaplain Division	Col. John S. Kelly, Chief
Inspector General Division	Maj. Gen. William W. Eagles, Inspector General
Finance Division	Col. Ernest O. Lee, Chief
Judge Advocate Division	Col. Damon M. Gunn, Judge Advocate
Armed Forces Information and Education Division	Col. Maurice G. Stubbs, Chief
Historical Division	Col. Wilbur S. Nye, Chief
Public Information Division	Col. Bjarne Furuholmen, Chief
Headquarters Commandant	Col. George P. Lynch, Headquarters Commandant
Budget Division	Col. Maynard N. Levenik, Chief
Special Activities Division	Brig. Gen. Charles H. Swartz, Director
Labor Services Division	Col. Charles M. Busbee, Chief ²³

17. Composition of Headquarters, USAREUR, on 31 December 1952

Upon redesignation of EUCOM as USAREUR on 1 August, staff activities and assignments of Headquarters, EUCOM, were continued in effect in Headquarters, USAREUR.²⁴ The organization of Headquarters, USAREUR, at the end of 1952 is shown in Chart 5.

18. Changes in Assignment of Key Staff Personnel

Changes in the assignment of heads of staff divisions and other key staff officers of Headquarters, EUCOM and USAREUR, during 1952 were as follows:²⁵

Chief of Staff	31 May Brig. Gen. Edward T. Williams vice Maj. Gen. Daniel Noce
----------------	--

²³EUCOM/USAREUR Organizational Chart and Directory of Key Officers, 15 Dec 51 and 15 Dec 52. UNCLASSIFIED.

²⁴EUCOM GO 51, 31 Jul 52. UNCLASSIFIED.

²⁵EUCOM/USAREUR GO's, 1952. UNCLASSIFIED.

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Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations

1 Jun Brig. Gen. Frederic J. Brown
vice Brig. Gen. Edward T. Williams
1 Aug Brig. Gen. John F. Uncles
vice Brig. Gen. Frederic J. Brown
17 Nov Brig. Gen. Robert G. Gard
vice Brig. Gen. John F. Uncles

Secretary of the
General Staff

15 May Lt. Col. Frederic W. Boye, Jr.
vice Col. Howard M. Snyder, Jr.
8 Aug Col. Bruce Palmer, Jr.
vice Lt. Col. Frederic W. Boye, Jr.

Political Advisor

10 Mar Mr. H. P. Fales
vice Mr. R. F. Corrigan

Director, Operations,
Plans, Organization and
Training Division

21 Aug Maj. Gen. Claude B. Ferenbaugh
vice Maj. Gen. Robert M. Montague

Comptroller

1 Aug Col. Charles R. Hutchison
vice Brig. Gen. John J. Binns

Headquarters Commandant

13 Feb Lt. Col. Leo Gilbert
vice Col. George P. Lynch
25 Jul Col. Fred McManaway
vice Lt. Col. Leo Gilbert

Inspector General

19 Feb Maj. Gen. Paul W. Rutledge
vice Maj. Gen. William W. Eagles
13 Aug Col. Edward J. Maloney
vice Maj. Gen. Paul W. Rutledge

Director Military Posts
Division

19 Feb Maj. Gen. William W. Eagles
vice Maj. Gen. Charles D. W. Canham

Chief, Finance Division

21 May Col. Leonard H. Sims
vice Col. Ernest O. Lee

Chief, Budget Division

10 Mar Col. Theodore G. Bilbo, Jr.
vice Col. Maynard N. Levenick

Judge Advocate

2 Oct Col. Edgar H. Snodgrass
vice Col. Damon M. Gunn

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
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Chart 6

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF SEVENTH ARMY

31 January 1952




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Source: Order of Battle, EUCOM (U.S. Army), 31 Jan 52. SECRET.

ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS, SEVENTH ARMY

31 December 1952



Source: Hq, Seventh Army, Organizational Chart and Directory of Key Personnel, 15 Jan 53. UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Chief, Engineer Division	7 Jul	Col. Theron D. Weaver
		vice Col. Willis E. Teale
	28 Nov	Col. David H. Tulley
		vice Col. Theron D. Weaver
Chief, Ordnance Division	4 Dec	Col. George W. White
		vice Brig. Gen. Ray M. Hare
Staff Advisor, Women's Army Corps	25 Sep	Lt. Col. Mary L. Milligan
		vice Lt. Col. Irene O. Galloway

Section IV: Major Commands

19. Seventh Army

During 1952 the Seventh Army constituted the fully operative field army of the U.S. military forces in Europe. Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolte assumed command of Seventh Army on 12 August 1952 when Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy succeeded to the command of USAREUR.²⁶

a. Organizational Structure on 1 January 1952. The composition of Seventh Army was relatively complete at the beginning of 1952. (See Chart 6.)

b. Organizational Structure on 31 December 1952. No important changes in Seventh Army organizational structure took place during the year. At the close of 1952 Seventh Army still consisted of Headquarters, Seventh Army; Seventh Army Artillery; Seventh Army Engineers; the V and VII Corps; and Seventh Army troops.

c. Composition of Headquarters, Seventh Army, on 31 December 1952. Headquarters, Seventh Army, retained its former organization substantially unchanged during 1952.²⁷ For the organization of Headquarters, Seventh Army, as of 31 December 1952, see Chart 7.

²⁶Seventh Army GO 34, 12 Aug 52. UNCLASSIFIED.

²⁷Remarks by Gen Bolte, Seventh Army Wkly Stf Conf, 13 Aug 52.
RESTRICTED.

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Information

20. Communications Zone

a. Organizational Changes. At the beginning of 1952 the EUCOM COMZ consisted of Headquarters, Communications Zone; the Orleans Area Command; the Base Section (BASEC); the Advance Section (ADSEC); and a number of administrative and technical operating units.²⁸ The Orleans Area Command was established effective 1 January 1952 with jurisdiction over the Cherbourg Detachment, organized at the same time.²⁹ Effective 1 December 1952 the 7805 Augmentation Detachment (7966 Headquarters Group, USAREUR COMZ) was redesignated as the 7805 Area Command (Orleans Area Command, USAREUR COMZ) with station at Orleans, France. New tables of distribution were in effect on 10 August 1952 for the 7966 Headquarters Group, the 7805 Augmentation Detachment, the 7965 Headquarters Group, the 7804 Augmentation Detachment, the 7964 Headquarters Group, and the 7803 Augmentation Detachment. New units activated during the year included the 524th Military Police Battalion, on 1 December 1952, and the 76th Army Band, on 5 May 1952.³⁰

b. Establishment of the Office of the Paris Representative. The Office of the Paris Representative of Special Assistant for International Negotiations to the Commanding General, EUCOM COMZ, was established on 15 July 1952.³¹

c. Jurisdiction over Former Class II Installations. The technical depots and installations which had been Class II activities under the command of the chiefs of the technical services of Headquarters, USAREUR, were placed under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, effective 1 December 1952. The technical supply operations, however, were continued under the direction of Headquarters, USAREUR. This change was effected in the interest of economy and efficiency.³²

d. Formulation of New Instructions. To meet the many complications and problems arising from the expansion and operation of the LOFC across France, a proposed new letter of instructions to the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, was submitted to COMZ 29 November 1952 for comment and concurrence. The new instructions were intended to revise, consolidate, and

²⁸Briefing for Lt Gen Manton S. Eddy, CINCUSAREUR, 27 Aug 52, sub: Status and Problems of COMZ. SECRET. In SGS 337 Briefings (1952), Vol. I, Item 14B, B/P.

²⁹EUCOM COMZ GO 21, 27 Dec 51. UNCLASSIFIED.

³⁰(1) USAREUR COMZ GO 16, 1 Dec 52; GO 6, 26 Sep 52; GO 15, 1 Dec 52. RESTRICTED. (2) EUCOM COMZ GO 3, 5 May 52. RESTRICTED.

³¹EUCOM COMZ GO 39, 19 Jul 52. UNCLASSIFIED.

³²(1) Ltr, Lt Gen M.S. Eddy, CINCUSAREUR, to Gen T. T. Handy, DCINC US EUCOM, 14 Nov 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR AG Rcds 322 (1952), Vol. II. (2) USAREUR GO 34, 24 Nov 52. RESTRICTED.

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
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Part 8

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF USAREUR COMMUNICATIONS ZONE

31 December 1952



Source: Interview, Capt E. K. Stewart, USAREUR Hist Div, with Miss E. S. Lay, USAREUR COMZ Hist Div,
13 Apr 53. RESTRICTED.

~~RESTRICTED~~


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1. The first group of authors (e.g., *Wallerstein, 1986*) has argued that the family structure in which a child is raised is the most important factor in determining the child's sexual orientation. This view is based on the idea that the family is the primary socialization agent for children, and that the family structure (e.g., single-parent, two-parent, etc.) determines the child's sexual orientation.

[REDACTED]

ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS, USAREUR COMMUNICATIONS ZONE

31 December 1952



Source: Hq COMZ Organizational Chart, 31 Dec 52. UNCLASSIFIED.

-----Supervision


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Chart 10

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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF TWELFTH AIR FORCE

1 January 1952




Source: 12th AF Statistical Summary, Jan 52, Vol. 1, No. 7, p. 5. CONFIDENTIAL.

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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF TWELFTH AIR FORCE

31 December 1952



[illegible]

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bring up to date previous instructions. The draft defined the mission and responsibilities of the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, and of the chiefs of the USAREUR technical services. At the end of the year the new instructions were still under consideration.³³

e. Organizational Structure of USAREUR Communications Zone. The organizational structure of COMZ did not change materially during 1952. The general structure of the command as of the end of the year is indicated in Chart 8. The composition of Headquarters, USAREUR COMZ, as of 31 December 1952 is shown in Chart 9. Maj. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis, Jr., replaced Brig. Gen. Mason J. Young as commanding General on 12 March 1952.³⁴

21. Twelfth Air Force

a. Organizational Structure. The organizational structure of Twelfth Air Force as of 1 January 1952 is shown in Chart 10. During 1952 the elements added to the Twelfth Air Force included the 10th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, the 317th Troop Carrier Wing, the 7352 Air Base Squadron, the 7356 Air Base Squadron, the 7364 Air Base Squadron, the 7365 Air Base Squadron, the 7360 Base Complement Squadron, the 155th Tactical Control Group, and the 862d Engineer Aviation Battalion.³⁵ At the end of the year the organization was as shown in Chart 11.

b. Composition of Headquarters. Effective 1 July 1952 the Installation Division, Headquarters, Twelfth Air Force, was taken from its former position as an agency of the Assistant Chief of Staff, A-4, and established as a special staff agency because of the great importance of the construction program.³⁶ The comptroller was designated as an assistant chief of staff in June 1952.³⁷ Throughout the year the Twelfth Air Force was commanded by Maj. Gen. Dean C. Strother. Colonel Clyde K. Rich was deputy commander and chief of staff.³⁸

³³Draft of ltr of instr (LOFC) France, CINCUSAREUR to CG USAREUR COMZ, 29 Nov 52. AG 322 GLD-AGO. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322 COMZ (1952), Vol. I, Item 42.

³⁴EUCOM COMZ GO 14, 12 Mar 52. UNCLASSIFIED.

³⁵Twelfth Air Force Comd Data Book, Vol. I, No. 4, Dec 52. SECRET.

³⁶Hist of Hq, 12th AF, 1 Jul to 31 Dec 52, Vol. I, Narrative.

SECRET

³⁷12th AF Stat Summary, Jun 52, No. 12, Staff Organizational Structure. CONFIDENTIAL.

³⁸Hist of Hq, 12th AF, 1 Jul to 31 Dec 52, Vol. I, Narrative, p. 2. SECRET.

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22. United States Naval Forces, Germany

This major command of USAREUR continued without important organizational changes during the year.³⁹ (See Chart 12.) The organization of Headquarters, USNAVGER, also remained practically unchanged during the year. Rear Admiral Howard E. Orem replaced Rear Admiral Carl. F. Holden as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Germany, on 5 June 1952.⁴⁰

Section V: Subordinate Commands

23. Technical and Administrative Services

a. General Organization and Mission. The technical and administrative services of EUCOM/USAREUR continued during 1952 to operate under a directive issued on 10 June 1951, in which the technical services were listed as the quartermaster, engineer, ordnance, signal, medical, transportation, and chemical and were designated as subordinate commands. The chief of each technical service was a staff officer of Headquarters, EUCOM, and was also a technical service commander of troops, installations, and activities assigned to his control.⁴¹ No new missions or responsibilities were added during 1952 to those contained in the original directive.

b. Organizational Changes During 1952. Early in 1952, EUCOM headquarters undertook to record the numerous changes that had occurred in the last half of 1951 in the establishment, designation, redesignation, and discontinuance of Class II installations and activities, located chiefly in France. These were installations and activities assigned to and controlled by the technical service chiefs of EUCOM headquarters.⁴² Similar changes made in 1952 are indicated in Appendix A. Also indicated are the redesignations of certain USAREUR Class I installations and activities as

³⁹(1) Interv, Capt E. K. Stewart, USAREUR Hist Div, with Capt W. C. Hughes, USNAVGER, 21 Apr 53. RESTRICTED. (2) EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 61 - 62. SECRET.


⁴⁰Interv, Capt E. K. Stewart, USAREUR Hist Div, with Capt W. C. Hughes, USNAVGER, 21 Apr 53. RESTRICTED.

⁴¹(1) EUCOM Cir 141, 10 Jun 51. RESTRICTED. (2) See also, EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 77 - 80. SECRET.

⁴²EUCOM GO 7, 5 Feb 52. RESTRICTED.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES, GERMANY

1952



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UNCLASSIFIED

Source: Interv. Capt E. K. Stewart, USAREUR Hist Div, with Capt W. C. Hughes, USN, USNAVGAR, 21 Apr 53. RESTRICTED.

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Class I installations of USAREUR COMZ, as these installations and activities were removed from the direct jurisdiction of the USAREUR technical chiefs and placed under the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ.

24. Area Commands

To define the general relationship between area commands and lodger units, USAREUR headquarters on 31 October 1952 issued a circular of instructions, applicable only to Army elements of USAREUR not stationed in France and England. The general responsibilities of the area commander, within his capabilities of personnel and facilities, was to provide supplies and services to units, agencies, and individuals residing within the area command. Area commanders, in view of the primary tactical mission with which most of the lodger units were charged, were to keep requests for support from such units to a minimum. The field of responsibilities of the area commanders included the provision and correlation of various functions such as chaplain and medical services; the enforcement of rules of military conduct and discipline; control over military police functions; the maintenance of general and internal security; the determination of fund requirements; the preparation and justification of appropriated dollar Deutsch Mark budgets of area requirements correlated with those of lodger units; the requisition and issue of supplies to logistically supported units, agencies, and personnel; and the general performance of functions and services as required. In addition to general courts-martial jurisdiction, area commanders were authorized to assume special and summary court-martial jurisdiction over U.S. Army units and personnel within their commands not assigned directly or attached unqualifiedly to USAREUR or Seventh Army. Area commanders were authorized to exercise supervisory power over special and summary courts-martial proceedings on the same basis. The lodger unit commander, besides being responsible for the internal security, supply, service, and administration of the unit and the accomplishment of its tactical, service, or other mission, was instructed to furnish minimum support to the area, district, and detachment commander, as jointly agreed upon, in proportion to the capabilities of the lodger unit. Barrack co-ordinators provided liaison between area and lodger unit commanders.⁴³

25. Special Troops. Headquarters. EUCOM/USAREUR

Special Troops, Headquarters, EUCOM/USAREUR, continued to perform its mission of furnishing enlisted personnel, and providing security, transportation, supplies, and utilities for EUCOM/USAREUR headquarters, and of administering and training all personnel assigned to Special Troops.⁴⁴ On 10 November 1952 a new table of distribution was published,

⁴³USAREUR Cir 140, 31 Oct 52. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁴⁴(1) Sp Trps, Hq USAREUR, Nar Rept, 1952, Ch. I. RESTRICTED.

(2) EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 69 - 70. SECRET.

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superseding that of 10 May 1951. Special Troops consisted of a Headquarters and Headquarters Company, and Companies A, B, C, D, and E of the 7888 Special Troops and other attached or assigned units. Changes in assigned units during the year included relief from assignment of the 427th Army Band, effective 1 April 1952; assignment of the 461st Strategic Intelligence Team, effective 13 June 1952; assignment of the 80th Army Band, effective 15 June 1952; assignment of the 4th Strategic Intelligence Team, effective 6 November 1952; relief from assignment of the 562d Transportation Detachment; and assignment of the 529th Military Police Company, effective 1 December 1952.⁴⁵

26. 7961 EUCOM/USAREUR Detachment

The 7961 EUCOM Detachment, organized in March 1951 with the major mission of furnishing support of SHAPE elements in the Paris area, had completed its basic organization and outlined its area of activities in 1951.⁴⁶ A new letter of instruction was published on 20 May 1952 redefining the specific missions and responsibilities of the commanding officer of the 7961 EUCOM Detachment. The authorized strength of the detachment was continued unchanged from the previous year. The commanding officer functioned as an installation commander for all activities under his command and was authorized direct contact with supported organizations, with Headquarters, COMZ, and with Class II administrative and technical service facilities. By the terms of his mission the commanding officer provided administrative and logistic support, as specified in the letter of instruction, when requested by international and U.S. national elements of international military headquarters, assigned and attached units and individuals, and other agencies located in Paris and Fontainebleau areas within the limitations of EUCOM Circular 2, 1950, as changed. He was also to co-ordinate with the international headquarters concerned and the commanding general of COMZ in the preparation of emergency plans, and to arrange continuously, by mutual agreement, for the transfer of maximum responsibility for operational supply, service, and administrative activities to organic elements of the international headquarters being supported. To carry out these missions the commanding officer was authorized to utilize services from available sources in the following priority: contract services, purchase, and hire; requisition on EUCOM/USAREUR (Class II facilities in France, COMZ, and administrative and technical service facilities in Germany for U.S. items and/or DM procured items for which dollar reimbursement was authorized); and services of attached units.⁴⁷

⁴⁵Sp Trps, Hq USAREUR, Nar Rept, 1952, Ch. II. RESTRICTED.

⁴⁶See EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 81 - 84. SECRET.

⁴⁷EUCOM ltr of instr (7961 EUCOM Det), 20 May 52. RESTRICTED.

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27. 66th Counterintelligence Corps Detachment

The 66th CIC Detachment continued during 1952 to perform the original mission assigned in August 1950. This mission was primarily to protect the U.S. occupation forces in Germany and U.S. forces in COMZ against espionage, sabotage, and subversion.⁴⁸ Effective 20 December 1952 the 66th CIC Detachment was reorganized and redesignated as the 66th CIC Group.⁴⁹ As a result of the closing out of a large part of the displaced persons program the Security and Screening Offices of the Plans and Operations Branch of Headquarters, 66th CIC Detachment, were combined on 1 February 1952 and redesignated as the Security Office. Also in February the General Investigative Teams and Visa Teams of the regional headquarters were consolidated into Security Teams. The Plans and Operations Branch of the 66th CIC Detachment headquarters was expanded from three to five sections in March 1952. Eighteen new resident agencies were established, three others were planned, and two existing field offices became resident agencies; three new field offices were established and two were planned.⁵⁰ The commanding officer of the 66th CIC Group recommended at the end of the year that a separate counterintelligence corps detachment be established in organic support of, and under the control of, USAREUR COMZ.⁵¹

28. 32d AAA Brigade

The 32d AAA Brigade performed in 1952 the same mission as in 1951, namely, to provide "AAA and Chemical Smoke Defense of the medium bomber units of the Strategic Air Command and Light Bombers of the 49th Air Division."⁵² In July 1952 an additional mission was added, to provide antiaircraft and chemical smoke defense against low level attack on specified U.S. Air Force installations in the United Kingdom, coordination to be effected by the Commanding General, Third Air Force, and appropriate British agencies.⁵³ In April and May 1952 three chemical smoke generator companies arrived in the United Kingdom, bringing to eight the number of companies of this type. The 1st Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons (AAA AW) Battalion (Provisional), formed in July 1952, was to become the 92d AAA AW Battalion in February 1953. The 53d Ordnance Service Company was reorganized on 20 April 1952. School,

⁴⁸(1) 66th CIC Gp, Comd Rept, 1952, pp. 1, 8 - 10. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Ref Lib. (2) See also EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 68 - 69. SECRET.

⁴⁹USAREUR GO 38, 8 Dec 52. RESTRICTED.

⁵⁰66th CIC Gp, Comd Rept, 1952, pp. 11 - 14. SECRET.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 6. SECRET.

⁵²32d AAA Brig Comd Rept, 1952, p. 1. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Ref Lib.

⁵³Ibid., p. 9. SECRET.

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support, and training facilities were organized into three provisional units (School Detachment, Range Detachment, and Support Detachment) in June 1952.⁵⁴ For organizational structure of the 32d AAA Brigade and Headquarters on 31 December 1952, see Chart 13.

Section VI: Units Reporting Directly to EUCOM/USAREUR Headquarters

29. 7755 Dependents School Detachment and the Dependents Education Organization

a. 7755 Dependents School Detachment. The 7755 Dependents School Detachment, assigned for administrative supervision to the Personnel and Administration Division and located at Karlsruhe, continued to be entrusted with its former mission of establishing, organizing, and supervising elementary and secondary schools for the education of minor dependents of American occupational personnel.⁵⁵ The increase in the number of authorized civilian spaces from 364 as of March 1951 to 511 at the end of 1952 was made necessary by rapidly increasing student enrollments.⁵⁶

b. Dependents Education Organization. On 15 November 1952 the position of Director of Dependents Education Organization was created to assume responsibility for certain professional functions previously exercised by the commanding officer of the 7755 Dependents School Detachment. These functions included the establishment and execution of all major policies regarding the education program of USAREUR dependents schools; the determination of number, size, and equipment of kindergartens, elementary and high schools, and their establishment, organization, and supervision; preparation or selection of all curricula and courses of study; determination of number, type, and qualification of all education and supervisory personnel, their procurement, assignment, and control; selection, preparation, and distribution of all textbooks and educational supplies; coordination with USAREUR elements on buildings and with installation

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 9 - 10. SECRET.


⁵⁵EUCOM T/D 77-7755, 1 Mar 51; C. 1, 17 Jun 52; C. 2, 25 Aug 52. RESTRICTED.

⁵⁶Interv, Capt E. K. Stewart, USAREUR Hist Div, with Secy of P&A Sec, 7755 DSD, 5 Jan 53. RESTRICTED.

Security Information

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE 32d AAA BRIGADE

31 December 1952



(PROVISIONAL UNITS)

Source: 32d AAA Brig Comd Rept, 1952. SECRET.

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commanders on educational activities; disciplinary control of students; and general supervision of instruction and educational administration.⁵⁷

30. 7756 Audit Agency

The 7756 Audit Agency continued during 1952 to perform the mission assigned to it in the preceding year, which was to exercise supervision over, and perform audits as required by the Department of the Army, or as might be directed by CINCEUR. No basic changes in organizational structure were made in 1952.⁵⁸ After January 1952 the chief of the Audit Branch, Office of the Comptroller, served as head of the 7756 Audit Agency as an additional duty. During 1952 there were in the agency an aggregate of 46 military spaces, including 42 officer spaces and 79 civilian spaces.⁵⁹

31. 7791 Office of the U.S. Commander, Berlin

The supporting elements of the U.S. Commander, Berlin, which had been consolidated into a single agency in 1949 and reorganized in 1951 under a new table of distribution with fourteen officers and fifteen enlisted men, continued to operate in 1952 without major change of mission or organization.⁶⁰ Throughout the year Maj. Gen. Lemuel Mathewson was U.S. Commander, Berlin.

32. 7792 Office of the High Commissioner for Germany

The EUCOM supporting elements of HICOG were organized into a single unit in December 1949 and reorganized under a new table of distribution effective 5 May 1951. At the beginning of 1952 no major change had been made; the office continued to consist of the Trains Section, Administration Section, Land Commissioner Section, Public Affairs Section, Requirements Liaison Section, and Military Security Board in addition to the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany. Military personnel totaling twenty officers and forty enlisted personnel staffed the agency. The deputy commissioner and the chiefs of the Land Commissioner Section and the Military Security Board were general officers.⁶¹ A new table of distribution published in February 1952 defined the mission of the organization as that of providing the required military support for the Office

⁵⁷USAREUR ltr, 14 Nov 52, sub: Director, Dependents Education Organization. AG 352.9 GPA-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁵⁸(1) EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 85 - 86. SECRET. (2) EUCOM T/D 77-7756, 20 Apr 51; C. 1, 21 Jun 51; C. 2, 13 Sep 51; C. 2 [sic], 14 Sep 51; C. 3, 19 Dec 51. RESTRICTED.

⁵⁹EUCOM T/D 77-7756, C. 2, 14 Sep 51; C. 3, 19 Dec 51. RESTRICTED.

⁶⁰EUCOM T/D 77-7791, C. 1, 26 Feb 52; C. 2, 3 Jun 52. RESTRICTED.

⁶¹EUCOM T/D 77-7792, 18 Apr 51; C. 1, 27 Jul 51. RESTRICTED.

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of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany. The unit was divided into four sections: Trains, Communications, Requirements Liaison, Construction, plus the Security Guard, and the Military Security Board. Spaces were provided for 16 officers and 76 enlisted men. Only two general officers, the deputy commissioner and the chief of the Military Security Board, were provided. In June the position of prison officer was deleted and in July the officer personnel were reduced to 13 and the positions for general officers deleted. In the following month the officer staff was reduced to 6 positions, with a colonel as the ranking officer, and the enlisted personnel were reduced to 64.⁶² Effective 31 December 1952 the 7792⁶³ Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany was discontinued.⁶³

33. 7893 U.S. Military Liaison Mission to the Commander in Chief for the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany

The 7893 U.S. Military Liaison Mission to the Commander in Chief for the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany continued its mission of observing Soviet execution of the quadripartite agreements and reporting to EUCOM headquarters any failure on the part of the Soviet authorities to enforce such agreements. This mission had been assigned upon initial organization in 1947 and continued following reorganization in 1951.⁶⁴ No reorganization took place during 1952; the agency continued to function with its staff of nine officers and eight enlisted men, divided into a Command Section and an Administrative Section. Of these seventeen, fourteen were accredited to the commanding general of the Soviet Zone and were permitted to travel in that zone as authorized by the Huebner-Malinin Agreement of 1947. The other three were utilized for administration of the mission and were located in the U.S. Sector of Berlin.

Section VII: Boards, Committees, and Councils

34. The EUCOM Shipping Space Assignment Committees

a. The EUCOM MSTS Passenger Space Assignment Committee. The EUCOM Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) Passenger Space Assignment

⁶²EUCOM T/D 77-7792, 14 Feb 52; C. 1, 3 Jun 52; C. 2, 17 Jul 52; C. 3, 20 Aug 52. RESTRICTED.

⁶³USAREUR GO 41, 22 Dec 52. RESTRICTED.

⁶⁴EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 87 - 88. SECRET.

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Committee was established on 28 January 1952. It was composed of the following members: Chairman, Commanding Officer, MSTs Office, Heidelberg; the Executive Secretary, an Army member from Transportation Division, Headquarters, EUCOM; a Navy member from the staff of USNAVGER; and an Air Force member from USAFE. The committee was responsible for recommending to the Commander, Military Sea Transportation Service, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (COMSTSELM), the required adjustments in the Joint Army, Navy, and Air Force Sea Transportation Message space allocations to the three services in EUCOM and to the Commander, MSTs, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Area.⁶⁵

b. The EUCOM MSTs Cargo Space Assignment Committee. The EUCOM MSTs Cargo Space Assignment Committee was established on 28 January 1952. It was composed of the following members: Chairman, Commanding Officer, MSTs Office, Heidelberg, Germany; Army member and executive secretary, Chief, Water Section, Operations Branch, Transportation Division, Headquarters, EUCOM; Navy member, Administrative Officer, Staff of Commander, USNAVGER; and Air Force member, Chief, Transportation Division, Assistant Chief of Staff, A-4, USAFE. The committee was responsible for reviewing each month the westbound cargo requirements of each service and for allocating surface shipping space available to the European Command from each port.⁶⁶

c. Space Assignment Committees. To remain in a stand-by status and to carry out the functions of the two EUCOM space assignment committees in case they were unable to act due to emergency conditions or failure of communications between Headquarters, EUCOM, and the port area, space assignment committees were appointed. Each committee included one member from each of the three services in addition to the chairman. These committees were as follows:

(1) Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation MSTs Passenger Space Assignment Committee. The chairman was the Commanding Officer, MSTs Office, Bremerhaven, Germany.

(2) Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation MSTs Cargo Space Assignment Committee. The chairman was the Commanding Officer, MSTs Office, Bremerhaven.

(3) Base Section, EUCOM COMZ, MSTs Passenger Space Assignment Committee. The chairman was the Commanding Officer, MSTs Office, La Pallice, France.

⁶⁵EUCOM GO 5, 28 Jan 52. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁶⁶Ibid.

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(4) Base Section, EUCOM COMZ, MSTS Cargo Space Assignment Committee. The chairman was the Commanding Officer, MSTS Office, La Pallice.⁶⁷

35. The EUCOM Passenger Space Requirements Committee

This committee, established effective 25 March 1952 under the jurisdiction of EUCOM chief of transportation, was composed of three Army members (namely, the Chief, Overseas Personnel Movements Section, Operations Branch, Transportation Division, Headquarters, EUCOM, as chairman; the Chief, Plans and Policy Section, Military Personnel Branch, Personnel and Administration Division, Headquarters, EUCOM; and the Chief, Machine Records Branch, Adjutant General Division, Headquarters, EUCOM); the Administration Officer, USNAVER, as Navy member; the Chief, Transportation Division, Assistant Chief of Staff, A-4, USAFE, as Air Force member; and the Commanding Officer, MSTS Office, Heidelberg. It was the responsibility of the committee to co-ordinate among its members and with the EUCOM MSTS Passenger Space Assignment Committee and the EUCOM Air Transportation Board the projected passenger space requirement reports submitted each month by the three services to their respective headquarters in Washington.⁶⁸

36. Budget Advisory Committee

The USAREUR Budget Advisory Committee was reorganized on 12 November 1952. The committee, as reorganized, was composed of a senior field grade officer, designated as a member of the Budget Advisory Committee, from each of the general staff divisions of Headquarters, USAREUR (the Office of the Comptroller, the Personnel and Administration Division, the Operations, Plans, Organization and Training Division, the Logistics Division, and the Budget Division); USAFE; USNAVER; HICOG (liaison observer), and a recorder from the Budget Division, Headquarters, USAREUR (without vote). The committee was to convene at the call of the chairman. Its mission was to review for CINCUSAREUR all dollar and Deutsche Mark budget estimates prior to submission to HICOG or to the Department of the Army. The committee was instructed to report on conformity of budget estimates with approved policies and programs, and on adequacy of budget items for performance of the USAREUR mission, with regard for every practicable management improvement consistent with military efficiency. During the examination of the budget estimates, the committee was to obtain not only the views of the staff representative of the agencies represented on the committee but also those of other agencies affected. Action reports were to be forwarded to the Chief of Staff, USAREUR, through the Comptroller, Headquarters, USAREUR.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ EUCOM GO 21, 29 Mar 52. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁶⁹ USAREUR GO 31, 12 Nov 52. UNCLASSIFIED.

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37. The USAREUR Board of Educational Advisers

The USAREUR Board of Educational Advisers was established on 14 November 1952 for the purpose of advising CINCUSAREUR with respect to the operation of the dependents education program. With the concurrence of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany and the director of the University of Maryland European Program, a board of six individuals was appointed, representing the Office of the U.S. Consul General, Stuttgart; the University of Maryland European Program; the Armed Forces Information and Education Division, Headquarters, USAREUR; the Director, Dependents Education Organization, USAREUR (ex officio); and the Personnel and Administration Division, Headquarters, USAREUR (ex officio and recorder). The board was authorized to provide for its own organization and mode of operation.⁷⁰

38. The EUCOM Committee on the NATO Status of Forces Agreement

Effective 25 June 1952 the EUCOM Committee on the NATO Status of Forces Agreement was established at Headquarters, EUCOM, for the purpose of studying and recommending to CINCUSAREUR, in co-ordination with the Commander in Chief, Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM) and Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Forces in Europe (CINCUSAFE), the policies and procedures to be followed in implementing the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. The committee was composed of representatives from the following EUCOM staff divisions: Logistics (chairman); Operations, Plans, Organization and Training; Comptroller; Judge Advocate; and Personnel and Administration.⁷¹ In October 1952, when direct communications between US CINCEUR and the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, were agreed to by CINCUSAREUR on matters involving the NATO Status of Forces Agreement in France, the committee was discontinued. General staff supervision over such matters was retained by the Director, Logistics Division, USAREUR.⁷²

39. The USAREUR Soviet Relations Advisory Committee

In October 1952 the USAREUR Soviet Relations Advisory Committee was established under the staff supervision of the Director, Civil Affairs Division, USAREUR, for the purpose of preparing USAREUR policy with respect to the Soviet and U.S. Military Liaison Missions accredited to the U.S. forces and to the Soviet forces respectively and of taking certain

⁷⁰USAREUR GO 32, 14 Nov 52. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁷¹EUCOM Stf Memo 24, 25 Jun 52, sub: Establishment of EUCOM Committee on the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. CONFIDENTIAL.

⁷²USAREUR Stf Memo 10, 13 Oct 52, sub: Discontinuance of the EUCOM Committee on the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. SECRET.

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implementing actions within the framework of the policy. The committee consisted of the Director, Civil Affairs Division (chairman); Director, Intelligence Division; and the Chief, Public Information Division. The Director, OPOT Division, had the status of a full-time member upon call by the chairman, and the Political Adviser was an ex officio member upon call by the chairman. Each of the first three divisions named was authorized one additional officer as a full-time member. The functions of the committee included preparing for approval USAREUR policy relative to the Soviet and U.S. Military Liaison Missions, formulating plans within the framework of approved policy to counter various actions open to the Soviets, preparing answers to letters of protest received from Soviet authorities, preparing letters of protest to the Soviet authorities when appropriate, and preparing news releases.⁷³

⁷³USAREUR Stf Memos 9 and 16, 7 Oct, 6 Nov 52, sub: USAREUR Soviet Relations Advisory Committee. SECRET.

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CHAPTER 3

Manpower

40. Manpower Trends

The year 1952 marked the completion of the Army troop augmentation program begun in 1951 and the commencement of the build-up of forces and installations along the line of communications in France. Extensive increases in personnel and frequent changes in the disposition of troops intensified the manpower problems facing the command during the year. Beginning in late 1951 dependents of the augmentation troops began to arrive in Europe, raising the number of dependents supported by the command to nearly 70,000 by the end of 1952, or approximately 20,000 more than at the end of 1951. Since the augmentation units had been composed largely of reserve and National Guard personnel, whose tours of active duty ended in 1952, a serious replacement problem arose in Europe as in other Army commands. The ingress of replacements kept the dependent support programs in a continual state of flux, accentuated morale and discipline problems, and aggravated politically sensitive American-European relations. A program of racial integration created personnel problems in addition to those resulting from troop augmentation.

Section I: Military Personnel

41. Military Strength of the Command

a. Summary of Changes in Strength. EUCOM military personnel at the end of 1951 totaled 253,807 persons, of whom 22,156 were Air Force and Navy personnel. In January 1952 total military strength decreased for the first time since the inception of the Army troop augmentation program in

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Table 1--USAREUR/EUCOM Military Personnel^a

	<u>U.S. Army Elements</u>		<u>Twelfth Air Force</u>		<u>U.S. Naval Forces Germany</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>Troop Ceiling</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Actual</u>	
31 Dec 51	259,000	222,727	231,651	21,381	775	253,807	
31 Jan 52	259,000	223,787	230,946	21,224	679	252,849	
29 Feb 52	259,000	228,912	234,843	23,583	626	259,052	
31 Mar 52	259,000	239,138	242,815	24,612	619	268,046	
30 Apr 52	259,004	247,378	245,425	23,691	622	269,738	
31 May 52	259,006	249,233	245,644	23,293	650	269,587	
30 Jun 52	259,000	251,203	250,692	24,987	664	276,343	
31 Jul 52	259,000	252,501	255,736	21,564	680	277,980	
31 Aug 52	259,000	255,039	262,166	21,716	726	284,608	
30 Sep 52	259,000	255,328	262,176	21,897	748	284,821	
31 Oct 52	258,558	256,059	254,405	21,956	757	277,118	
30 Nov 52	259,019	257,472	255,198	23,625	764	279,587	
31 Dec 52	259,019	258,869	252,137	23,510	782	276,429	

^aIncludes casual personnel, but excludes Army attached personnel and other military personnel not under USAREUR command.

Source: EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Rpts, Jan - Dec 52. SECRET.

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March 1951, hitting the low point for the year, but increased almost continuously thereafter until September, when the year's highpoint of 284,821 persons was reached. In October a gradual decrease began due to the rotation of large numbers of Army enlisted personnel to the zone of interior without correspondingly large replacement increases, and total military strength decreased to 276,429 by 31 December 1952 (Table 1).¹

(1) Army Elements. As in previous years the majority of military forces in Europe during 1952 were U.S. Army personnel. Army military personnel totaled 231,651 persons on 1 January 1952. After an initial drop to 230,946 at the end of January, Army actual strength increased steadily to 262,176 by the end of September. A gradual decline in strength began in October, reducing Army actual military strength to 252,137 by the end of the year. Throughout most of the year the Army troop ceiling remained constant at 259,000 spaces.² Only in August and September did the Army actual strength exceed the troop ceiling, but usually it was at least 4,000 spaces below ceiling. Army authorized unit strength climbed from 222,727 spaces on 1 January to 258,869 at the end of the year.³ Actual strength remained above authorized strength until April when understrength augmentation units began arriving in the command, thereby raising authorized strengths without corresponding increases in actual strengths. As large numbers of individual replacements arrived in July, August, and September actual strengths again rose above authorized strengths. Although large numbers of replacements continued to arrive in the last quarter of the year, greater losses in personnel caused actual strength again to drop below authorized strength. On 31 December the USAREUR Army operating strength was 2.6 percent below USAREUR Army authorized strength and 4.0 percent below USAREUR Army troop ceiling (Table 1).⁴

¹Figures include casual personnel but exclude Army attached personnel and personnel outside USAREUR command. (1) EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, Jan - Dec 52. SECRET. (2) Memos, EUCOM/USAREUR Compt to CINC EUCOM/USAREUR, Jan - Dec 52, sub: Analysis of the Monthly Statistical Report. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div 319.1 (1952).

²The troop ceiling reflected the number of personnel authorized to the command by the Department of the Army and was the figure on which the command made personnel requisitions to the Department of the Army.

³Authorized strength was the number of personnel authorized to each unit by T/O&E's or T/D's and was the figure upon which units based their requisitions for personnel from USAREUR. As changes were made in the command ceiling, the T/O&E's and T/D's of individual units were changed to account for the ceiling change. These changes and changes in actual strength therefore lagged behind ceiling changes.

⁴(1) EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, Jan - Dec 52. SECRET. (2) Memo, USAREUR Compt to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Jan 53, sub: Analysis of the Monthly Statistical Report. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div 319.1 (1952).

Table 2--EUCOM/USAREUR Army

Officer, Warrant Officer, and Enlisted Strengths

	Officer ^a			Warrant Officer			Enlisted		
	Troop Ceiling	Auth	Act ^b	Gains or Losses	Troop Ceiling	Auth	Act ^b	Gains or Losses	Troop Ceiling
31 Dec 51	19,024	16,622	16,778	--	3,275	2,777	2,227	--	237,114
31 Jan 52	18,856	17,009	16,975	197	2,950	2,795	2,264	137	237,194
29 Feb 52	18,856	17,414	17,173	198	2,950	2,834	2,313	149	237,194
31 Mar 52	18,856	17,935	17,575	1402	2,950	2,940	2,429	116	237,194
30 Apr 52	18,859	18,402	17,652	177	2,950	3,024	2,454	125	237,195
31 May 52	18,859	18,490	17,468	184	2,952	3,028	2,449	5	237,195
30 Jun 52	17,764	18,607	17,365	103	2,950	3,057	2,488	139	238,232
31 Jul 52	17,764	18,502	17,376	11	2,950	3,077	2,554	166	238,232
31 Aug 52	17,893	18,403	17,734	1358	2,950	3,109	2,661	107	238,157
30 Sep 52	17,893	18,403	17,777	143	2,950	3,100	2,610	51	238,157
31 Oct 52	17,557	18,443	17,710	67	2,930	3,100	2,670	60	238,071
30 Nov 52	17,825	18,520	17,738	28	2,950	3,118	2,717	147	238,244
31 Dec 52	17,807	18,755	17,717	21	2,950	3,059	2,745	28	238,262

^a Includes Female Medical Officers.

^b Indicates total EUCOM/USAREUR Army operating strength, including Theater Reserve, casualties, and pipeline.

Source: EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, Dec 51 - Dec 52. SECRET.

Table 3--EUCOM/USAREUR Army Military Strength by Grade

Officer and Warrant Officer

	<u>Gen & Col</u>		<u>Lt Col</u>		<u>MaJ</u>		<u>Capt</u>		<u>Lt</u>		<u>WO</u>	
	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Act</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Act</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Act</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Act</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Act</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Act</u>
31 Jan 52	472	423	1,243	1,340	2,209	2,096	5,505	5,048	7,580	8,007	2,795	2,264
30 Jun 52	482	443	1,354	1,436	2,404	2,104	6,077	5,293	8,271	8,634	3,057	2,488
30 Sep 52	462	444	1,376	1,476	2,378	2,184	6,083	5,360	8,330	8,747	3,100	2,610
31 Jan 53	458	487	1,256	1,460	2,349	2,218	6,047	5,124	8,187	8,150	2,999	2,737

Enlisted

	<u>E-7</u>		<u>E-6</u>		<u>E-5</u>		<u>E-4</u>		<u>E-3</u>		<u>E-1 & E-2</u>	
	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Act</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Act</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Act</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Act</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Act</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Act</u>
31 Jan 52	7,158	5,849	15,802	11,997	32,781	25,482	62,617	57,539	65,802	76,833	19,823	34,007
30 Jun 52	7,889	5,901	17,540	11,394	36,722	24,387	71,056	61,293	73,840	92,920	22,411	40,110
30 Sep 52	8,058	6,030	17,878	11,139	37,837	22,640	72,640	50,121	74,829	97,745	22,913	63,928
31 Jan 53	8,145	8,518	18,145	14,216	38,607	25,911	74,252	40,838	75,644	60,349	23,243	73,843

Source: EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, Feb, Jul, Sep 52, and Jan 53. SECRET.

(2) Navy and Air Force Elements. The Twelfth Air Force and U.S. Naval Forces, Germany, also augmented their forces during 1952 although not to the same extent as the Army. Twelfth Air Force actual strength fluctuated greatly during the year, increasing from the 1 January low of 21,381 to a high of 24,987 in June; decreasing sharply in July to 21,564; and thereafter increasing steadily to reach 23,662 at the end of the year. U.S. Naval Forces, Germany, actual strength decreased early in the year from 775 on 1 January to 619 on 31 March, thereafter increasing steadily to reach 782 at the end of the year (Table 1).⁵

b. Officer and Warrant Officer Strengths and Characteristics.

(1) Strengths. Total Army commissioned officer (including female medical officer) actual strength increased from 16,778 at the beginning of the year to 17,717 on 31 December. Officer actual strength gained consistently during the first four months of the year, dropping sharply in May and June as a result of the phase-over from a four- to a three-year tour of overseas duty, but gaining thereafter until October when a gradual decrease began as a result of the release of involuntarily recalled officers required to be effected by 30 November. Officer authorized strength increased rather steadily, remaining above actual strength throughout the year and above ceiling strength during the last seven months of the year. The officer troop ceiling, although fluctuating, dropped during the year from 19,024 to 17,807. This reduction came principally as a result of an Army-wide cut of 11,000 in officer spaces. Except in October when the actual strength exceeded ceiling strength, officer actual strength remained below both ceiling and authorized strengths. Warrant officer actual strength increased steadily from 2,227 on 1 January to 2,745 at the end of the year. Warrant officer authorized unit strength increased steadily until November, falling off slightly in December. Warrant officer ceiling strength was set at 2,950 effective 1 January and remained constant during most of the year. At no time during the year did actual warrant officer strength equal or exceed authorized or ceiling strengths, but toward the end of the year the differences were narrowing. During 1952 actual officer and warrant officer strengths in Seventh Army, COMZ, and the services were usually far below authorized strengths, while the actual officer and warrant officer strengths in military posts exceeded authorized strengths (Table 2). During most of the year the command was short of artillery, medical, and engineer officers.⁶

(2) Characteristics. During 1952 the command was understrength in all officer grades ~~except in the lieutenant colonel and lieutenant grades.~~ Authorized strengths for all grades increased in the early part of the year, falling off in the later months. In general, captains were most seriously understrength (Table 3). In 1952 approximately 82 percent of all male

⁵EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, Jan - Dec 52. SECRET.

⁶(1) Ibid. (2) Memo, EUCOM Compt to CINCEUR, 20 Feb 52, sub: Analysis of Monthly Statistical Report, pp. 3 - 6. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div 319.1 (1952).

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commissioned officers were below 40 years of age, over 55 percent being under 34. The tendency during the year was toward older officers, the increase in the percentage of those between the ages of 34 and 40 being particularly noteworthy (23 percent on 1 January 1952 and 31 percent on 31 December). This reversed the 1951 trend toward younger officers. The following tabulation shows officer ages by percentage below specified ages:

<u>Age</u>	<u>Average</u>	<u>1 Jan 52</u>	<u>31 Mar 52</u>	<u>30 Sep 52</u>	<u>31 Dec 52</u>
Below 19	--	0	0	0	0
Below 22	--	0.8	0	1	0
Below 25	9	10	17	10	9
Below 28	21	22	19	23	19
Below 31	36	40	36	37	33
Below 34	55	59	57	56	50
Below 37	72	74	74	73	69
Below 40	82	82	82	85	81

The percentage of non-Regular Army commissioned officers in the command remained fairly constant during 1952 at about 81 percent of command officer strength. The percentage of non-Regular Army warrant officers increased from 86 percent of warrant officer strength on 1 January 1952 to 91.4 percent on 31 December, as a result of the appointment of a number of non-Regular Army warrant officers during the year. Regular Army (RA) officers were generally better educated than non-Regular Army officers. More than 81 percent of all RA officers were college graduates or better as compared to 40 percent of all non-RA officers. Less than 1 percent of all RA officers had not finished high school, whereas more than 3 percent of non-RA officers had less than 12 years' schooling.

c. Enlisted Strengths and Characteristics.

(1) Strengths. Enlisted Army personnel operating strengths increased from a low of 211,707 at the end of January to a high of 241,789 on 30 September, thereafter decreasing to 231,675 by the end of December. The largest single gain in personnel strength came in March with the arrival of three engineer construction battalions, three field artillery battalions,

⁷(1) All information as to the characteristics of personnel represents the distribution of personnel characteristics of military personnel in USAREUR as compiled from the USAREUR portion of the Personnel Survey of the Army (RCS CSGPA-35). These reports are 5 percent samplings and the percentages above reflect actual data extracted from the samplings. (2) RA and non-RA strength figures prepared by Lt. R. Cryan, USAREUR Compt Prog Review & Analysis Br. RESTRICTED. (3) EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Rpts, Feb, Jul, Sep 52 and Jan 53. SECRET.

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and two antiaircraft artillery battalions. As a result of the arrival of new augmentation units, the authorized enlisted strength increased from 203,328 on 1 January to 237,055 on 31 December. Command enlisted strength remained above authorized strength for most of the year. In October, however, an understrength appeared which by the end of the year became a matter of concern to the command. This decrease in actual strength was a result of the 24-month service law under which a great number of the command's enlisted personnel had been inducted or recalled in 1950 after the start of the Korean hostilities. These personnel became eligible for discharge in the latter months of 1952, and the replacement stream did not provide adequate numbers of enlisted personnel to counteract their loss. The situation was expected to become critical if additional replacements were not received in early 1953. Seventh Army, with a great majority of the command's enlisted personnel, was overstrength only in January, February, March, and September. In the remaining months Seventh Army was understrength from 2,000 to 5,000 enlisted personnel each month. COMZ, because of understrengths in augmentation units, was understrength approximately 300 enlisted personnel each month from March until December, with even larger understrengths in August and December. The military posts were understrength the first five months of the year, thereafter being overstrength. The technical services were slightly understrength in enlisted personnel for most of the year, being overstrength only in July, September, and November. The most serious understrength among services was in the Ordnance Division, largely due to the nonavailability of qualified personnel in the replacement stream. The 32d Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade in England had slight overstrengths in February, April, May, and June and understrengths the remainder of the year, most seriously in November. The 7961 Detachment and command headquarters and headquarters units had slight overstrengths most of the year. The command enlisted troop ceiling climbed from 237,114 on 1 January to 238,262 on 31 December. It remained higher than the authorized strengths throughout the year. Actual enlisted strength exceeded the ceiling only in August and September (Table 2).⁸

7 (2) Strengths and Characteristics by Component. During most of 1952 more than 60 percent of the enlisted personnel in the command were non-Regular Army, with the percentage increasing until October because of large numbers of selective service personnel in the replacement stream and decreasing thereafter as large numbers of National Guard, ~~Army~~ ~~Reserve~~ ~~and~~ selective service personnel completed their tours of active duty. Approximately 20,000 of the 57,000 non-RA enlisted personnel who had arrived in EUCOM in the last quarter of 1951 had less than one year to serve and were thus rotated in late 1952, causing decreases in enlisted personnel and in the percentage of non-RA personnel in the command. The

⁸(1) EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 1952. SECRET. (2) USAREUR P&A Div paper, Nov 52, sub: Comments on OCAFF Inspection of USAREUR. SECRET. In USAREUR P&A Div 333 (1952).

decrease in the number of RA enlisted personnel can also be partially attributed to the return of the 3-year tour of duty. The tabulation below shows the RA and non-RA strengths at selected periods during the year:

<u>Date</u>	<u>RA</u>	<u>Non-RA</u>	<u>Percent Non-RA</u>
1 Jan 52	95,564	115,925	55
31 Mar 52	88,649	130,780	60
30 Jun 52	85,030	139,565	62
30 Sep 52	90,328	144,878	62
31 Jan 53	111,965	105,460	49

In 1952 the largest percentage of non-RA personnel was in the Seventh Army, COMZ, and the services, with the percentages of non-RA, in relation to the total strength of the unit, as follows:⁹

<u>Date</u>	<u>Hq and Hq Units</u>	<u>Seventh Army</u>	<u>COMZ</u>	<u>7961 Det</u>	<u>32d AAA</u>	<u>Svcs</u>	<u>Posts</u>
1 Jan 52	24	59	60	17	37	49	29
31 Mar 52	29	63	64	23	45	56	38
30 Jun 52	35	65	64	24	51	60	47
30 Sep 52	37	63	64	21	56	61	51
31 Jan 53	37	50	46	27	51	45	43

The Seventh Army non-RA strength was not consistent in all units, ranging at times from 38 percent non-RA in the 1st Infantry Division to over 77 percent non-RA in the 43d Infantry Division. The 1st Infantry Division was the only major unit to maintain a predominantly RA strength during 1952. The large numbers of non-RA personnel in the Seventh Army caused considerable concern to the command. During the year notably larger numbers of RA personnel were assigned to USAREUR units and military posts rather than to Seventh Army because (1) technical and administrative personnel tended to be RA; (2) the majority of highly graded positions in posts and higher headquarters called for personnel with extensive training and experience, which almost prohibited the assignment of selective service personnel to these positions since selective service personnel usually did not serve long enough to be properly trained for these positions; (3) many of the RA personnel were older, higher grade personnel in

⁹Figures are not available for December 1952. (1) EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Rpts, Dec 51; Mar, Jun, Sep 52; Jan 53. SECRET. (2) Memo, EUCOM Compt to CINCEUR, 23 Apr 52, sub: Analysis of Monthly Statistical Report. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div 319.1 (1952).

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physical categories which made them ineligible for combat duty; and (4) a large number of the RA personnel were in the upper-grade classification and Seventh Army commanders were of the opinion it would be injurious to morale to fill noncommissioned officer (NCO) vacancies by assignment from outside the unit. Efforts were made during 1952 to reclassify as many RA personnel as possible to combat military occupational specialties (MOS). The age distribution among RA enlisted personnel was wider than among non-RA personnel. Approximately 98 percent of the non-RA's were under 28 years of age, whereas only an average of 74 percent of RA personnel were younger than 28. There were considerably more very young RA enlisted personnel (39 percent were 22 years of age or younger, as compared to 18 percent of the non-RA's) and older RA personnel (approximately 3 percent were 40 years of age and above, compared to 1 percent of the non-RA's). The trend during the year was toward older RA personnel (6 percent over 40 in December) and slightly younger non-RA (99 percent below 28 in September and December). The higher percentage of younger non-RA personnel resulted from the draft of younger men. The following tabulation shows age trends during the year, in percentages:¹⁰

Age	<u>1 Jan 52</u>		<u>31 Mar 52</u>		<u>30 Sep 52</u>		<u>31 Dec 52</u>	
	<u>RA</u>	<u>Non-RA</u>	<u>RA</u>	<u>Non-RA</u>	<u>RA</u>	<u>Non-RA</u>	<u>RA</u>	<u>Non-RA</u>
Below 19	5	1	5	—	3	0.5	3	—
Below 22	44	18	42	16	38	17	34	21
Below 25	68	90	65	86	63	93	59	92
Below 28	78	98	75	98	74	99	70	99
Below 31	85	98	83	98	82	99	78	99
Below 34	91	99	90	99	89	99	86	99
Below 37	95	99	94	99	93	99	91	99
Below 40	97	100	97	99	96	99	95	99

Non-RA enlisted personnel were generally better educated than RA personnel. An average of 51.6 percent of all non-RA enlisted personnel had 12 or more

¹⁰(1) All information as to the characteristics of personnel represents the distribution of personnel characteristics of military personnel in USAREUR as compiled from the USAREUR portion of the Personnel Survey of the Army (RCS CSGPA-35). These reports are 5 percent samplings, and the percentages reflect actual data extracted from the samples. (2) EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, Jan, Apr, Oct 52, and Jan 53. SECRET. (3) Memos, EUCOM/USAREUR Compt to CINCEUR, 20 Feb, 23 Jul, 23 Oct 52, sub: Analysis of Monthly Statistical Report. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div 319.1 (1952). (4) Ltr, USAREUR P&A Div to USAREUR COFS, 20 Aug 52, sub: Redistribution of Regular Army Personnel in USAREUR. AG 461 GPA. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 320.2 (1952), Vol. II, Item 39D.

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years of schooling, compared to 29.3 percent of all RA personnel. Only 9.1 percent of the non-RA's had not completed grammar school, as compared to 11.9 percent of the RA's. In general non-RA enlisted personnel had better General Classification Test (GCT) or Area Aptitude I scores than did the Regular Army enlisted personnel. Approximately 30 percent of all non-RA's had scores of 110 (the minimum score required for admittance to officer candidate school) or higher as compared to 25 percent of all RA enlisted personnel. On the other hand only 2 percent of Regular Army enlisted personnel had scores lower than 60, as compared to 3 percent of the non-Regular Army personnel. The following tabulation shows the percentage of personnel in the various GCT groups:

<u>GCT Scores</u>	<u>RA</u>	<u>Non-RA</u>
110 and over	25	30
90 - 109	37	36
60 - 89	36	31
Under 60	2	3

So far as non-Regular Army personnel were concerned, the trend during the year was toward a greater concentration in the 60 - 109 GCT groups with fewer personnel in the 110-and-over group. The trend among RA personnel was toward slightly larger percentages in the under 60 and 110-and-over GCT groups. Generally, however, both RA and non-RA GCT levels improved toward the close of the year.¹¹

(3) Strength and Characteristics by Race. In 1952 the percentage of Negro enlisted personnel in the command increased from 12.5 percent of total enlisted strength on 1 January to 15.1 percent on 31 December 1952. The following tabulation shows Negro-white strengths during the year:¹²

<u>Date</u>	<u>White</u>		<u>Negro</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent of total</u>
1 Jan 52	186,063	87.5	26,583	12.5
31 Mar 52	191,508	86.0	31,303	14.0
31 Jul 52	201,552	85.5	34,254	14.5
30 Sep 52	205,698	85.1	36,091	14.9
31 Dec 52	196,649	84.9	35,026	15.1

¹¹ EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Rpts, Jan, Apr, Oct 52, and Jan 53. SECRET.

¹² Ibid., May, Jul, Dec 52. SECRET.

Table 4--Years of Education

Percent at Each Educational Level

	31 Mar 1952		30 June 1952		30 Sep 1952		31 Dec 1952	
	Negro	EM White	EM	Negro	EM White	EM	Negro	EM White
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1-7 Grammar School	15.3	9.9	14.0	9.9	13.2	9.0	14.0	10.6
8 Grammar School Graduate	14.6	14.5	14.2	14.6	15.3	15.3	15.4	15.8
9-11 1-3 Years High School	40.7	31.6	39.8	29.4	44.4	28.7	46.6	29.3
12 High School Graduate	22.2	33.6	23.6	33.6	21.3	35.9	19.3	34.0
13-15 1-3 Years College	5.6	8.0	7.1	9.7	5.0	8.7	3.7	7.9
16 College Graduate	1.3	2.1	1.1	2.4	.7	1.9	.8	2.0
Over 16 Postgraduate	.3	.3	.2	.4	.1	.5	.2	.4

Source: USAREUR Compt Div Prog Review and Analysis Br. UNCLASSIFIED.

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The command Negro personnel strength was largest in November (15.5 percent of command enlisted strength). White enlisted personnel were generally better educated than Negro enlisted personnel, more than 44 percent of white personnel being high school graduates or better as compared to less than 30 percent of the Negro personnel. Approximately 10 percent of the white personnel had less than an 8th grade education as compared to approximately 14 percent of the Negro personnel (Table 4). White enlisted personnel had better Aptitude Area I scores than did Negro personnel. Negro personnel tended to center in the 60 - 89 and 90 - 109 score groups with the majority in the 80 - 89 group. White personnel tended to concentrate in the 60 - 89, 90 - 109, and 110 - 129 score groups, with most in the 90 - 109 group and about equal numbers in the 60 - 89 and 110 - 129 groups. Considerably larger percentages of Negro enlisted personnel had scores of less than 60, while greater percentages of white personnel had scores of 130 and over. The following tabulation shows the percentage of white and Negro enlisted men in each aptitude area for two periods in 1952:

	<u>31 March 1952</u>		<u>31 December 1952</u>	
	<u>Negro</u>	<u>White</u>	<u>Negro</u>	<u>White</u>
130 and over	0.2	3.3	0.7	3.6
110 - 129	4.8	28.7	6.3	28.9
90 - 109	22.1	38.2	22.1	39.0
60 - 89	67.6	29.1	62.6	27.0
Under 60	5.3	0.7	8.3	1.5

Aptitude Area I scores corresponded to the promotion grades, with master sergeants having better score distributions than sergeants first class, sergeants first class having better scores than sergeants, etc.¹³

(4) Strength and Characteristics by Grade. In 1952 the command was over 30 percent understrength in the first three grades, with variations in understrengths as follows:

31 Jan 52	22 percent
30 Jun 52	33 percent
30 Sep 52	37 percent
31 Jan 53	25 percent

¹³ All figures prepared by USAREUR Compt Div Prog Review and Analysis Br from USAREUR Survey of the Army Reports. UNCLASSIFIED.

Grade E-4 (corporal) strength declined from 57,539 on 31 January 1952 to 40,838 on 31 January 1953 while authorized strengths increased steadily from 62,617 on 31 January 1952 to 74,252 on 31 January 1953, thereby causing understrengths in this category as follows:

31 Jan 52	8 percent
30 Jun 52	13 percent
30 Sep 52	31 percent
31 Jan 53	45 percent

The lower three grades were overstrength throughout the year, with grade E-3 (private first class) developing an understrength at the end of the year. Grades E-1 and E-2 increased from a 76 percent overstrength on 31 January 1952 to 79 percent on 30 June, 179 percent on 30 September, and 217 percent on 31 January 1953. Grade E-3 strength increased steadily from an overstrength of 16 percent on 31 January 1952 to an overstrength of 30 percent on 30 September 1952, thereafter decreasing rapidly to a 22 percent understrength on 31 January 1953.¹⁴ Due to the restricted promotion opportunities the trend during the year was toward large increases in grades E-1, E-2, and E-3 with only small gains in NCO grades (Table 3). Although the command was below authorized strength in NCO's, the NCO strength was above the Department of the Army promotion ceiling. In general the NCO grades had higher GCT scores than the lower three grades. In all grades there were more non-RA than RA personnel with scores of 110 and above (Table 5).¹⁵

(5) Enlisted Personnel Distribution. Although the command was overstrength 7,531 enlisted personnel (in relation to authorized strength) at the end of January 1952, the command was at that time understrength in 14 of the 31 enlisted MOS career fields, and remained understrength each month in eleven to sixteen career fields. In the combat career fields personnel with infantry and armored MOS's were overstrength or equal to authorized strength most of the year. The infantry dropped into understrengths in May (2 percent below authorized strength), June (1 percent), and December (9 percent). The armored career field was somewhat understrength in May (1 percent), October (less than 1 percent), and November (2 percent). The artillery combat MOS career field had serious understrengths in every month except January, February, and August. Shortages from March through July averaged approximately 3 percent, but it was not until the last quarter of the year that the situation became most critical with an 8 percent understrength in October and 14 percent understrength in November and December. In November the Department of the Army accorded

¹⁴No figures available for 31 December 1952.

¹⁵EUCCM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Rpts, Jan, Feb, Apr, Jul, Sep, Oct 52, and Jan 53. SECRET.

Table 5--GCT by Grade and Component (ENLISTED MEN), EUCOM/USAREUR^a
(Percentage)

		Total		MSGT		SFC		Sgt		Cpl		PFC		Pvt	
		RA	Non-RA	RA	Non-RA	RA	Non-RA	RA	Non-RA	RA	Non-RA	RA	Non-RA	RA	Non-RA
1 Jan 52	I & II	24	32	49	64	37	53	33	48	22	40	17	30	12	18
	III	39	36	36	33	38	28	39	36	41	37	36	37	37	33
	IV	36	29	15	3	24	17	27	15	36	21	44	30	50	43
	V	1	3	--	--	1	2	1	1	1	2	3	3	1	6
31 Mar 52	I & II	25	30	48	57	41	54	32	48	23	41	17	26	10	10
	III	37	36	30	37	37	32	40	35	40	33	32	36	35	37
	IV	37	32	22	6	22	14	28	17	36	25	49	36	53	50
	V	1	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	1	2	2	2	3
30 Sep 52	I & II	25.1	30.2	54.4	85.7	38.2	50.0	28.5	51.1	23.4	40.4	19.1	26.9	13.8	25.5
	III	37.0	33.6	34.1	14.3	38.4	37.5	40.9	27.5	35.6	37.2	35.8	34.6	37.3	30.0
	IV	36.1	32.8	11.5	--	23.4	12.5	29.7	20.9	39.3	21.0	42.1	34.7	46.2	39.5
	V	1.8	3.4	--	--	--	--	0.9	0.5	1.7	1.4	3.0	3.8	2.7	4.7
31 Dec 52	I & II	26.5	30.5	51.4	38.8	37.4	46.6	30.0	45.0	22.6	45.2	20.1	30.8	19.1	25.5
	III	36.9	36.0	31.5	27.8	39.5	26.7	40.4	33.6	37.4	31.1	36.5	35.3	34.3	38.0
	IV	34.6	30.5	14.0	27.8	22.5	26.7	28.6	19.1	38.1	22.8	41.0	30.3	43.7	33.4
	V	2.0	3.0	3.1	5.6	0.6	--	1.0	2.3	1.9	0.9	2.4	3.6	2.9	3.1

Legend: I - 130 and over
 II - 110 - 129
 III - 90 - 109
 IV - 60 - 89
 V - Under 60

^aReflects General Classification Test or Aptitude Area I Score.

Source: EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, Jan, Apr, Oct 52, and Jan 53. SECRET.

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USAREUR the third priority in artillery MOS's, after the Far East Command (FECOM) and the zone of interior, in order to improve the situation, but no notable improvement was accomplished during the last month of the year. The engineer and construction field had the third largest number of personnel (after infantry and artillery) of any one career field. Consequently, the trend from an overstrength in enlisted personnel in the first four months of 1952 to an 11 percent understrength on 31 December was rather serious. In the technical career fields the enlisted personnel situation was extremely critical in the automobile maintenance, communications, armament maintenance, and engineer equipment maintenance fields, which were understrength the entire year. In the communications field the understrength averaged about 8 percent of the authorized strength during the year; in the armament maintenance field, approximately 13 percent; in the auto maintenance field, approximately 8 percent, with the situation worsening during the last two months of the year; and in the engineer equipment maintenance field, approximately 14 percent, with the situation growing increasingly more serious as shortages increased from 8 percent in January to 26 percent at the end of the year. These understrengths were extremely serious because of the technical skills involved, the difficulty in procurement, and the long periods required to train persons in these fields. In other technical fields the electronics maintenance and wire maintenance fields started the year with understrengths. By June the understrength in the electronics maintenance field had been improved because of increased requisition priorities, and the year ended with an overstrength in that field. In the wire maintenance field the situation improved in July, August, and September, only to worsen in October, November, and December (16 percent understrength). In some of the lesser MOS fields (in regard to over-all strength) critical shortages occurred; for example, the quartermaster maintenance and the ammunition fields had average understrengths of approximately 8 percent each during the year, and the communications intelligence field had an average understrength of approximately 57 percent. Overstrengths were reflected principally in some of the administrative, combat, and transportation fields. The infantry, with by far the largest number of personnel, was overstrength approximately 5 percent during most of the year. The motor transport field overstrengths ranged from 4 to 17 percent, with the largest overstrengths occurring at the start of the year. The personnel and administration field was overstrength approximately 6 percent during most of the year, with overstrengths increasing in the latter months. The food service career field had an average overstrength of 13 percent for the year, with overstrengths as high as 18 percent in August and September. Among the lesser career fields, the finance, photography, scientific services, military intelligence, special services, military police, and railway fields had sizable overstrengths during the year, with the railway field having the largest average percent of overstrength (31 percent) of any of the 31 career fields.¹⁶

¹⁶Ibid., Feb 52 - Jan 53. SECRET.

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d. Troop Program Category. During 1952 the ratio of Army operating forces (combat and service units) to Army supporting forces remained constant, as indicated below:¹⁷

<u>Category</u>	<u>29 Feb 52</u>		<u>31 Dec 52</u>		<u>Percent Increase/Decrease</u>
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	
<u>Total</u>	<u>233,654</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>249,151</u>	<u>100.0</u>	—
<u>Operating Forces</u>	<u>211,262</u>	<u>90.4</u>	<u>225,265</u>	<u>90.4</u>	—
<u>Combat</u>	<u>142,294</u>	<u>60.9</u>	<u>142,893</u>	<u>57.3</u>	-3.6
Divisional	91,070	38.9	83,824	33.6	-5.3
Nondivisional	51,224	22.0	59,069	23.7	+1.7
<u>Service</u>	<u>68,968</u>	<u>29.5</u>	<u>82,372</u>	<u>33.1</u>	+3.6
Base	38,084	16.3	49,247	19.8	+3.5
Field	30,884	13.2	33,125	13.3	+0.1
<u>Supporting Forces</u>	<u>22,392</u>	<u>9.6</u>	<u>23,886</u>	<u>9.6</u>	—

As shown in the tabulation, within the operating forces the relative strength of combat units decreased, whereas the relative strength of service type units increased. This increase in the strength of service type units, particularly in the base service type, can be explained primarily by the build-up of service forces along the line of communications in France. The relation of divisional to nondivisional combat units was particularly significant. Whereas divisional units made up 38.9 percent of all forces in February, they comprised only 33.6 percent of all forces on 31 December. During the same period the nondivisional units increased their proportionate strength from 22 percent of total strength to 23.7 percent of total strength.¹⁸

¹⁷(1) Ibid., May 52 and Feb 53. SECRET. (2) Combat Units are T/O&E units whose primary mission is the destruction of enemy forces; Field Service Type Units are T/O&E units, primarily logistical, as service support to a field army; Base Service Type Units are T/O&E units, normally part of COMZ or logistical communications, whose primary missions are nontactical and logistical; Supporting Forces are T/O&E units in support of all other troops and personnel. Figures not available for 1 January 1952. Figures do not include Theater Operating Forces.

¹⁸(1) EUCCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, May 52 and Feb 53. SECRET. (2) Memo, USAREUR Compt to CINCUSAREUR, 25 Mar 53, sub: Analysis of the Monthly Statistical Report. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div 319.1 (1953), Vol. I.

42. Enlisted Replacements

a. Replacements Received. In 1952 a total of 122,454 individual enlisted replacements were received by the command, more than double the 52,253 received in 1951. Of this number 38 percent were Regular Army (23 percent in 1951), 61 percent selective service (74 percent in 1951), and 1 percent Enlisted Reserve or National Guard (3 percent in 1951). The majority of replacements were received in the last seven months of the year. The percentage of Regular Army replacements increased during the latter part of the year, while the percentage of non-RA decreased, as shown in the following tabulation:

<u>Month</u>	<u>Total Processed</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>		
		<u>ERC and NG</u>	<u>Selective Service</u>	<u>RA</u>
January 1952	2,107	0.5	82.4	17.1
February	3,660	6.7	62.7	30.6
March	4,251	0.6	84.7	14.7
April	5,598	0.6	84.3	15.1
May	8,372	1.4	61.2	37.4
June	9,852	0.6	67.5	31.9
July	11,905	0.7	72.1	27.2
August	19,290	0.3	82.2	17.5
September	13,744	1.2	56.2	42.6
October	13,730	1.7	43.6	54.7
November	12,088	0.9	32.7	66.4
December	17,857	1.7	46.1	52.2

The percentage of Negro enlisted personnel in the replacement stream decreased from 16.2 percent in 1951 to 12.2 percent in 1952. Negro replacements comprised 14.4 percent of all Regular Army replacements in 1952, as compared to 16.9 percent in 1951. Aptitude Area I scores during 1952 tended to follow the same pattern as in 1951, with white personnel tending to concentrate in the 90 - 109 score group, and Negro replacements concentrating largely in the 60 - 89 score group. In general, however, there were larger percentages of both Negro and white replacement personnel in the 90 - 109, 110 - 129, and 130-and-over Aptitude Area I score groups in 1952 than in 1951, and lesser percentages in the under 60 group. The grade distribution among both white and Negro replacement personnel improved in 1952, as shown in the following table:

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<u>Grade</u>	<u>White</u>		<u>Negro</u>	
	<u>1951</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1952</u>
E-7	.4	3.4	—	1.0
E-6	.7	4.4	1.0	2.5
E-5	1.3	6.9	—	4.7
E-4	2.2	9.6	1.3	9.6
E-3	7.3	12.0	3.1	11.9
E-2 & 1	88.1	63.7	94.6	70.3

Throughout most of the year the majority of replacements were between 21 and 24 years of age. However, as younger personnel were inducted and large numbers of senior NCO's were sent to the command, the percentages in the 17 - 20 and 25-and-over age groups increased. In general considerably greater percentages of RA than of non-RA replacement personnel were in the 17 - 20 and 25-and-older age groups. Non-Regular Army personnel were concentrated principally in the 21 - 24 age group, with only a small percentage of non-RA strength in the 17 - 20 and 25-and-older age groups. The educational distribution during 1952 followed the same pattern as in 1951. More than 90 percent of all replacements had 8th grade education or better; 45 percent were high school graduates; 9.4 percent had some college education and 2.4 percent were college graduates or better. White replacements were better educated than Negro replacements and non-RA replacements were better educated than RA replacements. The following tabulation shows the educational distribution of replacements in 1952 by percentage:

	<u>Total</u>	<u>White</u>	<u>Negro</u>	<u>RA</u>	<u>Non-RA</u>
College Grad or better	2.4	2.6	.9	1.1	3.1
Some College	9.4	12.3	5.1	5.8	11.5
HS Grad or better	45.2	49.9	27.9	31.9	53.3
8th Grade or better	90.6	91.4	85.6	88.7	91.9
Less than 8th grade	9.3	8.6	14.2	11.2	8.1
5th Grade or less	1.6	1.5	3.3	2.0	1.5

The physical profile varied little during the course of the year, with approximately 80 percent of the personnel replacements in Profile A, 12 percent in Profile B, and 8 percent in Profile C. The percentage of Negro personnel in Profile B increased during 1952, but not significantly.¹⁹

¹⁹(1) EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, Jan, Jul, Oct 52, and Feb 53. SECRET. (2) Memo, USAREUR G-1 Div MPB to USAREUR, ACOFS G-1, 15 Jan 53, sub: Brief of ECGPA-155 Report for Year 1952. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 320.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 8. (3) Educational Distribution figures, from USAREUR AG Div Career Guidance Br Enl Repl Sec. RESTRICTED.

b. Delays in the Arrival of Replacements. During a large portion of the year the command received only 26 percent of its white replacement allocation and 28 percent of the Negro allocation in the allocation month, with 62 percent of the white allocation and 68 percent of the Negro allocation arriving in the succeeding months and approximately 12 percent of the white allocation and 4 percent of the Negro allocation being canceled. The continued shipment of disproportionate percentages of Negro personnel, coupled with heavier proportionate losses in white personnel than in Negro personnel and the arrival of several all-Negro units, resulted in a steady climb in the command Negro strength. During most of the year the command averaged more than 14 percent in Negro strength. The large Negro over-strength impaired the success of the integration program and adversely affected the efficiency of the command. The operational efficiency of integrated units was adversely affected during the periods of white under-strength, since large numbers of the Negro personnel had low educational and Area Aptitude I levels and lacked specialized training in many fields. As a result of the large percentages of Negro personnel in the replacement stream the racial integration program in service type units had to be curtailed at the end of the year. Meanwhile USAREUR suggested that the Department of the Army hold Negro replacements to a minimum until the USAREUR white-Negro ratio could be reduced to the Army-wide level and that Negro replacements be supplied thereafter in accordance with Army-wide percentages.²⁰

c. Utilization of Short-term Replacements. One of USAREUR's greatest personnel problems was the utilization of short-term replacements. During 1952, more than 60 percent of the replacements had 18 months or less to serve in the command and a considerable number had less than 12 months to serve. At the beginning of the year the majority of replacements had 13 to 18 months to serve, while only a small percentage had more than 19 months to serve. Late in the year the situation improved somewhat with the majority of replacements having approximately 17 months to serve. The following tabulation shows months to serve, by percentage:²¹

²⁰(1) Memo, Col W. R. Calhoun, C/USAREUR G-1 Div MPB, to USAREUR ACOFS G-1, 8 Jan 53, sub: Enlisted Allocations, Gains, and Losses, September 1952 - March 1953. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 320.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 5. (2) Stf Study for Gen Hull Briefing, May 52, sub: Negro Enlisted Strength in EUCOM. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 337 Briefings (1952), Item 9. (3) Memo, C/USAREUR G-1 Div MPB to C/USAREUR G-1 Div Ctl Br, 12 Feb 53, sub: Problems for General Eddy's Conference in Washington. SECRET. In USAREUR G-1 Div Gen Files 337 (1953). (4) Interv, Mr. C. R. Petrie, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col L. P. Collins, C/USAREUR G-1 Div MPB Enl Sec, 8 Jun 53. SECRET.

²¹No figures available for January. EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, Jan, Jul, Oct 52 and Feb 53. SECRET.

<u>Month</u>	<u>0 - 5 Months</u>	<u>6 - 12 Months</u>	<u>13 - 18 Months</u>	<u>19 - 24 Months</u>	<u>Over 24 Months</u>
February	0.1	8.3	72.3	4.7	14.6
March	0.2	3.2	74.1	12.5	10.0
April	0.1	4.5	84.0	5.3	6.1
May	1.0	11.2	46.8	14.7	26.3
June	0.5	33.3	42.7	10.0	13.5
July	0.9	19.9	58.1	7.6	13.5
August	2.0	18.1	66.5	6.5	6.9
September	0.6	10.2	57.2	9.1	22.9
October	0.3	11.5	51.8	8.9	27.5
November	0.4	10.8	39.3	9.8	39.7
December	1.4	27.9	38.4	5.1	27.2

USAREUR protested to the Department of the Army that the shipment of short-term replacements was a waste of manpower and tended to cause too rapid personnel turnover which decreased operational efficiency. Seventh Army alone reported a 68 percent turnover of personnel during 1952. In addition a large number of the short-term replacements were educational basics (having less than a fifth grade education). The command contended that the education of basics in Europe tended to impose an undue burden on the command, impaired training, and lessened the period of useful service. USAREUR recommended that regulations be amended to require that replacements have a minimum of 14 months left to serve at the time of shipment, which would allow approximately a year in the command; and that educational basics be given educational training in the United States either during or after basic training. In October the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, informed USAREUR that beginning 1 February 1953 all replacements would have at least 9 months of usable service remaining and promised a re-examination of the situation to determine if the usable service period could be raised to 12 months. In addition he informed the command that an Army-wide survey was in progress to determine what action could be taken to alleviate the basic education problem and that action had already been taken to increase the amount of English language training given Puerto Ricans during basic training.²²

d. Reclassification. The command in 1952 was understrength in combat MOS's, especially in the first three promotion grades. Noncommissioned officer shortages were especially heavy in the infantry, artillery, armored, engineer and construction, and communications career fields. The replacement stream, at the same time, was short in these fields, although over-strength in such fields as administration, food service, and military police.

²²(1) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to COFSA, 12 Sep 52. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Ltr, COFSA to CINCUSAREUR, 20 Oct 52. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 320.2 (1952) Vol. II, Items 48a-1, 48a. (3) Seventh Army Comd Rept, 1952, p. 14. SECRET.

In November the command began reclassifying noncommissioned officer replacements with MOS's of the type for which the command had an unusable surplus to a different career field in which the command was critically short. In general these personnel had to have had previous training in the MOS field to which they were transferred and had to meet the physical requirements of that field. Personnel who did not meet these requirements were assigned as surplus to units which utilized their MOS. During November and December 1952 approximately 24 percent of all NCO replacements were reclassified. The command considered reclassification as one of the most important factors adversely affecting morale.²³

e. Team Replacements. In 1952 the command participated in a Department of the Army experiment in the use of 4-man replacement teams. On 25 August, Carrier Company No. 1 was assigned to USAREUR. This company, which arrived on 22 September, consisted of 4 officers, 4 NCO's, and 165 privates (grade E-2), plus 1 Department of the Army officer and 1 enlisted man as escort personnel. The enlisted men of the company had been trained in 4-man teams with infantry MOS's, with the four members remaining together from the time of their enlistment. USAREUR kept the 4-man teams intact and assigned them to the 112th Infantry Regiment, 28th Infantry Division. These personnel were closely studied from the moment of their arrival. The study revealed that the team plan was generally good because: (a) units received personnel packets intact from training units in the zone of interior; (b) potential skills were made available to the receiving units, and intervening headquarters could not remove individuals; and (c) the men tended to cooperate more satisfactorily in the pipeline than did individual replacements. From an administrative standpoint the plan had value because: (a) fewer entries were required in the personnel records, since personnel could be shipped by single orders and responsibilities could be fixed, en route, for records administration; (b) debarking was facilitated; and (c) classification procedures were less burdensome because of similar MOS's in the 4-man groups. In addition the command found that the teams were highly tractable and had good discipline. Their morale and efficiency appeared excellent. The personnel were clean, alert, and, because of the familiar officers and NCO's with them, did not seem to evidence the normal tendency toward resentment of transient authority. The command believed the use of carrier units would improve the morale of replacements, provide for higher combat efficiency, and facilitate augmentation into units. As a result of the study the command recommended to the Department of the Army that teams be restricted to combat fields and that the accompanying company clerk be made a member of the unit rather than one of the escort personnel.²⁴

²³(1) Ltr, USAREUR COFS to DCINC US EUCOM, 9 Mar 53, sub: Status of Morale, USAREUR. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 330.11 (1953), Vol. I, Item 5. (2) USAREUR Mthly Stat Rpts, Jan - Dec 52. SECRET. (3) Interv, Mr. C. R. Petrie, USAREUR Hist Div, with personnel of USAREUR AG Div Career Guidance Br Repl Sec. UNCLASSIFIED.

²⁴Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to TAG, 2 Jan 53, sub: Comments on Team Replacement Test. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 320.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 1.

43. Promotion Policies and Problems

On 21 March 1952 the Department of the Army, citing budget limitations, established an enlisted promotion ceiling over the noncommissioned grades in the command. Although the total number of NCO's (E-4 through E-7) was well below the number authorized for these grades in the troop basis, NCO actual strengths in all grades were above the promotion ceiling, necessitating a total suspension of enlisted promotions. The situation as of 31 March was as follows:

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Troop Basis Authorization</u>	<u>31 March Strength</u>	<u>Promotion Ceiling</u>	<u>Over Promotion Ceiling</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>121,609</u>	<u>113,405</u>	<u>94,000</u>	<u>/29,405</u>
E-7	7,311	6,474	6,000	/ 474
E-6	16,141	13,297	11,000	/ 2,297
E-5	33,632	28,140	27,000	/ 1,140
E-4	64,525	65,494	50,000	/15,494

The NCO understrength (in relation to troop basis) was notably serious in combat units. On 31 March all infantry units except the 28th Infantry Division and the 6th Infantry Regiment were understrength in infantry NCO's, with the largest shortages in the 4th Infantry Division (27 percent), 43d Infantry Division (18 percent), 2d Armored Division (17 percent), and 373d Armored Infantry Battalion (22 percent). In the armored MOS field all units were short armored NCO's with the command's three armored infantry battalions having NCO shortages in excess of 50 percent. Since promotions to grade E-4 and above were suspended these NCO shortages became increasingly more serious.²⁵ By June the NCO promotion ceiling had been lowered to 91,500, and, due to the rotation of large numbers of NCO's to the zone of interior, NCO actual strength had decreased to 102,975 (30,232 below troop basis authorized strength). Promotions remained frozen in all grades except E-5, where an understrength in relation to the promotion ceiling had developed, and increasingly severe NCO shortages continued to exist in combat MOS fields. In the artillery MOS field the 28th Infantry Division was 38 percent short in NCO's, the 43d Infantry Division was 34 percent short, and the 1st Infantry Division was 39 percent short. In the antiaircraft artillery MOS field the 1st Infantry Division was 42 percent short in NCO's and the 43d Infantry Division was 38 percent short. In addition there was a 25 percent shortage of NCO's in the communications field, a 23 percent shortage in the tank ladders of the automotive

²⁵(1) EUCOM Mthly Stat Rept, 31 Mar 52. SECRET. (2) Memo, EUCOM Compt to CINCEUR, 23 Apr 52, sub: Analysis of the Monthly Statistical Report. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div 319.1 (1952).

maintenance field, and a 39 percent shortage in the armament maintenance field.²⁶ Since the NCO shortages were becoming increasingly more serious the Department of the Army on 29 July 1952 abandoned the promotion ceiling and announced a system of monthly promotion allocations to each major command for all enlisted promotions above grade E-2. USAREUR in turn allocated promotions to subordinate commands on a monthly basis as allocations were received from the Department of the Army. Allocations for the subordinate commands were predicated upon the current strengths and relative percentages in specific grades, the current strength and relative percentages in higher and lower grades, the size of the subordinate commands, and the previously authorized promotions. Boards of not less than three officers were appointed by the promotion authorities to interview and examine candidates for promotion to grades E-5, E-6, and E-7. Review by promotion boards was not necessary for promotion to grades E-3 and E-4.²⁷ Even under this promotion policy the NCO situation did not materially improve (Table 3). In August the command estimated that NCO shortages unless reduced would adversely affect the command, especially in combat career fields in Seventh Army. The NCO shortages in Seventh Army were attributed to promotion restrictions and the release of National Guard and Enlisted Reserve NCO's. At the end of the year the situation had not improved. On 31 December major infantry MOS ladders were short from 32 to 49 percent in NCO strength; artillery MOS ladders, from 40 to 59 percent; armored MOS ladders, from 48 to 54 percent; and engineer and construction ladders, from 53 to 68 percent. In addition the engineer and equipment maintenance MOS field was 56 percent short of NCO's; the armament maintenance field, 59 percent; automotive maintenance, 42 percent; and wire maintenance, 55 percent. In general the NCO situation was better in the administrative fields because of large numbers of administrative NCO's in the replacement system. Many personnel in combat and technical units were serving in positions calling for higher grades, and the restrictions on promotion were having an adverse affect upon their morale. As a result the re-enlistment rate was adversely affected. Although the command badly needed NCO's, it preferred to promote personnel already in the job rather than bring NCO's into the unit, since such an action might adversely affect the morale and efficiency of the command.²⁸

²⁶(1) EUCOM Mthly Stat Repts, 30 Jun 52 and 31 Jul 52. SECRET. (2) Memo, EUCOM Compt to CINCEUR, 23 Jul 52, sub: Analysis of the Monthly Statistical Report. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div 319.1 (1952).

²⁷(1) USAREUR ltr, 16 Sep 52, sub: Promotion Policy for USAREUR Enlisted Personnel. AG 220.2 GPA-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) HMP ltr, 4 Aug 52, sub: Temporary Promotions of Enlisted Personnel. HEIAG 220.2. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR Hist Div 220 (1952), Vol. I, Item 35. (3) Memo, USAREUR Compt to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Aug 52, sub: Analysis of the Monthly Statistical Report. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div 319.1 (1952).

²⁸(1) Memos, USAREUR Compt to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Aug 52, 24 Jan 53, sub: Analysis of the Monthly Statistical Report. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div 319.1 (1952), Vol. I. (2) Stf Study, "Command NCO Strength," prepared for briefing of Secy Pace on 11 Aug 52 by USAREUR G-1 Div. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337 Briefings (1952), Vol. I, Item 15. (3) USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 31 Dec 52. SECRET.

REF ID: A66117

44. Rotation and Discharge Policies

a. Tour of Duty. Headquarters, EUCOM, on 10 January 1952 announced that the Department of the Army had placed restrictions upon voluntary extensions of foreign service tours for the following classes of enlisted personnel: (1) enlisted men below grade E-5 who had dependents in the command and were occupying family type quarters; (2) enlisted men having MOS codes which were excess to the needs of the command; (3) married enlisted men whose families were not residing with them; (4) married enlisted men with dependents in the command who had been reported to the Department of the Army for reassignment; (5) enlisted personnel who had been convicted once by a special or general court martial or twice by a special or general court martial or twice by a summary court during the current foreign service tour; (6) enlisted men whose continuous overseas service plus the requested extension would exceed seven years. Extensions for personnel in these categories had to be approved by Headquarters, EUCOM.²⁹ To counteract personnel shortages forecasted for late 1952 and early 1953, the command implemented in June a Department of the Army order extending foreign service tours from 36 to 42 months, effective 1 October 1952. The following personnel were exempted from the extension: (1) officer and enlisted personnel who had served the normal overseas tour and were serving in an extension (voluntary or involuntary) of their tours, which when completed would result in 42 or more months of service in their current tours (if the voluntarily extended foreign service tour did not equal a total of 42 or more months, the tour was extended an additional 6 months involuntarily); (2) officers selected for attendance at military or civilian schools in the continental United States; (3) officer and enlisted personnel engaged in foreign service activities such as military attache offices, Army Security Agency, joint task forces, Counter Intelligence Corps, Titles I, II, and III MAAG's, military missions and commissions, and SHAPE; and (4) Women's Army Corps (WAC) personnel and female officers of the Army Medical Service.³⁰ Later the Department of the Army announced that the return to a normal foreign service tour of 36 months was expected to begin 1 April 1953.³¹

b. Release of Personnel. On 28 February 1952, on the authority of AR 615-190, dated 7 February 1952, EUCOM directed that Enlisted Reserve Corps (ERC) and National Guard of the United States (NGUS) enlisted personnel who prior to 19 June 1951, had incurred a reserve obligation under the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 might discharge their reserve obligations upon completion of 21 months of active service plus one

²⁹EUCOM Wkly Dir 2, 11 Jan 52, Sec. XXII, p. 12. UNCLASSIFIED.

³⁰EUCOM AG Div Jnl, 9 Jun, 1 Jul, 23 Jul 52, Item 1 in each. UNCLASSIFIED.

³¹USAREUR Wkly Dir 4, 22 Aug 52, Sec. XVIII. UNCLASSIFIED.

more consecutive year of voluntary service, or a total of 33 months of active duty after 24 June 1948. Enlisted personnel of the ERC and NGUS who had incurred involuntary active duty obligations of 21 months, plus a 3-month extension, under the Selective Service Act of 1948, as amended, were given the same opportunity to discharge their reserve obligations. ERC or NGUS enlisted personnel not completing 33 months of minimum active service reverted to ERC or NGUS status upon completion of their current 24-month tour of active duty.³² At the same time EUCOM set up procedures for the phased return of NGUS and Organized Reserve Corps (ORC) officer and enlisted personnel in order to minimize the impact of their release upon the effectiveness of the commands to which they were assigned and to permit an orderly integration of replacements. This phased plan called for the release of personnel during the 4-month period just prior to the completion of their 24-month period of active service. In determining the sequence for returning personnel in advance of their normal extended tour of service date, primary consideration was to be given to the maintenance of unit effectiveness and to the requirement for, and availability of, trained replacements. Additional consideration was to be given to the length of World War II service, combat service in Korea, and dependency or hardship. Under no circumstances were personnel to be returned later than 15 days prior to the date they were to complete the 24 months of active service.³³ On 15 March 1952, EUCOM announced that RA, NGUS, and ORC enlisted personnel who were serving on active duty in an involuntary extension of enlistment would be returned to the United States for discharge in accordance with a phased plan. Under this plan enlisted personnel were returned to the United States in April, May, and June for discharge after completing ten or eleven months of service in an involuntary extension of their enlistments.³⁴ In a reversed trend the Department of the Army on 23 April 1952 announced a 9-month extension of RA, ORC, and NGUS enlistments (except 2-year enlistments under the Selective Service Act) expiring between 1 July 1952 and 30 June 1953, inclusive, unless a voluntary extension or re-enlistment was accomplished before the expiration of the normal enlistment.³⁵ On 2 September the Department of the Army announced plans for the early release from active duty of reserve officers and warrant officers, who had been ordered into active military service involuntarily from inactive or voluntary reserve status under the provisions of the Universal Military Training and Service

³²(1) EUCOM ltr, 28 Feb 52, sub: Release of Reserve Component Personnel Serving Involuntarily on Active Duty for 24 Months. AG 210.8 GPA-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) EUCOM ltr, 15 Apr 52, sub: Extension of Current Period Active Military Service of ORC and NGUS Enlisted Personnel. AG 220.31 AGP-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

³³EUCOM ltr, 28 Feb 52, cited above.

³⁴Ltr, EUCOM to Maj Comdrs, 15 Mar 52, sub: Reduction of Involuntary Extension of Enlistment. RESTRICTED. In EUCOM P&A Div Jnl File, Mar 52, p. 16, Item 1, Incl. 1.

³⁵EUCOM AG Div Jnl, 2 May 52, Item 1. UNCLASSIFIED.

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Act, as amended. Reserve officers who had served on active duty for 12 months or more between 7 December 1941 and 2 September 1945 (Category IV-17) were released by 30 November 1952, if they did not extend or had not voluntarily extended their enlistments. Those who did not serve at least 12 months between 7 December 1951 and 2 September 1945 (Category IV-24), were to be released as soon as practicable after completion of 19 months service on the current tour, but not later than 31 March 1953, whether or not they had completed 19 months service. Certain specified types of personnel were exempted from this directive.³⁶

45. Integration of Negro and White Troops

a. Background. Subsequent to World War II the U.S. Armed Forces initiated programs designed to ease their racial problems and improve operational efficiency. In May 1949 the President's Committee on Equal Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services recommended to the Department of the Army that all Army jobs and schools be opened to qualified persons without regard to race or color, that the policy of restricting Negro personnel to racial units and overhead installations be rescinded, that all personnel be assigned according to individual ability and the Army's needs, and that racial quotas be abolished. As a result of these recommendations the Secretary of the Army issued a new policy on 30 September 1949 opening all jobs to qualified personnel regardless of race and abolishing all racial quotas for Army school attendance. The Department of the Army on 16 January 1950 issued still another directive stating that "Negro manpower possessing appropriate skills and qualifications will be utilized in accordance with such skills and qualifications and will be assigned to any T/D (overhead) or T/O&E (regularly constituted) unit without regard to race or color." And in April 1950 the Army fulfilled the final recommendation of the President's committee when it declared that all enlistments in the Army within over-all recruiting quotas would be opened to qualified applicants without regard to race or color.³⁷ For the most part, however, Negro personnel still continued to be assigned to units designated as Negro. In March 1951 EUCOM published a directive on the utilization of Negro personnel which gave priority of assignment of Negro personnel to Negro units up to battalion size, and specified that individual Negro officer and enlisted replacements possessing primary qualifications which could not be utilized in Negro units because the individuals would be excess to the needs of the

³⁶USAREUR ltr, 6 Sep 52, sub: Reserve Officers Eligible for Early Release (RCS: AFAGX-OT-65). AG 210.8 AGP-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

³⁷C/N 2, Dir EUCOM P&A Div to EUCOM SGS, 15 Jan 52, on IRS, EUCOM SGS to Dir EUCOM P&A Div, 11 Jan 52, sub: Transmittal of letter to General Handy from Mr. McCloy with Inclosure from Mrs. Sampson regarding Segregation. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 291.2 (1952), Vol. I, Item I.

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unit, or because there were no Negro units in the command employing personnel with such primary qualifications, be assigned to units which could most effectively utilize their qualifications, regardless of race or color.³⁸ By early 1952, as a result of this directive, nearly 2,000 Negro enlisted men (or about 7 percent of all Negro enlisted personnel), over 17 percent of all Negro officers, and all Negro women, both enlisted and officer, were serving with units not designated as Negro.³⁹

b. Integration Procedures. On 1 April 1952, upon orders from the Department of the Army, EUCOM instituted a phased program of racial integration designed to end segregation in the European Command. This program called for immediate integration of combat units, followed by the integration of service- and T/D-type units. Originally it was estimated that complete integration of combat units would require from six to twelve months, while from one to two years would be necessary to complete the integration of service-type units. Integration was to be accomplished in two ways: (1) by redesignating and removing racial identifying symbols from Negro units, and concurrently transferring personnel from those units and replacing them with other personnel; and (2) by assigning replacements from the replacement stream to units in accordance with their MOS requirements and racial strength percentages. Personnel transfers required under the program, were to be made in such a manner that operational efficiency of the units would not be lessened. Units were instructed that the transfer of white personnel to Negro units, the redesignation of Negro units, and the removal of racial identification symbols could be accomplished only under specific instructions from EUCOM headquarters. The transfer of Negro personnel to white units on a large scale could be done only with prior approval of Headquarters, EUCOM. However, major units could transfer individual Negro personnel to white units without the prior approval of EUCOM headquarters, where it appeared that more successful utilization of available manpower would be effected. Initially the Negro element of integrated combat units was to approximate 10 percent, while the Negro element of service-type and T/D units was to approximate 18 percent. Eventually Negro strength in all units was to approximate the Negro percentage of total command strength. EUCOM emphasized that no unit was to consist solely of Negro personnel and that the program should proceed with no publicity.⁴⁰

³⁸ EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 114 - 15. SECRET.

³⁹ Ltr, CINCEUR to Mr. C. A. Burnett, Dir, The Association of Negro Press Inc., 7 Feb 52. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 291.2 (1952), Vol. I, Item 2.

⁴⁰ Ltr, EUCOM to Maj Units, 1 Apr 52, sub: Racial Integration of EUCOM Army Units. AG 300.2 GPA-AGO. RESTRICTED. In EUCOM P&A Jnl File, Apr 52, p. 1, Item 3, Incl 3.

10. Situation at the End of 1952. By the end of the year the majority of combat units and approximately 40 percent of the service-type units had been integrated. Although, for the most part, racial integration progressed rapidly and smoothly, some difficulties did arise. Since entire groups of men necessarily were uprooted and moved away from their units and friends, morale suffered in some instances. However, most unit commanders felt that morale had remained at an unexpectedly high level despite the difficulties caused by integration.⁴¹ More serious problems were caused by the increasing percentage of Negro enlisted personnel in the command and by the unfavorable distribution of military occupation specialties among the Negro enlisted replacements. When integration was begun, approximately 14 percent of the command enlisted strength was Negro, with Negro personnel constituting 10.5 percent of the enlisted strength in combat units, and over 18 percent of the enlisted strength in service-type units. Since there already was an overstrength of Negro personnel in the command, the rate of integration was directly dependant upon the rate at which the command received white replacements to integrate into the Negro units.⁴² However, as a result of heavy net losses of white personnel and the continued arrival of a high percentage of Negro personnel in the replacement stream, the Negro percentage in the command increased to 15.1 percent, thereby causing much concern. In the latter months of 1952 it became increasingly difficult to acquire white replacements for units scheduled to be integrated, or to maintain the proper Negro-white ratio in the units already integrated. The continued receipt of large numbers of Negro personnel with their lower educational and Aptitude Area I levels, coupled with the heavy losses of the trained white personnel, adversely affected the operational efficiency of some units.⁴³ The majority of Negro replacements had been trained in the infantry, armor, artillery, transportation, signal, and quartermaster career fields, thereby creating an overstrength of Negro personnel in these fields, with a corresponding understrength of white personnel in the same fields. At the same time there existed a Negro replacement shortage in such career fields as personnel and administration, electronics, intelligence, medical, and military police. These shortages could not be materially alleviated by intracommand reassignments

⁴¹Comments of Gen Handy, Mthly Conf with Post Comdrs and Selected Seventh Army Comdrs, 28 Apr 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1952), B/T 2. Morale situation estimated from comments of unit commanders in unit command reports for 1952.

⁴²Papers for Briefing of Gen Hull, May 52, subs: Negro Enlisted Strength in EUCOM; Training of Negroes in all MOS's; Racial Integration of EUCOM Army Units. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 337 (1952), Vol. I, Item 9.

⁴³Memo, C/USAREUR G-1 Div MPB to C/USAREUR G-1 Div Ctl Br, 12 Feb 53, subs: Problems for General Eddy's Conference in Washington. SECRET. In USAREUR G-1 Div Files 337 (1953).

due to a lack of qualified or potentially qualified Negro personnel in these fields. Although attempts were made to reclassify some of the thousands of Negro personnel trained in the overstrength career fields, they proved to be impractical because of the relatively small number of Negro personnel potentially qualified as well as wasteful of previous training. Nor would the Department of the Army favorably consider the return of surplus Negro personnel to the United States before termination of their tours of duty or enlistment. The surplus, therefore, had to be reduced by the slow process of normal attrition.⁴⁴ To accelerate the process USAREUR took action to ensure the attritional loss upon expiration of the normal tour or upon expiration of the term of service of individuals whose conduct had been detrimental to the integration program or to good relations with the European public.⁴⁵ USAREUR suggested to the Department of the Army that some difficulties could be solved if Negro personnel were trained in more career fields and if the MOS distribution among the Negro replacements sent to the command was wider.⁴⁶ USAREUR also recommended that the Department of the Army send a minimum of Negro replacements until the Negro percentage in the command had been reduced to the Army-wide level, and that the Negro replacements thereafter be supplied in accordance with Army-wide percentages. At the end of the year the situation in service-type units, especially in the transportation units, was particularly unsatisfactory. Including both integrated and all Negro units, Negro personnel constituted 46.6 percent of the enlisted strength of Transportation Division units; 44.6 percent of the enlisted strength of USAREUR COMZ transportation units; and 51.6 percent of the strength of Seventh Army transportation units. The integration accomplished within other transportation units and other arms and services had nearly exhausted the possibilities for personnel exchanges, and the replacement stream was unable to furnish sizable increments of the necessary white drivers and mechanics. USAREUR therefore proposed to assign the limited number of white drivers and mechanics in the replacement stream to the integrated units and to utilize Negro replacements to maintain the operational strength of all-Negro units. At the close of the year USAREUR was formulating plans to curtail the integration of service-type units until sufficient white replacements with the necessary military occupation specialties became available.⁴⁷

⁴⁴Memo, USAREUR P&A Div to USAREUR COFS, 25 Nov 52, sub: Racial Integration of Enlisted Personnel in USAREUR Units. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 291.2 (1952), Vol. I, Item 40A.

⁴⁵C/N 3, USAREUR P&A Div to USAREUR AG, 12 Nov 52, sub: Re-enlistment Criteria. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR P&A Div 342 (1952).

⁴⁶Paper for Briefing of Gen Hull, May 52, sub: Training of Negroes in all MOS's. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 337 (1952), Vol. I, Item 9.

⁴⁷(1) IRS, USAREUR P&A Div to USAREUR COFS, 16 Dec 52, sub: Racial Integration in USAREUR Units. AG 320.2 GPA. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR P&A Div 320.2 (1952). (2) Memo, C/USAREUR G-1 Div MPB to C/USAREUR G-1 Div Ctl Br, 12 Feb 53, sub: Problems for General Eddy's Conference in Washington. SECRET. In USAREUR G-1 Gen files 337 (1953).

46. Additional Military Personnel Requirements

During 1952 the command was faced with the problem of absorbing additional military personnel requirements within its ceiling of 259,000 spaces. This was principally a result of Department of the Army commitments to Congress to adhere to an over-all strength of 284,000 in Europe. Practically every unit in the command troop basis was organized at a reduced strength. T/O&E shortages in the FY 1953 troop basis were as follows:

	<u>Off</u>	<u>FMO</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>1,589</u>	<u>882</u>	<u>229</u>	<u>8,216</u>	<u>10,916</u>
Combat	826	—	105	1,331	2,262
Service	763	882	124	6,883	8,654

The command was therefore approximately 11,000 spaces below full T/O&E strength without considering additional requirements. The command was also required to satisfy various personnel requirements imposed by the Department of the Army which disrupted the planned use of reserve spaces, particularly in regard to officers. The command had to furnish troop basis support for several new higher headquarters, additional unprogrammed support for the U.S. Air Forces in the United Kingdom, and at the same time troops for the build-up of COMZ. USAREUR estimated a deficit of 1,727 spaces by the end of FY 1953. The command estimated that 1,971 spaces would be recovered through the reorganization of the 66th CIC Detachment, discontinuance of the 7792 HICOG Detachment, consolidation of the military posts, inactivation of the 10th and 11th Hospital Bands, reorganization of Army bands, inactivation of the 557th Infantry Rifle Platoon, and by reorganization of certain T/D units under Change 3, SR 310-30-1. To improve the over-all situation, USAREUR recommended that the Department of the Army assume complete responsibility for activities over which the command had no control and which could be considered Department of the Army or Joint Chiefs of Staff activities, and restore such spaces to USAREUR. While the number of spaces involved was not great, about 45 percent of the spaces were for officers and warrant officers. USAREUR suggested that if the spaces could not be restored to the command, the USAREUR ceiling be reduced to 258,225 and all further requirements for these activities be met by the Department of the Army, without recourse to the USAREUR troop basis. If the spaces were withdrawn USAREUR recommended that officer authorized strength be increased by 328, with a corresponding decrease in enlisted spaces. Enlisted shortages could be covered by a reduction in unit administrative overhead.⁴⁸

⁴⁸(1) Ltr, USAREUR COFS to DA DCOFS for Opns and Admin, 3 Nov 52. SECRET. (2) Memo, USAREUR ACOFS G-3 to USAREUR COFS, 24 Nov 52, sub: Military Personnel Authorization for Fiscal Years 1953-1954-1955. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 320.2 (1952), Vol. II, Item 48A-1.

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47. Reduction in General Officer Spaces

In FY 1953, USAREUR's general officer ceiling was reduced from 44 to 36 spaces. Of these 36 spaces 14 were committed to US EUCOM or to the Department of the Army activities, leaving only 22 for use by USAREUR. Of this number, 15 spaces were assigned to USAREUR headquarters (7 as staff officers and the remainder as chiefs of technical and administrative services), 3 were assigned to the major area commands, 3 were assigned to COMZ, and one was U.S. Commander, Berlin. USAREUR contended that it was seriously undergraded in two key positions. Only a colonel space was authorized for the commander of Berlin Command. Since the U.S. Commander, Berlin, spent approximately 85 percent of his time on HICOG matters and depended on the Commanding Officer, Berlin Command, for British, French, Soviet, and German contacts, USAREUR believed the position should have the prestige and dignity of a general officer rank. USAREUR also believed the increased augmentation and responsibilities of the Communications Zone warranted a general officer rank for the deputy commander of the Communications Zone. USAREUR therefore suggested an increase in general officer ceiling strength from 36 to 38.⁴⁹

48. Re-enlistment and Recruiting Program

In 1952 it became increasingly important to re-enlist Army personnel in the command. The percentage of non-RA personnel increased until over 60 percent of the enlisted personnel in the command were non-RA. Overseas tours for many enlisted personnel were exceedingly short, and many of the enlisted personnel inducted for 24-months' service after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea became eligible for discharge in 1952. Such conditions resulted in a continual turnover of personnel. The re-enlisting of personnel reduced training costs and eased the drain on civilian manpower. In an effort to retain trained personnel, the command continued to conduct intensive re-enlistment campaigns in 1952, the first extending from 1 January to 31 June and the second from 1 July to 31 December. Commanders were instructed to make every effort to re-enlist RA personnel; to enlist in the Regular Army the Enlisted Reserve, National Guard, and selective service personnel in the command; and to persuade Enlisted Reserve, National Guard, and selective service personnel to extend their enlistments. These personnel were informed that they could discharge completely their reserve obligations by extending their enlistments for one year or by enlisting in the Regular Army.⁵⁰ The campaigns were only moderately successful. A total of 13,875 enlisted personnel re-enlisted or extended during the year, only slightly more than the 10,854 who had re-enlisted or extended in the 6-month period, July - December 1951. During the year 9,689 RA's and 1,737 non-RA's were re-enlisted, and 2,440 non-RA's extended their enlistments.⁵¹ (Table 6). There were many possible reasons for the decline in re-enlistments,

⁴⁹Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to DA Act ACOFS G-1, 30 Jan 53. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 320.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 9B.

⁵⁰Ltr, CINCEUR to Maj Comdrs, 10 Jan 52, sub: Re-enlistment Campaign. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 342 (1952), Vol. I, Item 1, Tab A.

⁵¹EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, Jul to Dec 52. SECRET.

Table 6--Regular Army Recruitment by Command
(EUCOM/USAREUR Army Elements)

For Period 1 Jan - 30 Jun 52

Commands	From RA Status			From Non-RA Status		
	Total Eligibles ^a	Eligibles Recruited	Per-cent Recruited ^b	Non-RA Str (as of 30 Jun)	Total Recruited	Non-RA Extensions
Total Army	2,524	265	10	139,565	949	610
Hq EUCOM						
(Special Troops)	27	3	11	576	7	2
Seventh Army	1,641	146	9	99,943	778	488
EUCOM COMZ ^c	106	14	13	7,377	13	10
32d AAA Brig	59	6	10	1,958	10	3
Services	320	61	19	20,381	113	69
Mil Posts	371	35	9	9,330	28	38

For Period 1 Jul - 31 Dec 52

Commands	From RA Status			From Non-RA Status		
	Total Eligibles ^a	Eligibles Recruited	Per-cent Recruited ^b	Non-RA Str (as of 31 Dec)	Total Recruited	Non-RA Extensions
Total Army	11,236	1,920	17	127,642	788	1,830
Hq EUCOM						
(Special Troops)	99	21	21	609	10	10
Seventh Army	6,982	1,255	18	84,157	526	1,272
EUCOM COMZ ^c	580	72	12	11,239	36	59
32d AAA Brig	369	37	10	1,992	13	22
Services	1,670	254	15	15,148	138	287
Mil Posts	1,536	281	18	14,504	65	180

^aARA enlisted personnel whose extended ETS is within the period recorded.^bIncludes potential eligibles for the following recruiting period.^cIncludes 7961 Detachment.

Source: EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, Jul and Dec 52. SECRET.

including restrictions on promotions, the tightening of the pass system and the curfew, and the necessity to reclassify many personnel from their trained MOS fields to career fields where personnel were more vitally needed.

a. Infantry Volunteer Program. On 9 January 1952, in accordance with the provisions of Section II, SR 615-229-7, EUCOM implemented a program authorizing personnel to volunteer for service in infantry units in the command or in Korea. Applicants for transfer had to meet MOS and physical qualifications for infantry duty; they could not be in MOS fields which were critically short in the command; and they could not have had a general or special court martial or three summary courts martials during their current tour of duty. In addition the applicants had to have twelve months remaining in their foreign service tours when they reported for duty with the infantry unit. Applicants for transfer to Korea therefore had to have a minimum of fifteen months remaining to allow for processing and travel time. During 1952 the command received 1,133 applications for transfer to infantry units in the command and approved 969. In the same period 3,146 applications were received for transfer to infantry units in Korea, 2,716 of which were approved by the Department of the Army.⁵²

b. Alien Enlistments. The enlistment of aliens in the United States Army was authorized by Public Law 597, enacted 30 June 1950. Alien applicants had to be between the ages of 18 and 35, unmarried, without dependents, and able to pass the Regular Army physical examinations. In Europe, German nationals or nationals of countries participating in the European Recovery Plan and/or countries which were members of NATO were not eligible for enlistment. Enlistments had to be for five years or more. Additional security, educational, and vocational requirements were added. During 1952 it continued to be difficult to obtain qualified applicants. Vocational and educational requirements were high and difficulty was encountered in obtaining security clearances. The command opposed lowering the qualifications on the basis that the few enlistments received were of superior quality. From the start of the program to the end of 1952 the command had received 6,547 applications and enlisted 486 aliens. In April the first ten alien enlistees to complete their basic training in the United States were returned to the command for duty.⁵³

⁵²(1) USAREUR AG Div Jnl, 9 Jan 52, Item 4. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Figures from USAREUR AG Compt Unit. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁵³(1) EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 113 - 14. SECRET. (2) EUCOM P&A Div Jnl, 18 Apr 52, Item 1. CONFIDENTIAL. (3) Paper for Gen Hull Briefing, May 52, sub: Alien Enlistment Program. In USAREUR SGS 337 (1952), Vol. I, Item 9. (4) Figures from files of USAREUR AG Div Mil Pers Br Proc Sec. RESTRICTED.

Section II: Labor Services Personnel

49. Organization and Strength

a. Trends. Labor service personnel were Germans and displaced persons in a civilian status who were employed by the command in mobile, organized units. Generally they were grouped into liaison, guard, technical and industrial police units under the staff supervision of the Labor Services Division, Headquarters, EUCOM/USAREUR. The number of labor service personnel in Germany was limited to a ceiling of 31,000 (not including industrial police in Berlin) by a German-American agreement of August 1949, and the number in France was limited by Franco-American agreements to 1,500 at the start of the year, and to 2,400 after May 1952. At the beginning of the year the authorized strength of labor services and industrial police in Germany and France was 32,646 personnel and the actual strength was 31,224 personnel. Of this number USAFE was authorized 3,232 and employed 3,008, and USNAVGAR was authorized 1,070 and employed 883. Of the total actual strength 21,798 were Germans and 9,426 were displaced persons. On 31 December 1952 the command employed 21,871 Germans and 10,664 displaced persons. At that time the Army elements of USAREUR were authorized 29,393 labor service spaces and employed 29,108 persons, USAFE was authorized 3,110 and employed 2,337, and USNAVGAR was authorized 1,096 and employed 1,090. Although the majority of displaced persons employed were of Polish origin, the labor services personnel claimed birth and/or citizenship in thirty-nine countries.⁵⁴

b. Labor Services Division. The Labor Services Division (LSD) exercised no direct command responsibility for labor service units, but was assigned responsibility for formulating policy on the organization, administration, and utilization of labor service units, co-ordinating with other staff divisions on labor service matters, and developing directives for the administration of the units.⁵⁵ Until 15 September 1952 the division was composed of the Organization and Training Branch and the Administrative Branch. A reorganization on 15 September

⁵⁴Figures are as of 16 January 1952 and 10 January 1953. (1) EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 115 - 24. SECRET. (2) USAREUR LSD Jnl File, 16 Jan 52, 10 Jan 53, Items 2 and 1. RESTRICTED. (3) Intvrs, Mr. C. R. Petrie, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj F. E. Smith, C/USAREUR LSD Admin Br, and Miss J. Olliger, USAREUR LSD Org & Tng Br, 19 May 53. RESTRICTED.

⁵⁵IRS, EUCOM LSD to EUCOM P&A and OPOT Divs and EUCOM Compt, 1 Feb 52, sub: Request for T/D Authorization. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR LSD Jnl File, 1 Feb 52, Item 1.

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resulted in the addition of the Supply Branch.⁵⁶ Attached to the division for operational control in order to have available advisors familiar with the various nationalities represented in Labor Services, was a liaison detachment, with parallel German and displaced persons sections. At the beginning of the year this detachment was designated the EUCOM Labor Services Liaison Detachment and was authorized 28 officers (8 displaced person, 20 German) and 55 enlisted men (20 displaced person, 35 German). On 22 August the detachment was redesignated the 3331 USAREUR Labor Services Liaison Detachment and was reorganized with 34 officers (17 displaced person, 17 German) and 57 enlisted personnel (25 displaced person, 32 German).⁵⁷

c. Supervisory Units. Labor supervision center headquarters and labor supervision detachments made up of U.S. personnel were utilized to command, supervise, and administer labor service units (non-U.S. personnel). At the beginning of the year there were 15 supervisory centers, each authorized 4 officers and 9 enlisted men. Ten of these centers were assigned to the military posts (except Garmisch) and the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation to supervise labor service guard personnel and to function as special staff sections providing technical liaison assistance in all labor service matters to the post commanders; five centers supervised technical labor service units of the various technical services. During 1952 two additional supervisory centers were organized and assigned to the USAREUR COMZ to supervise and administer COMZ labor service guard personnel. In January there were also 48 supervisory detachments, each authorized 2 officers and 5 enlisted personnel. Thirty-two of these detachments (25 in Germany, 7 in France) exercised command, administrative, and operational supervision over associated labor service guard units of company size, composed of displaced persons; sixteen supervised the operations of various technical labor service units. By the end of the year there were 30 labor supervision detachments (20 in Germany, 10 in France) supervising guard units and 13 supervising technical units in Germany.⁵⁸ The trend throughout the year was toward the withdrawal of U.S. supervision at company level as soon as the labor service company had progressed sufficiently to operate efficiently without supervision. As a result, while labor service personnel (non-U.S.) increased by approximately 1,300 spaces during the year, the authorized strength of labor service supervisory personnel (U.S.) decreased from 531 spaces to 431 spaces.⁵⁹

d. Liaison Detachments. At the beginning of 1952 there were seven labor service liaison detachments in addition to the EUCOM Labor Services Liaison Detachment at Headquarters, EUCOM. These detachments assisted in

⁵⁶USAREUR LSD Jnl File, 15 Sep 52, Item 3. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁵⁷Ibid., 15 Dec 52, Item 1, SECRET; 22 Aug 52, Item 1, RESTRICTED.

⁵⁸Figures as of 16 Jan 52 and 10 Jan 53. USAREUR LSD Jnl File, 16 Jan 52, Item 2; 10 Jan 53, Item 1. RESTRICTED.

⁵⁹Ibid.

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the administration of displaced person labor service units and were used as a basis for the assignment of chaplains and doctors. The seven units had a total authorized strength of 92 persons; however, two of the units had been at zero strength since November 1951 and actual strength was only 77 at the beginning of the year. With the organization of displaced persons centers on 10 January the necessity for the detachments no longer existed and all except the headquarters detachment were discontinued on 1 February.⁶⁰ Later as the need arose other labor service liaison detachments were organized. On 20 April 1952 the EUCOM COMZ Labor Service Liaison Detachment with an authorized strength of 10 Polish personnel was organized to assist in the administration of Polish labor service units in France. On 1 July the 3333 Labor Services Liaison Detachment was organized with a strength of four Germans to assist in the supervision of the labor service personnel in the Rhine Military Post area. On the same date the 3334 Labor Services Liaison Detachment was organized with a strength of two Latvian personnel to provide liaison between the Engineer Division and the Latvian labor service engineer units. In order to have all medical matters pertaining to the labor services co-ordinated through one agency, the 3332 Labor Services Liaison Detachment was organized and assigned to the Medical Division on 10 August with an authorized strength of 38 displaced and German personnel.⁶¹ At the end of 1952 there were 5 liaison detachments (including the headquarters detachment) with a total authorized strength of 147 and an actual strength of 152.⁶²

e. Guard Personnel. The majority of labor service personnel were organized into guard units, employed as security police at U.S. installations. Most guard units were assigned to the military posts in which they were employed and further assigned to the labor service supervisory units at those posts. At the beginning of the year guard units were organized into companies under the operational control of 100-man labor service centers or, in the case of Berlin Military Post, under a 200-man labor service area. At that time EUCOM Army elements in Germany employed 88 guard units (62 German, 26 displaced person), with a total authorized strength of 17,300 (11,300 German, 6,000 displaced person) and an actual strength of 17,457 (12,204 German, 5,253 displaced person). In addition, and outside the command ceiling, the Army elements of the command employed in France 8 guard units with an authorized strength of 2,000 displaced persons and an actual strength of 1,438 displaced persons. These personnel and units were distributed as follows:⁶³

⁶⁰Ibid., 15 Jan 52, Item 1, SECRET; 16 Jan 52, Item 2, RESTRICTED.

⁶¹Ibid., 14 Apr 52, Item 1, SECRET; 16 Jun 52, Item 2, RESTRICTED; 19 Jun 52, Item 1, SECRET; 28 Jul 52, Item 2, SECRET.

⁶²Ibid., 10 Jan 53, Item 1. RESTRICTED.

⁶³Ibid., 16 Jan 52, Item 2. RESTRICTED.

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	<u>Units</u>	<u>Authorized Strength</u>	<u>Actual Strength</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>19,300</u>	<u>18,895</u>
<u>Total in Germany</u>	<u>88</u>	<u>17,300</u>	<u>17,457</u>
German Units in Germany	62	11,300	12,204
Areas	1	200	205
Centers	11	1,100	1,922
Companies	50	10,000	10,077
DP Units in Germany	26	6,000	5,253
Centers	3	300	152
Companies	23	5,700	5,101
<u>Total in France</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>2,000</u>	<u>1,438</u>
Centers	1	---	5
Companies	7	---	1,433

At the end of the year the U.S. Army in Germany employed 93 guard units (64 German, 28 displaced person) with a total authorized strength of 16,920 (11,620 German, 5,300 displaced person) and a total actual strength of 16,909 (11,589 German, 5,320 displaced person). The one German guard area had been disbanded, and one additional center and two additional German guard companies organized. Two additional displaced person companies were also present in Germany. In France there was an additional guard center and four additional guard companies, raising the total authorized guard strength in France to 2,388 and the total actual strength to 2,385. The 3333 Labor Service Liaison Detachment and the COMZ Labor Service Liaison Detachment, although also guard units, are not included in these figures.⁶⁴

f. Technical Personnel. Labor service technical personnel were organized into units similar to those of the service which employed them and performed similar functions. A labor service engineer construction company, for example, was organized within the T/O&E of a similar U.S. Army engineer construction company. Personnel spaces for which the labor service unit had no need (e.g., intelligence officer)

⁶⁴Ibid., 10 Jan 53, Item 1. RESTRICTED.

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were dropped and spaces peculiar to a labor service unit created (e.g., interpreter). A labor service table of distribution was then issued for the unit. Labor service technical units were assigned, with few exceptions, to the using technical service or to a tactical command. However, prior to 25 April 1952 the degree and method of administrative control of these technical units varied throughout the command. Some units were further assigned to labor supervision centers (U.S. personnel) of their own service and might or might not have operated directly under the center to which assigned. Others were attached for administration and logistical support to the military post labor supervision center. Some units were administered and supported through the U.S. unit or installation under which they operated. Some had labor supervision detachments (U.S. personnel) directly over them and others did not. Labor service and labor supervision units assigned to technical services and tactical commands were considered lodger units on the military post on which they were located.⁶⁵ After 25 April all lodger labor supervision and labor service technical units not assigned to technical service labor supervision centers were given administrative and logistical support and supervision by the post commander through the labor supervision center on his post.⁶⁶ At the beginning of the year EUCOM Army elements employed 60 technical units (47 German, 13 displaced person) with an aggregate authorized strength of 8,489 (6,196 German, 2,293 displaced person) and an actual strength of 7,950 (5,895 German, 2,055 displaced person). There were no technical service units in France. At the end of the year USAREUR Army elements employed 70 technical units (58 German, 12 displaced person) with an aggregate authorized strength of 9,573 (7,415 German, 2,158 displaced person) and an actual strength of 9,302 (7,145 German, 2,157 displaced person).⁶⁷ The number and type of units assigned to each technical service and Seventh Army at the beginning and end of the year are shown in Table 7. The 3332 and 3334 Labor Service Liaison Detachments, although serving with technical service units, are not included in Table 7.

g. Berlin Industrial Police. Industrial police (IP's) were employed in Berlin as civilian guards and differed from other labor service personnel only in that they were "static indigenous civilians" and did not come within the command labor service ceiling. They were employed by the Army only in Berlin and were supervised by the 7929 Labor Supervision Detachment (U.S. personnel). At the start of the year Berlin was authorized 400 IP's and employed 360. The strength fluctuated very

⁶⁵(1) IRS, EUCOM LSD to EUCOM Log Div thru EUCOM Mil Posts Div, 17 Jan 52, sub: Administration of Labor Service Units. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR LSD Jnl File, 17 Jan 52, Item 1. (2) Intervs, Mr. C. R. Petrie, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj F. E. Smith, C/USAREUR LSD Admin Br, 9 Feb 52 and 19 May 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁶⁶USAREUR LSD Jnl, 23 Apr 52, Item 1. SECRET.

⁶⁷USAREUR LSD Jnl Files, 16 Jan 52, Item 2; 10 Jan 53, Item 1. RESTRICTED.

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Table 7--Labor Service Units

<u>Type of Unit</u>	<u>16 January 1952</u>		<u>31 December 1952</u>	
	<u>German Units</u>	<u>Displaced Person Units</u>	<u>German Units</u>	<u>Displaced Person Units</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>58</u>	<u>12</u>
<u>Seventh Army</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>2</u>
Engr Truck Co	3		3	
Engr Float Bridge Co				1
Engr Equip Maint Co		1		
Engr Bridge Maint Plat			1	
Med Evac Co		1		
Med Svc Plat	4		4	
Ord MAM Co	1		1	
Ammo Depot Co				1
Engr Bridge Maint Co	1			
<u>Engineer</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>6</u>
Hq & Svc Co (Constr)			1	
Med Det (Constr)			1	
Constr Co	5	4	5	4
Constr Cen	1			
Bridge Maint Plat		1		1
Dump Truck Co	1	1	1	1
Depot Co	1		1	
Float Bridge Co			1	
<u>Medical</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>2</u>
Depot Co			1	
Collection Co				1
Svc Plat	12	1	9	1
<u>Ordnance</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
General Depot Co		2		2
Supply Depot Co			1	
MAM Co	2		1	
Ammo Depot Co		1		

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Table 7--Labor Service Units (cont'd)

<u>Type of Unit</u>	<u>16 January 1952</u>		<u>31 December 1952</u>	
	<u>German Units</u>	<u>Displaced Person Units</u>	<u>German Units</u>	<u>Displaced Person Units</u>
<u>Quartermaster</u>	<u>5</u>		<u>8</u>	
Hq Det			2	
Svc Co			6	
Ctr	1			
Labor Co	2			
Labor Plat	1			
Supply Co	1			
<u>Signal</u>	<u>7</u>		<u>13</u>	
Hq Co (Constr)			2	
Constr Co	4		6	
Constr Gen	1			
Med Det			2	
Depot Co	2		2	
Base Maint Co			1	
<u>Transportation</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>4</u>	
Trans Truck Co	2	1	3	
Equip Maint Det			1	
Rwy Equip Maint Plat	1			
<u>Provost Marshal</u>			<u>1</u>	
Rwy MP Gd Co			1	
<u>Stuttgart Mil Post (District)</u>	<u>1</u>		<u>1</u>	
Reception & Processing Center	1		1	

Source: EUCOM/USAREUR LSD Jnl Files, 16 Jan 52, Item 2; 10 Jan 53.
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slightly during the year and by the end of the year, although authorized strength had been reduced to 365, actual strength was still 360.⁶⁸

h. Air Force and Navy Labor Service Personnel. Air Force and Navy labor service personnel in Germany came within the over-all command labor service ceiling of 31,000 persons. At the beginning of the year the USAFE labor service ceiling was established at 3,232 and USAFE employed 3,008, of whom 1,059 were industrial police. By the end of the year all industrial police spaces were converted to Air Force labor service spaces. In March the ceiling was reduced to 3,186 and on 14 November it was again reduced to 3,110. At the end of the year the Air Force employed 2,337 labor service personnel in Germany; none were employed in France. The Air Force administered its labor service personnel under the same conditions as Army labor service personnel. In January the Navy labor service ceiling was 1,070 and USNAVGECOM employed 883 personnel. In February the ceiling was increased to 1,096. At the end of the year the Navy employed 1,090 persons in Germany; none were employed in France. Naval labor service personnel were administered by USNAVGECOM under the same conditions as Army labor service personnel. The Air Force employed both German and displaced personnel, but the Navy employed only German personnel.⁶⁹

50. Conditions of Hire and Payment

Labor service personnel in Germany were supported from occupation cost Deutsche Mark funds, those in countries other than Germany from dollar appropriated funds. Personnel in Germany were paid according to the following wage scale:⁷⁰

Colonel	(LSO-6)	DM 1,000.	MSGT	(LS-7)	DM 400.
Lt Col	(LSO-5)	850.	SFC	(LS-6)	360.
Major	(LSO-4)	700.	Sgt	(LS-5)	325.
Captain	(LSO-3)	600.	Cpl	(LS-4)	275.
1st Lt	(LSO-2)	500.	Pfc	(LS-3)	250.
2d Lt	(LSO-1)	450.	Pvt	(LS-2)	230.
			Recruit	(LS-1)	186.

⁶⁸(1) Intervs, Mr. C. R. Petrie, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj F. C. Smith, C/USAREUR LSD Admin Br, and Miss J. Olliger, USAREUR LSD Org and Tng Br, 19 May 53. RESTRICTED. (2) USAREUR LSD Jnl File, 16 Jan 52, Item 2, RESTRICTED; 11 Mar 53, Item 1, SECRET; 10 Jan 53, Item 1, RESTRICTED.

⁶⁹(1) USAREUR LSD Jnl File, 27 Feb 52, Item 3. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Interv, Mr. C. R. Petrie, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj F. C. Smith, C/USAREUR LSD Admin Br, 19 May 53. RESTRICTED.

⁷⁰EUCOM ltr, 16 Jul 52, sub: Pay, Allowances, and Pay Roll Procedures for Labor Service Personnel. AG 322 LSD-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

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During German Fiscal Year (GFY) 1952 the average salary was DM 269.70 per month, and the total salary cost for the labor services in Germany was approximately DM 85,000,000. Subsistence costs for the same period amounted to DM 950 per man per year. In addition DM 42,400 was allocated for per diem labor service personnel at labor service or U.S. Army service schools.⁷¹ Personnel in France were under an ungraded Department of the Army ceiling and were paid in converted French francs according to the following scale (dollars converted at current exchange rate):⁷²

Lt Col	\$231.74	MSGT	\$109.04
Major	190.86	SFC	98.15
Captain	163.55	Sgt	88.58
1st Lt	136.29	Cpl	76.76
2d Lt	122.67	Pfc	69.79
		Pvt	64.20
		Recruit	51.90

Ten dollars a month was paid each individual in France in Military Payment Certificates (MPC) for the purchase of post exchange items, shoe repair, laundry, dry cleaning, etc. In FY 1952 the average salary in France was \$970 per year, and the total budget for salaries for labor service personnel in France was \$2,037,000. Subsistence costs amounted to \$310 per man per year.⁷³ Labor service personnel worked an 8-hour day, 48-hour week. Sundays and holidays were granted as days off, but under unusual circumstances overtime could be required without compensatory time off. Holidays were the same as for U.S. personnel, national holidays being granted at the discretion of the commander concerned. Annual leave was accrued at the rate of two days per completed calendar month of service with a maximum accrual of 24 days. A pass system similar to the one applying to American personnel was in effect, with passes up to 72 hours authorized. Personnel were provided three meals a day on the basis of the continental Allied ration, and billets were provided. Although monetary allowances in lieu of rations and quarters were not paid to labor service personnel, per diem was authorized for duty travel or attendance at U.S. service schools. Personnel in Germany were entitled to social insurance and wage taxes in accordance with German laws and regulations. Compensations such as rations and quarters were also subject to German taxation. In France, labor service personnel came within the provisions of Department of the Army civilian personnel regulations for compensation for injuries or disease incurred in connection with their employment. Normally two weeks'

⁷¹Interv, Mr. C. R. Petrie, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj F. C. Gray, USAREUR LSD Org and Tng Br, 26 May 52. SECRET.

⁷²USAREUR LSD Jnl File, 21 Feb 53, Item 1. SECRET.

⁷³Interv, Mr. C. R. Petrie, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj F. C. Gray, USAREUR LSD Org & Tng Br, 26 May 52. SECRET.

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notice was required for separation, but during the first 90 days of employment release without notice was authorized.⁷⁴ At the end of the year the Labor Services Division was negotiating with representatives of France, the United Kingdom, and Germany to formulate uniform employment and pay agreements.⁷⁵

51. Supply and Equipment

In general labor service units received the same supplies and equipment as similar U.S. Army units. However, since they were not military personnel, but German citizens or displaced persons subject to German and HICOG laws, it was necessary to make special provisions in certain instances. Initial equipment was supplied to the labor supervision units under Project-Army-Gen-20-51-OP, as amended, and further issued to the labor supervision personnel. Some difficulty was experienced since German or displaced person officers could not legally be made accountable for supplies. Under U.S. Army regulations the accountable officer had to be bonded by an American bonding company. Since these companies would not accept payment in Deutsche Marks, German and displaced personnel could not be bonded. The supply accounting systems were therefore haphazard.⁷⁶ Labor service personnel in Germany wore Class X, blue-black dyed U.S. army clothing. In addition a blue-gray dress uniform for off-duty wear was provided. In accordance with French-U.S. agreements, labor service personnel in France wore an American uniform, less insignia. Labor service personnel were prohibited from wearing distinctive insignia of the U.S. Army, but were authorized to wear emblems, indicating their nationality, on their sleeves and braid on their caps.⁷⁷ The only weapon issued to labor service personnel was the U.S. Army's .30-caliber M1 carbine. Early in the year the Department of the Army ordered the replacement of all carbines with the U.S. .30-caliber M1 rifle, but upon the request of HICOG excepted the labor service units from the order. HICOG reported that the German authorities favored only sufficient arms to permit the performance of the guard mission under peacetime conditions, and HICOG feared the issuance of the more powerful M1 rifle would provide material for the anti-U.S. elements of the German press and for the opposition party in the Bundestag, thereby endangering the approval of the contractual agreements.⁷⁸

⁷⁴USAREUR LSD Jnl File, 25 Feb 53, Item 2, CONFIDENTIAL; 21 Feb 53, Item 1, UNCLASSIFIED.

⁷⁵Interv, Mr. C. R. Petrie, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj F. C. Smith, C/USAREUR LSD Admin Br, 19 May 53. RESTRICTED.

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷IRS, USAREUR LSD to USAREUR P&A Div, 28 Oct 52, sub: Request for Publication. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR LSD Jnl File, 28 Oct 52, Item 2.

⁷⁸IRS, USAREUR LSD to USAREUR OPOT and Log Divs, 18 Dec 52, sub: Issue of Rifle Cal .30 M1, in lieu of Carbine Cal .30 to Labor Service Units. SECRET. In USAREUR LSD Jnl File, 18 Dec 52, Item 1.

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52. Status in France

a. Strength. Polish displaced person labor service personnel were utilized in France along the line of communications under the provisions of the "Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of France Regarding the Establishment and Operation of a Line of Communication Across France," signed on 6 November 1950. This agreement authorized the employ of labor service personnel by the United States in France, but specified that the personnel be non-American personnel, recruited among displaced persons of Polish origin, coming from the American Zone of Occupation in Germany. The labor service personnel were to serve as security guards on vital depots and installations within the line of communications, thereby relieving U.S. personnel of such guard duties so that the efforts of a maximum number of troops could be directed toward full training for combat missions.⁷⁹ Originally the French Government authorized the United States to employ 750 labor service personnel but this number was increased to 1,500 on 16 February 1951, to 2,000 in January 1952, and to 2,400 in May 1952.⁸⁰ During 1952 only Polish guard personnel were employed in France. The number of these personnel increased from 1,438 in January 1952 to 2,395 at the end of the year. The Air Force and Navy employed no labor service personnel in France although the Air Force was making plans for their future employment at Air Force installations.⁸¹ It was expected by COMZ authorities that as the line of communications grew approximately 5,000 labor service personnel would be needed. During 1952 the Labor Services Division was unable to furnish all the labor service units needed or authorized for France, because of an inadequate number of Polish displaced persons located in the U.S. Zone of Germany and because of lack of equipment with which to supply the units. It also became difficult to maintain the authorized strength of units already in France, because: (1) concurrent with the increase of guard commitments in France, the demand for labor service units within Germany, especially in the Rhine Military Post, increased; (2) French authorities required from four to six weeks to complete the security checks necessary before replacements could enter France; (3) with the steady increase in demand for Polish displaced personnel, the number of these persons available in the U.S. Zone decreased due to immigration, enlistment in the U.S. Army, and discharge from the labor services to accept employment on the German economy;

⁷⁹1st Ind, GINCEUR to CG Twelfth AF, n.d., to ltr, USAFE to GINCEUR, 15 Feb 52, sub: Utilization of Labor Service Units (Polish). RESTRICTED. In USAREUR LSD Jnl File, 28 Feb 52, Item 2.

⁸⁰(1) Ltr, AMEMB Paris to French Fgn Aff Min, 16 Feb 52. SECRET. In AMEMB Paris Pol Div files. (2) Interv, Mr. C. R. Petrie, USAREUR Hist Div, with Miss J. Olliger, USAREUR LSD Org & Tng Br, 19 May 53. RESTRICTED.

⁸¹Intervs, Mr. C. R. Petrie, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj F. C. Smith, C/USAREUR LSD Admin Br, and Miss J. Olliger, USAREUR LSD Org & Tng Br, 19 May 53. RESTRICTED.

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(4) German and French restrictions made it possible to recruit Polish displaced persons only from Germany, thereby making unavailable the estimated four thousand Polish displaced persons residing in France, and approximately five hundred in Sweden; and (5) delays often resulted from the U.S. policy of not assigning units to France until replacement units had been formed for use in Germany, which often proved difficult because of American reluctance to form new German units.⁸² Throughout the year continued efforts were made to obtain a German agreement permitting the importation of displaced personnel from other countries for enlistment in the labor services, but by the end of the year no progress had been made.

b. Problems and Policies. The transporting of labor service displaced personnel across the German-French border resulted in difficulties in obtaining proper German documentation. Under German law police registration was necessary before passports could be issued. Most displaced persons in the labor services were not registered since the Labor Services Division in 1951 had secured for labor service personnel an exemption from the registration law on the basis that the mobile nature of the units made registration difficult. Early in 1952, however, the German Minister of the Interior requested that all labor service personnel register with local police officials, stating that registration was necessary in West Germany for (1) establishing and determining the official residence of every inhabitant; (2) as a means of assisting the local police in curbing criminality and apprehending criminals; (3) establishing jurisdiction of local social insurance companies in settling disability claims; (4) providing the basis for and determining the competence of local authorities to issue passports or appropriate travel documentation; and (5) establishing census and electoral rolls. The minister felt that registration would help reduce the number of refugees from the East who infiltrated into Western Germany and then joined the labor services where documentation was not needed. Recognizing the difficulties involved in having all labor service personnel register individually, he suggested the Labor Services Division make arrangements with local police officials for the registering of personnel on the basis of rosters signed by American supervisory personnel. The interior minister, however, refused to issue the necessary instructions to the local police since this would conflict with the existing law prescribing registration procedures. The local police in turn refused to register labor service displaced personnel on the basis of the old law exempting employees of the labor service. The USAREUR Intelligence Division also objected to the registration of these personnel for security reasons. It was feared that the names of displaced persons from Soviet satellite nations might filter from the hands of the German police into the hands of Communist agents who could exert pressure upon the labor service personnel through their families in the countries of their birth. An agreement was finally

⁸²(1) 1st Ind, CINCEUR to CG Twelfth AF, n.d. to 1tr, USAFE to CINCEUR, 15 Feb 52, sub: Utilization of Labor Service Units (Polish). RESTRICTED.
(2) C/N 3, EUCOM LSD to EUCOM Log Div, 19 Mar 52, sub: COMZ Personnel Problems. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR LSD Jnl File, 28 Feb 52, Item 2; 19 Mar 52, Item 1.

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secured from the Ministry of the Interior in September 1952 which permitted displaced persons labor service employees to cross German borders upon presentation of U.S. Army travel orders and labor service identification cards. Homburg and Bruchmuehlbach were established as the only authorized border crossing points. Personnel were required to be in U.S. Army uniforms when crossing the border. Although this did not completely settle the matter, nothing more was done during the year.⁸³ Difficulties were foreseen in respect to the German Federal law concerning homeless foreigners. Article 2 of this law provided that homeless foreigners who changed their place of ordinary abode from the territory of the German Federal Republic to another country would lose their status as homeless foreigners and all the rights of such persons if they did not re-establish their legal residence in the territory of the Federal Republic within two years.⁸⁴ Since the 6 November 1950 LOFC agreement was effective for five years, and subject to renewal at the end of that period, many labor services personnel would remain outside German territory for longer than the two years provided for in the law, thereby losing the legal status of homeless foreigners conferred upon similar personnel working or residing in displaced persons camps in Germany. Undue hardship would result especially in cases where labor service personnel required long-term hospitalization resulting from nonservice accidents or diseases incurred while in France and were unable to enjoy such social insurance benefits granted to displaced persons remaining in Germany. Since USAREUR authorities realized that after the disbandment of the labor services organization the labor service personnel would be dependent upon their status as homeless foreigners for their security against future unemployment, HICOG was requested to take the necessary steps to exempt labor service personnel from Article 2 of the law, providing they returned to Germany immediately upon termination of their employment by the labor services.⁸⁵ Nothing had been settled by the end of the year. Difficulty arose over medical care for labor service personnel in France. French authorities excluded labor service personnel from French social insurance and the expenditure of Department of the Army appropriated funds for the medical care of labor service personnel for nonservice connected illnesses was not authorized. Labor service personnel in France were therefore without adequate medical care. Protection against nonservice connected injuries could be obtained only at the expense of the individual and labor service personnel could not afford this expense. At the end of the year steps were being taken to authorize the addition of several beds in Army hospitals in France for the care of labor service personnel on the same basis as for military personnel.⁸⁶

⁸³(1) Interv, Mr. C. R. Petrie, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. R. Populaire, LSD Admin Br, 19 May 53. RESTRICTED. (2) USAREUR LSD Jnl File, 3 Sep 52, Item 5, UNCLASSIFIED; 19 Sep 52, Item 2, UNCLASSIFIED; 14 Feb 52, Item 2, CONFIDENTIAL.

⁸⁴German Law Concerning the Legal Status of Homeless Foreigners within the Federal Territory, 25 Apr 51. In USAREUR LSD files.

⁸⁵USAREUR LSD Jnl File, 20 May 52, Item 1. SECRET.

⁸⁶(1) Interv, Mr. C. R. Petrie, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj F. C. Smith, C/USAREUR LSD Admin Br, 19 May 53. SECRET. (2) USAREUR LSD Jnl File, 18 Aug 52, Item 1. SECRET.

53. Planning with Reference to Labor Services

The contractual arrangements between the Western Powers and the German Federal Government provided for the phasing out of the German labor service units within two years after the date of ratification. This would affect some 52 labor service companies and about 12 labor service centers, totaling 11,700 personnel. No major changes were contemplated or recommended in the current over-all labor service organization prior to that date. USAREUR policy was to attempt to maintain the authorized ceiling for labor service spaces (31,000 in the U.S. Zone of Germany), and as spaces were created within this ceiling, principally through the transfer of Polish labor service units to France, to organize additional displaced person units to replace units transferred from the U.S. Zone. This policy was adopted because the United States would continue to have need of civilian labor service personnel after the signing of the contractual agreements and the employment of displaced personnel was far less expensive than the employment of U.S. civilians or military personnel. The organization of additional German units was not contemplated. It was believed that after the phase-out of German units a strength of approximately 15,000 displaced persons could be maintained.⁸⁷ After the contractual agreements came into effect these personnel would be employed by the German Federal Republic.⁸⁸

Section III: Civilian Personnel

54. Strength and Trends

Civilian manpower strength in EUCOM/USAREUR dropped sharply from 265,320 at the beginning of the year to 223,717 at the end of July, after large numbers of German quarters attendants were released, and then rose somewhat to 227,048 by 31 December. Throughout the year all categories of civilian personnel except German employees lagged behind current authorizations. Beginning in September, the strength adjustments required by 1 July 1953 to bring actual strength to tentative FY 1954 authorizations were determined each month. Since these tentative FY 1954 authorizations reflected only the Army budget provisions submitted to the Bureau of the Budget, further adjustments downward would be required if the latter agency or Congress should reduce the over-all or USAREUR figures. In September the over-all civilian personnel reduction necessary to meet over-all

⁸⁷Memo, USAREUR LSD to USAREUR COFS, 20 Nov 52, sub: Labor Services. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR LSD Jnl File, 20 Nov 52, Item 1.

⁸⁸USAREUR LSD Jnl File, 28 Apr 52. SECRET.

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Table 8--Civilian Personnel Strength, 1952*

<u>Category of Personnel</u>	<u>1 Jan 52</u>	<u>30 Apr 52</u>	<u>31 Jul 52</u>	<u>31 Dec 52</u>
<u>Aggregate</u>	<u>265,320</u>	<u>259,846</u>	<u>223,717</u>	<u>227,048</u>
<u>U.S. Civilians - Total</u>	<u>8,216</u>	<u>7,043</u>	<u>5,464</u>	<u>6,025</u>
Army, Air Force, Navy	4,580	4,514	4,096	4,164
HICOG, State Dept.**	1,966	1,000	--	--
Nonappropriated Fund Agencies	1,532	1,529	1,368	1,861
IRO and Affiliated Agencies***	138	--	--	--
<u>European Civilians - Total</u>	<u>5,386</u>	<u>7,314</u>	<u>8,194</u>	<u>10,279</u>
Allied/Neutral	3,100	4,757	5,470	6,563
Labor Service (in France)	1,454	1,872	1,867	2,393
HICOG, State Dept.**	8	0	--	--
Nonappropriated Fund Agencies	601	685	857	1,323
IRO and Affiliated Agencies***	223	0	--	--
<u>Resident Employees in Germany - Total</u>	<u>251,718</u>	<u>245,489</u>	<u>210,059</u>	<u>210,744</u>
Labor Services	27,628	28,416	29,689	29,843
Direct Hire	149,533	149,663	111,255	110,672
Contractual	45,482	40,988	40,854	39,359
Mandatory Cost	7,107	2,461	2,041	1,575
Nonappropriated Fund Agencies	21,968	23,961	26,220	29,295

*Includes DA, AF, Navy elements of EUCOM/USAREUR

**HICOG and State Department civilian personnel are excluded from monthly statistical reports after April 1952. After that date, only personnel with command relationships in EUCOM/USAREUR are included.

***IRO and affiliated agencies phased out in April 1952.

Source: EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, Dec 51, Apr, Jul, and Dec 52. SECRET.

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FY 1954 requirements was determined to be slightly more than 13,000. By the end of the year shortages of personnel in relation to authorized strengths were being reduced by cutting down authorized strengths. As of 31 December a net reduction of 12,808 personnel (representing 10.6 percent net over-strength) was required to reach FY 1954 budgetary figures.⁸⁹

a. U.S. Civilian Personnel. This category of personnel remained fairly constant throughout the year despite the decline of more than 2,000 shown in Table 8. The apparent decrease is chiefly accounted for by the fact that State Department personnel were no longer tabulated after April. Department of the Army civilian actual strength (3,696) on 31 December was still about 16 percent (607) below FY 1954 authorization (4,303).⁹⁰

b. European Civilian Personnel. The year saw a doubling of the number of personnel in this category, from over 5,000 on 1 January to over 10,000 at the end of December. The number in each subgroup was also doubled. Despite these increases, strength adjustments did not keep pace with the increased authorizations entailed by expansion within COMZ and installations along the LOFC. By the end of the year, Allied/neutral employees (including local wage rate (LWR) and continental wage scale (CWS) were 58 percent or over 8,000 short of tentative FY 1954 requirements of 14,300 personnel, COMZ alone being 4,750 spaces short.⁹¹

c. German Civilian Personnel. The largest category of civilian personnel, that of German resident employees, underwent large reductions in 1952 in actual and authorized strengths in anticipation of the expected change in status of the German Federal Republic under the contractual agreements. Excluding German labor service units, German civilians employed in EUCOM/USAREUR, totaled 224,090 at the beginning of 1952, and decreased to 180,901 on 31 December.⁹² Except in February, there was a steady decline through the year in the number of Army Deutsche Mark paid, direct hire employees. The largest decrease, of nearly 35,000 employees, took place between the end of February and the last of July. The withdrawal of certain Deutsche Mark supported activities, including the services of quarters attendants from

⁸⁹(1) USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 31 Dec 52, pp. 5, 17. SECRET. (2) Memos, USAREUR Compt to CINCUSAREUR, 23 Oct, 22 Jan 53, sub: Analysis of the Monthly Statistical Report. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div 319.1 (1952).

⁹⁰(1) EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Statistical Reports, Dec 51 - Dec 52, SECRET. (2) IRS, USAREUR G-3 to USAREUR Hist Div, 15 Jan 53, sub: Civilian Personnel Reports. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR Hist Div 319.1/8 (1952).

⁹¹(1) Ibid. (2) Memo, USAREUR Compt to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Jan 53, sub: Analysis of the Monthly Statistical Report. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div 319.1 (1952).

⁹²EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 31 Dec 51, 31 Dec 52, p. 5. SECRET.

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1 July on, was responsible for the curtailments, particularly in July, when more than 20,000 German civilians were removed from the command's Deutsche Mark payroll.⁹³ The following tabulation gives the number of Army Deutsche Mark paid, direct hire employees of the command (Air Force and Navy personnel are not included) as of the dates shown:

1 January	130,519
31 January	133,970
29 February	135,264
31 March	134,776
30 April	130,455
31 May	127,503
30 June	121,339
31 July	100,502
31 August	100,121
30 September	100,184
31 October	100,019
30 November	99,355
31 December	98,803

To keep pace with the troop augmentation program begun in 1951, ceilings and authorizations for German civilian employees were increased at the beginning of 1952. Actual strength was far short of the ceiling for the first three months of the year. The gap was narrowed considerably in April by a 30,000 space reduction in ceiling. The margin continued to be narrowed by cuts in actual and ceiling strengths until August when there was an 8,000 space difference between the two figures. When FY 1954 authorizations were determined in September, German employees proved to be some 25,000 overstrength. They continued until the end of the year to be above FY 1954 requirements, so that in December they were about 23,000 or close to 31 percent over the 75,000 figure tentatively set for FY 1954.⁹⁴

55. Financing of Civilian Personnel

Total dollar obligations incurred during the calendar year 1952 for civilian personnel costs in Germany and France amounted to \$22,282,240, compared with \$21,504,346 obligated in 1951. Expenditures in 1952 for German civilians employed by the command totaled DM 521,953,292 or \$124,274,593 (converted at the official rate of exchange of 4.2 marks to

⁹³(1) Ibid., 31 Dec 51 to 31 Dec 52. SECRET. (2) EUCOM ltr, 7 May 52, sub: Employment of Domestics in Germany. AG 248 GPA-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) EUCOM ltr, 12 May 52, sub: Changes in Appropriated DM Support. AG 120 COM. RESTRICTED.

⁹⁴EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, Apr, Aug, Sep, Dec 52. SECRET.

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the dollar).⁹⁵ In calendar year 1952 \$31,335,936 was paid to nonappropriated fund civilian employees in USAREUR/EUCOM.⁹⁶

<u>Nonappropriated Fund Employees</u>	<u>1952 Expenditures</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>\$31,335,936</u>
<u>Germany</u>	
U.S. Civilians	6,770,232
Allied/neutral	240,264
German	22,757,196
<u>France</u>	
U.S. Civilians	477,252
Allied/neutral	-----
French	1,090,992

The average monthly salaries of nonappropriated fund employees paid in 1952 showed significant variations between France and Germany. For example, a Department of the Army civilian in Germany earned an average of \$399 per month, whereas his counterpart in France had an average monthly earning of \$491; and Allied/neutral employee averaged \$213 a month in Germany, but \$272 in France. The cost of living allowances paid in France to these two categories of personnel accounts for the regional difference. The variation in the average monthly salary paid to the LWR employee (\$77 in Germany, \$119 in France) is attributable to the variation in labor legislation in these two countries.⁹⁷ There was also a wide variation between salaries of Department of the Army civilians and local wage rate civilians. The average yearly salary paid to a Department of the Army civilian employee on an appropriated fund basis varied from \$4,650 to \$4,850 whereas indigenous personnel in Germany earned an average of \$928 to \$950 a year, and those in France \$1,400 to \$1,600. These figures show clearly one reason why both the Department of Defense

⁹⁵(1) Interv, Mr. R. Sher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. R. V. Wilson, Jr., USAREUR Off of the Compt, 5 Jun 53. RESTRICTED. (2) EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, p. 128. SECRET.

⁹⁶Expenditure figures are compiled on a fiscal year basis. The total given here for the calendar year was especially calculated for this report. Interv, Mr. R. Sher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj C. L. Jones, USAREUR Off of the Compt, 5 Jun 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁹⁷Ibid.

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and the command endorsed the maximum utilization of indigenous personnel. Another was that this policy comported with the over-all objective of the manpower savings program to ease the drain on continental United States manpower resources.⁹⁸

56. Personnel Problems and Policies

a. Administration. Civilian personnel operations were affected by the reorganization of the command in December 1952, involving the reorganization of USAREUR into area commands. The narrowing down of the delegations of authority through fewer lines of command was expected to ultimately simplify work at command headquarters and thus result in saving dollars by reducing the number of persons employed in the administration of civilian personnel. Such savings were not yet discernible in the short interval between 1 December and the close of the year.⁹⁹

(1) Changes in the Administration of Civilian Personnel. Several transfers of authority for civilian personnel administration within the command were made in 1952. Authority for the personnel administration of Department of the Army and Allied/neutral civilian employees of the 7887 American Graves Registration Detachment, which moved from France to Frankfurt, was transferred from the 7961 EUCOM Detachment to the Frankfurt Military Post on 6 January 1952.¹⁰⁰ Effective 1 April 1952 the civilian personnel staff of the Twelfth Air Force was disbanded and the functions of that staff merged with those of USAFE. All operational offices under the Twelfth Air Force were placed under the staff supervision of Headquarters, USAFE. Command headquarters revoked the delegation of authority for German civilian personnel administration from the Twelfth Air Force and redelegated it to Headquarters, USAFE.¹⁰¹ The authority and responsibility for civilian employee administration in the 7961 EUCOM Detachment was delegated to EUCOM COMZ on 3 August 1952.¹⁰² The authority for civilian personnel administration at the Wuerzburg Military Post was transferred on 1 October 1952 from the post to the Chief, Civilian Personnel Branch, Personnel and Administration Division, USAREUR.¹⁰³ USAREUR COMZ assumed responsibility for civilian employee administration of the 7754 Finance

⁹⁸Brief for Asst SD Anna Rosenberg, 21 Jul 52, sub: Comptroller Program with Particular Emphasis on Civilian Manpower. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 337 Briefings (1952), Vol. I, Item 14.

⁹⁹Interv, Mr. R. Sher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Messrs. S. Sutherland and D. I. Robinson, USAREUR G-1 Civ Pers Br, 19 Feb 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁰⁰USAREUR P&A Div Jnl, 5 Jan 52, Item 1. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁰¹Memo for recd, USAREUR P&A Div Jnl, 11 Mar 52, Item 3, Incl 1, p. 12. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁰²EUCOM P&A Div Jnl, 21 Jul 52, Item 3. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁰³USAREUR ltr, 29 Sep 52, sub: Delegation of Civilian Personnel Authority. AG 230 GPA-APO. RESTRICTED.

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Office, U.S. Army, (FOUSA), Paris, on 26 October 1952, although 7754 FOUSA retained payroll authority.¹⁰⁴ Administration of U.S. civilian employees of Headquarters, US EUCOM, was assigned to CINCUSAREUR on 13 October 1952 under U.S. Civil Service regulations and Department of the Army Element, US EUCOM, civilian personnel regulations and directives, but CINCEUR delegated this authority to Frankfurt Military Post.¹⁰⁵ Effective 1 December 1952, in connection with the reorganization of the USAREUR area commands, the Commanding General, Northern Area Command, was delegated authority for the administration of all civilian employees of organizations formerly administered by Frankfurt and Wuerzburg Military Posts, and Bamberg Military Subpost of Nuernberg Military Post. The Commanding General, Southern Area Command, was delegated similar authority for civilian personnel of organizations formerly administered by the Munich, Stuttgart, Augsburg, Garmisch, and Nuernberg (less Bamberg) Military Posts and the Karlsruhe Subpost of Heidelberg Military Post. The administration of U.S. and Allied/neutral employees in the Bamberg and Karlsruhe Military Subposts formerly the responsibility of the Nuernberg and Heidelberg Military Posts, respectively, was made the responsibility of the respective area commanders. Allocation of spaces and funds for this function remained unchanged for administrative purposes, but the civilian personnel programs were under the area commander's control as operational entities.¹⁰⁶ By Department of the Army instructions, on 1 July 1952 responsibility in the command for U.S. and Allied/neutral civilian payroll accounting was transferred from the director of Personnel and Administration Division to the EUCOM/USAREUR Comptroller. The latter was made responsible for the function of processing civilian payrolls for salaries due U.S. and Allied/neutral employees paid from appropriated funds, for implementing civilian payroll accounting policies and procedures, and for technical supervision of civilian payroll activity. The Personnel and Administration Division director was to retain responsibility for the issuance of policies and implementing instructions concerning civilian employees' entitlement to pay and was to have regulatory responsibility for and technical supervision of maintenance of leave records and time and attendance reporting.¹⁰⁷

(2) The Whitten Amendment. Though the Whitten Amendment to the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1952 was effective retroactively to 1 November 1951 and its implementation begun in 1951, the impact of the amendment was not felt until 1952. Its principal provision required civil service employees to be in grade one year before advancement to the next

¹⁰⁴USAREUR P&A Jnl, 10 Oct 52, Item 1. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., 17 Oct 52, Item 1. RESTRICTED.

¹⁰⁶USAREUR ltr, 1 Dec 52, sub: Authority and Responsibility for Civilian Employee Administration. AG 230 GPA-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁰⁷EUCOM ltr, 27 Jun 52, sub: Jurisdictional Transfer of Department of the Army U.S. and Allied Neutral Civilian Payroll Accounting. AG 248 COM-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

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higher grade. Normally, promotions could not be in excess of two grades. The law enabled the command to retain employees with the longest periods of Federal service in the event of large reductions in force. However, because of the many difficult problems of interpretation, an unusual amount of implementation resulted, involving expenses in the central payroll, personnel, and auditing offices of the command, and undoubtedly leading to an increase in dollar expenditures, though no actual figures were available. There was no means of estimating the effect on either the morale or the retention and recruitment of civilian personnel.¹⁰⁸ The Whitten Amendment also furnished the legislative authority for revised annual position reviewing and reporting, which USAREUR implemented in December 1952. The USAREUR implementation provided that classification survey activities were to be co-ordinated with organization, manpower controls, and methods analysis. Subordinate commands were to review existing positions annually to determine whether all positions were actually needed. Effective 30 June 1953 each commander was to be required to certify at the end of each twelve months covered by these reviews that all positions under his jurisdiction had been reviewed for necessity, those found unnecessary abolished, and classifications and grades reviewed and corrected as found necessary. The first review was to cover the period from June 1952 to June 1953.¹⁰⁹

(3) Transfer of German Payroll Function. Since 1 October 1948 U.S. payroll offices had performed the function of paying German and non-German resident employees of the occupation forces in the U.S. Zone of Germany. In contemplation of contractual arrangements with the German Federal Republic, negotiations had been initiated on 7 December 1951 between Headquarters, EUCOM, and the West German Federal Ministry of Finance to effect the transfer of that function to German authorities. Agreement was reached in subsequent discussions in January and February 1952 between representatives of EUCOM, Federal and Land ministries, and the Senate of Berlin on the details involved in the mechanics of executing such a transfer. After a preliminary difficulty involving the temporary use of U.S. payroll office space by the Germans was resolved, the transfer was put into effect on 1 July 1952.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸Interv, Mr. R. Sher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Messrs. S. Sutherland and D. I. Robinson, USAREUR G-1 Civ Pers Br, 19 Feb 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁰⁹(1) Ibid. (2) USAREUR ltr, 23 Dec 52, sub: Implementation of Change 1, Department of the Army Civilian Personnel Regulation P2, 19 September 1952. AG 230.418 GPA-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹¹⁰(1) Ltr, Fed Min of Fin (Under-Secy Hartmann) to Gen Handy, 16 Feb 52, sub: Re-transfer of Payroll Functions to German Authorities. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) IRS, Dir, EUCOM P&A Div to EUCOM COFS, 31 Mar 52, sub: Transfer of German Payroll Function to German Authority. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SCS 230 Ger (1952), Item 8A, and atchd. (3) USAREUR P&A Div Jnl, 1 Jul 52. UNCLASSIFIED.

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(4) Christmas Bonus. In anticipation of the coming Christmas holiday in 1952, German trade unions, employee groups, and employees strongly urged the payment of a Christmas bonus to all German employees of the U.S. forces in Germany. Command policy had been that neither Christmas nor other special bonuses were to be paid to German or non-German resident employees of the American forces since wage scales in the U.S. Zone consisted of basic wages and a percentage increase to cover specified extra allowances including a Christmas bonus. A combination of circumstances, however, seemed to challenge the validity of the command position. The current wage scales were admittedly lagging behind the "going rate" in German industry. Employees in German industry in some instances did receive Christmas bonuses, although the practice was neither the rule nor the exception. The Federal Republic had departed from previous practice by passing legislation in 1952 entitling its civil servants to a Christmas bonus payment. The British and French authorities approved of the application of this law to German employees in their respective zones, thus making German employees of the American forces in the Western Area Command eligible for Christmas bonus payments because French wage scales prevailed in that area. Employees of U.S. forces in Berlin were also eligible for a Christmas bonus under Allied Kommandatura regulations.¹¹¹ The Office of the High Commissioner of Germany (HICOG) was asked by USAREUR to suggest possible courses of action in the event of strike votes, threatened strikes, or actual strikes against the U.S. forces.¹¹² At the end of the year the command was still awaiting a reply from HICOG. Fortunately, the nonpayment of a Christmas bonus produced no untoward effects. The situation was unquestionably relieved by the knowledge that the command had entered into negotiations with the West German Government at the end of the year to determine an equalization payment to German and non-German resident employees (excepting those already eligible for the bonus). Pending a final formula, expected early in 1953, a preliminary payment of DM 50 was authorized to each employee on the rolls as of 1 September 1952.¹¹³

b. Changed Conditions of Employment. The provisions of the Annual and Sick Leave Act of 1951, effective 6 January 1952, inaugurated a new system of graduated leave for all Federal Government employees including those in the command. Employees were not entitled to annual leave benefits until after completion of an unbroken period of employment of 90

¹¹¹(1) IRS, Dir USAREUR P&A Div to USAREUR COFS, 8 Dec 52, sub: Payment of Christmas Bonuses to German Employees of the U.S. Forces. UNCLASSIFIED. In SGS 230 Ger (1952), Vol. II, Item 40A atchd. (2) USAREUR Wkly Dir 20, 12 Dec 52, Sec IX. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹¹²Ltr, C/USAREUR G-1 Civ Pers Br to HICOG, attn of Labor Attache, 28 Nov 52. UNCLASSIFIED. Copy in SGS 230 Ger (1952), Vol. II, Item 40A atchd, Tab C.

¹¹³Jnl, USAREUR P&A Div, 22 Dec 52, Item 1. UNCLASSIFIED.

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calendar days, when the leave earnings were credited retroactively to the beginning of the first complete pay period following appointment. Annual leave was accrued on a pay-period basis depending upon each employee's total creditable service, which was determined as follows: Category 4 or employees with less than 3 years' service accrued 4 hours each pay-period (amounting to 13 days a year); Category 6 or those with 3 but less than 15 years' service accrued 6 hours every pay-period and 10 hours for the last pay period of the year (totaling 20 days a year); and Category 8 employees with more than 15 years' service accrued 8 hours every pay period (or 26 days a year). Previously all employees had earned 26 day's leave a year regardless of the length of service. Military service as well as civilian Federal employment were included in determining leave category status. Leave accumulations were restricted generally to 90 days for employees in overseas commands whose employment agreements provided for their return to the United States at government expense, and to 60 days for most other employees. Sick leave accrual was reduced from 15 to 13 days a year (one half day each pay period) but no limitation was placed on accumulation.¹¹⁴ Nonappropriated fund employees in the command were covered by the new leave regulations in September 1952.¹¹⁵ Re-employment leave to the United States for Department of the Army civilians overseas was discontinued by a Comptroller of the Army decision which found no legal authority for the practice after 16 August 1951. The ruling did not apply to employees appointed before that date.¹¹⁶ Among other changes in conditions of employment, in addition to those arising from the Annual and Sick Leave Act of 1951, were revised regulations on the transportation of civilian employees and their dependents and the shipment of personal property. After August 1951 no legal basis was found for the practice of moving dependents and household goods prior to the movement of the employee, and in consequence such movement in 1952 was made at the time of return or subsequently. Locally hired American civilian employees who had completed an employment agreement of stipulated duration were authorized government transportation to their point of residence at the time of hire. After September 1952 U.S. civilian employees were no longer permitted to ship their personally owned automobiles to their overseas stations at government expense; cars could be shipped commercially or through MSTs at prescribed rates. However, persons in overseas commands owning automobiles as of 1 September were authorized movement back to the United States at no expense to themselves other than dock handling charges.¹¹⁷ A voluntary group hospitalization

¹¹⁴(1) DA CPR 11, Leave, 14 Apr 52. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Part 11, EC(Army)-Manual 700-1. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹¹⁵USAREUR Wkly Dir 10, 3 Oct 52, Sec III. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹¹⁶USAREUR P&A Div Jnl, 7 Feb 52, Item 2. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹¹⁷(1) Interv, Mr. R. Sher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Messrs. S. Sutherland and D. I. Robinson, USAREUR G-1 Civ Pers Br, 19 Feb 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) EUCOM ltr, 6 Mar 52, sub: Government Transportation of Locally Hired Civilian Employees. AG 510 GPA-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) DA CPR T3, Civilian Travel, 31 Jan 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

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plan to be administered by the Indemnity Insurance Company of North America was authorized by the command effective January 1952 and renewed for 1953. The negotiations which led to the establishment of the plan were begun in 1951 after the policy of providing free Army medical service to American civilian employees in overseas commands was discontinued. Civilian personnel of U.S. Forces, Austria (USFA); Trieste, U.S. Troops (TRUST); and U.S. Air Forces, Europe (USAFE), were also included in the plan.¹¹⁸ Allied/neutral employees were no longer authorized payments of allowances and grants of free living quarters after June 1952. Wage rates were scaled upward on 1 July to compensate for the loss of salary involved for these employees and those in nonappropriated fund agencies.¹¹⁹

c. Recruitment of Personnel. The need for technically trained civilian personnel, particularly in the line of communications installations in France, was urgently felt in 1952. The policy prohibiting the hiring of Allied/neutral civilian employees in France was rescinded in April 1952 as a result of both the critical shortage of personnel in COMZ and the difficulties encountered in recruiting qualified American personnel. Recruitment difficulties were attributed to stateside procedure which produced prolonged delays and to the inadequacy of recruitment media in Europe. In addition, the command headquarters was aware that the discontinuance of re-employment leave rights might hinder the recruitment and retention of personnel in the command. The Department of Defense found it necessary, in fact, to submit suggested legislation to Congress requesting the re-establishment of such leave, but by the end of the year no relief had been granted. The effect of the Whitten Amendment upon the recruitment and retention of personnel had not yet become clear by the end of 1952.¹²⁰

57. The Contractual Relations and German Civilian Personnel

The use of German and non-German resident civilian personnel by the military forces of the United States (as well as of France and Britain) in the Federal Republic of Germany under the contractual agreements which were being negotiated in 1952 was defined in Articles 44 and 45 of the "Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany."¹²¹ Since the contractual

¹¹⁸(1) Interv cited above. (2) EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, p. 136. SECRET.

¹¹⁹(1) USAREUR P&A Div Jnl, 3 Jul 52, Item 2; 7 Aug 52, Item 3. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR Wkly Dir 16, 14 Nov 52, Sec III. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹²⁰(1) Ltr, EUCOM COFS to Vice COFSA, 26 Jan 52, sub: Recruitment of Technically Trained Civilian Employees. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 230 (1952), Vol. I. (2) USAREUR P&A Div Jnl, 28 Apr 52, Item 2. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) USAREUR ltr, 2 Dec 52, sub: Leave to the United States for US Civilian Employees. HACCP 461.01. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹²¹Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany and Related Conventions, pp. 80 - 81.

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agreements were not ratified in 1952, the terms of the above articles did not go into effect and the administration of German and non-German resident civilian employees continued to be governed by the current Laender wage tariffs and pertinent directives of the command. However, meetings were held between EUCOM/USAREUR representatives and German authorities during the year to develop uniform working conditions and tariffs for Western Germany. Considerable progress was reported, and it appeared that under Western Germany's new autonomous status the difficulties attending the administration of the wage scales and employment conditions of German and non-German civilian employees would be appreciably lessened.¹²²

58. Management Problems and Programs

Cutting costs and corners with regard to efficient manpower utilization and control continued to be an important preoccupation of the command in 1952. Consciousness of the need for efficiency and elimination of waste were exemplified by the various projects of the management improvement program operated by the Office of the Comptroller.

a. Work Simplification and Employee Suggestion Programs. The purpose of the work simplification program was to promote management consciousness in supervisory personnel by on-the-job training in the use of easily understood and proven management improvement techniques. Work simplification techniques were to be applied involving periodic and systematic review by supervisory personnel to appraise efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and to bring about improved operating methods and procedures, reduction in personnel, material and space, and transportation requirements. The purpose of the employee suggestion program was to identify and reward military personnel and civilian supervisors and employees whose superior accomplishments or other contributions to efficiency, economy, or operations merited recognition. American, Allied/neutral, German and non-German, and French civilian employees were eligible for cash awards in dollars, Deutsche marks, or francs or were authorized special honors, certificates of merit, or other recognition. The nature and amount of the award depended upon the estimated or potential savings involved in the suggestion.¹²³ Figures on

¹²²(1) EUCOM ltr, 9 Jul 52, sub: Civilian Employee Administration - German and Non-German Resident Employees. AG 230 GPA-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Memo, EUCOM P&A Div to EUCOM COFS, 18 Apr 52, sub: EUCOM Wage Board Conference (German). UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 230 Ger (1952), Item 19. (3) USAREUR P&A Div Jnl, 25 July 52, Item 1. UNCLASSIFIED. (4) USAREUR ltr, 16 Oct 52, sub: Special Employment Conditions, Pay Scales, and Locality Indexes for German and Non-German Resident Employees. AG 248 GPA-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹²³EUCOM Cir 33, 6 Feb 52, sub: Management Improvement, Work Simplification, and Efficiency Awards Programs. UNCLASSIFIED.

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both programs for 1951 and 1952 are shown in the following table.¹²⁴

<u>Project</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1952</u>
Trainers	90	36
Supervisors trained	3,749	2,034
Supervisors to be trained	4,013	5,193
Work Simplification proposals received	4,727	3,179
Work Simplification proposals adopted	1,160	1,659
Employee Suggestion proposals received	3,940	4,473
Employee Suggestion proposals adopted	326	1,676
Estimated Savings*	\$ 587,306 DM 7,748,513	\$ 725,183 DM 10,412,725
Awards Paid	\$ 4,466 DM 130,283	2,681 132,724

*Estimated savings are potential first year savings on adopted proposals, including work simplification ideas which may ultimately appear in efficiency awards program.

Of the 7,562 work simplification and employee suggestions received in 1952, 6,328 (83 percent) originated with civilian employees; of the 3,335 proposals adopted, 2,611 (78 percent) were of civilian origin. The civilian employee contribution was two and a half times as great in proportion to strength, as that of military personnel.¹²⁵

b. Manpower Utilization and Control. The Department of the Army informed the command in March 1952 that the critical manpower situation which the Army was expected to face made it necessary for every echelon to establish the most economical manpower base possible and sound techniques

¹²⁴(1) USAREUR Off Compt Mgt Bul, 15 Jan 53, Vol. V, No. 1, pp. 12 - 13; (2) Memo, USAREUR to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Jan 53, sub: Analysis of Monthly Statistical Report. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div 319.1 (1952); (3) Interv, Mr. R. Sher, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. K. D. Pithey, USAREUR Off of Compt Mgt Br, 5 Jun 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹²⁵Memo, USAREUR Compt to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Jan 53, sub: Analysis of Monthly Statistical Report. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div 319.1 (1952).

of manpower control. All major commands were required to submit "Manpower Utilization Program Progress Reports" every fiscal quarter and to conduct annual on-the-site reviews of manpower utilizations and appraisals of the manpower requirements of using facilities. The reports were to include a record of all activities surveyed and those scheduled for survey in the succeeding quarters; significant changes in the organization for manpower control in major headquarters and subcommands and installations, and the staffing of this organization; major developments in control procedures, systems and techniques, including requirements determination and the allocation and reallocation of personnel resources to conform with varying workloads and changing missions; management improvement projects; and copies of regulations, directives, policy statements, instructions, operating procedures, staffing guides, forms, and other matter published by the command.¹²⁶ The current Department of the Army survey program was instituted in this command on 1 June 1952, which meant that the first year's survey program would be completed by 31 May 1953. However, in the course of the seven months of 1952 during which the program operated, fifty-nine surveys were completed and thirty-three of these approved. The approved surveys covered activities involving a total authorized strength of 29,034 and resulted in a total net savings of 787 spaces, distributed as follows:¹²⁷

<u>Category</u>	<u>Total Spaces Saved in Percent</u>	<u>Number of Spaces Saved</u>	<u>Spaces Added</u>
LWR	41	325	-
Labor Service & other cmd agencies	40	315	-
Enlisted Men	11	90	-
Dollar paid civilian employees	6	47	-
Officer	2	17	-
Nonappropriated Fund employees	-	-	8

Until 1 October 1952, the Office of the Comptroller, USAREUR, was the staff division responsible for staff supervision of the Manpower Utilization Survey Program as well as statistical control and the preparation and submission of required reports to the Department of the Army. After that date, the USAREUR Budget Division of the Office of the Comptroller relinquished to

¹²⁶ DA ltr, 7 Mar 52, sub: Activities to be Surveyed Annually
AGAO-S 320.2 (19 Feb 52) GI-M. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹²⁷ Memo, USARUER Compt to CINCUSAREUR, 22 Jan 53, sub: Analysis of the Monthly Statistical Report. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div 319.1 (1952).

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the command's Operation, Plans, Organization and Training Division the function of controlling and allocating civilian manpower spaces. The transfer centralized all manpower control functions, including the responsibility for requests for allocation of spaces, all reports, and publication of policy.¹²⁸ This same centralization plan authorized the Director of OPOT Division to establish control of German manpower on a "space" rather than a "fund" basis, thus making possible a return to the method of control in effect until 1947.

Section IV: Morale, Welfare, and Discipline

59. Status of Morale, Welfare, and Discipline

a. Morale and Welfare. Since the factors contributing to morale, welfare, and discipline encompass all the activities of the daily life of the members of the command, it is impossible to place quantitative values upon all the individual factors in determining the status of morale, welfare, and discipline. Any discussion of this subject must therefore be an arbitrary one, including consideration of only those factors which can most readily be assigned values. Maj. Gen. E. T. Williams, USAREUR chief of staff, in a report submitted to the Deputy Commander in Chief, US EUCOM, shortly after the close of 1952 stated that the high degree of morale in the command was demonstrated by the fitness of the command for the performance of its assigned duties, by the general over-all state of well-being within the command, by the excellent record achieved in training tests and field exercises, and by the excellent statistical record in activities normally associated with morale and discipline.¹²⁹

b. Factors Contributing to Morale. General Williams reported as follows regarding factors contributing most to the morale of the command:

(1) Welfare and Recreation Activities. The command's excellent welfare and recreation programs were of outstanding importance.

¹²⁸(1) USAREUR ltrs, 3 Oct, 5 Nov, 13 Dec 52, sub: Activities to be Surveyed Annually. AG 320.2 COM-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) CINC's Wkly Staff Conf 21, 23 Sep 52, Comments by Gen O'Neill, DCOFS Admin, p. 3. SECRET.

¹²⁹Ltr, USAREUR COFS to Dep US CINCEUR, 19 Mar 53, sub: Status of Morale, United States Army, Europe. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 330.11 (1953), Vol. I, Item 5.

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(2) Mess Facilities. The excellent messes and messing facilities in the command constituted perhaps the most outstanding single factor affecting troop morale. In France and Germany it was possible to supplement the standard Army ration with locally available fresh foods, dairy products, and other items. In most instances messes and messing facilities were rated highly by inspector general teams.

(3) Extra Duties. Second to the messes in importance to morale was the reducing of additional duty requirements. Within USAREUR units, required additional duties in 1952 were kept to a minimum consistent with administrative and operational necessity. The availability of local labor made possible the employment of unskilled personnel on a voluntary contribution basis for the performance of such duties as kitchen police, fireman, janitorial service, etc.

(4) Support Facilities. The support facilities for military and civilian personnel and their dependents in Germany were for the most part excellent. Most troops were housed in permanent type buildings with excellent shower, latrine, and messing facilities. Although crowded conditions existed in some casernes, most troop barracks allowed for a minimum of 50 square feet per man. Nearly every caserne contained a club, chapel, bowling alley, library, gymnasium, and often a theater. Post exchanges were located within easy reach and contained barber shops, tailors, and cleaning and pressing facilities. Personnel authorized to have dependents in the command were assigned adequate quarters, either in requisitioned housing or in newly constructed apartments, and commissaries were available for their use. Facilities in France were not as complete as in Germany, but much progress was made in providing for the most urgent needs during 1952. (Pars. 68a, 68b-1, 60b.)

(5) Education and Travel. The educational and travel opportunities in Europe also contributed to morale. The Special Activities Division in co-operation with commercial travel agencies arranged tours to many of the countries in Europe. These tours were planned to fit the interest, time, and pocketbook of the soldier and his family. Many persons, of course, followed their own travel plans. The U.S. Armed Forces Institute (USAFI) and the European branch of the University of Maryland provided opportunities for education at high school and college levels (pars. 60c, 63).¹³⁰

c. Factors Adversely Affecting Morale. Although the state of morale remained high during 1952 General Williams reported that some conditions were prejudicial to morale.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

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(1) Promotion Situation. On account of budget and manpower limitations, stringent eligibility requirements, and an inordinate number of high ranking noncommissioned officers in the replacement stream, the promotion of enlisted men was extremely slow (par. 43).

(2) Reclassification of Enlisted Men. The forced reclassification of enlisted personnel from their trained career fields in MCS's for which the command had a surplus to fields in which the command was critically short was an adverse factor (par. 42d).

(3) Leaves and Passes. Command morale was also adversely affected by administrative restrictions on the granting of passes. During 1952 the command continued to follow the pass system begun in 1951 which provided that not more than 15 percent of a unit's present-for-duty strength could be granted overnight passes. Personnel residing with their families in government quarters were exempted from these restrictions. Of the 85 percent subject to the restrictions, 50 percent had to be available for duty within thirty minutes, and the remaining 35 percent within two hours. These restrictions were considered essential to the performance of the command mission and their adverse effect upon morale was partially offset by the command's active recreational program and the recreational facilities available within the casernes.

(4) Forced Separation of Families. The forced separation from his family is never completely reconciled or accepted in the mind of the soldier. During 1951 and 1952 the burden placed upon existing dependent housing facilities by the rapid augmentation of U.S. forces in Europe made necessary a waiting period for quarters varying from four to twelve months depending upon the assignment location in Germany.

(5) Living Conditions in France. In France morale was generally lower than elsewhere in the command. The morale of personnel stationed in France with dependents was adversely affected by the high cost of living, the extreme scarcity of suitable family housing, and the personal inconveniences caused by the lack of central heating, inadequate plumbing facilities, inconvenient means of transportation, and a standard of living generally lower than that in the United States. In addition administrative support facilities for personnel in France were not as adequate as in Germany. For the most part permanent type housing facilities for troops were unavailable or were substandard. Although an extensive troop billet construction and rehabilitation program was pursued in 1952, the rapid augmentation of personnel and installations in the Communications Zone forced many troops to live in semipermanent housing or in tents (par. 142).¹³¹

¹³¹ Ibid.

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60. Welfare and Recreation Program

The problem of maintaining high morale is a complex and difficult one under any circumstances. In oversea commands the problem is immeasurably increased. Differences in the customs, interests, and backgrounds of the troops from those of the citizens of the country in which they are stationed make necessary an extensive recreational and welfare program based upon American habits and preferences. Originally this program was entirely American in nature, but as the occupation continued the program was expanded to include continental sports and diversified activities which not only broadened the program, but encouraged a closer association between Germans and Americans. General Williams attributed the high degree of morale in the command in a large part to the efforts made by the command to foster an integrated recreation program. This program consisted primarily of the European Exchange System (EES), the motion picture service, the special services program, the command information and education program, and the operation of the recreation areas at Garmisch and Berchtesgaden.¹³²

a. AFGA Welfare Board. In September 1952 the EUCOM Welfare Board was renamed the Armed Forces Germany Austria (AFGA) Welfare Board, but its duties remained unchanged. The AFGA Welfare Board was responsible to the Commander in Chief, USAREUR, and administered, supervised, and safeguarded the AFGA Welfare Fund which originated in the reserves from the European Exchange System, the European Motion Picture Service, The Stars and Stripes, and officer and noncommissioned officer clubs in Germany, Austria, and France. Nonappropriated funds were allocated by the AFGA Welfare Board for the support of the Armed Forces Network, Blue Danube Network, AFGA Special Services Program, USAREUR and USFA dependent schools, and AFGA scouting activities. Each of these activities had a board which supervised the utilization of the funds under broad directives set up by the AFGA Welfare Board. Funds not necessary for the support of these activities were prorated to the USAREUR Welfare Fund, the USAFE Welfare Fund, and the USFA Welfare Fund on a strength basis. The USAREUR Welfare Fund was supervised and administered by the USAREUR Welfare Board which made grants to the USAREUR Special Services Fund; the area, district, and USAREUR COMZ central welfare funds; USAREUR Education Fund; and the Seventh Army Central Welfare Fund.¹³³

b. European Exchange System. The European Exchange System in 1952 continued to provide normal exchange facilities for the U.S. Army, Europe, and the U.S. Forces, Austria, with particular emphasis on the establishment

¹³²Ibid.

¹³³Interv, Mr. C. R. Petrie, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. E. Q. Adams, USAREUR SAD Welfare Fund, 28 May 52. RESTRICTED.

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of outlets and adequate service for small and outlying installations. Maneuver areas and isolated troop concentrations were serviced periodically by mobile exchanges. To meet augmentation needs, installations of all types were increased by 22 percent, from a total of 1,894 at the end of 1951 to 2,306 on 31 December 1952. The breakdown of EES installations at the end of 1952 was as follows:

	<u>Retail Stores</u>	<u>Food</u>	<u>Other Activities</u>
<u>Totals</u>	<u>483</u>	<u>529</u>	<u>1,294</u>
Germany	408	467	1,236
Austria	37	44	45
France	38	18	13

Sales increased from \$111,626,593 in 1951 to \$161,659,357 in 1952, an increase of 45 percent. Despite the considerable increase in the number of installations and in the volume of sales, the total personnel employed increased only 23 percent, while nonresident support personnel actually decreased 10 percent. In the interest of more efficient operation the EES in 1952 reorganized its headquarters and revamped the merchandise warehousing and distribution systems. A program for the centralization of warehouses initiated on 1 June 1952 was expected to result in a saving of \$112,000. To reduce capital investment in merchandise inventory, steps were taken in 1952 to have continental and U.S. vendors warehouse their products for the EES. This resulted in the availability of a wider variety of merchandise and reduced EES expenses by eliminating pilferage and reducing insurance costs. Also in 1952 a customer information service was created to disseminate information regarding EES products. The EES continued to be a major contributor to the welfare fund, declaring a dividend of \$7,525,000 for FY 1953. This dividend was being paid at the rate of \$600,000 per month.¹³⁴

c. Special Services Program. Although all phases of the Army special services program were expanded during 1952 to meet the needs of the augmentation program, the cost of the program dropped more than 25 percent below the cost at the commencement of the augmentation program. During 1952 the cost of the entire recreation program amounted to 10 cents per man per day.

¹³⁴(1) Ltr, USAREUR COFS to Dep US CINCEUR, 9 Mar 53, sub: Status of Morale, United States Army, Europe. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 330.11 (1953), Vol. I, Item 5. (2) USAREUR SAD Comd Rept, 1952, Pt. I, par. 1a; Pt. II, Sec. V, par 2b; and Pt. II, Sec. VI, par. 2a. CONFIDENTIAL.

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Of this amount, approximately 6 cents was provided by nonappropriated welfare funds, 3 cents came from occupation cost Deutsche Mark funds, and 1 cent came from appropriated funds.¹³⁵ Increased soldier participation was encouraged during 1952 by a heightened promotion program and through clinics which encouraged and trained personnel in recreation activities and in self-entertainment. Financing of the program continued to be problematic because of uncertainty over the availability and source of necessary funds.¹³⁶

(1) Service Clubs and Other Facilities. In 1952 there was an over-all increase of 24 percent in special service facilities. On 31 December 1952 the command operated the following number of installations, not including bowling alleys:

	<u>Service Clubs</u>	<u>Libraries</u>	<u>Crafts Shops</u>	<u>Photo Labs</u>
<u>Totals</u>	<u>109</u>	<u>195</u>	<u>88</u>	<u>109</u>
USAREUR (Germany)	100	181	87	105
COMZ (France)	9	14	1	4

Service clubs provided a varied and well-rounded recreation program that included both indoor and outdoor activities. The clubs, which were open 7 days a week, 12 to 14 hours a day, were located in cities, casernes, and training areas and were staffed completely by American women recruited from the United States and trained in recreational work. During the year nineteen additional service clubs were built, an increase of 21 percent over the previous year. Average daily attendance increased from 45,801 in December 1951 to 58,271 in December 1952. Twelve additional crafts shops were made available, an increase of 16 percent, and participation in the crafts program increased more than 130 percent, from 578,965 persons in 1951 to 1,334,658 in 1952. Twenty-three additional photo labs were equipped, resulting in a 27 percent increase in participation over 1951. The number of libraries and deposit book collections increased 20 percent, from 298 in 1951 to 349 on 31 December 1952. Average daily attendance at libraries increased from 9,178 as of 31 December 1951 to 13,399 at the end of 1952. In order to offer a larger reading selection the total number of books in the command was increased by 23 percent, from 510,468 to 626,180.¹³⁷

¹³⁵Ltr, USAREUR COFS to Dep US CINCEUR, 9 Mar 53, cited above.

¹³⁶USAREUR SAD Comd Rept, 1952, Pt. I, par. 1a. CONFIDENTIAL.

¹³⁷Ibid., Pt. II, Sec. V, par. 2d. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Ltr, USAREUR COFS to Dep US CINCEUR, 9 Mar 53, cited above.

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(2) Athletic Program. In 1952 the command sponsored the world's largest organized athletic program, with an estimated participation of 400,000 persons per week. The principal objective governing the athletic program was mass participation. Conferences were organized in all sports, and conference champions competed against each other to produce a command champion in each major sport. In addition many of the teams participated in international meets organized by the International Council of Military Sports. During the year the major organized sports were baseball, football, softball, touch-football, basketball, track, boxing, swimming and diving, golf, tennis, ping-pong, bowling, soccer, and skiing. Participation in international competition was expanded in June with the organization of the first Army soccer conference. Sports clinics were conducted in baseball, softball, swimming and diving, touch-football, football, basketball, and boxing to train officials, coaches, and other personnel from USAREUR, USAFE, Twelfth Air Force, USFA, and TRUST. Bowling was one of the most popular of sports; during the year the number of bowling installations was increased by 14 percent and of bowling alleys by 23 percent. USAREUR also continued to service outside installations and alleys in Tripoli, Trieste, Asmara, and the Azores. The bowling alleys were purchased, installed and serviced by nonappropriated funds and were self-supporting. Bowling participation averages in 1952 approximated 1,000 lines per single alley, per month.¹³⁸

(3) Entertainment Program. During 1952 self-entertainment programs were stressed. Field entertainment directors with experience in all aspects of stagecraft worked directly with the soldiers in producing, directing, and writing shows. There were 641 formal soldier shows organized during 1952 (a 1,125 percent increase over 1951), and 1,846 more performances were given in 1952 than in 1951. Informal soldier shows numbering 1,887 were organized, most of which were produced by service club directors and presented in service clubs, and 2,042 informal soldier show performances were given. In 1952 great emphasis was placed on soldier singing groups. The first annual USAREUR Soldier Singing Contest was judged in May and the first USAREUR Chorus Director's Clinic was held in June. In August a clinic in barbershop quartet singing was organized. The 7701 Bandsmen School, a play script library, and a central costume shop were operated by the command to assist in the entertainment program.¹³⁹

(4) Garmisch and Berchtesgaden Recreation Areas. Recreation areas for the benefit of U.S. Armed Forces personnel in Europe continued to be maintained by the command at Garmisch and Berchtesgaden on a completely self-supporting basis. General Williams placed the highest value on these areas

¹³⁸(1) Ltr, USAREUR COFS to Dep US CINCEUR, 9 Mar 53, cited above. (2) USAREUR SAD Comd Rept, 1952, Pt. II, Sec. V, par. 2d (4). CONFIDENTIAL.

¹³⁹(1) USAREUR SAD Comd Rept, 1952, Pt. I, par. 1a; Pt. II, Sec. V, par. 2d(3). CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Ltr, USAREUR COFS to Dep US CINCEUR, 9 Mar 53, cited above.

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as factors contributing to good morale. Many commanders used the opportunity for a 3-day pass to Garmisch or Berchtesgaden as an incentive in connection with training and discipline. In general these recreation areas were held in high regard by the personnel of the command, as witnessed by the continued effective utilization of their facilities and by the competition for reservations. During 1952 the average daily utilization of hotels at Garmisch was 73.6 percent of capacity. From January until 12 September, when the Schneefernerhaus Hotel was derequisitioned, the hotel capacity at Garmisch was 1,384 spaces; thereafter the capacity was 1,274. At Berchtesgaden the average daily utilization of hotels was 69.9 percent of capacity. Capacity at Berchtesgaden fluctuated between 578 and 702 spaces. In both areas weekend utilization approximated 100 percent of capacity.¹⁴⁰

d. Motion Picture Service. Motion picture entertainment was provided to the command by the European Motion Picture Service (EMPS). Effective 10 February 1952 the EMPS assumed operational responsibility for USAFE theaters in the United Kingdom, North Africa, and France, thereafter furnishing motion picture service to permanent and maneuver areas in Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom, France, Trieste, North Africa, and Italy. Difficulties were encountered in the United Kingdom because the USAFE-RAFCC (Royal Air Force Cinema Corporation) agreement under which RAFCC supplied 35mm. motion picture service to U.S. units in the United Kingdom precluded the issuance of EMPS 35mm. products. On 30 December 1952 the USAFE-RAFCC agreement was terminated, thereby opening the way to EMPS 35mm. service in 1953. Until October the admission price for military personnel and dependents in the command was \$.20 and the admission price for civilians and other authorized personnel was \$.30. After 19 October upon orders of the Department of Defense Joint Welfare Board a uniform admission of \$.25 was charged, thereby increasing net profit. To meet augmentation needs EMPS installations were increased 28 percent during the year, from 282 at the end of 1951 to 361 on 31 December 1952. The number of 35mm. theaters was increased from 112 in 1951 to 150 in 1952, a 34 percent increase, and that of 16mm. paid admission theaters 55 percent from 76 in 1951 to 118 in 1952. By the end of 1952 average monthly theater attendance was in excess of 1,750,000. In 1952 additional prints of each picture were secured in order to improve the age of release. To improve operations in France and the United Kingdom regional offices were established in Paris and London.¹⁴¹

¹⁴⁰(1) EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 1952. SECRET. (2) Ltr, USAREUR COFS to Dep US CINCEUR, 9 Mar 53, cited above.

¹⁴¹(1) Ltr, USAREUR COFS to Dep US CINCEUR, 19 Mar 53, cited above. (2) USAREUR SAD Comd Rept, 1952, Pt. I, par. 1a; Pt. II, Sec. I, par. 2g(1); Pt. II, Sec. V, par. 2g(1). CONFIDENTIAL.

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61. Relief Activities

a. Army Emergency Relief. On 3 December 1952 the USAREUR Branch, Army Emergency Relief (AER), was established with CWO W. F. Wyman as USAREUR Army Emergency Relief Officer and Chief, USAREUR Branch, Army Emergency Relief. This branch was assigned the mission of supplementing the American National Red Cross (ARC) whenever assistance by the ARC was, for policy or any other reason, not available or was considered inadequate, in order that under all circumstances timely and adequate emergency financial assistance would be available to members of the Army and their dependents. An AER section was established at Headquarters Area Command on 11 December and it was planned that other sections would be established at headquarters of Northern, Southern, Western, and COMZ areas in January 1953.¹⁴²

b. American National Red Cross. The American National Red Cross, at the close of 1952, maintained 102 offices in Europe and North Africa for the purpose of rendering the organization's traditional services to members of the U.S. Armed Forces. The ARC European Area Headquarters was located in Esslingen/Neckar, Germany, and a central communications office was located in Heidelberg, Germany. During 1952 the ARC met its increased responsibilities by opening ten additional offices to render service to able-bodied military personnel and eight additional offices in hospitals to serve hospitalized personnel. At the close of 1952 the ARC had 241 paid workers and 600 volunteer workers on its staff in Europe and North Africa. The volunteer staff had been increased by about 300 percent in 1952. During the year the ARC served 107,717 military personnel in Europe and North Africa in regard to major personal and family problems and provided \$236,995 in financial assistance. During a typical month (November 1952) Red Cross recreation workers and Gray Ladies offered 1,940 planned recreation activities for patients in 20 military hospitals. In the same 30-day period, Gray Ladies gave 5,739 hours of volunteer service. In coordination with military authorities the Red Cross consultant in first aid and water safety trained selected groups of servicemen as instructors in water safety and survival swimming. Upon completion of the instructor courses, the personnel returned to their home stations to train their fellow servicemen in local lifesaving and water safety schools.¹⁴³

¹⁴²(1) USAREUR P&A Div Jnl, 11 Dec 52. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR ltr, 11 Dec 52, sub: Establishment of Army Emergency Relief (AER), USAREUR. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR P&A Div Jnl File, 11 Dec 52, Incl 1, p. 11, Item 1.

¹⁴³Information prepared for Hist Div by Mr. J. F. Higgins, ARC In Off to USAREUR, 27 May 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

[REDACTED]

62. Statistical Indices of Morale, Welfare, and Discipline

a. Absence Without Leave. The rate of man-days lost due to absence without leave (AWOL) in USAREUR Army elements was substantially lower in 1952 than the Army world-wide and zone of interior rates. In 1952 the USAREUR Army average monthly incident rate ran slightly under 5.4 AWOL's per 1,000 strength, as compared with the over-all Army monthly average rate of 13.3 AWOL's per 1,000 strength. The average 1952 USAREUR AWOL was absent from duty for a period slightly in excess of $3\frac{1}{2}$ days, whereas the average Army-wide AWOL was absent 4 to 5 days. The daily average of man-days lost per 1,000 Army strength during 1952 was 0.65 or approximately 50 percent of the 1951 Army rate of 1.24. During an average 24-hour period during 1952, there were 149 USAREUR Army personnel absent from duty, or less than the strength of a reduced rifle company.¹⁴⁴

b. Crimes and Offenses. The USAREUR Army crimes and offenses rate (offenders or alleged offenders) per thousand troops dropped from 1.12 in 1951 to 0.90 in 1952. During 1952 the USAREUR Army average crimes and offenses rate of known offenders per 1,000 troops was 0.72; the rate for white personnel was 0.59; and the rate for Negro personnel was 1.56.¹⁴⁵

(1) Characteristics of Convicted Personnel. A study of the characteristics of the enlisted personnel convicted of assault, rape, and robbery during the first six months of 1952 revealed that among white personnel the 20-and-below age group was involved in a disproportionately large number of incidents of all types in relation to strength, and the 30-and-over age group in a disproportionately high number of assaults. Although the 21-to-24 age group accounted for the greatest number of incidents, it accounted for a disproportionately smaller percentage of incidents in relation to its strength. Negro personnel showed much the same general picture. The ratio of crimes, white to Negro, however, showed a far greater number of Negro offenders. Negro personnel were consistently convicted of more offenses in relation to strength than whites. The following tabulation gives more detailed information on characteristics of enlisted personnel convicted of serious crimes during the first six months of 1952.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁴Complete ZI Army and total Army figures not available. (1) Memo, USAREUR Compt to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Jan 53, sub: Analysis of Monthly Statistical Report. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Hist Div 319.1 (1952), Vol. I. (2) Ltr, USAREUR COFS to DCINC US EUCOM, 9 Mar 53, sub: Status of Morale, United States Army, Europe. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 330.11 (1953), Vol. I, Item 5. (3) EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 1952. SECRET.

¹⁴⁵EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 1951 - 52. SECRET.

¹⁴⁶(1) USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, Nov 52, p. 41. SECRET. (2) Memo, USAREUR Compt to CINC USAREUR, 30 Dec 52, sub: Analysis of the Monthly Statistical Report. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div 319.1 (1952), Vol. I.

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Age	White					Negro				
	Comd	Str	Assault	Rape	Robbery	Comd	Str	Assault	Rape	Robbery
30 and over	8.2		9.5	0.0	0.0	9.2		13.4	0.0	0.0
25 - 29	12.9		11.7	0.0	0.0	14.3		7.5	8.3	10.0
21 - 24	65.4		56.2	60.0	50.0	60.0		61.2	75.0	70.0
20 and below	13.5		22.6	40.0	50.0	16.5		17.9	16.7	20.0

GCT Score

110 and over	32.1		16.2	50.0	0.0	7.8		4.0	0.0	0.0
90 - 109	38.5		24.6	0.0	100.0	24.2		22.0	23.1	14.3
70 - 89	23.8		43.8	50.0	0.0	44.6		34.0	30.8	71.4
39 - 69	5.6		15.4	0.0	0.0	23.8		40.0	46.1	14.3

(2) Crimes Against Persons and Property. The command Army apprehension rate per thousand troops for crimes against persons and property continued the downward trend begun in 1950.¹⁴⁷ The average monthly rate for 1950 was 1.97, for 1951 it was 1.81, and for 1952 it was 1.63.

(3) Military Offenses. Military offenses included AWOL, uniform violations, pass violations, curfew violations, intoxication, disorderly conduct, off-limits violations, etc. The command military offenses rate per thousand troops was considerably lower in 1952 than in 1951 or 1950. The average monthly rate for 1952 was 21.5 per thousand troops, as compared to 24.4 for 1951, and 28.9 for 1950. This average monthly rate was based on the following categories and rates of military offenses: Curfew violations, 4.2; uniform violations, 1.8; AWOL, 4.7; pass violations, 5.3; miscellaneous, including drunkenness, disorderly conduct, off-limits violations, etc. 5.6.¹⁴⁸

(4) Traffic Offenses. The average monthly command rate of traffic offenses per thousand troops decreased from 10.5 in 1950 to 8.1 in 1951 and to 6.95 in 1952. Traffic offenses included speeding, driving too fast for road conditions, reckless driving, drunken driving, and parking violations. The most frequent offenses in 1952 were violations of speeding and parking regulations.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷(1) EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 1951 - 52. SECRET. (2) EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, p. 141. SECRET.

¹⁴⁸(1) EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 141, 142. SECRET. (2) EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 1951 - 52. SECRET.

¹⁴⁹Ibid.

c. Inspector General Complaint Rate. The inspector general complaint rate provided another index of the status of morale in the command. The 4.97 quarterly rate of complaints per thousand troops in 1952 was higher than the 4.13 rate in 1951, but lower than the 1950 average rate of 5.40. The highest rate in 1952 (6.32) came in the January to March quarter when COMZ, Seventh Army, and the 32d AAA Brigade had unusually high ratings. The great majority of these complaints came from the 28th Infantry Division of Seventh Army. 28th Division personnel complained about an alleged frequency of guard duty performed by privates and privates first class, poor messing conditions, and inadequate medical and dental care. Action was taken to correct these complaints. During the same period there were numerous complaints from the Rhine Military Post area about the lack of recreation facilities. Efforts were made during the year to correct this deficiency. During 1952 the highest complaint rates were in the Communications Zone (8.5 per thousand), principally because of the poor living conditions in France. The majority of complaints in 1952 fell into the categories of "duties" (.56 per thousand), "services and supplies" (.49 per thousand), "food-mess" (.46 per thousand), "administration" (.34 per thousand), and "pay and allowances" (.33 per thousand).¹⁵⁰

d. Venereal Disease. The venereal disease (VD) incidence rate per thousand Army personnel in 1952 climbed sharply above the low rates of 1950 and 1951. The rate was 48 for 1950, 51 for 1951, and 69 for 1952. In 1952 the number of cases fluctuated from a low of 50 per thousand in March to 89 per thousand in August, thereafter decreasing. The rates for white and Negro personnel increased over the previous year, the latter rate increasing more than the former. The rate for white personnel climbed from a low of 41 per thousand in March to a high of 62 in August, never reaching the command average of 69 per thousand, while Negro rates climbed from 112 in March to a high of 261 in August. The following tabulation shows VD rates for 1951 and 1952 based on monthly averages:¹⁵¹

	<u>1951</u>	<u>1952</u>
Army ZI Rate	—	32
USAREUR, All Army Personnel	51	69
USAREUR, White Army Personnel	44	49
USAREUR, Negro Army Personnel	118	195

¹⁵⁰EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 1952. SECRET. (2) Memo, EUCOM Compt to CINCEUR, 23 Apr 52, sub: Analysis of the Monthly Statistical Report. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div 319.1 (1952), Vol. I.

¹⁵¹EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 1951 - 52. SECRET.

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Although the rate in 1952 was higher than in the two previous years it still compared favorably with the over-all Army overseas VD rate of 142.5 per thousand for 1952. The increase in VD rates beginning in 1952 was partially attributed to a normal recovery from the exceptionally low levels prevailing in 1950 and 1951, and to the new command policy of de-emphasizing the rates at the individual command level, thereby causing more soldiers to seek treatment through Army channels rather than from private practitioners.¹⁵²

e. Health of the Command. The health of military personnel of the command as reflected in the medical noneffective rate during 1952 was good. The average daily rate per thousand personnel during 1952 was 14.9, or 1.6 less than in 1951. This rate compared favorably with the zone of interior Army rate of 35.5 for 1952. The rate remained comparatively stable during the year with highest rates in January, February, and March because of the increases in common respiratory diseases and lowest rates in June, July, August, and September.¹⁵³ The September rate of 13.0 was the lowest since the end of World War II.¹⁵⁴ During 1952 the largest number of admissions to hospitals was, as in 1951, for common respiratory diseases and for psychiatric care. Rates for both increased over the 1951 rates; however the psychiatric rates for 1951 were not accurate since during the first four months of that year only half of the total psychiatric types were reported as such. During the year the rate per thousand admissions for pneumonia increased over the previous year, with most cases coming in the first four months of the year. The influenza, infectious hepatitis, intestinal disease, and scabies rates decreased during the year as compared with the 1951 rates. The following tabulation shows 1951 and 1952 rates for selected diseases:¹⁵⁵

	<u>1951</u>	<u>1952</u>
Common Respiratory	116.1	117.2
Pneumonia	6.5	7.9
Influenza	4.6	4.2
Infectious Hepatitis	8.4	4.9
Intestinal Diseases	2.0	1.7
Psychiatric	14.7	17.6
Scabies	5.0	2.3

¹⁵²Memo, EUCOM Compt to CINCEUR, 24 Jun 52, sub: Analysis of Monthly Statistical Report. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div 319.1 (1952), Vol. I.

¹⁵³EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Rpts, 1951 - 52. SECRET.

¹⁵⁴Memo, USAREUR Compt to CINC USAREUR, 24 Sep 52, sub: Analysis of the Monthly Statistical Report. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div 319.1 (1952), Vol. I.

¹⁵⁵(1) EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Rpts, 1951 - 52. SECRET. (2) Ltr, USAREUR COFS to Dep US CINCEUR, 9 Mar 53, sub: Status of Morale, United States Army, Europe. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 330.11 (1953), Vol. I, Item 5.

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A study of alcoholism and drunkenness in the command during the first seven months of the year revealed that only .0028 percent of the total admissions to hospitals were for alcoholism and only .0017 percent of the total admissions to hospitals were for drunkenness. The average rate of alcoholism per thousand per year for the period was .88, indicating that less than one tenth of one percent of all Army personnel in Europe were admitted to hospitals for alcoholism.¹⁵⁶

f. Chaplain Activities. In 1952 the EUCOM/USAREUR religious program was adequate and successful. The average rate of chapel attendance rose from 23.6 per 100 troops in 1951 to 28.8 per 100 troops in 1952, and the rate of attendance at chaplain's character guidance hours rose from 49 per 100 troops in 1951 to 54 per 100 troops in 1952.¹⁵⁷ The Army-wide shortage of chaplains resulted in difficulties in the command. As in all oversea Army commands, the chaplains were also responsible for providing for the spiritual needs of dependents and Department of the Army civilians, but were assigned to troop units on the basis of troop strength. Since the chaplains accompanied their troop units in the field, dependents and civilians in some areas frequently had no chaplain available. Although the command utilized approximately 70 German and 16 American civilian clergymen as auxiliary chaplains, most of the German clergymen could not speak English and were therefore unable to conduct Protestant services or hear Catholic confessions. As a result some chaplains were forced to conduct three or four masses and services in three or four different locations each Sunday. Even then not all needs were satisfied. This shortage of chaplains also hampered the establishment of Sunday schools in the command. The situation was made more critical by a Department of the Army cut in authorized chaplain spaces in EUCOM/USAREUR from 304 to 264. Based on the temporary over-All Army ratio of one chaplain to each thousand troops the command needed approximately 300 chaplains.¹⁵⁸ EUCOM requested and received from the Department of the Army an increase of 20 in the chaplain ceiling which was balanced by a reduction of 20 in the WAC officer ceiling.¹⁵⁹ In January 1952 the chaplain program was furthered through the establishment of the EUCOM Religious Education Fund to enable the procurement of literature and materials not available through quartermaster channels. The fund was started with a \$5,000 loan from the Central Welfare Board and obtained income through the sale of literature by the chaplains.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁶Memo, USAREUR Surg to USAREUR COFS, 9 Aug 52, sub: Admission to U.S. Army Hospitals for Alcoholism. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 720 (1952), Vol. I, Item 25.

¹⁵⁷Ltr, USAREUR COFS to Dep US CINCEUR, 9 Mar 53, cited above.

¹⁵⁸Ltr, CINCEUR to COFSA, 14 Jul 52. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR P&A Div 312.1 (1952).

¹⁵⁹Ltr, CINCEUR to Lt Gen C. O. Bolte, DCOFSA for Plans & Opns, 14 Jul 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 330.11 (1952), Vol. I, Item 6.

¹⁶⁰USAREUR Ch Div Jnl, Jan 52, Item 16. UNCLASSIFIED.

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g. Soldiers Savings Program. During 1952 an average of 35 percent of all Army enlisted personnel participated in the soldiers' savings program each month, an increase over the 1951 average monthly rate of 30.8 percent. Reflecting in part the augmentation of troops the total dollar deposits increased from \$801,000 in 1951 to \$1,503,000 in 1952. The largest number of depositors were in the Seventh Army, but the military posts had the largest percentage of depositors. The Communications Zone and the 7961 Detachment had the smallest percentage of depositors, probably because of the high living expenses in France.¹⁶¹

h. Army Schools. During 1952 the command operated ten Army schools with a student capacity of 3,927 (an increase of 201 over the 1951 capacity). The average student strength was 3,619, amounting to an effective utilization of 92.2 percent, which was an increase over the 87.9 percent utilization in 1951.¹⁶² The increased opportunities for schooling in 1952 with the probable increase in opportunity for promotion among the personnel attending the schools, had a favorable effect upon morale.

63. Information and Education Program

a. Army Education Program. The Army Education Program conducted by the EUCOM/USAREUR Armed Forces Information and Education Division (AFIED) provided military personnel with nonmilitary academic and vocational education. The objective of the program was to increase the efficiency of the Army by raising the academic educational level of its personnel. In keeping with that objective, subjects providing preparation for progress in career fields were stressed. Instruction was offered at basic, intermediate, high school, and college levels. The education programs consisted of USAFI correspondence and self-teaching courses, instruction in education centers, university extension courses, resident instruction in the European branches of the University of Maryland or in other colleges and universities, and USAFI tests. Mandatory education was provided for white personnel with less than a fifth grade education and for Negro personnel with less than an eight grade education (educational basics).¹⁶³

(1) Mandatory Education Programs. In accordance with AR 355-30 command emphasis was placed upon the elimination of educational basics by aiding personnel in attaining the ability to speak and write English with the fluency of an adult who has completed the fifth grade. Until March 1952

¹⁶¹(1) EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Rpts, 1951 - 52. SECRET. (2) Ltr, USAREUR COFS to Dep US CINCEUR, 9 Mar 53, sub: Status of Morale, United States Army, Europe. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 330.11 (1953), Vol. I, Item 5.

¹⁶²Ltr, USAREUR COFS to Dep US CINCEUR, 9 Mar 53, cited above.

¹⁶³(1) AR 355-30, 24 Apr 51, as changed. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) EUCOM Cir 115, 2 Feb 51, as changed; EUCOM Cir 115 (Army), 2 Feb 51, and 23 Jul 52. UNCLASSIFIED.

two mandatory education programs were conducted in the command. White personnel, required to complete basic education through the fifth grade level, were provided instruction in unit schools and to a limited degree in basic education centers in Frankfurt, Nuernberg, and Munich. Instructors and classroom facilities for the unit schools were furnished by the units concerned. Such schools could be conducted during or after normal duty hours. No set number of hours was specified, but the Armed Forces I and E Division recommended a minimum of twenty hours per week. The special basic education centers were staffed by trained civilian instructors furnished by the Armed Forces I and E and by qualified enlisted personnel from the units whose personnel were attending the school. In the centers a minimum of six hours daily was devoted to academic training, and a maximum of two hours to military training. The courses were of twelve weeks' duration. Due to the limited facilities at the centers, most training was done in unit schools. Under the provisions of the Negro On-Duty Education Program, Negro personnel were required to complete intermediate (eight grade) education. On 24 January 1952 this program was renamed the Special Education Program and responsibility for it was transferred from the OPOT to the Armed Forces I and E Division. Instruction under this program was conducted in unit schools with classroom facilities furnished by the unit and instructors furnished by the 7744 Educational Training Unit. Ten hours of academic training per week were required--six hours during duty time and four hours after normal duty time. Personnel in educational grade levels one and two were enrolled in the basic education centers. Attendance and grade completions for both programs proved unsatisfactory. The sporadic part-time nature of the unit schools, the interference with training, and the large enrollments hindered the effectiveness of the programs. The command directives on this training permitted a lack of uniformity, token compliance with directives, and rationalization of frequent interruptions resulting in the committing of large numbers of men to the program over long periods of time without sufficient compensating grade advancements. By March 1952 there existed a backlog of 8,000 educational basics and 15,000 intermediates. Early in the year Seventh Army had expressed dissatisfaction with the program, declaring that it was progressing more slowly than desirable, and suggested a full-time program of academic study.¹⁶⁴ This suggestion was adopted on a command-wide basis on 24 March. Under this program personnel below the fifth grade educational level received 40 hours of mandatory education, plus 8 hours of military training each week in

¹⁶⁴(1) AR 355-30, 24 Apr 51, as changed. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) EUCOM Cir 115 (Army), 2 Feb 51, as changed. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) EUCOM TC 2, 7 Mar 52, sub: Special Education Program. UNCLASSIFIED. (4) EUCOM AFIED Jnl, 24 Jan 52, Item 1. RESTRICTED. (5) Memo, EUCOM AFIED to EUCOM COFS, 24 Mar 52, sub: Mandatory Educational Training. AG 350 IED. RESTRICTED. (6) IRS, EUCOM OPOT Div to EUCOM COFS, 18 Apr 52, same sub. RESTRICTED. Last two in USAREUR SGS 352 (1952), Vol. I, Item 1B-1a.

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unit schools, up to twelve weeks as necessary. No more than 20 percent of the present-for-duty strength of any one unit could be in school at one time, and no student could spend more than twelve weeks in school during one calendar year. Negro personnel in Negro units continued to receive educational training toward completion of the eighth grade, but educational requirements for Negro personnel in integrated units were reduced to fifth grade completion, thereby causing a gradual phase-out of the Special Education Program. Units furnished instructors at the rate of one per twelve students, and civilian instructors were provided by the AFIED. Under this program fewer persons were enrolled at one time, but they attended classes regularly on a full-time basis, thereby eliminating some of the deficiencies of the original mandatory education programs. As a result of the gradual phase-out of the Negro Special Education Program the 7744 Educational Training Unit was able to reduce its personnel on 19 November by 100 noncommissioned officers. The basic education centers at Frankfurt, Nuernberg, and Munich were still operated under the new program with priority given to first and second grade levels.¹⁶⁵ During the year 18,227 personnel completed mandatory basic courses, 15,047 received Grade 5 certificates, 6,229 completed intermediate courses, and 1,290 received Grade 8 certificates.

(2) USAFI Services. As part of the Army Education Program the Armed Forces I and E Division operated USAFI, Europe, which offered correspondence and self-teaching courses at all levels to members of all the U.S. armed services in Europe. The average USAFI enrollment during 1952 was 21,343 persons and 1,650 persons completed USAFI courses. This was a considerable increase over the 1951 average enrollment of 12,660 and 771 course completions. In the interest of supply economy, better administration, and more accurate reporting, the number of USAFI registration centers was decreased during 1952 from 51 to 12; after 1 November, only one registration center was maintained in the geographic area of each military post.¹⁶⁶

(3) Army Education Centers. The 150 Army education centers maintained by the command offered instruction at all levels, administered USAFI tests, conducted University of Maryland college courses, and offered educational advisement. These centers were established wherever a need existed.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁵(1) IRS, EUCOM OPOT Div to EUCOM COFS, 18 Apr 52, cited above.
(2) EUCOM ltr, 14 May 52, sub: Mandatory Educational Training. AG 350 IED-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) EUCOM Cir 115 (Army), 23 Jul 52. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁶⁶(1) EUCOM Cir 115, 2 Feb 51. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR AFIED Comd Rept, 1952, p. 19. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) USAREUR AFIED Jnl, 2 Oct 52, Item 1. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁶⁷Interv, Mr. C. R. Petrie, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col C. S. Hampton, C/AFIED Educ Br, 27 May 52. UNCLASSIFIED.

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Table 9--Army Education Program

I. Tests and Enrollments

	<u>1951</u>	<u>1952</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>132,468</u>	<u>177,099</u>
1st Quarter	28,011	45,127
2d Quarter	30,823	44,420
3d Quarter	36,335	40,738
4th Quarter	37,299	46,814

II. Course Completions and Certificates

<u>Total</u>	<u>25,973</u>	<u>63,071</u>
Basic course completions	5,566	18,227
Grade 5 certificates	2,118	15,047
Intermediate course completions	4,557	6,299
Grade 8 certificates	1,275	1,290
High school and vocational course completions	8,626	18,152
College course completions	828	1,160
University of Maryland course completions	3,003	2,896

III. USAFI Correspondence Study

Average enrollment	12,660	21,343
Total course completions	771	1,650
Lessons graded	15,356	33,903
Tests scored	24,348	36,946
Tests processed only for record	11,514	33,850

IV. Items Issued

<u>Total</u>	<u>935,060</u>
Books	541,012
Charts and maps	49,572
Outlines, answer sheets, and tests	319,107
Posters	14,321
Miscellaneous items	11,048

Source: USAREUR AFIED Comd Rept, 1952, pp. 19 - 20. UNCLASSIFIED.
In USAREUR Hist Div Ref Lib.

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(4) University of Maryland. During 1952 the University of Maryland, European Branch, continued to offer college courses for credit toward a baccalaureate degree. Courses were conducted in Army education centers throughout the command. Until July tuition was paid through the so-called GI Bill of Rights or by the individual student with assistance up to 75 percent of cost from the command's appropriated funds. Thereafter, as a result of Congressional action limiting expenditures for troop education to enlisted personnel, students who were officers or warrant officers had to pay full tuition. Enlisted men received a tuition aid of 50 percent, but not more than \$7.50 per semester hour. Following the termination of aid for officers, course enrollments declined only slightly (Table 9).¹⁶⁸

(5) Statistical Analysis. Total enrollments increased from 132,468 in 1951 to 177,099 in 1952. Course completions increased from 25,973 to 63,071, making an increase in the percentage of eligibles completing courses from 26.2 percent in 1951 to 50.6 percent in 1952. Although the cost of the education program increased from \$995,719 to \$1,195,990, the cost per completion decreased from \$38.33 in 1951 to \$18.96 in 1952. The number of course enrollments and completions during 1952 placed USAREUR in first place in the Army-wide education program.¹⁶⁹

b. The Stars and Stripes. The Stars and Stripes Fund was a non-appropriated, revenue producing fund, operated under the supervision of the EUCOM/USAREUR Armed Forces I and E Division. It published and distributed The Stars and Stripes, the unofficial newspaper of the U.S. Armed Forces in Europe; sold commercial books, magazines, and other publications; and did job printing. During 1952 six editorial bureaus and fourteen circulation districts throughout Europe were operated. In 1952 The Stars and Stripes began printing the USAREUR Information Bulletin which previously had been printed by a German firm.

c. American Forces Network. The American Forces Network (AFN) operated a network of six studio stations and twenty satellite transmitter stations to provide information, education, and entertainment for U.S. personnel stationed in Europe. Throughout the year, AFN presented 133 hours of radio programs weekly, approximately 36 percent of the programs being productions prepared by the Armed Forces Radio Service and the remaining 64 percent being produced at the various AFN studios. Approximately 68 percent of the combined programs consisted of music; 10 percent,

¹⁶⁸(1) Cable DA-341393, DA to EUCOM, 7 Jul 52. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322.01 (1952), Vol. I. (2) Interv, Mr. C. R. Petrie, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col C. S. Hampton, C/AFIED Educ Div, 27 May 52. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁶⁹(1) AFIED Comd Rept, 1952. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, USAREUR COFS to Dep US CINCEUR, 9 Mar 53, sub: Status of Morale, United States Army, Europe. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 330.11 (1953), Vol. I, Item 5.

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drama; 8 percent, news and sports; 6 percent, comedy; 4 percent, information and educational type productions; and 4 percent, religious. AFN assigned two mobile radio broadcasting units to Exercise ROSEBUSH during the fall maneuvers in September. A major problem during the year was the inability to secure sufficiently trained announcers and program and news personnel. This situation was partially alleviated by accepting qualified personnel on temporary duty (TDY) from their assigned units, particularly in the case of Air Force personnel, for a stipulated period of time.¹⁷⁰

64. Command Actions Against Undesirable Acts

a. Curfew. During 1952 there was increased concern in the command over charges from German and other sources concerning an alleged excessive increase in crimes and black-market activities by U.S. military personnel. One such charge was made by Dr. Reinhold Maier, Minister President of Land Wuerttemberg-Baden, who demanded that more stringent controls be exercised over U.S. military personnel to reduce the allegedly high number of crimes being committed by occupation personnel against German civilians. A Provost Marshal Division study of the American-German crime rate during the last six months of 1951 showed that offenses by Germans against Americans consistently far outnumbered those by Americans against Germans; the number of offenses by Germans against Americans increased more rapidly than did the number of offenses by Americans against Germans; the rate of offenses by Americans against Germans declined, as compared to the rate prior to the augmentation program; American homes were subjected to housebreakings and burglaries more frequently than were German dwellings in the same localities; and American-owned automobiles were more frequently stolen or pilfered than were cars owned by Germans.¹⁷¹ Although the command serious incident rate was relatively low (par. 62b), the EUCOM provost marshal expressed the opinion that there was cause for concern in view of the forthcoming change in command status under the contractual agreements, and stated that, unless the serious incident rate was reduced, more unfavorable publicity and retaliation by the Germans could be expected. He reported that German civic bodies, through the press, were publicly exaggerating the behavior of American soldiers and demanding a curfew, and that German police, in breaking up brawls between Germans and American soldiers, had begun to beat the soldiers with clubs--an action the police had previously been careful to avoid. He also stated that in an investigation of an alleged rape it was discovered that the girl concerned had "willingly and charitably accommodated two soldiers, but when picked up by the German police was coached by them to say force was used and that she was raped."

¹⁷⁰(1) AFIED Comd Rept, 1952, App. A, Annual AFN Command Report. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR AFIED Jnl, 29 Mar 52, Item 1. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁷¹PM Div Comd Rept, 1952, p. 11. CONFIDENTIAL.

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The provost marshal further expressed the belief that the American soldier could be expected to resist any increased arrogance on the part of German authorities.¹⁷² To find a method of reducing the command serious incident rate the Provost Marshal Division had analyzed the serious incidents reported during the six-month period, 1 July to 31 December 1951. This survey indicated that enlisted men below the first three grades, who comprised 72 percent of the total EUCOM strength, committed 83.7 percent of all crimes and offenses; that enlisted men of the top three grades, who comprised 19.1 percent of the total strength, were responsible for 13.8 percent of all serious incidents; and that officers, who comprised 8.9 percent of the total strength, were responsible for 2.5 percent of total crimes and offenses.¹⁷³ In addition the survey showed that of 1,541 offenses committed at a known time, fully 495, or 32.1 percent of the total, were committed during the three hours between 2301 and 0200; and 666, or 43.2 percent of the total, were committed during the seven hours between 2301 and 0600. Of the total offenses, 16.8 percent were committed on Saturday, 26.7 percent on Sunday, and 14 percent on Monday, constituting a total of 57.5 percent from Saturday through Monday.¹⁷⁴ By keeping military personnel out of public places from midnight to 0600 it seemed possible to eliminate a high percentage of the serious incidents. Accordingly, on 27 August a curfew was established by General Eddy which prohibited off-duty enlisted personnel below the first three grades from loitering on streets or in public places between 0001 and 0600 on Monday through Saturday, except legal holidays, and 0100 through 0600 on Sunday and legal holidays. Enlisted personnel of the top three grades on leave, temporary pass, or sponsor's pass, as well as officers, and warrant officers, were exempted from this order, but all were expected to conform with its spirit by not loitering on streets or in public establishments during the curfew hours. To enforce this curfew, bed-check was to be conducted by officers and/or noncommissioned officers.¹⁷⁵ Initially some difficulty arose over the application of this order to officers, warrant officers, and enlisted personnel of the top three grades. The order was therefore changed, on 15 November, to read: "Officers; warrant officers; and enlisted personnel of the upper three grades on leave, temporary pass, or sponsor's pass will be exempt from the requirement that they be off the streets and other thoroughfares during the hours of curfew. However, exempted personnel will not loiter on the streets or be in public establishments, such as gasthouses, restaurants, etc., during the above hours."¹⁷⁶ Although the curfew was still in effect at the close of the year, some doubt had arisen

¹⁷²Comments of PM at Mthly Maj Unit and Post Comdrs Conf, 31 Mar 52. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1952), Vol. I, B/P 3.

¹⁷³Ibid.

¹⁷⁴EUCOM PM Div, Chart Notes and Summary, Time Analysis of Offenses by EUCOM Military Personnel, 18 Feb 52. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1952), Vol. I, B/P 3. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁷⁵USAREUR ltr, 27 Aug 52, sub: Curfew. AG 250 GPA-AGO. RESTRICTED.

¹⁷⁶USAREUR Cir 135, 15 Nov 52. UNCLASSIFIED.

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as to its value. A study by the USAREUR Provost Marshal Division of the pattern of offenses by enlisted personnel during the three months preceding the curfew (June, July, August) and the first three months of curfew (September, October, November) revealed a substantial reduction in the number of offenses committed during curfew hours, but also revealed a corresponding increase in the number of offenses committed during precurfew hours. The number of enlisted offenders in the curfew months had actually been greater than in the precurfew months. The provost marshal reported that the command-wide curfew had not had the desired effect of substantially reducing the incidence of crimes and offenses by enlisted personnel, and that it had no significant effect on the pattern of offenses by enlisted personnel.¹⁷⁷ Additional study by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, and the Adjutant General Division revealed that the military noneffective rate which had improved in September regressed in October and November; the morale index had decreased; the re-enlistment rate had declined slightly; the VD rate had decreased slightly; and an analysis of German press comments had shown little change.¹⁷⁸

b. Gurtailment of Black Market Activities. The year 1952 saw a continuation of complaints by German authorities that excessive smuggling and black-market activities by American personnel were resulting in great monetary losses to the German Federal Republic. In March the German Finance Minister claimed that tax revenue totaling DM 400,000,000 had been lost to the Federal Republic through smuggling and black-market operations by American occupation personnel. Studies by the Provost Marshal Division revealed that if every pound of coffee and every carton of cigarettes sold in commissaries and post exchanges were sold on the black market the resulting loss in taxes to the German Government would be only 14 percent of the amount charged by the Finance Minister.¹⁷⁹ However, effective 1 September, closer restrictions were placed upon the sale of coffee, tea, and cocoa, and ration allowances were cut. Thereafter, for personnel assigned individual billets and authorized a coffee ration the ration was two pounds of tea, cocoa, or roasted and ground coffee, or any combination of these provided the total monthly ration did not exceed two pounds. Personnel assigned to barracks type quarters were entitled to only one pound of tea, cocoa, or roasted and ground coffee. Personnel with commissary cards, and sponsored visitors,

¹⁷⁷ IRS, USAREUR PM Div to USAREUR ACOFS G-1, 7 Jan 53, sub: Effect of Curfew on Crimes and Offenses by Enlisted Men. PMG 250.1 PAS. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR PM Div Jnl File, 7 Jan 53.

¹⁷⁸ Memo, Lt Col F. W. Boyle, Jr., USAREUR SGS, to Brig Gen E. J. O'Neill, USAREUR DCOFS Admin, 16 Jan 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 330.11 (1953), Vol. I, atehd to 2.

¹⁷⁹ USAREUR PM Div Comd Rept, 1952, p. 13. CONFIDENTIAL.

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were not entitled to purchase coffee, tea, or cocoa in EES establishments.¹⁸⁰ For personnel entitled to commissary cards the monthly ration in all commissaries was reduced on 1 September to 5 pounds of coffee and 1 pound of tea. In commissary stores in Germany only, personnel could purchase an additional 16 ounces of soluble coffee product or 8 ounces of pure soluble coffee.¹⁸¹ To eliminate illegal transactions with postal money orders, Army post offices in March began to demand positive identification of all purchasers of money orders.¹⁸² In addition, the command issued a directive prohibiting authorized U.S. personnel from converting Military Payment Certificates to dollar instruments or to U.S. currency in excess of \$300 in any one month, except on approval of the unit or organization commander.¹⁸³

c. Regulations Pertaining to Privately Owned Vehicles. A study of offenses committed by personnel operating privately owned vehicles during 1951 revealed that although enlisted men comprised only 19.3 percent of EUCOM privately owned vehicle registrants they had been responsible for 39.1 percent of all EUCOM privately owned vehicle accidents, for 54.7 percent of all hit-and-run offenses, for 78.1 percent of all sex crimes employing privately owned vehicles, for 61.3 percent of all black-marketing offenses employing privately owned vehicles, for 22.6 percent of all customs violations employing privately owned vehicles, for 36.5 percent of all speeding apprehensions, for 50.3 percent of all reckless driving apprehensions, for 22.8 percent of all parking violations apprehensions, for 55.7 percent of all apprehensions for permitting unauthorized personnel to drive, and for 55.0 percent of all apprehensions for drunken driving. It was also noted that for the categories listed above rates had been substantially higher for enlisted men below the first three grades than for the remaining personnel.¹⁸⁴ In September 1952 a new directive made it mandatory for enlisted personnel below grade E-5 who wished to buy vehicles to obtain permission from the commander exercising court-martial jurisdiction. Permission was not granted unless the commander was assured that the individual had a good driving record, good disciplinary history, good off-duty habits and conduct, and adequate financial means to maintain the vehicle in proper mechanical condition. Nor was any individual permitted to register more than one vehicle per year without the permission of his commanding officer.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁰USAREUR Wkly Dir No. 4, 22 Aug 52, Sec. VIII. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁸¹USAREUR ltr, 12 Aug 52, sub: Uniform System of Rationing in Commissary Stores. AG 331.3 CQM-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁸²USAREUR AG Div Jnl, 12 Mar 52, Item 1. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁸³EUCOM Cir 76, 13 Jun 52. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁸⁴USAREUR FM Div Comd Rept, 1952, pp. 14 - 15. CONFIDENTIAL.

¹⁸⁵USAREUR Wkly Dir No. 8, 19 Sep 52, Sec. VII. UNCLASSIFIED.

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65. Courts-Martial

Although the number of accused tried by courts-martial increased from 19,256 in 1951 to 28,051 in 1952, the over-all monthly court-martial rate per thousand troop strength for 1952 (9.3) was substantially lower than the 1951 rate (12.2). The rate for special and summary courts-martial decreased, while the rate for general courts-martial increased slightly. A tabulation of the court-martial rates per thousand troops for the year 1952 follows:¹⁸⁶

<u>Date</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>General</u>	<u>Special</u>	<u>Summary</u>
Average 1951	<u>12.2</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>3.7</u>	<u>8.1</u>
Average 1952	<u>9.3</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>2.7</u>	<u>6.0</u>
January	10.4	0.4	3.4	6.6
February	8.0	0.4	2.6	5.0
March	8.2	0.4	2.8	5.0
April	8.9	0.6	2.7	5.6
May	9.0	0.6	2.6	5.8
June	9.5	0.6	2.6	6.3
July	8.4	0.5	2.4	5.5
August	8.6	0.6	2.1	5.9
September	7.9	0.5	2.2	5.2
October	10.2	0.6	3.1	6.5
November	11.8	0.6	3.2	8.0
December	10.6	0.6	3.1	6.9

The high rates in October, November, and December were attributed to the courts-martial of personnel accused of curfew violations.

66. Prisons and Prisoners

The average number of prisoners per month in 1952 was 1,325 or approximately twice the average number in 1951 and the monthly rate of prisoners per thousand military strength increased from 4.50 in 1951 to 5.31 in 1952.¹⁸⁷ The average monthly rate of prisoners committed to confinement in 1952 was 3.07 per thousand troops.¹⁸⁸ On 29 April 1952

¹⁸⁶Indicates numbers of accused tried by courts-martial in the Army courts-martial jurisdiction of USAREUR. All USAREUR Army DA attached and SCARWAF personnel in USAREUR fall within this jurisdiction. EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 1951 and 1952. SECRET.

¹⁸⁷Ibid., Jan, Dec 52. SECRET.

¹⁸⁸Ltr, USAREUR COFS to Dep US CINCENR, 9 Mar 53, sub: Status of Morale, United States Army, Europe. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 330.11 (1953), Vol. I, Item 5.

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the EUCOM chief of staff approved a plan to eliminate the Frankfurt and Nuernberg guardhouses and establish a 1,000-prisoner stockade as an addition to the 500-prisoner EUCOM Retraining Center (later the 7727 USAREUR Retraining Center) at Lechfeld, Germany. At the same time the EUCOM chief of staff approved the expenditure of DM 1,600,000 for the construction of guard towers and fences, and the rehabilitation of existing buildings at the retraining center and the expenditure of DM 90,000 to construct a provisional guardhouse in the William O. Darby Caserne at Nuernberg. These actions enabled Nuernberg Military Post to return the Nuernberg prison to the German authorities and Frankfurt Military Post to close all except one wing of the Frankfurt prison, the one wing to be used as a provisional guardhouse. On 1 October the Frankfurt and Nuernberg Military Post guardhouses commenced phase-out operations and began transferring prisoners having 60 or more days of their sentence remaining to be served to the 7727 USAREUR Retraining Center. By 31 October, when the last transfer of eligible prisoners was made, a total of 513 prisoners had been transferred. At the end of the year, 1,161 prisoners were confined in the 7727 USAREUR Retraining Center, constituting all prisoners in the command receiving sentences of six months or less. Personnel receiving sentences of more than six months were transferred to the EUCOM military prison for evacuation to the United States. Prisoners remaining in the Nuernberg and Frankfurt guardhouses were in pretrial status or casuals awaiting disposition instructions.¹⁸⁹

67. Army Safety Program

Safety was a matter of particular concern to the command during 1952. During the year Army personnel, equipment, property, or operations were involved in 22,557 reported accidents, an increase of 41 percent over 1951, resulting in an estimated loss of more than \$16,000,000. There was an accident every 23 minutes, which resulted in one nonfatal injury every 38 minutes; one death each 23 hours; direct costs of injuries, fatal and nonfatal, of \$20 per minute; and property damage costs of \$9 per minute. Of all injuries, 2.7 percent were fatal. The estimated man-days lost increased from 1,094,351 in 1951 to 1,870,458 in 1952. These increases were partially caused by the continued expansion of Army activities during the year.¹⁹⁰ During 1952, as in previous years, the command engaged in a wide promotional campaign through posters, radio, and newspaper designed to make the personnel of the command safety conscious. Accident statistics were analyzed in an effort to detect trends. If a trend toward accidents of a particular type was detected, promotion campaigns in relation to that

¹⁸⁹(1) EUCOM/USAREUR FM Div Jnl, 29 Apr 52, Item 3, UNCLASSIFIED; 3 Nov 52, Item 1, UNCLASSIFIED. (2) USAREUR FM Div Comd Rept, 1952, pp. 7 - 8. CONFIDENTIAL.

¹⁹⁰USAREUR ACOFS G-1 Safety Sec, USAREUR Safety Program, Annual Rept, 1952, pp. 5, 8. CONFIDENTIAL.

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type of accident were heightened and commanders were notified of the trend.

a. Civilian Personnel Experience. Civilian personnel incurred 4,025 injuries, 15 percent more than in 1951, and the injury rate increased 14 percent from 9.62 injuries per one million man-hours exposure in 1951 to 10.8 in 1952. This was a 57 percent increase over the 1950 rate. Exposure for civilian personnel was based on actual working hours. Less than 2 percent of the total injuries to civilians were permanent impairment, and less than 1 percent were fatal.¹⁹¹

b. Military Personnel Experience. Injuries of all types to military personnel increased 49 percent over the number in 1951 to 7,293 in 1952 (1 out of every 34 military personnel as compared to 1 out of every 29 in 1951). As a result of a 79 percent increase in exposure (total days during the month, including on- and off-duty, pass, leave, and AWOL), the injury rate decreased 17 percent to 7.98 injuries per 100,000 man-days exposure, or 38 percent below the 1950 rate. Approximately 2.7 percent of all injuries to military personnel were fatal and approximately 1.4 percent were permanent impairments. The number of fatalities increased, but the added exposure resulted in a continuation of the downward trend in fatality rates per 100,000 man-days begun in 1948 (0.43, 0.42, 0.40, 0.31, and 0.21 in 1952). Army motor vehicle accidents caused 12 percent of total injuries to military personnel and 23 percent of total fatalities. The percentage of injuries committed on duty time rose from 51 percent in 1950 to 55 percent in 1951 and to 63 percent in 1952. The percentage in the last quarter of 1952 increased to 65 percent on-duty. This increase in the on-duty percentage was in part due to additional periods of duty, increased training activities, and the establishment of the curfew which increased on-duty time. In 1951 one of each 29 military personnel was injured, one of each 882, fatally. In 1952 one of each 34 personnel was injured, one of each 1,281, fatally.¹⁹²

c. "Other Army Personnel" Experience. The category "other Army Personnel" included contractor's employees, and all employees paid from nonappropriated funds. The number of injuries for "other Army personnel" decreased from 1,555 in 1951 to 1,505 in 1952. The injury rate of 7.89 injuries per million man-hours was, however, 17 percent below that for 1951, because of an increase in exposure (actual working hours). Permanent impairments made up 0.5 percent of total injuries, and deaths represented 0.9 percent of total injuries, a rate of 0.07 deaths per million man-hours. The fatality rate was 30 percent below the rate for 1951. In 1951 there was one injury per 105,556 hours worked, one death per 10,258,700 hours. In 1952 there was one injury

¹⁹¹Ibid., p. 10.

¹⁹²Ibid., p. 16.

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per 126,700 hours, one death per 13,618,900 hours.¹⁹³

d. Army Motor Vehicle Experience. There were 10,501 accidents involving Army motor vehicles in 1952, an increase of nearly 56 percent over the number in 1951. Added exposure resulted in the accident rate being only slightly higher than in 1951, 2.47 per 100,000 miles driven as compared to 2.33 in 1951. These accidents resulted in 16 percent of the total injuries and 47 percent of the total fatalities. The fatality rate for Army motor vehicles decreased about 25 percent during 1952 to 42.08 deaths per 100,000,000 miles driven. Property damage costs totaled \$1,201,368, representing 27 percent of the damage costs due to all accidents. The average damage of \$114 per accident was higher than in 1950 and 1951. In 1950 there was one accident per 47,698 miles driven, one injury per 3.7 accidents. In 1951 there was one accident per 42,837 miles, one injury per 3.8 accidents. In 1952 there was one accident per 40,504 miles, one injury per 4.6 accidents. "Speed too fast for conditions" as a cause of accidents increased 4 percent above the 1951 experience. The rise in the accident rate was due in part to the 47 percent increase in number of miles driven, and to the increase in the number of vehicles owned by the resident population and their unsafe driving practices.¹⁹⁴

e. Non-Army Motor Vehicle Experience. The number of non-Army motor accidents decreased from 556 in 1951 to 486 in 1952, constituting only 2.2 percent of all accidents. Non-Army motor vehicle accidents resulted in 562 injuries, or 4 percent of the total injuries; 9.8 percent of the injuries were fatal. These fatalities represented 14.6 percent of all fatalities due to accidents. This type of accident accounted for over one-fourth of the total military personnel fatal injuries, and more than 7 percent of all military personnel injuries. Total injuries resulted in a loss of more than 349,000 man-days and in \$964,260 direct cost.¹⁹⁵

f. Army Aircraft Experience. The number of aircraft accidents increased 168 percent, from 19 in 1951 to 51 in 1952. The accident rate increased 31 percent, from 45.67 accidents per 100,000 hours flown in 1951 to 59.69 accidents in 1952. In 1951 there was one injury per 9.5 accidents, in 1952 one per 12.7 accidents. Property damage costs increased from \$60,752 in 1951 to \$159,174 in 1952; the average damages per accident, however, decreased from \$3,197 to \$3,121. The increase in aircraft accident rate was due largely to the 100 percent increase in hours flown.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹³Ibid., p. 33.

¹⁹⁴Ibid., p. 23.

¹⁹⁵Ibid., p. 36.

¹⁹⁶Ibid., p. 37.

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g. Fires. The number of fires increased to 183 in 1952, but constituted less than one percent of the total number of accidents. Injuries as a result of fires increased from 24 to 86, including 2 deaths. Damages resulting from fires increased 88 percent to \$2,877,100, constituting 64 percent of total property damages.¹⁹⁷

68. Dependents in the Command

The number of dependents in the command in 1952 increased approximately 54.8 percent as follows:¹⁹⁸

1 January 1952	45,214
31 January 1952	47,387
29 February	49,202
31 March	50,954
30 April	51,970
31 May	53,271
30 June	54,612
31 July	55,930
31 August	58,399
30 September	60,527
31 October	63,292
30 November	66,773
31 December	69,992

a. Housing. The number of dependents in the command was governed principally by the availability and location of housing. The large-scale augmentation of forces during 1951 and 1952 increased the demand for dependent housing and the situation was made more acute by the command policy of not requisitioning additional German property. The dependent housing construction program did not keep pace with the housing requirements, but the situation was somewhat improved in 1952. Previous to 1952 the waiting period for quarters varied from four to twelve months depending upon the location. By the end of 1952 this waiting period had reduced to four to eight months.¹⁹⁹ In January 1952 the command required 30.3 thousand family units. However only 22.7 thousand were available and only 21.4 thousand were located within housing areas where the

¹⁹⁷Ibid., p. 8

¹⁹⁸EUCOM/USAREUR Mthly Stat Repts, 1952. SECRET.

¹⁹⁹(1) Ltr, USAREUR COFS to Dep US CINCEUR, 9 Mar 53, sub: Status of Morale, United States Army, Europe. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 330.11 (1953), Vol. I, Item 5. (2) Stf Study, Maj M. F. Gibbons, Jr., USAREUR G-1 Div, 31 Mar 53, sub: Status of Dependent Housing in the Area of Responsibility of US CINCEUR. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR G-1 Div 624 (1953), Vol. I.

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requirement existed. In January there were 28.2 thousand family units under EUCOM control in Germany. Of that number 5.5 thousand were not available for housing families. Approximately four thousand were used as bachelor officer quarters (BOQ's) and nine hundred were used as office space, clubs, German youth centers, etc. To improve this situation efforts were made to increase housing construction, to construct housing units at the proper locations, and where possible to locate troop units in the areas where housing was most available. However, during the year family housing requirements increased more rapidly than housing became available. By December 1952 the command required 33.2 thousand family housing units; a total of 26.9 thousand units were available, but only 23.4 thousand units were located within housing areas where a requirement for them existed.²⁰⁰ In France the housing situation was much more serious than in Germany. No government sponsored housing was available and no construction of family housing was in progress in 1952. At the end of the year there were approximately 7,000 families requiring housing in France (1,600 Army, 5,400 Air Force), not including personnel already residing on the French economy who expressed satisfaction with quarters leased from the French. In August it was estimated that 40 percent of the families in France had inadequate sanitary facilities, 39 percent had inadequate heating facilities, 30 percent lived beyond 10 miles from their place of work, and 23 percent lived in hotels.²⁰¹

b. Support Problems and Policies

(1) Commissaries. For personnel with dependents and assigned to government quarters, commissaries comparable to small food stores in the United States were available at the major centers of troop population. In keeping with the augmentation of troops and dependents, the commissary operations in the command were expanded. (See par. 126.)²⁰²

(2) Quarters Attendants. Quarters attendants had been utilized by Allied forces since the beginning of the occupation to meet the requirements of maintenance of requisitioned facilities and the provision of security for property and dependents. On 1 December 1951 the U.S. High Commission for Germany (HICOG) released the German Federal Republic from

²⁰⁰(1) EUCOM/USAREUR Log Div, Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Jan 52, p. 47; 31 Dec 52, p. 26. SECRET. (2) Memo, Dir USAREUR P&A Div to USAREUR COFS, 19 Sep 52, sub: Dependent Housing. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 620 (1952), Vol. I, Item 35A, B/P.

²⁰¹(1) Stf Study, Maj M. F. Gibbons, Jr., USAREUR G-1 Div, 31 Mar 53, cited above. (2) Briefing for Gen Eddy, 27 Aug 52, sub: Status and Problems of COMZ, Sec VI, Personnel and Dependent Schools. SECRET. In USAREUR P&A Div files.

²⁰²(1) EUCOM Log Div and USAREUR ACOFS G-4 Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Jan 52, p. 38; 31 Jan 53, pp. 6, 39. SECRET. (2) Ltr, USAREUR COFS to Dep US CINCEUR, 9 Mar 53, cited above.

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the obligation of furnishing quarters attendants for HICOG personnel except in special cases which were financed by counterpart Deutsche Mark funds, and suggested that EUCOM do likewise. Quarters attendants, furnished by the Army, were restricted to one attendant for each set of quarters except for residences where official duties required additional assistance. British and French occupation personnel did not limit the use of this category of employee to the same degree. As early as September 1951 the command had suggested to the British and French occupation authorities the elimination of this type of employee, but neither the French or British were prepared to follow the suggestion. In protesting the HICOG insistence upon the discontinuance of this type of support, the command reiterated its willingness to do so on a tripartite basis, but protested against unilateral action. Despite EUCOM objections, the Department of the Army ordered the discontinuation of that category of support and the payment of quarters attendants from the EUCOM Deutsche Mark budget was eliminated on 1 July 1952.²⁰³ (See also par. 174.)

(3) Household Goods Shipments. A Transportation Division study in late 1951 revealed that personnel were returning excess property to the United States for storage rather than making shipments for emergency reasons as provided for in joint travel regulations (JTR's). To reduce the volume of household goods being returned to the United States for storage it was recommended to the Department of the Army that personnel assigned to the command be limited to 50 percent of the then authorized household weight allowances. Consequently on 15 November 1952 the Department of the Army limited household goods shipments from the United States to Germany to 25 percent of the permanent change of station weight allowance, or 2,000 pounds, whichever was greater.²⁰⁴

(4) Transportation Costs. Effective 1 October the Military Sea Transportation Service announced that space available passenger travel between the United States and Europe would no longer be free. Under the new tariffs civilians, officers, and passengers whose passage emanated from their affiliation with officers were charged \$50 for cabin travel and \$20 for troop class. Passengers whose passage emanated from their affiliation with enlisted personnel were charged \$20 for both cabin and troop class travel. Subsistence was included in these amounts and children five years of age or younger could travel at no charge.²⁰⁵ In addition travel rates on the German State Railways

²⁰³(1) Cable S-3547, CINCEUR to COFSA for COM, 23 Mar 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. I, atchd to Item 20. (2) EUCOM P&A Div Jnl, 7 May 52, Item 2. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) EUCOM ltr, 7 May 52, sub: Employment of Domestics in Germany. AG 248 GPA-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

²⁰⁴USAREUR Trans Div Comd Rept, 1952. RESTRICTED.

²⁰⁵USAREUR Wkly Dir 10, 3 Oct 52, Sec. VII. UNCLASSIFIED.

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(Deutsche Bundesbahn) were revised on 16 July 1952. Previously occupation personnel and their dependents were charged 1.6 Deutsche Pfennige per kilometer for second class travel. To this amount was added DPfg 3.25 from appropriated Deutsche Mark funds if the tickets were sold at U.S. military ticket offices or DM 3.40 if the tickets were sold by Deutsche Bundesbahn stations. After 16 July such subsidy payments were discontinued and authorized occupation personnel were charged at the following rates per kilometer:²⁰⁶ 1st class, DPfg 7.2; 2d class, DPfg 4.8; 3d class, DPfg 2.4.

c. Tourist-Dependents. During 1952 the problem of tourist-dependents in the command became increasingly serious. Under a directive of 3 March 1952 dependents of personnel ineligible because of grade or rotation date to be assigned quarters, as well as dependents of recently arrived eligible sponsors who wished to join their sponsors before their place on the waiting list warranted quarters assignment, were limited to 90 days in the U.S. Zone of Germany in a tourist-dependent status. In this status their sponsors were eligible for sponsor's passes, station allowances, and separate rations. In general, families already in the zone at that time were allowed to remain; however, their requests for extension had to be processed through post commanders to permit disapproval of cases which caused problems within the command. All tourist-dependents were required to register with military authorities for security reasons.²⁰⁷ The situation continued to become more acute as the year progressed. It became increasingly difficult to provide for the security of these personnel in case of emergency, and overcrowded living conditions caused resentment by the Germans because American dependents were occupying needed housing by virtue of their willingness to pay more than Germans could afford. By October there were more than 2,000 dependents in the command who were in a tourist status and were not eligible for dependent status and support. Of the 2,000, approximately 1,800 could not become authorized dependents because their sponsors lacked the necessary rank or had too short a period to serve in the command. Unauthorized dependents were increasing at the rate of 125 per month. Previous efforts to restrict the numbers of tourist-dependents had been unsuccessful, and the command decided the most effective deterrent would be the withholding of privileges. In line with this reasoning the command published a new directive on 24 September which established the following policy: (1) Sponsors of tourist-dependents who entered Germany prior to 15 March 1952 and who were holding sponsors' passes could retain such passes at the discretion of the unit commanders, but their overnight absence from their units would be chargeable against the authorized 15 percent absence. Dependents could

²⁰⁶USAREUR Trans Div Comd Rept, 1952. RESTRICTED.

²⁰⁷(1) USAREUR P&A Div Jnl, 3 Mar 52, Item 1, p. 2. UNCLASSIFIED.

(2) USAREUR P&A Div Jnl File, Mar 52, Incl 1, Item 1, p. 1. UNCLASSIFIED.

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continue to receive such limited logistical support, if facilities permitted, as they had been receiving. Dependents school facilities could be provided on a space available basis only, with that portion of the cost paid from nonappropriated funds to be reimbursed by the sponsor. (2) Sponsors of tourist-dependents who had arrived subsequent to 15 March 1952 and whose dependents had been authorized to extend their visits beyond 90 days were accorded the same privileges for the period of their authorized extension. (3) Sponsors of tourist-dependents who had arrived subsequent to 15 March 1952 and whose dependents had been in the area more than 90 days without specific authorization had their sponsors' passes, station allowances, and separate rations terminated. Post exchange privileges for tourist-dependents were withdrawn and all other forms of logistical support except emergency medical care were canceled. Such dependents were not eligible for reduced train fares, use of recreational areas, or possession of scrip. The use of dependents schools was made available on the same basis as mentioned above. Sponsors were not authorized to continue residence off post and were not to receive any special consideration for passes. (4) Sponsors of tourist-dependents whose dependents had been in the area less than 90 days continued to receive such privileges as they were then accorded for a period of 90 days from the date of arrival of their dependents, at which time all privileges and support terminated. This group alone continued to be granted sponsors' passes not chargeable against the authorized 15 percent during the 90-day period. At the end of the 90-day period sponsors' passes were withdrawn and sponsors had to return to their assigned billets, separate rations and station allowances were terminated, and they received no special considerations as to passes. (5) Tourist-dependents of military and civilian personnel who entered the command after 1 October 1952 were considered merely as tourists and received no privileges or logistical support, except emergency medical care and post exchange cards for 90 days. Sponsors of such personnel were not authorized sponsors' passes, station allowances, and/or separate rations, nor were they authorized to reside outside their assigned billets with their dependents or receive special pass privileges. This directive did not solve all problems. Considerable difficulties were encountered because under the provisions of the joint travel regulations dependents who were present at the time of their sponsor's permanent change of station (PCS) had to be furnished return transportation if the sponsor was authorized government expense travel for dependents. This enabled dependents who timed their visit to coincide with their sponsor's PCS to make inexpensive European trips, thereby encouraging an influx of tourist-dependents. Under JTR's the remainder of the tourist-dependents were authorized space available transportation and their problem was even more serious. Under regulations the dependents had to travel with the sponsor. The shipment of sponsors could not be deferred until space available transportation existed since in the majority of cases the sponsor had to reach the United States for separation prior to a specified date. Approximately 60 percent of the known tourist-dependents fell into this group. The command expressed the opinion to the Department of the Army that the Army and Congress in granting appropriations

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for support of dependents overseas intended to furnish facilities to dependents authorized by the command. Under the regulations then existing it appeared that certain benefits accrued to dependents whom the command did not authorize and did not wish to have in the command because of security problems and limited logistical support facilities. The command suggested that the JTR's be amended to obviate the requirement to supply government expense transportation for dependents not in an authorized status when the sponsor received his PCS orders. This would impose no hardship on dependents who arrived as tourist, but who were later authorized government transportation during sponsor's tour, and at the same time eliminate expenditure of government funds for purposes not believed warranted or intended. The command also recommended that existing regulations be changed to specify that space would not be made available on government transports for dependents of enlisted personnel entitled only to space available, if these dependents came to the overseas command in tourist status or if the legal dependency was acquired in the overseas command.²⁰⁸

69. Dependents Schools

a. Strength and Organization. The Department of the Army operated schools in Europe for minor dependents of employees of the Department of Defense and certain other U.S. governmental agencies, with certain other children admitted on a space available, full tuition basis. The curriculum of these schools was similar to the better school curriculums in the United States, and generally the scholastic standards were as high. During most of the year the schools were operated by the 7755 Dependents School Detachment (DSD). On 15 November, after criticism by the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools that professional educators in charge of the school program were subject to military control at a subordinate level, the Dependents Education Organization (DEO) staffed by professional civilian educators was organized and assigned specifically the educational responsibilities formerly exercised by the commander of the 7755 DSD. The DEO was under the staff supervision of the USAREUR Personnel and Administration Division and reported directly to the Commander in Chief, USAREUR. The 7755 DSD remained the logistical support agency for the dependents education program. At the same time the USAREUR Board of Educational Advisers was established to advise the Commander in Chief, USAREUR, with respect to the operation of the education program.²⁰⁹ In

²⁰⁸(1) EUCOM P&A Div Jnl, 3 Mar 52, Item 1, p. 3. UNCLASSIFIED.
(2) EUCOM P&A Div Jnl File, Mar 52, p. 1, Item 1, Incl 1; p. 5, Item 1, Incl 1. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Draft ltr, USAREUR to TAG, n.d. sub: Tourist Dependents. AG 292 GPA. SECRET. In USAREUR P&A Div 292 (1952).

²⁰⁹Intervs, Mr. C. R. Petrie, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. J. B. Boyer, Dir DEO, 13 May 52; and Lt Col J. E. Steel, USAREUR ACOFS G-1 Pers Svcs Br, 28 May 52. RESTRICTED.

Table 10--EUCOM/USAREUR Operated Schools in Germany and France^a

School Population^a

<u>Date</u>	<u>Total</u>		<u>Grades 1-8</u>		<u>Grades 9-12</u>		<u>Kindergarten</u>	
	<u>Sch</u>	<u>Enroll</u>	<u>Sch</u>	<u>Enroll</u>	<u>Sch</u>	<u>Enroll</u>	<u>Sch</u>	<u>Enroll</u>
<u>Average</u>								
<u>Sch Yr</u>								
<u>51 - 52</u>		<u>8,950</u>		<u>7,873</u>		<u>1,098</u>		<u>2,046</u>
Jan	71	8,875	64	7,805	7	1,070	32	1,997
Feb	71	9,367	54	8,263	7	1,104	37	2,149
Mar	74	9,355	67	8,242	7	1,113	37	2,165
May	78	9,534	71	8,420	7	1,114	37	2,108
Jun	78	9,392	71	8,294	7	1,098	37	2,078
<u>Average</u>								
<u>Sch Yr</u>								
<u>52 - 53</u>		<u>14,280</u>		<u>12,942</u>		<u>1,338</u>		<u>3,082</u>
Sep	87	13,239	79	11,975	8	1,264	37	2,650
Oct	88	14,179	80	12,865	8	1,314	45	3,171
Nov	88	14,688	80	13,312	8	1,376	45	3,239
Dec	91	15,013	83	13,616	8	1,397	45	3,267

Paris American Schools Population

<u>Date</u>	<u>Total</u>		<u>Grades 1-8</u>		<u>Grades 9-12</u>	
	<u>Sch</u>	<u>Enroll</u>	<u>Sch</u>	<u>Enroll</u>	<u>Sch</u>	<u>Enroll</u>
<u>Average</u>						
<u>Sch Yr</u>						
<u>51 - 52</u>		<u>240</u>		<u>190</u>		<u>49</u>
Jan	2	218	1	175	1	43
Feb	2	238	1	191	1	47
Mar	2	248	1	197	1	51
May	2	248	1	194	1	54
Jun	2	249	1	196	1	53
<u>Average</u>						
<u>Sch Yr</u>						
<u>52 - 53</u>		<u>449</u>		<u>347</u>		<u>102</u>
Sep	2	357	1	259	1	98
Oct	3	458	2	357	1	101
Nov	3	478	2	375	1	103
Dec	3	502	2	398	1	104

^aLess Paris American School

Source: 7755 DSD Sch Population Repts, 1952. UNCLASSIFIED.

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January 1952 the command operated 73 elementary and secondary schools in Germany and France (including the 2 Paris American Schools) with an enrollment of 9,093, and 32 kindergartens with an enrollment of 1,997. By the end of the year as a result of the heavy troop augmentation program and the increase in family housing facilities, the number of elementary and secondary schools had increased to 94 (with 3 schools in Paris) and the enrollment had increased by 70 percent to 15,515. The number of kindergartens had been increased to 45 with an enrollment of 3,267. In January the command employed a total of 504 American and Allied personnel to operate the schools. By the end of the year the number of American and Allied personnel had increased to 727. In addition, at the start of the year, the command employed 261 German personnel (and 4 French personnel in Paris) in teaching and clerical positions. In the 1951 - 1952 school year the average teacher-pupil ratio was 1 teacher to 24 pupils. In the 1952 - 1953 school year this ratio increased to 1 to 28.²¹⁰ (Table 10).

b. Budgetary Matters. During FY 1952 and FY 1953 the elementary and secondary dependents schools in Europe were supported almost entirely from appropriated funds. The command-operated schools in Germany and France were budgeted separately from the SHAPE Paris American Schools which were also operated and mainly supported by the Army. The kindergartens were supported entirely by nonappropriated and occupation cost funds.

(1) Schools in Germany and France (less Paris). For the 1951 - 1952 school year EUCOM budgeted for all Department of Defense students at the rate of \$200 per student. As the average cost per student increased to approximately \$235 per student per year, the command requested and received an increased appropriation. The total appropriated funds received for the year amounted to \$1,994,680. In addition the command received \$490,094 in occupation cost funds at the rate of \$58 per student per year and approximately \$3,000 in nonappropriated funds. HICOG allocated \$74,848 to meet the full cost for HICOG students less the occupation cost funds. Payments from other tuition students, who paid the full cost including the occupation cost, totaled \$32,469. This made \$2,605,296 available for the operation of the 1951 - 1952 school year. Since the original appropriation was not sufficient to cover costs and since appropriated funds were received on a quarterly basis, usually arriving too late to be of use in the current quarter, difficulties arose. Very little money was necessary during the first quarter (July - September 1951) thereby making available sufficient funds to start the program in September. But in the third and fourth quarters appropriated funds became inadequate, necessitating the loan of \$302,820 from the EUCOM Central Welfare Fund to cover current expenses until appropriated funds became available. Since total actual costs amounted to \$2,605,296, which was almost completely covered by appropriated funds, occupation cost funds, and tuitions and

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since savings were made on estimated supply costs, the 7755 DSD was able to repay all except approximately \$3,000 to the Central Welfare Fund. In all, this program cost the Central Welfare Fund approximately \$.35 per enrollee. In FY 1953 the funding program became more complicated. The Air Force began operation of several schools in Europe and it became necessary for each service to budget for its own funds. To facilitate matters cross-service agreements were signed to cover the transfer of funds. Under these agreements the Air Force and Navy allocated the same amount per pupil as did the Army and agreed to try to meet Army levels in the event the Army increased its allocation. Congress limited the pupil support to a maximum of \$225 per pupil on a world-wide basis in oversea areas, and the three services and HICOG made available only \$206 per pupil in Europe. While \$206 was sufficient to cover the average estimated cost of \$204 per pupil for the number of students budgeted for, the number of enrollees increased greatly over this number, thereby causing a large deficit. The Army allocated \$2,405,015 for USAREUR schools and the Air Force allocated \$522,724. HICOG furnished support of \$58,460 and other tuitions were expected to amount to \$39,476. Deutsche Mark support at the rate of \$47 per student was expected to approximate \$708,000. Because of this increase in the number of students and the slowness in the receipt of appropriated funds, operating funds became inadequate in the latter part of 1952. It was estimated that approximately \$596,274 would have to be borrowed from the AFGA Welfare Fund in order to cover current expenses. While most of this sum would be repaid, a deficit of approximately \$135,000 was expected for the 1952 - 1953 school year.

(2) Kindergartens. The American kindergartens in Germany were financed with nonappropriated and occupation cost funds. During 1952 no kindergartens were operated in France. In FY 1952 the 32 kindergartens required \$167,000 in nonappropriated funds and \$39,000 in occupation cost funds. By 31 December the number of kindergartens was increased to 45. The kindergarten program in FY 1953 was expected to require approximately \$170,000 in nonappropriated funds and \$37,200 in occupation cost funds.

(3) Paris American Schools. The Paris American Schools were operated for the minor dependent children of Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel assigned to SHAPE and of Army personnel assigned to EUCOM/USAREUR units in Paris. Minor dependent children of personnel employed in Paris by the Navy, Air Force MAAG's, and such miscellaneous agencies as attaches, MATS, Air University, Battle Monuments Commission, FOUSA, etc., could attend the school on a space available basis. Fiscal support of the Paris American School was considerably complicated by the large number of different agencies participating in the program. The 7961 EUCOM Detachment budgeted for the Army element of SHAPE and the 7755 DSD budgeted for Army elements of the MAAG and for EUCOM/USAREUR personnel assigned in Paris. Other services and agencies budgeted

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independently for their funds. The operation of the Paris American School was extremely difficult and expensive. Living quarters were not provided, making necessary the addition of a cost-of-living allowance to teachers' salaries. In FY 1952 EUCOM budgeted for minor dependent children of all its assigned personnel (Army, Navy, and Air Force) and separately for SHAPE. The funds for the miscellaneous groups were obtained in various ways depending on the fiscal regulations governing each group. The operation of the Paris American School required \$84,199 in FY 1952 of which \$10,946 came from nonappropriated funds. During that year the appropriated fund support amounted to approximately \$225 per pupil. In FY 1953 each service was required to budget for the school children of its own personnel thereby requiring cross-service funding agreements. The Army's and Air Force's authorized support for the program was \$351 per pupil. Navy support amounted to only \$252 per pupil. Since the estimated cost of the Paris American School program was \$369, a deficit developed which had to be filled through nonappropriated funds. It was estimated that the overall cost of the program would be \$214,000 of which \$117,000 was loaned from the 7961 Welfare Fund. It was anticipated that approximately 90 percent of this would be repaid.²¹¹

c. Personnel. The dependents school system employed American, German, and French personnel in teaching and administrative positions. Most of the American teachers were recruited in the United States and paid from appropriated funds as government service employees. Generally they were hired under 1-year contracts to enable prospective employees to take advantage of leaves of absence from their schools in the United States. These personnel were required to have American citizenship; a bachelor of arts or science degree, with 18 hours credit in education; a valid teaching certificate; and a minimum of two years teaching experience in grades or subject field for which employed. In addition they had to meet the physical fitness standards for overseas assignment and in most cases had to meet the age requirements of under 45 years for women and under 55 for men. Teachers meeting these requirements were hired at GS-7 ratings, teacher-principals at GS-8 ratings, and principals at GS-9 or GS-10 ratings. Although the annual personnel requirements forecasts usually had less than 2 percent error, the command found itself in need of additional teachers in 1952 due to the heavy increases in enrollment. Since appropriated funds were not available to hire more teachers this demand was met by hiring additional teachers with nonappropriated funds loaned from the Central Welfare Fund. In most cases these personnel were dependents of personnel already in the command or were tourists hired in the command. Because appropriated funds in FY's 1952 and 1953, as in previous years, arrived too late to be used for current expenses, some personnel had to be transferred temporarily to a nonappropriated fund pay status until the

²¹¹Intervs, Mr. C. R. Petrie, USARUER Hist Div, with Mr. J. A. Murphy, C/USAREUR 7755 DSD B & F Br, 14 and 15 May 53. RESTRICTED.

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appropriated funds became available. In general, these personnel were paid on the same scale as appropriated fund employees except that no retirement deductions were taken from their salaries. The transferred personnel were carried in a leave without pay (LWOP) status on Department of the Army civilian time and attendance reports in order that they might retain all annual and sick leave credits accrued in the Department of the Army civilian payrolls. Although the time spent in nonappropriated fund pay status could not be credited for periodic step-in-grade increase purposes, the time was not deemed a break in government service. Morale problems developed since annual and sick leave credits accrued in nonappropriated fund status could not be transferred when the teacher reverted to appropriated fund status and step increases for nonappropriated fund employees were not authorized. Administrative problems arose from the necessity of transferring nonappropriated fund personnel to appropriated fund payrolls before the termination of their contracts in order to insure transportation to the United States on other than space available basis. The number of employees paid from nonappropriated funds increased from 63 in January 1952 to 406 in December 1952. A continuing problem was that of the heavy turnover of American personnel. Because of the 1-year contracts the annual American teacher turnover was approximately 30 percent as compared to the 18 percent turnover of German employees. This heavy turnover necessitated continual recruitment of new employees. During the year the number of German employees was decreased from 261 in January to 235 in December as the result of the command-wide reduction-in-force program. German employees were paid during 1952 from occupational cost funds, while the French employees were paid from nonappropriated funds. During the summer of 1952 twenty-five summer schools were operated by EUCOM for retarded children and for children who had been unable to attend school due to travel overseas. These schools enabled the command to furnish employment for those teachers who elected summer duty and wished to remain for the 1952 - 1953 school year. Other teachers who wished to travel or attend school in the summer months were placed in the LWOP status so as not to cause a break in service.²¹²

d. Supply Activities. At the start of 1952 the Supply Branch of the 7755 DSD was supervising, procuring, storing, and issuing 8,000 line items of supply for the seventy-three secondary and elementary schools in the American dependents school system. Approximately 11 percent of the funds appropriated for the operation of the dependents school system were expended in the procurement of textbooks, workbooks, laboratory equipment, chemicals, athletic equipment, administrative

²¹²(1) 7755 DSD Sch Population Rpts, 1952. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Intervs, Mr. C. R. Petrie, Jr., USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. C. W. Sole, C/USAREUR 7755 DSD P&A Br; Mr. J. B. Boyer, Dir DEO; and Capt R. C. Linebarger, 7755 DSD Adj, 13 May 52. UNCLASSIFIED.

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supplies, and other supplies necessary for the operation of the schools. This was in addition to the nonreimbursable items procured through normal Army channels from the various technical services. The unexpected increase in enrollments, the addition of some twenty new schools, and the frequent changes in troop and dependent concentrations caused many supply problems. The movement of student populations from one area (and school) to another resulted in supply shortages in the gaining school and excesses in the losing school, leading to a maldistribution of supplies. Because of the long distances between 7755 DSD headquarters and the various schools, correspondence, supplies, and supply records were in transit for long periods of time. Loss of shipments and correspondence were frequent detriments to smooth supply operating conditions. Frequent changes in key supply personnel also hampered the efficient operation of the supply system to some extent, but by the end of 1952 most supply difficulties had been corrected.²¹³

70. U.S. Military-German Relations

a. Trends. During 1952 increasingly successful efforts were made to improve U.S. military-German relations. A HICOG public opinion poll of civilian-troop relations, conducted in late 1952 and early 1953, revealed an improvement over the results of a similar study conducted in late 1951. More than a third of the West Germans who participated in the study expressed the opinion that relations between American soldiers and the German civilian population had improved during 1952, whereas only 2 percent asserted that relations had deteriorated. The following tabulation shows the results of this poll in the different zones, by percentage:

	<u>West</u> <u>Germany</u>	<u>British</u> <u>Zone</u>	<u>U.S.</u> <u>Zone</u>	<u>French</u> <u>Zone</u>
Improved	36	31	44	34
Worsened	2	2	2	1
Remained unchanged	28	30	26	26
No opinion	34	37	28	39

The study noted that the improvement in relations seemed to be at the informal, soldier-civilian level. German comments indicated that American soldiers were doing their part in furthering good relations by being more friendly, polite, and considerate. There appeared to be a continuing tendency toward the opinion that the American soldier behaved well, with

²¹³ Resume of Supply Branch Activities during Calendar Year 1952, 26 May 53, prepared for USAREUR Hist Div by WOJG F. P. Preston, 7755 DSD Sup Br Admin Asst. UNCLASSIFIED.

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53 percent of the West Germans polled judging his behavior as good, 22 percent fair, 4 percent bad, and 21 percent without opinion. Those who most frequently came in contact with soldiers seemed to have the most favorable opinions of them. In addition, Germans rated American soldiers as better fighting men in 1952 than they had in 1951; 54 percent conjectured that the U.S. soldier would fight fairly well or well against the Russians, as compared to 42 percent in 1951. In general, the Korean record had raised the estimate of the American soldier in the mind of the German. In 1952 the American soldier was more frequently ranked second to the German as a fighting man than he had been in 1951, but was still generally considered inferior to the Russian. The general evaluation of the presence of American forces in Germany seemed to be more favorable than previously. Only 19 percent maintained there were no advantages in having American troops in Germany, in contrast to 33 percent in 1951. The following tabulation lists the main advantages and disadvantages of the continued presence of American forces by percentage of persons mentioning the reason:²¹⁴

	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>U.S. Zone</u>
<u>Advantages</u>		
Security: external, internal	51	51
Economic: general, jobs, food	38	37
Promotes international friendship	8	4
Others	8	9
Undecided	20	19
No advantages	19	20
<u>Disadvantages</u>		
Provocation of Russia	2	2
Economic: occupation costs, requisitioning, damage through maneuvers, food	76	76
Personal: limitation of freedom, corruption of morals, racketeering	15	12
Others	3	3
Undecided	18	18
No disadvantages	16	17

²¹⁴ Some respondents gave more than one answer. HICOG RAS Rept No. 147, Series No. 2, 11 Mar 53, sub: The American Soldier as Appraised by the West German People, A Continuing Study of Civilian-Troop Relations. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Hist Div Ref Lib.

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Studies by the German Relations Branch of the USAREUR Public Information Division of German press reports of American actions also revealed a trend toward better American-German relations. An analysis of press items revealed an increase in the percentage of articles favorable to Americans from 12 percent in July, when the studies first were made, to 45 percent in December. The December figure was unusually high because of the great amount of favorable publicity toward joint American-German Christmas activities, but the 28 percent favorable figure in November was also a considerable improvement. Correspondingly the percentage of unfavorable reports declined from 59 percent in July to 23 percent in December. The actions receiving the majority of favorable comments were "American Assists" (American aid of any type: money grants, rescues, building of sport areas, etc.), "Cultural Exchanges," "Law Enforcement Efforts," "Derequisitioning," and "Joint Noncultural Activities" (sports, etc.). The majority of unfavorable comment came in regard to "Crimes of Force and Violence," "Traffic Accidents," "Requisitioned Property," "Rowdiness," and "Maneuver Damage." Garmisch Military Post, Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation, and Augsburg Military Post areas seemed to have consistently good percentages of favorable comments, whereas Heidelberg, Nuernberg, Wuersburg, and Rhine Military Post areas appeared to have consistently high percentages of unfavorable comment. In general, however, the percentage of favorable comment improved and the percentage of unfavorable comment lessened in all areas.²¹⁵

b. Efforts to Improve Relations. Civil affairs officials with the co-operation of commanders at all levels engaged in numerous campaigns to improve German-American relations. (See also par. 213). The establishment of S-5's and German-American Advisory Councils at local levels enhanced closer co-operation and understanding between Germans and Americans. S-5 officers acted as focal points of contact between the local military and civilian populations. By working closely with both military and German authorities they often succeeded in resolving disagreements concerning such matters as troop and dependent housing, maneuver and training areas, light and coal, transportation and the use of roads, etc. S-5's assisted in the dissemination of information about American activities and motivations, endeavored to rectify complaints from the German authorities or populace, and co-ordinated the U.S. military-German programs to solve traffic problems, control venereal disease and prostitution, etc. They promoted closer military-German social association by arranging for the joint use of recreation and athletic equipment; by insuring that the military was represented at German ceremonies and that Germans were invited to view military parades, sports events, and the like; and by sponsoring joint American-German clubs and social activities of all types. Through the organization of the German-American Advisory Councils wherever

²¹⁵ Information compiled from USAREUR PID, German Press Analysis Repts, Jul - Dec 52. RESTRICTED.

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there were concentrations of troops, military and civilian officials were in a position to work toward the solution of problems harmful to German-American friendship, by full discussion of these problems, and by agreeing on proper recommendations to the responsible agencies. Since both the local civilian officials and the local commanders were members of the council, many matters of friction could be and were settled immediately. The activities of the councils were wide and beneficial. In Ludwigsburg, for example, the council agreed on a plan to end traffic tie-ups on the town's main streets by re-routing heavy military trucks; in Heilbronn, members of the council solved a critical space shortage and saved DM 10,000 by working out a plan to place German school facilities at the temporary disposal of American school children, thus solving a critical problem and also bringing German and American children into closer contact; the council in Schweinfurt organized an informal club for German-American social and discussion meetings; and in Giessen the council brought together German customs police, local police officials, and Giessen military police officials to formulate plans for combating the black market and controlling venereal disease. These, and similar activities, although on a local level and small in scope, did much to improve local German-American relations. The Public Information Division, through its analysis of German press reports, was able to chart the trends in German-American relations and point out areas where there appeared to be friction. Upon the basis of this information the Civil Affairs Division and the USAREUR commander in chief were able to advise the local commanders on what actions to take to rectify the situation. To help create a favorable press the Public Information Division guided local public information officers (PIO) in the selection of material for local and zone-wide distribution, developed favorable material for distribution to the PIO's and/or for release to the wire services; and improved techniques for insuring the flow of favorable press items to the German press. At a higher level, monthly meetings were initiated in July at the Office of the U.S. Special Representative in Europe, to discuss methods of improving American relations with the people of Europe. Representatives of the Army, Navy, Air Force, State Department, and Mutual Security Agency from Germany, Italy, England, and France attended the meetings. At these meetings joint plans were made for the improvement of American-community relations by disseminating information about Americans through radio, newspapers, pamphlets, films, etc. to the citizens of countries where U.S. forces were located. Other methods of improving relations between the U.S. military and the civil populations of Europe were discussed and implemented. Joint efforts were made in Germany to promote good will during the Christmas season. It was estimated that approximately 175,000 German families invited U.S. servicemen to their homes for Christmas. Although the same program had been followed in 1951 only approximately 20,000 German families had participated that year. In addition an estimated 200,000 West Germans and refugees received gifts from U.S. personnel. Joint German-American Christmas parties were held throughout the command,

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and many units held Christmas dinners for German and refugee needy children. This program met with ready approval by the German population as witnessed by the tremendous increase in favorable press commentary in December and by the fact that 34 percent of the West Germans polled considered that the Christmas program had contributed considerably to the improvement of German-American relations. Surprisingly, the soldiers' part in the Christmas activities, consisting of gifts to children and the needy and parties, were mentioned in the polls more frequently than the German public's part, involving invitations from German families to soldiers.²¹⁶

c. German Youth Activities. The Armed Forces Assistance Program to German Youth Activities (GYA) was considered one of the successful programs for furthering American-German relations. During 1952 activities of the program included instruction in civics; discussion groups; youth councils; handicraft shops producing items of sewing, knitting, carpentry, clay-modeling, and art; dramatic presentations; voice, instrumental, and ballet instruction; photography; radio; model railroading; libraries; English classes; gardening; summer camps; ski camps; and team and individual sports. Contests were conducted throughout the command, including the Meistersinger Contest (singing), handicraft contests, and community service contests. In FY 1953 it became necessary, for financial reasons, to modify the program. EUCOM estimated that it would need approximately DM 3.9 million from HICOG counterpart funds to continue the program at its FY 1952 size and scope. However, because of the impending contractual arrangements, HICOG was unable to furnish more than DM 1,000,000, and economy measures had to be instituted. As a result of a study of the GYA program by Brig. Gen. T. L. Futch, Commanding General, Wuerzburg Military Post, in April 1952, it was decided to cut costs by eliminating nonproductive centers, moving as many centers as possible into rent-free property, and initiating economies in operators. At the start of FY 1953, 26 centers were closed and 18 were moved into rent-free buildings, thereby reducing the number of centers from 102 to 76 and saving approximately DM 1,012,300. Additional economy measures were taken. The number of paid instructors was reduced and educational programs were continued by rotating instructors between centers and by utilizing volunteer instructors for such subjects as music and ballet. Janitorial and cleaning personnel were cut to a minimum, and greater emphasis was placed upon the necessity of troop support.

²¹⁶(1) Interv, Mr. C. R. Petrie, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col. J. T. Barret, C/CAD Govt Off Br, 1 Jun 53. SECRET. (2) Draft doc prepared by CAD for publication as a Trp Info Bul in Jun 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) USAREUR PID, German Press Analysis Repts, Jul - Dec 52. RESTRICTED. (4) Ltr, Mr. W. H. Draper, SRE, to US CINCEUR, 1 Aug 52. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR PID Ger Rel Br files. (5) HICOG RAS Rept No. 147, Series No. 2, 11 Mar 52, sub: The American Soldier as Appraised by the West German People, A Continuing Study of Civilian-Troop Relations. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Hist Div Ref Lib.

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The centers which had to be closed were either turned over to responsible German organizations which volunteered to operate them, or were turned over to troop units which volunteered to assume complete responsibility for their support. In either case all supplies and equipment purchased through counterpart or nonappropriated funds were transferred with the centers, and the centers continued to receive a proportionate share of the nonappropriated funds. When possible the buildings housing the centers were derequisitioned, and the centers continued to receive such assistance as: (a) an equitable distribution of usable salvage; (b) equitable distribution of donated materials, which were not earmarked, for six months after date of transfer; (c) the participation of youth of German sponsored centers in command-wide and other GYA sponsored and assisted activities; (d) invitations to youth leaders employed in transferred centers to attend GYA area training conferences for German employees; (e) distribution of nonclassified publications pertaining to GYA; (f) contact visits by GYA officers upon request of German sponsors; (g) transportation support on an occasional basis and without interference with military requirements; and (h) encouragement and facilitation of volunteer assistance by U.S. nationals. By the end of the year the number of centers operated by the command had been reduced to seventy-four, and the command was planning to turn over to German organizations, as rapidly as possible, the remaining centers. This action was expected to proceed slowly since the German organizations needed money to finance the centers, and the command had to ascertain that the community was ready to continue with the GYA policy of democratic ideas and "open door" youth activities. The following tabulation compares GYA activities between FY 1946 and FY 1953.²¹⁷

	<u>FY 1946 - 49</u>	<u>FY 1950</u>	<u>FY 1951</u>	<u>FY 1952</u>	<u>FY 1953</u>
GYA centers	350	295	254	121	74
Participation	850,000	650,000	618,000	500,000	400,000
Off assigned	130	124	132	84	83
EM & EW assigned	265	249	236	110	99
U.S. volunteers	450	773	899	346	300
German volunteers	1,500	1,121	1,089	581	550
German employees	1,000	991	887	588	270
Basic costs	DM 8,500,000	8,500,000	8,300,000	4,600,000	2,000,000

²¹⁷(1) Interv, Mr. C. R. Petrie, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col R. A. Norman, G/USAREUR G-3 Div Tng Br GYA Sec, 1 Jun 53. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to Gen J. E. Hull, Vice COFSA, 6 Dec 52. UNCLASSIFIED; and IRS, EUCOM OPOT Div to EUCOM DCOFS Admin, 9 Jun 52, sub: GYA Funding. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 353.81 Ger (1952), Vol. II, Item 25, Item 36. (3) Table prepared by USAREUR G-3 Div Tng Br GYA Sec. UNCLASSIFIED.

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CHAPTER 4

Intelligence Activities

71. Intelligence Mission of the Command

The primary function of the Director, Intelligence Division, USAREUR, throughout 1952 was to collect, collate, interpret, and disseminate pertinent information required by the Commander in Chief, USAREUR, and by the Department of the Army, and to protect the security of the U.S. forces. Counterintelligence activities centered about opposing intelligence efforts on the part of agents of the Soviet Union and its satellites in Eastern Europe, including East Germany (see par. 71). While the most pertinent information sought by the Intelligence Division related to imminence of hostilities, information was also collected on political, economic, scientific and technical matters. In the event of war, the Intelligence Division was destined to become the nucleus of the G-2 Division of the Central Army Group headquarters.¹

Functions of a routine nature performed by the Intelligence Division during 1952 included the following: maintaining staff supervision of intelligence training in the command; supervising subordinate intelligence agencies; co-ordinating action affecting relations with the Soviet Mission in Frankfurt; performing security checks and personnel investigations of designated American and German personnel; providing liaison with British, French, and other U.S. intelligence services; and controlling the release of classified information.

The formation of Headquarters, US EUCOM J-2 Division, on 1 August 1952 did not significantly affect the mission of the USAREUR Intelligence Division; however, on 15 August the US EUCOM J-2 assumed the former USAREUR function of sponsoring the monthly meetings of the Joint Indications of

¹Briefing for CINCUSAREUR on Off of Dir of Intel, 11 Sep 52. SECRET. In USAREUR Intel Div files.

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the Imminence of Hostilities Committee in Europe. The US EUCOM J-2 Division also assumed the function of co-ordinating intelligence matters, including counterintelligence, for all three services; USAREUR intelligence representatives attended several conferences held under US EUCOM auspices to discuss subjects of common interest.²

72. Changes in Intelligence Organization

Chart 14 shows the organizational pattern of the Intelligence Division in effect at the end of 1952. No important changes in organization were effected during the year.

Responsibility for Operation PAPERCLIP and Project 63 reverted from the Security Section of the Operations Branch to the Special Projects Section of the Analysis Branch in August. Both PAPERCLIP and Project 63 related to the employment in the United States of German scientists and technicians.

Two changes in terminology were made on 12 September, when the Training Section of the Plans, Policy, and Training Branch became the Training and G-2 Air Section, and the Scientific and Technical Section of the Analysis Branch became the Special Projects Section.³ A reorganization committee was formed in the fall to recommend changes in the organizational plan of the Intelligence Division. Although the committee submitted a preliminary draft of proposed revisions in the branches and sections to the Director of Intelligence and his branch chiefs on 28 November, no action had been taken on reorganizing the division by the end of the year.⁴

73. Agencies Supervised by the Intelligence Division

Operating under the general staff supervision of the Operations Branch of the USAREUR Intelligence Division were three collection agencies: the 7707 USAREUR Intelligence Center at Oberursel, the 66th Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) Detachment with headquarters at Stuttgart, and the 7880 Military Intelligence Detachment (MID) in Berlin. (See Chart 15.) The 7712 USAREUR Intelligence and Military Police School at Oberammergau, was supervised through the Plans, Policy and Training Branch of the

²(1) Ibid. (2) Interv, Miss M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col P. G. Morgan, USAREUR Intel Div Analysis Br 18 Feb 52. SECRET.


³USAREUR T/D 77-7890-07, 12 Sep 52. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁴(1) USAREUR Intel Div Jnl, 28 Nov 52, Item 2, p. 8. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br. (2) Interv, Miss M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj D. J. Delaney, USAREUR Intel Div PP&T Br Policy & Org Sec, 18 Feb 53. SECRET.

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FUNCTIONAL CHART - USAREUR INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

31 December 1952




Source: EUCOM Intel Div Jnl file, 1 Jan 52, Item 1. UNCLASSIFIED.
 In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br. Amended by Interv. Miss M. L. Gels, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj D. J. Delaney, USAREUR G-2, 2 Feb 53.

Command Channels
 Staff Supervision
 Liaison Channel

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USAREUR INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
USAREUR

KEY: _____ Operational Control

----- Support

[-----] Collection Agencies

[-----] Support Organizations

Nov 52

a Direct support, but not under USAREUR

Source: Chart 2 to PP&T Br, annex to USAREUR Intel Div Briefing for CINCUSAREUR, Gen Eddy, 11 Sep 52. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR Intel Div files.

Amended by inter, Miss M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj D. J. Delaney, USAREUR G-2, 2 Feb 53. RESTRICTED.

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division. The 7821 Composite Group at Munich and three strategic intelligence research and analysis teams were also controlled operationally by the Intelligence Division.

a. The 7707 USAREUR Intelligence Center. At the 7707 USAREUR Intelligence Center basic strategic information on countries behind the Iron Curtain was obtained by interrogating former German prisoners of war returned by the Soviets and illegal border crossers (IBC's). The 7707 Intelligence Center received persons for interrogation from the Seventh Army, the 66th CIC Detachment, and from its own two field detachments. On 26 February 1952, the USAREUR Intelligence Division directed the center to close its IBC screening points at Hof, Ulm, and Hersfeld, and to establish a permanent screening team at Giessen, in collaboration with Seventh Army.⁵ Soviet deserters and other persons possessing considerable information were referred to the Defectors Reception Center (DRC) at Oberursel. A high percentage of information obtained at this center was considered of greater interest to the Department of the Army than to USAREUR and much material was sent to Washington for use in the National Intelligence Surveys (NIS) and the Industrial Card Files. The five and one-half technical intelligence detachments at the center assisted with the NIS program and prepared briefs of the interrogations. The intelligence center regularly employed approximately 142 civilians and 312 military personnel.⁶ The center was scheduled to be reorganized on 15 January 1953 concurrent with the activation of the 513th Military Intelligence Service Group.⁷

b. The 66th CIC Detachment. The largest and most important agency operating under the USAREUR Intelligence Division was the 66th CIC Detachment, redesignated as the 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Group upon its reorganization on 20 December 1952.⁸ The actual strength of the 66th CIC Detachment in September 1952 was 425 civilians and 1,631 military personnel. The authorized strength of the 66th CIC Group when it was reorganized was 301 officers, 123 warrant officers, and 1,066 enlisted men, or a total military strength of 1,490 persons. In addition to its primary mission of collecting counterintelligence

⁵EUCOM Intel Div Stf Jnl and Files, 14 Feb 52, Item 1; 26 Feb 52, Item 3. SECRET.

⁶Briefing for Gen Eddy on Opns Br, 9 Sep 52, & PP&T Br, 11 Sep 52. SECRET. In USAREUR Intel Div files.

⁷(1) USAREUR GO 41, 22 Dec 52, Secs. I and II. RESTRICTED. (2) USAREUR Intel Div PP&T Br Staff Jnl, 22 Dec 52, Item 5, p. 7. SECRET.

⁸USAREUR GO 38, 8 Dec 52. RESTRICTED.

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information and performing security investigations, the 66th CIC Detachment also gathered information from the Soviet Zone of Germany and from Czechoslovakia. As shown on Chart 15, the 66th CIC Detachment operated twelve regions, which were located in the U.S. Zone of Germany, in Berlin, and in the USAREUR Communications Zone. Attached to the detachment were the 1st Military Censorship Organization, which provided a planning and training cadre for a censorship unit to operate in time of war, and the 7746 Communications Intelligence Service.⁹ (See also par. 79).

c. The 7880 Military Intelligence Detachment. A positive intelligence agency, the 7880 Military Intelligence Detachment at Berlin, devoted its principal efforts to obtaining order of battle information from the Soviet Zone of Germany and from Poland, and to collecting economic, scientific, and technical information on the Soviet Zone. Composed of approximately 92 military persons and 32 civilians, the 7880 Military Intelligence Detachment was aided in collecting information by two and one-half technical intelligence teams and by the Air Technical Liaison Office, staffed by personnel provided by USAFE headquarters.¹⁰ In October 1952 the Intelligence Division began the preparation of plans for establishing a rear headquarters for the 7880 Military Intelligence Detachment, but this alternate headquarters had not been established by the end of the year.¹¹

d. The USAREUR Intelligence and Military Police School. The USAREUR Intelligence and Military Police School in Oberammergau offered courses in combat intelligence, aerial photograph interpretation, and foreign languages, as well as a one-week course for field grade officers on Communism and the situation in Eastern Europe. The USAREUR Provost Marshal prescribed the courses offered in the Military Police School. The Plans, Policy, and Training Branch of the USAREUR Intelligence Division established the frequency of courses, defined their general subject matter, and allocated quotas of students to the school.¹²

e. The 7821 Composite Group. Intelligence plans contemplated the phasing out of the 7821 Composite Group at the end of FY 1953, and the assumption of its functions by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

⁹Cable DA-921330, COFSA from ACOFSA G-1 to CINCUSAREUR, RESTRICTED. In USAREUR Intel Div PP&T Br Policy & Org Sec files.

¹⁰Briefing for CINCUSAREUR on Off of Dir of Intel, 11 Sep 52. SECRET. In USAREUR Intel Div files.

¹¹(1) USAREUR Intel Div Opns Br Stf Jnl, 22 Oct 52, Item 1. SECRET.
(2) Interv, Miss M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj D. J. Delaney, USAREUR Intel Div PP&T Br Policy & Org Sec, 2 Feb 53. SECRET.

¹²Briefing for Gen Eddy on Off of Dir of Intel, 11 Sep 52. SECRET. In USAREUR Intel Div files.

f. Strategic Intelligence Research and Analysis Teams. The 403d and 461st Strategic Intelligence Research and Analysis (SIRA) teams operated in Heidelberg under the control of the USAREUR Intelligence Division. In November 1952, two additional SIRA teams, the 4th and 5th, were sent to the command, and a 5th team was assigned to the G-2 Division of the Seventh Army. (See Chart 15.) Three of the teams specialized in terrain analysis and were charged with targeting and other terrain study missions. The other team specialized on economic matters, particularly the supply of POL products.¹³

g. The 513th Military Intelligence Service Group. Authorized by the Department of the Army in October 1952, the 513th Military Intelligence Service Group was to be activated at Oberursel on 15 January 1953 to replace the 7707 USAREUR Intelligence Center. Organized on T/O&E as amended, the new service group was authorized a strength of 351 military personnel including 48 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 302 enlisted men.¹⁴ The function of the 513th Military Intelligence Service Group was to serve as a centralized administrative and logistics agency for USAREUR intelligence units. Its principal missions included the procurement, training, and assignment of intelligence specialists in the command. In addition the group assumed the operational missions formerly assigned to the 7707 USAREUR Intelligence Center.¹⁵

74. Additional Sources of Intelligence Information

In addition to the three major intelligence collection agencies mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the USAREUR Intelligence Division obtained information from the other agencies in the command. Such agencies included the G-2 divisions of the Seventh Army and USAREUR Communications Zone, the S-2 sections of the area commands and detachments (military posts), and technical intelligence teams.

a. Seventh Army Intelligence. As shown on Chart 15, the Seventh Army G-2 controlled five different types of intelligence agencies. The 427th CIC Detachment operated directly under the Seventh Army G-2, which also supervised the CIC detachments at corps and division level.¹⁶ The

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ (1) USAREUR GO 41, 22 Dec 52. RESTRICTED. (2) DA ltr, 22 Oct 52, sub: Change in Status of Certain Units in the United States Army, Europe. AGAO-1(M) 322 (26 Sep 52) G-1. RESTRICTED. (3) USAREUR Intel Div PP&T Br Stf Jnl, 17 Oct 52, Item 4. SECRET.

¹⁵ Interv, Miss M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col G. A. Chester, Dep Dir USAREUR Intel Div, 27 Jan 53. SECRET.

¹⁶ Interv, Miss M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col R. Garrison, USAREUR Intel Div, 19 Feb 53. RESTRICTED.

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532d Military Intelligence Battalion included a company for each corps and a platoon for each division assigned to the Seventh Army. Operating under the Seventh Army G-2, the 532d Military Intelligence Battalion screened illegal border crossers to determine individuals to be exploited by U.S. intelligence agencies; the battalion also collected intelligence pertaining to the security of the Seventh Army. The 5th Strategic Intelligence Research and Analysis Team attached to the Seventh Army specialized in terrain analysis.¹⁷

b. The Army Security Agency, Europe. Although not a USAREUR agency, the Army Security Agency, Europe (ASAE), was supported by USAREUR headquarters, for which it provided communications intelligence. The ASAE was larger than all other command intelligence agencies combined, having a strength of approximately 3,800 persons in 1952. The functions of the agency were to insure compliance of all U.S. Army units in the command with communications security procedures, to distribute and account for cryptographic material in the command, to inspect U.S. Army communications centers periodically, and to advise CINCUSAREUR on matters pertaining to the Army Security Agency. With headquarters in Frankfurt, the ASAE also maintained fixed installations at Herzo Base, Scheyern, and Baumholder in addition to eight mobile units.¹⁸ ASAE tactical units also supported the Seventh Army and its corps and divisions.

c. Technical Service Units. Technical service intelligence units contributing to the intelligence effort of the command included engineer map units, signal electronic units, and quartermaster, ordnance, chemical, and transportation teams.¹⁹

d. Miscellaneous Intelligence Activities. Intelligence functions for the USAREUR Communications Zone were performed by the COMZ G-2 and chiefs of technical services. COMZ headquarters maintained operational control of Region IX, 66th CIC Detachment. Although the Region IX received its missions both from Headquarters, COMZ, and from the 66th CIC Detachment, missions assigned by COMZ were given priority.²⁰ The Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Germany, maintained intelligence field bases at Berlin, Bremerhaven, and Munich, from which pertinent items of naval intelligence were sent to CINCUSAREUR. The S-2 sections of military posts, and of the area commands and military districts after 1 December 1952,

¹⁷Briefing for CINCUSAREUR on Off of Dir of Intel, 11 Sep 52. SECRET. In USAREUR Intel Div files.

¹⁸Ltr, USAREUR ASAE In Off to Dir USAREUR Intel Div, 13 Aug 52, sub: Mission of the Army Security Agency, Europe. SECRET. In USAREUR Intel Div files.

¹⁹Cable SX-530, CINCUSAREUR to FMP, 18 Nov 52. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR Intel Div Jnl File, 25 Nov 52, Item 1.

²⁰EUCOM Intel Div Jnl and Jnl Files, 21 Jan 52, Item 4; 6 Dec 51, Item 3. SECRET.

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were very limited in scope and performed no covert operations.²¹

75. Co-ordination of Intelligence Activities

a. The Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee, Germany. Under the permanent chairmanship of Lt. Gen. L. K. Truscott (ret.) as Intelligence Co-ordinator and Special Advisor to the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, the Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee, Germany (ICCG), was composed of the director of intelligence, USAREUR; the Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2, USAFE; and the intelligence officer, USNAVGER; in addition to General Truscott. Subcommittees were appointed periodically on an ad hoc basis to study the various subjects considered by the committee as a whole. No change occurred in the mission or the charter of the organization during 1952, in the course of which three main projects were undertaken.

(1) Co-ordination of Collection Activities. The committee completed a report in October 1952 dealing with the co-ordination of collection activities in the Soviet Zone of Germany and selected satellite areas. The comprehensive report contained separate studies on each category of information collected, including order of battle, political, economic, scientific, and technical subjects. The studies formed the basis for reassigning priority targets to U.S. intelligence agencies of all three services collecting information on the Communist controlled areas, to eliminate duplication of effort.

(2) Contractual Agreements. Another major project of the ICCG during 1952 was the negotiation of the intelligence portions of the contractual agreement to protect U.S. interests. An ad hoc committee was formed to work with intelligence representatives of the British, French, and German authorities in preparing two classified memorandums of understanding covering matters omitted from the contractual agreements because of their security classification. The ICCG also completed standing operating procedures to implement the memorandums of understanding; at the end of the year the standing operating procedures were being co-ordinated with the Allies and the German Federal Republic.

(3) Berlin Intelligence Agencies. The third problem confronting the ICCG was the co-ordination of intelligence operations of U.S. intelligence agencies in Berlin. Plans made by the ICCG for correcting deficiencies and eliminating gaps in information collected by Berlin agencies culminated in the establishment in October 1952 of the Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee, Berlin (ICCB).²²

²¹Briefing for Gen Eddy, 11 Sep 52. SECRET. In USAREUR Intel Div files.

²²(1) Interv, Miss M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col James F. Hughes, Jr., C/USAREUR Intel Div Opn Br Collection Sec, 20 Feb 53. SECRET.
(2) Briefing for CINCUSAREUR, 11 Sep 52, sub: ICCG, Tab. C. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Intel Div files.

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b. The Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee, Berlin. The ICCB was composed of six members: the commanding officers of the 7880 Military Intelligence Detachment and Region VIII of the 66th CIC Detachment; a representative from District 3 of the Office of Special Investigations, USAFE; the Chief, Department of the Army Detachment in Berlin; and the intelligence officers of USNAVGER and USCOB. The Berlin committee, which met six times in 1952, held its initial session on 15 October. The ICCB considered three principal topics: (1) co-ordinating detailed aspects of U.S. intelligence operations in Berlin; (2) formulating individual plans to obtain coverage of targets assigned by ICCG to Berlin agencies in their respective areas of responsibility; and (3) modifying the rights to be held by the Allied powers in consonance with the spirit of the contractual agreements after the signing of those agreements. Although Berlin was not covered by the agreements with the German Federal Republic, the Allies desired to extend the same rights to the city administration as would become effective in the Western Zones of Germany upon ratification of the contractual agreements.²³

76. Control and Dissemination of Intelligence

a. The Military Information Control Committee. The USAREUR Intelligence Division authorized the release of classified information on a local basis; however, the joint Military Information Control Committee (MICC) of the Departments of State and Defense in Washington controlled the overall policy on disseminating information to the extent that MICC permission was frequently required to release information originating in USAREUR and concerning that headquarters. In March 1952, a team composed of ten MICC members visited the command to discuss problems concerning the release of classified information to foreign governments, particularly the German Federal Republic. The team was briefed by the EUCOM Intelligence Division and interested staff sections of other divisions, and held conferences with officials of SHAPE and USAFE.²⁴

b. Release of Intelligence to German Agencies. A continuing problem confronting the command was that posed by the limitations on the release of security information to the German Federal Republic. The inability of USAREUR headquarters to disclose certain classified information to German agencies hampered the co-ordination of USAREUR plans and operations with those of German governmental agencies. USAREUR officials requested a revision of the regulations to permit the disclosure of classified information including the SECRET category when German officials required the information to implement programs of mutual concern. While this broad

²³ Ibid.

²⁴(1) Interv, Miss M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj D. J. Delaney, USAREUR Intel Div PP&T Br, 18 Feb 53. SECRET. (2) Briefing for Gen Eddy, 11 Sep 52. SECRET. In USAREUR Intel Div files.

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permission was not granted, regulations were relaxed to some extent to permit co-ordination of emergency planning in some fields.²⁵

c. Exchange of Information with NATO Countries. The Intelligence Division, USAREUR, disseminated intelligence items to SHAPE through ALFCE. The only restrictions imposed by the Department of the Army on the disclosure of finished intelligence to ALFCE were: (1) that the information be developed entirely from sources within the command; (2) that material which might prove embarrassing to Allied countries be withheld; (3) that original sources not be disclosed. It was thus possible to divulge to ALFCE virtually all important intelligence items emanating from USAREUR headquarters. The information was imparted to British and French intelligence agencies in Germany as well as to ALFCE through a weekly cable known as INTEX (intelligence extracts), classified as COSMIC SECRET. The INTEX cable contained excerpts from the weekly WEEKA cable and items of Intelligence Interest, from which information classified for U.S. EYES ONLY NOFORN (not releasable to foreign nationals) was expurgated. The British Army of the Rhine and the French Forces in Germany (FFA) reciprocated by transmitting to the USAREUR Intelligence Division information of interest to the U.S. forces. The G-2 Division of ALFCE also sponsored quarterly conferences attended by intelligence representatives from USAREUR, FFA, and BAOR to resolve questions of mutual interest such as the interrogation of war prisoners, the processing of order of battle, logistic, and technical intelligence items. USAREUR officials also attended bilateral conferences with the British on the order of battle in Czechoslovakia and Poland.²⁶

77. Fields of Intelligence Interest

a. Studies on Indications of Impending Hostilities. During 1952 the major USAREUR intelligence effort continued to be focused on ascertaining the Soviet potentialities for waging war and studying the indications of impending hostilities. Toward that end, the BARNACLE Committee (Joint Indications of Imminence of Hostilities Committee) composed of representatives from USAREUR, USAFE, USNAVER, HICOG, and CIA met monthly to consider approximately seventy factors with the aim of canvassing all available intelligence items to determine the imminence of hostilities. If the political situation were to become critical, the BARNACLE Committee

²⁵(1) Interv, Miss M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col G. A. Chester, D/Dir USAREUR Intel Div, 27 Jan 53. SECRET. (2) IRS, Dir USAREUR Intel Div to USAREUR COFS, 1 Aug 52, sub: Item for Discussion between the Secretary of the Army and the Commander in Chief, USAREUR; and incl, memo, n.d., sub: Release of Classified Information to the German Federal Republic. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337 (1952), Vol. I, Item 15.

²⁶(1) Interv, M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col P. G. Morgan, USAREUR Intel Div, 18 Feb 53. SECRET. (2) Briefing for Gen Eddy, 11 Sep 52, Tab D. SECRET. In USAREUR Intel Div files.

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planned to hold continuous sessions. All intelligence agencies concerned automatically gave top priority to BARNACLE factors or indicators. Within twenty four-hours after the meetings, a summary of the conclusions was distributed, and a few days later a complete report was published. An oral briefing on the highlights of the BARNACLE report was presented monthly to CINCUSAREUR and his staff, who were also regularly informed of developments on communications intelligence, strategic intelligence developments in tense areas throughout the world, and on significant intelligence findings in the European area.²⁷

b. Coverage of Soviet Troop Installations.

(1) Information Requirements. On 23 January 1952 the Operations Branch of the USAREUR Intelligence Division issued a compilation of requirements on Soviet troop installations to be used in determining Soviet military strength, equipment, location, disposition, organization, and training. These items of information were deemed essential for ascertaining Soviet capabilities and intentions. Intelligence requirements for troop housing included the requisitioning and de-requisitioning of buildings and areas by Soviet authorities, the construction of tent camps, bivouacs and training areas, range facilities, and changes in the restriction of travel or in the curtailment of civil freedom.²⁸

(2) Collection Difficulties. The collection of information on Soviet activities and installations was impeded during 1952 by the tightening of security in the Eastern Zone, including the inauguration of a protective area along the east-west frontier between East Germany and the German Federal Republic. For the purpose of tightening internal security in the Eastern Zone Headquarters, Soviet Group of Occupation Forces, Germany, was transferred from the Babelsburg-Potsdam area to casernes near Wuensdorf at the end of May 1952.²⁹

c. Revision of Essential Elements of Information. To designate target priorities and areas of coverage, the Operations and Analysis Branches of the USAREUR Intelligence Division conducted a conference on 18 February 1952 for representatives of the G-2 Division of Seventh Army, the 66th CIC Detachment, the 7880 Military Intelligence Detachment and the 7707 EUCOM Intelligence Center. The EUCOM intelligence collection plan was the subject of the conference, at which a revised set of "Essential Elements of Information" was distributed and discussed.³⁰

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ EUCOM Intel Collection Memo 4 - 52, 23 Jan 52, sub: Soviet Troop Installation Coverage. 350.09 (GID/OPS/COLL). SECRET. In EUCOM Intel Div Jnl File, 23 Jan 52, Item 1.

²⁹ USAREUR ACOFS G-2 Intel Sum 155, 30 Jan 53, sub: 1952 in Review. SECRET

³⁰ EUCOM Intel Div Jnl, 18 Feb 52, Item 2. SECRET.

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d. Topics of Special Interest. Matters of intelligence interest on which studies were made during 1952 included: antiaircraft defenses in the Soviet Zone and the USSR, the reorganization and reinforcement of border police in the Soviet Zone, communist front organizations in the U.S. Zone, trends in West Zone state elections, reactions of West Germans to the contractual agreements, security forces in Czechoslovakia, remilitarization of the German Democratic Republic in East Germany, foreign trade in the East Zone, possibilities for a renewed blockade of Berlin, propaganda attempts, and the supply of liquid fuel in the Soviet Zone.³¹

78. Intelligence Aspects of the Contractual Agreements

a. The Memorandums of Understanding. Under the general supervision of the ICCG, all U.S. intelligence agencies in Germany collaborated in negotiating intelligence agreements with the Federal Republic to insure the continuance of essential intelligence operations after the effective date of the contractual agreements. Since it was obvious to all concerned that the intelligence rights of the U.S. forces could not be included within the open conventions, provision was made in the "Convention on the Rights and Obligations of the Foreign Forces and Their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany" for an understanding to be reached between the appropriate authorities of the Three Powers and the Federal Republic with regard to the collection, exchange, and protection of the security of all pertinent information.³² Two separate secret memorandums of understanding were negotiated with the intelligence authorities of the Federal Republic in order to implement this provision of the contractual agreements. Negotiated on a quadripartite basis, the memorandums provided for the retention of most of the rights considered essential in intelligence operations, but certain privileges formerly exercised by the occupation forces were permitted to expire upon the ratification of the contractual agreements. The rights to perform security arrests and to obtain communications intelligence were severely curtailed. Compromises with the Germans were effected on the following matters: the protection from prosecution of persons co-operating with the Allied intelligence agencies; the inclusion of non-German nationals on travel restriction lists; and the extradition, retention, or expulsion of persons of security interest. The two memorandums guaranteed Allied agencies the following rights: (1) to conduct intelligence operations; (2) to exploit former German prisoners of war; (3) to move persons and things across German borders; (4) to obtain documents and licenses necessary for intelligence operations; (5) to have certain security legislation enacted by

³¹USAREUR ACOFS G-2 Intel Sum 155, 30 Jan 53, sub: 1952 in Review.
SECRET.

³²Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany and Related Conventions, 26 May 1952, p. 60.
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the Federal Republic of Germany; (6) to secure Allied archives installations and documents from search or seizure by German authorities; (7) to require the Federal Republic to provide adequate security measures for information made available by the Allies; (8) to have access to information collected by German agencies; and (9) to contract on a voluntary basis with German nationals of interest to Allied intelligence organizations.³³

b. Supplementary Instructions. After the signing of the two separate memorandums of understanding in May 1952, a working committee under the ICCG prepared standing operating procedures and other necessary implementing instructions to carry out the provisions of these memorandums. By 31 December 1952, all U.S. elements concerned had approved the draft procedures, and ICCG was co-ordinating them with Allied and German intelligence authorities.³⁴

79. Counterintelligence in the Command

During 1952 U.S. counterintelligence agents in Germany concentrated upon measures to meet the many changes in intelligence threats posed by agents of the USSR and its satellite nations. Of such changes, the most significant was the increased use made of the Soviet Zone of Germany as a base for the intelligence operations of espionage agents directed against the West. USAREUR CIC agents were aware that the Ministry for State Security of Eastern Germany employed thousands of low-level spies and informers, in addition to its overt staff of some two thousand persons. USAREUR agents observed Communist efforts to develop sources of positive intelligence. During 1952 charges of espionage against the U.S. forces in Germany were proved against twenty-nine persons, who were sentenced to a total of 130 years in prison. Ten of the spies were Soviet-paid agents operating in East Germany, and the other nineteen were employed by the Czechs. Most of the agents were apprehended in Bavaria, site of many U.S. Army and Air Force units and whose eastern border facing Czechoslovakia runs over 100 miles.³⁵

³³Briefing for Gen Eddy, 11 Sep 52, Tab E, sub: Effect of Contractual Relations on Intelligence Operations. SECRET. In USAREUR Intel Div files.

³⁴(1) Ibid. (2) Interv, Miss M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col J. F. Hughes, Jr., 20 Feb 53, and Maj D. J. Delaney, 18 Feb 53, both of USAREUR G-2 Div. SECRET.

³⁵USAREUR ACOFS G-2 Intel Sum 155, 30 Jan 53, sub: 1952 in Review, pp. 84 - 92. SECRET.

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CHAPTER 5

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80. Co-ordination of USAREUR Emergency Planning with SHAPE and ALFCE

As SHAPE plans provided that in the event of war the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, would assume operational command of all U.S. forces in Germany, USAREUR plans for a general emergency were prepared in consonance with the defense plans of SHAPE and its subordinate commands. The combined Central Europe Emergency Defense Plan was prepared jointly by the Commander in Chief, Allied Land Forces Central Europe (CINCLAFCE), the Flag Officer, Central Europe (FOCE), and the Commander in Chief, Allied Air Forces, Central Europe (CINCAAFCE). The plan co-ordinated the operations to be performed by Allied land, naval, and air forces in Western Germany upon the outbreak of hostilities, and specified in detail the measures to be taken at various stages of the alert in order to create the conditions requisite for the success of planned Allied operations.¹ The joint Central Europe Emergency Defense Plan served as a basis for emergency planning of the Central Army Group and USAREUR plans in turn were based upon those of Central Army Group.² Emergency plans provided that upon the outbreak of hostilities, personnel from USAREUR would form the U.S. element of CAG headquarters and would perform certain theater U.S. Army staff functions.³

¹Interv, Miss M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj T. Q. Donaldson, IV, USAREUR SGS, 11 Feb 53. SECRET.

²Introductory remarks by Gen Williams, USAREUR COFS, at Briefing for Asst SA Fred Korth at Hq USAREUR, 4 Nov 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337 (1952), Vol. II, Item 24.

³Interv, Miss M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col W. M. Vann, USAREUR Asst DCOFS Opns, 20 Feb 53. SECRET.

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81. Mission of the Allied Planning Group

a. Organization. Responsibility for operational planning and training for the Central Army Group was vested in the Allied Planning Group (APG), which was organized in January 1952 as a joint U.S.-French agency within the framework of EUCOM headquarters with Maj. Gen. R. M. Montague, Director, EUCOM OPOT Division, as co-ordinator, and Brig. Gen. Jacques M. Gazounaud of the French Army as deputy co-ordinator. When Maj. Gen. C. B. Ferenbaugh replaced General Montague as director of OPOT Division, he simultaneously assumed the position of APG co-ordinator. In September 1952 Col. Lewis S. Griffing succeeded Col. George E. White, Jr., as assistant co-ordinator and G-3 representative in the group.⁴ All U.S. personnel of the APG were members of USAREUR staff divisions. French officer members of the group were assigned directly from the Ministry of Defense. French enlisted personnel were assigned from Headquarters, French Forces in Germany.⁵

b. Operations. The primary function of the APG was to plan the operations to be undertaken by CAG in time of war. The APG prepared emergency plans for CAG and co-ordinated planning with commands adjacent and subordinate to CAG. The APG was to function only in peacetime; upon execution of the general alert order, its members were to return to their respective staff divisions and the APG was to be dissolved.⁶ By 31 March 1952, the requirements for the CAG organization had been prepared and an emergency plan for CAG had been published. On 5 February 1952 the APG assumed the additional function of authorizing tactical reconnaissance in France or in the Saar by members of the U.S. forces in Europe. The APG also co-ordinated requests for conducting reconnaissance with the French VI Military Region.⁷

82. The General Alert Order

The EUCOM General Alert Order 1-52 (GAO 1-52), consisting of a basic order and eight annexes, was published on 15 April 1952. Two annexes were added on 31 July. The GAO was to be implemented only upon order of CINCENR/CINCUSAREUR. The OPOT Division of EUCOM/USAREUR headquarters amended GAO 1-52 with seven changes ranging in date from 16 July to 22 December 1952. The provisions, annexes, and changes to the GAO were all

⁴(1) EUCOM Off of Compt, Mthly Status Rept to ALFCE, 31 Jan 52. SECRET. (2) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf 21, 23 Sep 52, p. 3. SECRET.

⁵Interv, Miss M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj Jacob H. Towers, USAREUR OPOT Div APG G-3 Sec, 16 Dec 52. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁶Ibid.

⁷(1) Ibid. (2) EUCOM Stf Memo 6, 5 Feb 52, sub: Tactical Reconnaissance in France, including the Saar. SECRET. (3) EUCOM OPOT Div Jnl, 15 Jan 52, Item 1. SECRET. (4) EUCOM Off of Compt, Mthly Status Rept to ALFCE, 31 Mar 52. CONFIDENTIAL.

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classified TOP SECRET. GAO 1-52 was prepared in consonance with directives issued through NATO channels. The order indicated the actions to be taken by European Command forces in the event of an act of aggression. "A-hour" was the term used to identify the time when the GAO was to be implemented.⁸

83. The Orders for Simple and Reinforced Alert

a. Conditions for Implementation. Provisions of the EUCOM/USAREUR Order for Simple Alert (OSA), to be implemented at S-hour, placed all U.S. troops on an alert status and prepared them for any emergency that might develop. No action was to be taken under OSA that would compromise the over-all operational plans of command headquarters, and most activities under the order were to be covert in nature. The order directed the movement of certain service troops, but combat troops were to remain in the area of their normal location except for some bridge guards and patrols. The OSA was to be implemented when tension developed to such an extent that local incidents might arise or when intelligence information indicated that a potential enemy was girding for active warfare. The order for the reinforced alert (ORA) was to be implemented at R-hour upon order of CINCEUR/CINCUSAREUR whenever he considered that imminent aggression threatened from the Soviets, its satellite countries, or from East German paramilitary forces. In assuming the reinforced alert status, EUCOM/USAREUR forces would also prepare to execute the GAO. If not already executed, the noncombatant evacuation order (NEO) was to be implemented automatically at R-hour.⁹

b. Changes in Troop Lists. The OPOT Division recommended on 5 January 1952 that the troop lists contained in Annex 1, Appendixes A to I, of the orders for simple and reinforced alerts be amended to reflect certain operational and administrative changes that had occurred since the orders were last revised on 15 August 1951. Subordinate commands were informed of the proposed shifting of EUCOM units upon execution of either of the emergency plans, in order that they might plan for dispatching, receiving, and utilizing the units concerned. The revised plan particularly affected the movement of medical units to insure adequate medical support for Seventh Army troops upon the outbreak of hostilities. On 19 January 1952,

⁸(1) Interv, Miss M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col C. M. Worthy, C/USAREUR OPOT Div Plans Br Trp Sec. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) EUCOM CINC's Wkly Stf Conf 10, 15 Apr 52, p. 3. CONFIDENTIAL. (3) HMP NEO-1-52, 15 May 52, as changed 11 Sep 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1952), Vol. 1, Item 26B.

⁹(1) Interv, Miss M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col C. G. Fredericks, C/USAREUR OPOT Div Plans Br Emerg Plans Sec, 8 Dec 52. SECRET. (2) Foreword to draft of EUCOM Rev OSA-ORA, Incl 1 to IRS, USAREUR OPOT Div to gen & spec stf divs, n.d., sub: Revision of OSA-ORA. AG 371.2 GOT. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br, Security Plan file (1952).

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the recommended changes in destinations of EUCOM troop units were published as amendments to the EUCOM Order for Simple Alert (OSA) 1-51 and Order for Reinforced Alert (ORA) 1-51.⁵ These provisions were retained when USAREUR replaced EUCOM later in the year.

c. Plans to Revise the Orders. Although EUCOM/USAREUR OSA-ORA 1-51 as amended remained in effect throughout 1952, OPOT planners during the year revised both the OSA and the ORA in conformance with instructions received from the Department of the Army. The purpose of revising the alert orders was to reflect changes brought about by the troop augmentation program of 1951 and to indicate the assignments and destinations of the new units upon implementation of the plan. The new ORA was to be enlarged to encompass the repelling of an actual attack on the U.S. Zone of Germany by East German or satellite forces, a contingency formerly covered only in the GAO. The heads of general and special staff divisions were requested on 21 May 1952 to review the OSA-ORA 1-51 and to submit recommendations to OPOT for revising the basic plans.¹¹ A draft of the revised OSA-ORA, based on the recommendations of EUCOM/USAREUR agencies, was submitted to those agencies by OPOT in the summer of 1952 for their further comment and review. By the end of December 1952, the drafts of both alert orders were in the final stages of preparation for publication early in 1953.¹²

84. Plans for Evacuating Noncombatants

The EUCOM Noncombatant Evacuation Order (NEO) 1-50 was neither rescinded nor amended in 1952, although OPOT planners during the year were preparing a revised NEO designed to give the Seventh Army more control over the area commands, to utilize more camps centered about COMZ installations in France, and to rely less on French assistance in housing and feeding noncombatants. The new NEO was completed but not published by

¹⁰(1) EUCOM ltr, 19 Jan 52, sub: Changes No. 2, EUCOM OSA-ORA 1-51. (Rev 15 Aug 51). AG 371.2 GOT-AGO. SECRET. (2) IRS, USAREUR OPOT Div to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 5 Jan 52, sub: Recommended changes to EUCOM OSA-ORA 1-51. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 371.2 (1952), Vol. I, Item 1A. (3) EUCOM OPOT Div Jnl, 4 Jan 52, Item 3. SECRET.

¹¹IRS, USAREUR OPOT Div to gen & spec stf divs, 21 May 52, sub: Revision of OSA and ORA. AG 371.2 GOT. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Docs Br, Security Plan file (1952).

¹²(1) Incl 1 to IRS, USAREUR OPOT Div to gen & spec stf divs, n.d., sub: Revision of OSA-ORA. AG 371.2 GOT. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Docs Br, Security Plan file (1952). (2) Interv, Miss M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col C. G. Fredericks, C/USAREUR G-3 Div Plans Br Emerg Sec, 2 Feb 53. SECRET.

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the end of the year. The NEO's of both the Seventh Army and USAREUR COMZ were revised during 1952, as were those of many of the military posts and their successors, the area commands and districts.¹³

a. Basic Provisions. The noncombatant evacuation order provided for the protection and removal from danger areas of all U.S. and other noncombatants for whom CINCUSAREUR was responsible. To synchronize actions under NEO by all commands, N-hour was designated as the time for executing the order and the point from which times would be designated. If not already executed, the NEO was to be implemented automatically with the GAO or ORA, N-hour being the same as A-hour, but NEO might be implemented at any time independently of the other alert orders.¹⁴ Upon execution of the NEO, CINCUSAREUR was to evacuate all U.S. and Allied personnel and persons on the King and general lists in the U.S. Zone of Germany to the Bordeaux-La Pallice port area in France by motor serials using U.S. Government and government-requisitioned private vehicles. Seventh Army was to control the evacuation to the Franco-German border, at which point USAREUR COMZ would assume responsibility for the serials. The U.S., French, and British zone commanders each agreed to evacuate all known noncombatants of the other two occupying powers located in his respective zone. Under the operational control of the Seventh Army, the area commands and detachments, except for Bremerhaven and Berlin, were to alert, assemble, and dispatch noncombatants within their respective areas. USAFE was charged with evacuating Berlin noncombatants by air to Orly Field near Paris, and Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, was to transport evacuees from Bremerhaven to the United Kingdom by ship. Noncombatants residing in the Mediterranean area and in Northern Europe, including Scandinavia, the Low Countries, and France, north of the Loire River, were to be evacuated by representatives of the U.S. Department of State.¹⁵

b. Evacuation Categories. To identify the various classes of persons to be evacuated, six categories of noncombatants were established. In the first category were dependents and those patients in U.S. hospitals who could not be returned to duty. Category two consisted of U.S. Government employees except those whose services were required by their commanders or who volunteered for duty. U.S. citizens not employed by the

¹³ Interv, Miss M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col K. T. Klock, Jr., USAREUR G-3 Div, 19 Feb 53. SECRET.

¹⁴ HMP NEO 1-52, 15 May 52, as changed 11 Sep 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1952), Vol. I, Item 26B.

¹⁵ (1) Seventh Army NEO 2-52, 30 Aug 52. SECRET. (2) EUCOM COMZ NEO 1-52, 1 Jan 52. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1952), Vol. I, Item 37A, B/P. (3) Interv, Miss M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col K. T. Klock, Jr., USAREUR G-3 Div, 19 Feb 53. SECRET.

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U.S. Government and not in a dependent status comprised category three. Allied employees of U.S. agencies were placed in category four. British and French nationals not included in categories one or four were in category five, as were diplomatic and consular representatives of NATO and other western countries. Non-Allied personnel to be evacuated were included in the King or general lists as category six. Persons on the King list were key scientists whose evacuation was mandatory irrespective of their personal wishes. At N-hour, local detachments of the 66th CIC Group were to deliver all individuals on the King list to noncombatant supply points; persons on that list who objected to being evacuated were to be moved forcibly through CIC channels. The general list included all other non-Allied individuals and their dependents whom the United States was morally obligated to evacuate, but they were not to be moved before execution of the GAO. General list personnel were to be alerted and assembled by commanders with area responsibilities, normally by utilizing S-5 officers at noncombatant supply points for organization into march units utilizing excess vehicles.¹⁶

c. Alert Notification. In the U.S. Zone, USAREUR headquarters was to issue the command to execute the NEO as follows: "Execute NEO. N-hour is (time and date). General List Noncombatants (will) (will not) and King List Noncombatants (will) (will not) be evacuated."¹⁷ Noncombatants were to be informed of the implementation of the evacuation order by all available means, including repeated broadcasts emanating from stations of the American Forces Network, telephone announcements, couriers, sound trucks, and sirens. The siren signal was five siren blasts of one minute duration with an interval of one minute between blasts, to be repeated for an hour at intervals of fifteen minutes. Military post emergency plans provided for the appointment of officers or warrant officers as block leaders to insure that all noncombatants within their respective areas of responsibility read and understood the NEO instruction issued by the posts and that they would be alerted promptly in the event of an emergency. Elements of Seventh Army and EUCOM headquarters supplemented military post personnel in serving as block leaders. In order to facilitate the rapid alert notification of dependents who were in Germany as tourists, command headquarters required such visitors to register with their respective post commanders and to indicate their address, date of arrival in the command, and probable duration of visit.¹⁸

¹⁶EUCOM COMZ NEO 1-52, 1 Jan 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1952), Vol. I, Item 37A, B/P.

¹⁷Seventh Army NEO 2-52, 30 Aug 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1952), Vol. I, Item 37A, B/P.

¹⁸EUCOM CINC's Wkly Stf Confs 16 and 6, 24 Jun 52, p. 2; 4 Mar 52, Sec III, p. 3. SECRET.

d. Organization of NEO Columns. Upon implementation of the NEO, vehicles containing noncombatants were to be organized into march units consisting of thirty passenger cars led by a control truck and accompanied by a march unit commander. Each control truck was to be manned by two soldiers to serve as driver and armed guard. If soldiers were unavailable, German or other non-Allied persons were authorized to drive the control trucks. March serials were to consist of five march units. Each serial would also contain the following: a tow truck to pick up stranded noncombatants, to move stalled vehicles from the road, and carry the necessary supplies; a serial control vehicle to transport the serial commander; a class B agent finance officer; and medical personnel with supplies and equipment required for emergency medical treatment. USAREUR COMZ was directed to establish two supply points near Montlucon and Montargis in France to provide medical aid stations and facilities for provisioning noncombatants and refueling their vehicles.¹⁹

e. Fixing of Responsibilities. Upon execution of the NEO, the 7961 USAREUR Detachment in Paris was responsible for evacuating all U.S. noncombatants affiliated with EUCOM and USAREUR agencies and the U.S. elements of the Allied military headquarters in the Paris-Fontainebleau area. Other U.S. noncombatants located in or near Paris were to be evacuated through the American embassy in Paris. CINCUSAREUR requested the 7961 USAREUR Detachment on 22 September 1952 to co-ordinate its NEO plans with the chairman, Paris Liaison Group (See par. 90), and the evacuation officer of the American embassy in order to clarify the division of responsibility for evacuating noncombatants in the Paris area.²⁰ Emergency plans provided that in addition to evacuating noncombatants from Berlin by air, USAFE was to evacuate U.S. and Allied personnel from Vienna to Orly Field near Paris on orders of CINCUSAREUR. Evacuees arriving from Berlin and Vienna were to be moved from Paris to Bordeaux by the USAREUR COMZ. The Chateauroux Air Base in France was required to evacuate noncombatants to La Rochelle. COMZ was responsible for operating a staging area at Bordeaux to process U.S. and U.S.-sponsored noncombatants for movement to the United Kingdom on transports provided by CINCNELM. A ship was also to be provided by CINCNELM at the Bordeaux-La Pallice port area to supply communications and direct port activities. When noncombatants arrived in the United Kingdom, they would become the responsibility of the U.S. Department of State, which was to provide for their

¹⁹(1) Annex 7 to Seventh Army NEO 2-52, 30 Aug 52, sub: Organization of Noncombatant March Units and Serials. SECRET. (2) EUCOM COMZ NEO 1-52, 1 Jan 52. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1952), Vol. I, Item 37A, B/P.

²⁰(1) Cable SX-3569, CINCUSAREUR to 7961 USAREUR Det, 22 Sep 52. SECRET. (2) Cable EC-121, 7961 USAREUR Det to CINCUSAREUR for Dir USAREUR OPOT Div, 22 Aug 52. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1952), Vol. I, Item 35.

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further evacuation to the United States through the U.S. ambassador to Great Britain and the London Liaison Group. Under the terms of an agreement made in 1951, the United Kingdom would feed and house 71,000 U.S. noncombatants, the U.S. Government to be responsible for supporting persons in excess of that number.²¹

f. Safe Haven Plans. Because of the possibility that the port of Bordeaux might be mined or blocked through enemy action, U.S. naval planners objected to transporting noncombatants from Bordeaux to the United Kingdom. Moreover, noncombatants, including tourists, might number as many as 200,000 persons, and the United Kingdom was reluctant to receive so great an influx. It was therefore decided to explore the possibilities of using the Iberian Peninsula as a safe haven for noncombatants pending their return to the United States with the purpose of restricting the number of noncombatants to the United Kingdom to the 71,000 persons for whom logistical support was assured by the British. An agreement negotiated by the U.S. ambassador to Spain in June 1952 with the Spanish Government provided that Spain would furnish housing, storage of personal effects, and other necessities for approximately 150,000 U.S.-sponsored noncombatants in Europe at the expense of the U.S. Government. It was planned to execute a similar agreement with the Portuguese Government early in 1953. The French and Spanish Governments agreed to expedite the movement of NEO columns by controlling the indigenous traffic on NEO routes in their respective countries. These governments would also waive the normal customs requirements to permit the unrestricted entry of noncombatants, military personnel, vehicles, supplies, and baggage in NEO columns.

g. Interim Crash Plan. An interim plan to be implemented only if the NEO was executed between 15 January and 1 May 1953 provided for the organization on the Iberian Peninsula of nine NEO staging detachments, four of which were to be staffed by personnel from USAREUR COMZ and five by the U.S. ambassador to Spain. CINCNELM was to provide shipping for approximately 130,000 noncombatants to the United States from the ports of Bilbao, Santander, and Lisbon; the remaining 55,000 noncombatants were to be carried by CINCNELM from the ports of Barcelona, Valencia, Alicante, Cartagena, and Malaga. Because of the lack of basic planning data on the resources of the Spanish Government, the interim plan was only tentative and was to be superseded as soon as possible by a more detailed and permanent plan based on the findings of a technical survey team operating under the U.S. embassy at Madrid. This team was composed of five officers assigned to USAREUR headquarters and drawn from the following staff divisions:

²¹(1) Interv, Miss M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col K. T. Klock, Jr., USAREUR G-3 Div, 19 Feb 53. SECRET. (2) EUCOM COMZ NEO 1-52, 1 Jan 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1952), Vol. I, B/P.

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G-3, G-4, Quartermaster, Engineer, Medical, and one officer from EUCOM COMZ G-4. The team was scheduled to leave Heidelberg for Madrid on 19 January 1953.²²

85. The Special NEO Planning Group

a. Organization and Composition. To determine deficiencies in NEO plans and preparations and to take corrective action necessary to insure the effectiveness of the evacuation order, the USAREUR Special NEO Planning Group was established on 20 November 1952 to function on a full-time basis for a period of about thirty days. The group consisted of one or more representatives of the four general staff divisions of USAREUR headquarters, Seventh Army, and the USAREUR COMZ, including separate representatives for ADSEC and BASEC. The initial meeting of the group was convened by the chairman, Col. Lyle W. Bernard of the USAREUR Logistics Division, on 21 November 1952. The Director, USAREUR Logistics Division, submitted biweekly progress reports to CINCUSAREUR on the group's activities and prepared a final report of conclusions reached by the group.²³

b. Planning Assumptions. The initial activity of the planning group was a study of the first draft of the USAREUR NEO 1-53 prepared by the OPOT Division. In preparing a second draft of the NEO, the group proceeded on the basis of the following twelve assumptions: (1) the NEO would be implemented with little or no warning; (2) the NEO might be executed concurrently with GAO; (3) within the six days following N-hour, noncombatants housed at the staging area would increase gradually to a total of approximately 125,000 persons, who would be sent to a safe haven at a uniform rate until N plus 30 days; (4) if advance notice were received of NEO implementation, 6,000 U.S. noncombatants would be evacuated by air from Berlin and Vienna to Orly Field for further evacuation to the USAREUR COMZ staging area; (5) all NEO routes would be subject to disruption during NEO implementation; (6) medical channels would be required to evacuate approximately 5,000 noncombatants, including military patients;

²²(1) Cable 111-22Z, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR et al., 11 Dec 52. SECRET. (2) IRS, Dir USAREUR OPOT Div to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 19 Dec 52, sub: Crash Plan for Use of Spanish Safehaven. AG 370.05 GOT. SECRET. (3) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to all concerned, 1 Jan 53, sub: Noncombatant Evacuation Order (Safehaven - Spain) 1-53. SECRET. All three in USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 2, B/P. (4) Interv, Miss M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col K. T. Klock, Jr., USAREUR G-3 Div, 19 Feb 53. SECRET. (5) Notes by Lt Col K. T. Klock, Jr., Apr 53, on draft of this MS. SECRET.

²³(1) USAREUR Stf Memo 20, 20 Nov 52, sub: Establishment of USAREUR Special NEO Planning Group. SECRET. (2) Cable SX-5317, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, USAREUR COMZ, 19 Nov 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1952), Vol. II, Item 49.

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(7) approximately 25,000 civilian cars and 2,000 military vehicles would be available to evacuate noncombatants from Germany; (8) German police forces would assist in the movement of NEO columns by clearing NEO routes from refugees leaving Germany; (9) French authorities would control traffic to a limited extent on NEO routes in France; (10) execution of the NEO might occur at any season of the year at any time of day or night; (11) five NEO routes would be available in France; (12) the U.S. forces must be capable of providing all essential support for noncombatants in France.²⁴

c. Stockage of Supplies. Representatives of USAREUR staff divisions concerned attended a conference sponsored by the Special NEO Planning Group on 3 December 1952 to begin preparation of administrative annexes and to complete a draft of the operations order of the NEO. The technical services reported that they planned to have sufficient supplies in BASEC depots and to equip enough camps to support 40,000 noncombatants by 1 February 1953; by 1 June the capacity of camps was to be increased to 125,000 persons. The technical services also agreed to store sufficient maintenance supplies in the BASEC area to support 125,000 noncombatants for 10 days beginning 1 February 1953 and for 30 days beginning 1 June 1953.²⁵

d. Air Evacuation of Berlin and Vienna. The air evacuation of Berlin and Vienna was discussed at a second conference held on 8 December with representatives of USAFE headquarters and the Twelfth Air Force. To avoid the necessity of establishing holding facilities at Orly Field, consideration was given to sending Berlin noncombatants to Burtonwood, England, and Vienna noncombatants to Chateauroux, France, but no final decision was reached.²⁶

e. Concurrent Execution of NEO and GAO. As the NEO 1-53 was to be based on the supposition that NEO and GAO might be implemented simultaneously, military districts and area commands were questioned on 10 December 1952 as to their ability to execute the two orders concurrently. Most military districts replied that the simultaneous implementation of GAO

²⁴Tab A to memo, Chm Sp NEO Plng Gp to USAREUR COFS, 28 Nov 52, sub: NEO Assumptions of Special NEO Planning Group. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1952), Vol. II, Item 51A.

²⁵Memo, Col Lyle W. Bernard, Chm Sp NEO Plng Gp to USAREUR COFS, 12 Dec 52, sub: Biweekly Report of NEO Special Planning Group. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1952), Vol. II, Item 53.

²⁶Memo, Col L. W. Bernard to USAREUR COFS, 12 Dec 52, sub: Biweekly Report of NEO Special Planning Group. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1952), Vol. II, Item 53.

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and NEO would engender certain difficulties because of shortages in personnel and transportation facilities. The Special NEO Planning Group therefore recommended that the districts be resurveyed early in January 1953 after publication of the USAREUR NEO 1-53 to determine their capabilities to execute the two orders concurrently under the provisions of the revised plan, and CINCUSAREUR accepted this proposal. Several commanders of area commands and military districts noted in their replies that execution of the NEO would be hampered by their secondary and non-tactical demolition missions. The Special NEO Planning Group consequently recommended that these missions be restudied and reassigned, but the suggestion was not approved by command headquarters.²⁷

f. Completion of Final Draft of NEO 1-53. By the end of December, the Special NEO Planning Group had completed the final draft of NEO 1-53 except for the appendix containing the numbers of noncombatants in various categories, which was to be compiled by the USAREUR comptroller. After co-ordination with USAFE, CINCNEIM, and State Department agencies, the final draft was sent to USAREUR staff divisions for comment and concurrence as a preliminary to submission to CINCUSAREUR for approval.²⁸

86. Evacuation Routes and Traffic Control

a. Routes Across France and Germany. Seventh Army NEO plans prescribed fourteen different routes leading from Germany to France, but only eight of the routes transversed the Franco-German border, the remaining six joining other routes in Germany. The routes which led through the eight crossing points at the border in turn converged with two routes going through France to Bordeaux. A USAREUR survey of COMZ emergency plans indicated that two evacuation routes across France would not suffice to absorb the incoming traffic columns from Germany, and it was therefore determined in December 1952 to add four more routes to the COMZ NEO, but plans were not completed by the end of the year. The northern route through France, known as HYDRAULIC, began at Brienne le Chateau; the southern route, IGNITION, at Seurre.²⁹ Both routes ended at Bordeaux. The fourteen evacuation routes crossing the U.S. Zone of Germany were as follows:³⁰

²⁷(1) IRS, USAREUR SGS to Dir USAREUR Log Div, Attn Sp NEO Plng Gp, 24 Dec 52, sub: Revision of NEO Plan. SECRET. (2) Memo, Col L. W. Bernard to Asst DCOFS Ops, 18 Dec 52, sub: Revision of NEO Plan. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1952), Vol. II, Item 54.

²⁸Memos, Col L. W. Bernard to USAREUR COFS, 28 Nov, 29 Dec 52, sub: Biweekly Report of NEO Special Planning Group, 28 Nov, 29 Dec 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1952), Vol. II, Item 51A; (1953), Vol. I, Item 3.

²⁹Interv, Miss M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col K. T. Klock, Jr., USAREUR G-3 Div, 19 Feb 53. SECRET.

³⁰Annex 1 (Routes) to Seventh Army NEO 2-52, 30 Aug 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1952), Vol. I, Item 37A, B/P.

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<u>Code Name of Route</u>	<u>Beginning</u>	<u>Traversing</u>	<u>Destination</u>
AXLE	Wiesbaden	Mainz	Perl
ANTENNA	Giessen	Mainz-Kastel bridge	Ittersdorf
BATTERY	Hoechst	Weilerbach	Route BRAKE
BODY	Frankfurt	Kaefertal	Sarreguemines
BRAKE	Stinheim	Hanau	Saarbruecken
CHOKE	Schwetzingen	Bruchsal	Weissenburg
COIL	Aschaffenburg	Frankenthal	Saareguemines
DYNAMO	Giebelstadt	Heilbronn	Breisach bridge
EAST DYNAMO	Ansbach	Crailsheim	Route DYNAMO
ENGINE	Ellingen	Chalampe bridge	Bantzenheim
SOUTH ENGINE	Augsburg	Riedlingen	Route ENGINE
EAST ENGINE	Pasing	Turkheim	Route SOUTH ENGINE
FLYWHEEL	Murnau	Saulgau	Folgensbourg
SOUTH FLYWHEEL	Garmisch	Oberammergau	Route FLYWHEEL

In the event that these routes were blocked by snow, an alternate NEO plan provided for the utilization of four bridges at Maximiliansau, Bantzenheim, Breisach, and Mannheim. NEO plans provided for the operation of twenty-nine holding areas, all but three of which were located along evacuation routes.³¹

b. Traffic Control Measures. If the movement of French Army units should conflict with the movement of U.S. noncombatant columns, military police (MP) commanders were to co-ordinate with the French authorities concerned. The only vehicles to be permitted to move against traffic on evacuation routes were MP control emergency military vehicles. The average rate of march of NEO columns was set at twenty miles per hour unless local ordinances directed lower speed limits. Movement was to be continuous except for 10-minute halts made every two hours. The 175th, 709th, and 793d Military Police Battalions were required to reconnoiter the assigned routes under jurisdiction of the Seventh Army and to select alternate routes around defiles, bridges, and other areas which might be rendered impassable by sabotage. Upon implementation of the NEO, the MP battalions were to post or paint markers along the evacuation routes, control all traffic moving on or across the assigned routes, move refugee traffic away from the NEO routes, and remain on their assigned routes until all NEO columns were cleared. The Seventh Army directed that a traffic and communication exercise be held monthly to train personnel charged with implementing the NEO.³²

³¹Ibid., Apps. A and B.

³²Seventh Army NEO 2-52, 30 Aug 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1952), Vol. I, Item 37A, B/P.

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87. Special Evacuation Problems

Although concerted efforts were made to correct deficiencies in NEO planning, many evacuation problems remained unsolved at the end of 1952. The USAREUR Special NEO Planning Group, in a report of 12 December, pointed out a number of deficiencies.³³ Storage space in the COMZ Base Section was insufficient to meet NEO requirements. Medical facilities at BASEC were inadequate. Seven million dollars in greenbacks for exchanging funds of personnel in camps had been requisitioned but not received by the end of the year; moreover, BASEC contained no storage facilities for the money, which was to be kept in Paris until adequate facilities became available. Plans had not yet been formulated for evacuating approximately five thousand hospital patients, including many women in late stages of pregnancy. The London Liaison Group was attempting to obtain information on the number and location of reception areas in England, but had so far been unsuccessful. Facilities were unavailable for the care of casualties and mortalities occurring in NEO columns. Negotiations were not completed on the four additional routes across France; NEO columns on the two routes available in 1952 would be about seven hundred miles long and subject to delays caused by the merging of columns and other disruptions. Moreover, although storage points on the four additional routes in France had been chosen, they had to be reconnoitered, approved by the French, and stocked with supplies. The number of military police available in COMZ was inadequate to control traffic on the six routes contemplated. All USAREUR technical services would be burdened with a major supply and transportation problem during the first six months of 1953 in attempting to fill the basic supply requirements for the camps in BASEC. No command chain had been developed to control NEO from the USAREUR level. As to identifying and locating persons in transit during NEO, a method was being studied by the USAREUR comptroller but had not been worked out. Seventh Army communications plans were not in final form, although the Seventh Army was co-ordinating with the USAREUR Signal Division in regard to these plans. No method existed for determining the ability of the Department of State to support or evacuate U.S. tourists in an emergency, and the French authorities had made no definite commitment to control refugees or otherwise assist in traffic control during an evacuation. The ability of the Navy to evacuate patients on hospital ships was undetermined and air evacuation facilities were unavailable; consequently it was anticipated that hospitals in COMZ would be overcrowded for a considerable period. The amount of support required from USAREUR to implement safe haven plans had not yet been determined. Finally, the U.S. High Commissioner's agreement to permit the use of German Federal Police in moving NEO columns could not be implemented because of the prohibition against divulging classified information to the Germans.

³³ Incl to memo for USAREUR COFS, sgd Col L. W. Bernard, 12 Dec 52. SECRET. In SGS 383.2 (1952), Vol. II, Item 53.

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88. Retention of Employees in an Emergency

a. Recall of Reserve Officers. The U.S. Army Chief of Staff informed CINCEUR on 15 February 1952 that he could order into active military service persons under his jurisdiction in the Officer Reserve Corps who had not previously been ordered into service under the Universal Military Training and Security Act. The reserve officers were to be put on active duty only if the NEO was implemented prior to the execution of the reinforced alert order.³⁴

b. Authority to Retain Other Civilians. On the basis of a policy decision of 1951, HICOG employees, except those in a reserve status, were not subject to involuntary induction into the Army in the event of an emergency. Unless they volunteered for enlistment, or were retained on duty by the U.S. High Commissioner, U.S. civilians in the employ of HICOG were to be evacuated in NEO columns with other noncombatants.³⁵ During 1952 the question arose as to whether the restriction against impressing HICOG employees applied equally to USAREUR personnel. The USAREUR judge advocate ruled in December 1952 that CINCUSAREUR was legally authorized during an emergency situation to retain in a civilian capacity both male and female USAREUR employees whose loss would prejudice the military effort. CINCUSAREUR should retain them only for as long a time as their services were essential for operational purposes, unless they volunteered to remain. During an emergency involving the evacuation of noncombatants, CINCUSAREUR was empowered to hold employees of the Department of Defense in civilian capacities if their temporary retention would improve the efficiency of the NEO operation or if the functions performed by the employees concerned could not be readily assumed by military personnel.³⁶

89. Plans for Phasing out Dependents

Although the USAREUR OPOT Division was responsible for developing NEO plans and procedures, the evacuation of dependents under nonemergency conditions was planned by the Personnel and Administration Division. An initial plan for a 30-day evacuation of dependents was published as a precautionary measure on 19 May 1952, although command headquarters did not

³⁴Cable DA-902139, COFSA to CINCEUR, 27 Feb 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1952), Vol. I, Item 11.

³⁵EUCOM ltr, 28 Jun 51, sub: Emergency Planning. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1951), Vol. I, Item 137.

³⁶(1) C/N 1, Dir USAREUR P&A Div to USAREUR DCOFS, 5 Dec 52, sub: Authority to Retain Civilian Personnel in an Emergency. AG 381 GPA. SECRET. (2) Incl to C/N 2, USAREUR SGS to Dir USAREUR P&A Div, 5 Dec 52, same sub. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1952), Vol. II, Item 52A.

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alter its established policy of retaining authorized dependents as long as feasible. The plan was postulated on the evacuation of dependents under conditions which might result in an emergency situation.³⁷

a. The Rate of Evacuation of Dependent Population. Dependents logistically supported in the command, including personnel of HICOG and 7961 EUCOM Detachment, numbered approximately 51,000 women and children in May 1952. It was estimated that 2,000 male civilian sponsors would resign from their positions to accompany their dependents in an evacuation, and that 3,000 female civilians would be evacuated with the dependents. An average of 400 military sponsors who were due for rotation each month would also accompany the group. The total number of persons to be evacuated was consequently estimated at 56,400. It was estimated that 40,435 persons would be evacuated by ship, at the rate of 1,350 persons per day for 30 days. Air transportation would be provided for women and children of families with infants less than a year old and for women in advanced stages of pregnancy who would be evacuated at the rate of 500 a day for 30 days. The families of women in late stages of pregnancy and those who had infants less than two weeks old were to be moved through medical channels, as were patients requiring hospitalization for a month or more. The average number of persons who would require medical evacuation was estimated at 2,635, to be evacuated at the rate of 30 per day. All medical evacuees from Berlin would be air-lifted to Frankfurt. Air evacuation of patients to hospitals in the United States would be accomplished from the air fields at Echterdingen, Rhein-Main, and Neubiberg.³⁸

b. Planning on a Local Basis. The commanding general of COMZ and commanders of all military posts except Wiesbaden were directed to prepare individual plans for evacuating their dependent populations in consonance with the master plan developed for the command as a whole.

(1) Military Post Responsibilities. Military post planners were instructed to provide for the movement of approximately 1,850 persons daily in addition to medical evacuees. Except for exchanging currency, all processing was to be accomplished at the military post level. To eliminate undue delay at the air and water points of embarkation, both the Bremerhaven Port and the 7705 Air Returnee Center would send processing teams to each military post, except Bremerhaven and Berlin, as it

³⁷Ltr, EUCOM to CG EUCOM COMZ and Mil Post Comdrs excl Wiesbaden, 19 May 52, sub: Rapid Phase-Out of Dependents. AG 292 GPA. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR AG Lib files.

³⁸Ibid., Tabs A, B, C, and G. CONFIDENTIAL.

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was being evacuated. Each military post was instructed to establish an evacuation center for the assembling of dependents. At each center, the dependents would be prepared for movement to Frankfurt or in the case of patients, to a general hospital. It was estimated that 37 coaches would be required to carry the 1,850 evacuees to Frankfurt, from where the air contingent of 500 persons would be sent directly to the United States, and the water contingent of 1,350 persons would be transferred by rail to Bremerhaven. By the close of 1952 definite information had not been received from the Department of the Army as to the amount of overseas air and water transportation facilities that could be allocated to the command in the event that dependents were ordered evacuated.³⁹

(2) COMZ Evacuation Plans. Plans for the evacuation of 1,500 COMZ and 200 7961 EUCOM Detachment dependents were co-ordinated with plans for evacuating U.S. dependents of USAFE, SHAPE, ALFCE, and other headquarters in France. Dependents were not to be evacuated from France, however, until Germany and other more critical areas had been cleared; hence only general plans for the French area were outlined during 1952. The evacuation of the COMZ Advance Section was to be executed through Germany, if feasible, with Orly Field at Paris and the La Pallice port being reserved to evacuate dependents from other areas in France.⁴⁰

c. Ban on Tourist Travel. USAREUR planners believed it advisable to recommend to the Department of State that it ban tourists from remaining in France and Germany after USAREUR, on the basis of intelligence estimates, decided to evacuate dependents.⁴¹ However, this recommendation was not made to the State Department during 1952.

90. Functions of the Paris Liaison Group

The Paris Liaison Group was instituted on 1 February 1952 as a joint agency of the U.S. Departments of State and Defense to co-ordinate non-combatant evacuation plans of the chiefs of diplomatic missions and the military commanders throughout the European area. Tentative terms of reference for the Paris Liaison Group were prepared at a meeting held on 28-30 January in Paris by representatives of the U.S. Liaison Officer to SHAPE, the three service commands in Europe, and the Washington Liaison

³⁹Ltr, EUCOM to TAG, 19 May 52, sub: Rapid Phase-out of Dependents in EUCOM. AG 292 GPA. CONFIDENTIAL.

⁴⁰(1) Cable S-2822, CINCEUR to CINCUSAFE, 3 Mar 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1952), Vol. I, Item 16. (2) Ltr, EUCOM to CG EUCOM COMZ and Mil Post Comdrs exel Wiesbaden, 19 May 52, cited above.

⁴¹Memo, Lt Col J. E. Kelly, USAREUR Asst DCOFS Opns, to Maj Gen E. T. Williams, USAREUR COFS, 8 Apr 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1952), Vol. I, Item 18A.

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Group.⁴² The draft terms of reference provided that the London and Rome Liaison Groups would continue to function, but in a capacity subordinate to the Paris Liaison Group, which in turn operated under the direction of the Washington Liaison Group. The area of responsibility of the Paris Liaison Group comprised Europe, the United Kingdom, Northern Africa, the Levant, and Turkey. The London Liaison Group assisted the parent organization in Scandinavia, the United Kingdom, and Eire, and the Rome Liaison Group performed the same function in countries in the Mediterranean area. The Paris group was composed of a representative of the State Department as chairman and representatives of CINCELM, CINCUSAFE, and CINCUSAREUR. Revised terms of reference approved by the State and Defense Departments on 1 May 1952 did not essentially alter the composition or functions of the Paris group. Projects undertaken during the year included negotiations for new safe havens, surveys of shipping facilities and evacuation ports, studies on emergency communications, review of stockpiling facilities, and co-ordination of the NEO with the plans formulated by representatives of other Allied countries.⁴³

91. Co-ordination of Emergency Planning with HICOG

At the suggestion of CINCEUR, a joint HICOG-EUCOM Working Group was appointed in the spring of 1952 to revise the TOP SECRET HICOG-EUCOM agreement. The revision was necessitated by the reduction in HICOG's field organization which vitiated parts of the former agreement. Signed on 30 June 1952 by CINCEUR and the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, the agreement aimed at providing civil support of military preparations for an emergency and co-ordinating politico-military efforts of U.S. governmental agencies in Germany. The agreement contained certain provisions of the emergency planning of both HICOG and EUCOM, and outlined the U.S. High Commissioner's functions in the event of a simple, reinforced, or general alert.⁴⁴ According to the terms of the agreement, CINCEUR would assume control over German law enforcement agencies for certain purposes

⁴²EUCOM CINC's Wkly Stf Conf 4, 12 Feb 52, p. 4. SECRET.

⁴³(1) Interv, Miss M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col K. T. Klock, Jr., USAREUR G-3 Div Opns Br, 19 Feb 53. SECRET. (2) Cable 101446Z, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, CINCNEIM, CINCUSAFE, 10 Dec 52. SECRET. (3) Cable 211052Z, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR et al, 21 Nov 52. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 2. (4) Cable, no ref, PLG to CINCEUR et al, 15 Apr 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 383.2 (1952), Vol. I, Item 20.

⁴⁴HICOG-EUCOM Agreement, rev 30 Jun 52, sgd Gen T. T. Handy, CINCEUR, and Mr. J. J. McCloy, HICOG. TOP SECRET. (Only SECRET statements used, per interv, M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj T. Q. Donaldson, IV, USAREUR SGS, 26 Feb 53.)

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during a reinforced alert. The German authorities were also to be given increased responsibility for maintaining the security of the border between Eastern and Western Germany in the event of an emergency. However, the plans pertaining to the responsibilities of German agencies were retarded by the inability of German nationals to receive classified information.⁴⁵

92. Maintenance of Internal Security

a. New Internal Security Directive. Previous directives for controlling civil disturbances among the German population and for countering sabotage were rescinded on 29 July 1952 when a new EUCOM internal security directive was published. The revision was made necessary by the abolition in June of the resident offices and the Land commissioners of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany. S-5 officers at the post level replaced the resident officers on 5 June 1952, and liaison and co-ordination for security were assumed by the Land relations officers at the end of the month. It was anticipated that a further revision of the directive would be required when the contractual agreements were ratified.⁴⁶

b. Internal Security Mission of EUCOM/USAREUR. The three fold internal security mission of EUCOM headquarters as defined in the July 1952 directive comprised the military occupation of the U.S. areas of responsibility in Germany; the protection of persons, property, and installations of the U.S. forces in those areas; and the support of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany in maintaining security, law, and order. Persons to be protected in the event of local disturbances included members of HICOG; their dependents and those of U.S. forces; citizens of the United States, France, and Great Britain; and nationals of NATO countries employed by the United States or otherwise connected with the occupation mission. The high commissioners for Germany were empowered to request CINCEUR to commit troops to restore law and order in their respective areas of Germany if German law enforcing agencies were incapable of coping with disturbances. Protection of critical nonmilitary installations in U.S. areas of responsibility was the function of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany and the German police officials.⁴⁷

⁴⁵IRS, Dir USAREUR Intel Div to USAREUR COFS, 1 Aug 52, sub: Items for Discussion between the Secy of the Army and CINCUSAREUR. GID/FP&T. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337 (1952), Vol. I, Item 15.

⁴⁶(1) EUCOM CINC's Wkly Stf Confs 13 and 14, 3 Jun 52, CONFIDENTIAL; 10 Jun 52, pp. 2 - 3, UNCLASSIFIED. (3) EUCOM ltr, 22 Jul 52, sub: Internal Security Directive - EUCOM. AG 371.2 GOT-AGO. CONFIDENTIAL.

⁴⁷EUCOM ltr, 29 Jul 52, sub: Internal Security Directive - EUCOM. AG 371.2 GOT-AGO. CONFIDENTIAL.

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c. Mission of Seventh Army. The internal security responsibilities of the Commanding General, Seventh Army, included the following: maintenance of the military security of the eastern borders of the U.S. Zone of Germany; the restoration of law and order in military posts other than Berlin, Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation, and Rhine posts upon the request of the post commanders concerned; the protection of vital bridges from sabotage; and the conducting of quarterly practice security alerts for Seventh Army units and military posts with the exception of Wiesbaden, Berlin, and Bremerhaven. The practice alerts were to be co-ordinated when feasible with the commanders of USNAVGEC and the Twelfth Air Force. In the event of a civil uprising, the Seventh Army commander was solely responsible for securing the Kastel-Gustavsburg highway bridge over the Main River, and the following Rhine bridges: two highway bridges at Kastel-Mainz, two adjacent railroad bridges at Mainz-Gustavsburg, the railroad and highway bridge at Worms-Hofheim, the Autobahn bridge at Frankenthal, the bridges at North and South Mannheim, and the Maxau-Pfalz bridge at Karlsruhe. The protection of other bridges required by the Seventh Army in active operations was to be co-ordinated with the post commanders concerned and with German officials.⁴⁸

d. Responsibilities of the Twelfth Air Force. The Internal Security Directive of 1952 imposed the following responsibilities on the commanding general of the Twelfth Air Force: insuring that adequate security provisions were in effect at all U.S. Air Force installations in Germany, including the Tempelhof Air Base at Berlin and the Wiesbaden Military Post; supplying air support at the direction of CINCEUR in the event of local disturbances; co-ordinating the plans and, if practical, the practice alerts of exempt Air Force installations with commanders of the posts on which such installations were located; and co-ordinating the internal security plan of Wiesbaden Military Post with the Commanding General, Seventh Army.⁴⁹

e. Responsibilities of the U.S. Naval Forces. The role of the commander of U.S. Naval Forces in Germany in the maintenance of internal security was to operate the Rhine River Patrol in accordance with instructions issued from command headquarters; to co-ordinate security provisions of the naval advanced base at Bremerhaven with the port commander; to co-ordinate security plans of other U.S. naval installations in Germany with the local post commander concerned; and to conduct practice alerts.

f. Missions of Other Agencies. When directed by USAREUR headquarters, post commanders were to take the necessary action to restore law and order in case of a disturbance. In undertaking such action the post commanders were authorized to employ initially troops assigned or attached to their

⁴⁸Ibid., Incls 1 and 3.

⁴⁹Ibid., par. 9, p. 2.

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respective posts, and to assume operational control of other U.S. troops within their posts except Seventh Army units and EUCOM intelligence agencies. In addition, the post commanders were to assume operational control of German law enforcement agencies. If adjacent military posts became involved in a disturbance, the senior post commander was to assume over-all control. In the event that the senior commander considered his resources inadequate to restore law and order, he was authorized to request the Commanding General, Seventh Army, to assume control of the situation. The Berlin post commander was responsible for supporting the Berlin Element of HICOG in maintaining security; for co-ordinating the planning of military units, detachments, and installations located in his post; and for committing troops and performing other security functions upon the request of the U.S. Commander, Berlin. The commander of Special Troops, Headquarters, EUCOM, was responsible for providing for the security of units and installations under his command and for co-ordinating his internal security plan with the commander of Heidelberg Military Post. The chiefs of EUCOM administrative and technical services were directed to require their subordinate commanders of service installations to prepare security plans, to conduct quarterly practice alerts in conjunction with their respective post commanders, and to provide for the security of outlying installations, such as transmitter sites and repeater stations. As EUCOM COMZ was not affected by the changes in HICOG's organizational pattern, the security mission of that command remained unchanged throughout the year.⁵⁰

93. The Line of Communications Through France

USAREUR emergency plans provided that the LOFC would be operated to the extent necessary to maintain special reserve stocks and to insure the adequate support of the Seventh Army in the event of hostilities. Under the USAREUR Order for Simple Alert, Class II installations (under control of the USAREUR technical services) would revert to control of the Commanding General, COMZ (Class I status), and the USAREUR technical services would send critical supplies daily by train from their depots east of the Rhine to COMZ depots. Upon implementation of the order for reinforced alert, USAREUR would direct its installations east of the Rhine to dispatch all supplies in excess of 15 days' requirements to COMZ depots, and COMZ would open designated installations, implement the NEO if this had not already been done, and prepare for a general alert.⁵¹

⁵⁰(1) Ibid. (2) EUCOM ltr, 28 May 51, sub: Internal Security, EUCOM Elements in France. AG 371.2 GOT-AGO. CONFIDENTIAL.

⁵¹USAREUR COMZ Briefing for Gen Eddy, 1 Aug 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337 (1952), Vol. I, Item 19A, B/P.

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94. Changes in the Location of Troop Units

Except for one antiaircraft battalion and several smaller units, the troop augmentation program was in essence completed in 1952, and troops arriving in the command were deployed in accordance with the RED Plan.⁵² In furtherance of the RED Plan, the three regimental combat teams of the Seventh Army were phased north. The 22d Regimental Combat Team of the 4th Infantry Division was relocated from Schweinfurt to a tent camp in Giessen on 25 June 1952, and was further scheduled for transfer from the temporary quarters at Giessen to a newly constructed cantonment camp at Kirsch Goens early in 1953. To occupy the facilities vacated by the 22d Regimental Combat Team, the 16th Regimental Combat Team of the 1st Infantry Division was moved in June from the Nuernberg-Fuerth area to Schweinfurt. Finally, the 169th Regimental Combat Team of the 43d Infantry Division was transferred on 10 June from the Munich-Bad Tolz area to the vicinity of Nuernberg-Fuerth to replace the 16th Regimental Combat Team.⁵³ The northward movement of the regimental combat teams served to strengthen the critical Eisenach-Giessen-Frankfurt and Kassel-Giessen-Frankfurt approaches. To concentrate components of the 1st Infantry Division, its headquarters was moved from Darmstadt to Wuerzburg on 15 September 1952. In consonance with over-all tactical plans, several supporting units, including antiaircraft and field artillery battalions and engineering units were transferred during the latter part of 1952 to improve the tactical support rendered for the major units.⁵⁴ Although all combat units of division size under the troop augmentation program had arrived in 1951, most of the supporting units were sent to the command during 1952. The increase in the number of troops in nondivisional supporting units, including engineer, tank, antiaircraft and field artillery battalions, is discussed in Chapter III, Section I. The following table shows the increase in the number of nondivisional units during the year.⁵⁵

<u>Battalions</u>	<u>1 January 1952</u>	<u>31 December 1952</u>
Antiaircraft	11	16
Field Artillery	14	27
Combat Engineer	8	10
Tank	0	3

⁵²See EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 214 - 15.

⁵³Cable SX-5757, CINCEUR to Seventh Army, 2 Jun 52. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS SMC files.

⁵⁴Interv, Miss M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col J. A. Requarth, USAREUR G-3 Opns Br, 19 Feb 53. RESTRICTED.

⁵⁵Interv, Miss M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col J. A. Requarth, USAREUR G-3 Div Opns Br, 6 Apr 53. SECRET.

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95. Projected Plans for Berlin Airlift

The Alternate Operations Plan for a Berlin Airlift (Reduced) was completed in January 1952 with the preparation of Annex V to the plan by the Public Information Division. Published in February 1952, the plan for the reduced airlift was designed to augment the export operations of commercial aircraft for a limited period of from 30 to 60 days as a preliminary to a full scale airlift. The plan was to be implemented only in the event that tightening Soviet restrictions on outgoing commercial planes rendered such action necessary. The plan provided for a monthly average of 37,000 tons to be flown into Berlin by D plus 31 days. In May and June 1952, when the Soviets organized Communist rallies in East Berlin, closing border transfer points and instituted other harassing measures, interested USAREUR staff divisions were directed to review their planning for a Berlin airlift. A study made in July on USAREUR's capabilities of implementing the reduced airlift to Berlin concluded that the initial plan could be implemented at any time without difficulty. It was ascertained that the initial increments of the airlift could become operational in three days, and could be 80 percent operational within six to ten days. A new support plan for the airlift prepared by the Twelfth Air Force in July changed somewhat the concepts of the original plan. Under revisions introduced by the Twelfth Air Force plan, the Rhein-Main and Tempelhof airfields would be the only ones utilized in the reduced operation, and by D plus 60, 47,000 tons of supplies would be airlifted monthly, this figure to be increased to approximately 200,000 tons by D plus 90, when the full-fledged airlift would replace the reduced operation. When the Twelfth Air Force was transferred from the operational control of USAREUR headquarters, the Deputy Commander in Chief, USAFE, assumed its responsibility for participation in airlift planning.⁵⁶

96. The Combat Developments Program

The Combat Developments Branch of OPOT Division was established on 15 September 1952 in conformity with the combat developments system which had been instituted at the Army Field Forces headquarters at Fort Monroe, Virginia, earlier in 1952. The purpose of the combat developments program was to evaluate the effects on tactical doctrine of recent scientific

⁵⁶(1) C/N 2, Dir USAREUR OPOT Div to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 14 Aug 52, sub: Discussion between Chief of Staff and Gen Taylor. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337 (1952), Vol. I. (2) EUCOM CINC's Wkly Stf Confs 4, 12, and 13, 12 Feb 52, p. 3, par. 2; 27 May 52, p. 5; 3 Jun 52, p. 3; SECRET. (3) Interv, Miss M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col James N. Cupp, USAREUR G-3 Plan Br, 5 Apr 52. SECRET. (4) EUCOM OPOT Div Jnl, 26 Feb 52, Item 1; 11 Jan 52, Item 1. SECRET.

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developments, and to pace the production of new equipment with the concurrent development of military tactics. A secondary purpose was to develop the military requirements for new equipment when necessary to meet the changing demands of recent tactical concepts. The Combat Developments Branch was also responsible for atomic warfare planning and for certain aspects of unconventional warfare planning. The branch also included the Psychological Warfare Section and the Operations Research Office.⁵⁷

97. The Operations Research Office

The institution of the EUCOM Operations Research Office (ORO) Field Team in the Operations Branch of EUCOM OPOT Division was announced on 8 January 1952; the team was transferred to the Combat Developments Branch upon its establishment on 15 September 1952. The ORO team was a part of the Department of the Army ORO, a nongovernmental civilian agency operating under contract with the Johns Hopkins University. The ORO functioned under the general supervision of the Department of the Army, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, for Research and Development, until 22 January 1952, when it was transferred to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.⁵⁸ The ORO field team was assigned the mission of undertaking such analytical studies of military problems as would provide the U.S. Army with a scientific basis for decision or action in improving military operations. The ORO field team consisted of four members, including a field director, in addition to certain specialists assigned for short periods to specific tasks. Dr. Hugh Cole succeeded Dr. George Shortley as field director of the USAREUR ORO on 9 November 1952. Besides advising the USAREUR staff on matters of a technical nature, the ORO field team undertook two types of studies in 1952: projects conducted at the request of the Department of the Army such as Project ATTACK, and those assigned by the EUCOM/USAREUR Research Advisory Committee. Project ATTACK was directed by Dr. Lynn Rumbaugh until its completion on 9 November 1952. The Department of the Army distributed publications derived from that project under the symbol ORO-R-1 (EUCOM). The USAREUR Research Advisory Committee directed the ORO field team to conduct research in the following four main areas: aerial reconnaissance and photography; a critical analysis of retardation

⁵⁷(1) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf 21, 23 Sep 52, p. 3. SECRET.
(2) Interv, Miss M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col R. E. Quackenbush, C/USAREUR G-3 Div Combat Devs Br, 7 Apr 53. RESTRICTED. (3) USAREUR OPOT Div, Admin Memo 3, 15 Sep 52. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR OPOT Div Gen Files (1952).

⁵⁸(1) EUCOM Stf Memo 3, 8 Jan 52, sub: EUCOM Operations Research Office Field Team (ORO). UNCLASSIFIED. (2) EUCOM OPOT Div Jnl, 6 Feb 52, Item 8. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) AR 14-480, 4 Apr 51, sub: Boards, Commissions, and Committees—ORO. UNCLASSIFIED.

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and demolition plans; the vulnerability of the command's logistical systems to hostile action; and a study of antitank measures, including tanks. Work in these fields resulted in the publication of classified studies distributed either through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Department of the Army, or USAREUR headquarters. Studies in the group classified as SECRET or lower included the following: "Effects of Atomic Weapons on Forests of Western Europe," "Photo Interpretation Training in USAREUR," and "Denial of West German Highway Transport."⁵⁹

98. Psychological Warfare Program

a. The Psychological Warfare Section. The Psychological Warfare Section gathered information on psychological warfare by screening intelligence reports and interrogating persons at the Defectors Reception Center. The section was responsible for planning the emergency evacuation of the personnel of Radio Free Europe and of the Committee for the Liberation of the Free Peoples of Russia, Inc., in Munich, and for the utilization of these facilities in time of war. Country plans were prepared and kept current on psychological warfare potentialities in France, the East and West Zones of Germany, the USSR, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The Psychological Warfare Section also revised Annex C to the USAREUR General Alert Order, issued a planning guide for lower echelons of the command entitled "Psychological Warfare Planning Guidance for EUCOM," and prepared annexes to the European Emergency War Plans (ECEOP series). In co-ordination with the USAREUR Intelligence Division, the section furnished pertinent intelligence information to the Voice of America and to Radio Free Europe.⁶⁰

b. Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group. The 301st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, a unit subordinate to the Psychological Warfare Section, trained new personnel, gathered intelligence data for incorporation into the country plans, and supported the Voice of America with personnel and facilities to assist in radio broadcasting. Early in 1952 the 7878 Augmentation Detachment was formed and assigned to the 301st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group. The functions of this detachment were to develop the capability for disseminating propaganda and other materials by means of free balloons, to gather meteorological data, and to investigate European sources of equipment and facilities. The detachment maintained liaison with the defector reception centers, HICOG offices at Bonn, the Voice of America, and U.S. Commander, Berlin.

⁵⁹Interv, Miss M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Dr. Hugh Cole, USAREUR ORO, 1 Apr 53. SECRET.

⁶⁰Interv, Miss M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj J. T. Dabinett, USAREUR G-3 Div Combat Devs Br, 4 Apr 53. SECRET.

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c. Other Psychological Warfare Agencies. The 5th Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, assigned to Seventh Army in September 1951, was a completely mobile field-type unit equipped with printing presses and loudspeakers for Seventh Army tactical psychological warfare operations. This unit participated during 1952 in all maneuvers of Seventh Army, serving with both aggressor and friendly forces. Upon the establishment of U.S. EUCOM headquarters in Frankfurt, a Psychological Warfare Section was created in the Support Plans Branch of its J-3 Division; the section prepared guidance of a joint nature for subordinate commands and co-ordinated its activities with the USAREUR G-3 Division.⁶¹

99. Emergency Map Reserves

The tactical map reserve plan, which called for 46,000,000 maps to be issued to USAREUR units or to be stored at the EUCOM Map Depot at Schwetzingen or in the Rhine General Depot and France, was prepared in 1951 and executed during 1952. In December 1952 it was decided to revise the plan to provide greater flexibility in distributing the maps, but no action was taken by the end of the year. The British grid was replaced by the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid on 27 March 1952.⁶²

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² (1) See EUCOM Comd Rept 1951, pp. 219 - 22. (2) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf 1, 6 Jan 53, p. 5. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) USAREUR ltr, 17 Dec 52, sub: Change-over of UTM Grid System Maps. AG 060 ENG-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. (4) Interv, Miss M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj J. E. Evans, USAREUR Engr Div, and Lt Col P. V. Converse, USAREUR G-2 Div, 6 Feb 53. SECRET.

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CHAPTER 6

Training

Section I: General

100. Training Program for 1952

a. Training Responsibilities of the Command. The training responsibilities of EUCOM/USAREUR in 1952 remained largely with major subordinate commands, and the command headquarters itself was generally concerned with matters of policy, co-ordination of training of the several services, liaison with higher headquarters and a few specific activities. EUCOM Training Circular No. 1, dated 28 March 1952, stated that the objective of all training was to prepare personnel of U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force in the command for combat operations. Commanding generals of the two major commands, the Seventh Army and the Twelfth Air Force, were instructed to conduct such joint training as would provide effective air-ground operations and insure effective air defense and troop movement by air. Emphasis was to be given to the provision of a sufficient number of properly trained personnel for functions specific to air-ground operations. The directive stipulated that the Seventh Army and the U.S. Naval Forces, Germany, would conduct joint training that would prepare both forces for conducting amphibious operations in the event of hostilities. The major commands were to carry out the field training exercises, command post exercises and alerts considered necessary to attain and maintain readiness for combat. Major training activities within the direct purview of Headquarters, EUCOM/USAREUR, in 1952 included the planning and supervision of maneuvers, the acquisition of training areas, liaison with Allied Land Forces Central Europe (ALFCE), and implementation of Department of Army directives.

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b. Co-ordination with Allied Land Forces Central Europe.

(1) Responsibilities of ALFCE. The training objectives of ALFCE as defined at a conference at Fontainebleau, 23 - 24 January, were to insure that assigned forces would reach and maintain a uniformly high standard of training, to obtain agreement on common tactical concepts in all plans for combat, and to make certain that training was provided in the tactical doctrines of the probable enemy.¹ The ALFCE Training Directive for 1952 - 53, dated 6 August 1952, in laying down broad principles of policy and main objectives of training, delineated the role of that headquarters in its relation to EUCOM/USAREUR. It was the responsibility of the Commander in Chief, ALFCE, that the land forces assigned for the defense of Central Europe should be trained to form an efficient and fully co-ordinated interallied fighting machine in the event of war. He was also responsible for insuring, through subordinate commanders, that the forces assigned to ALFCE were trained to accomplish their assigned missions in an emergency; after consultation with subordinate commanders, he was to make to the governments that furnished troops to ALFCE any recommendations he considered necessary to achieve this objective. Finally, he was responsible, in conjunction with the Commander in Chief, Allied Air Forces, and Flag Officer, Central Europe, for outlining the general policy requirements as to the organization of joint and combined training and for formulating the standards to be achieved.² The training objectives of ALFCE were further amplified in several directives issued in 1952, including Directive No. 2, pertaining to tactical deception, and Directive No. 3, covering realism in training; and in memorandums concerning movement by night, atomic defense, and defense against napalm and flame warfare. ALFCE also carried out its responsibilities for the acquisition of training areas for the several occupational forces.³

(2) Planning for Co-ordination of Training. A wide range of subjects pertaining to co-ordination of training in 1952 was discussed at the ALFCE training conference at Fontainebleau on 23 - 24 January 1952, with representatives of EUCOM and Seventh Army in attendance. Principal topics discussed included the following: ALFCE training directives; defense against atomic attacks; combined maneuvers in 1952;

¹ALFCE Tng Conf Notes. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 (1952), Vol. I, Item 22A.

²ALFCE Tng Dir 1952 - 53. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR G-3 Tng Br files (1952).

³Memo, C/USAREUR OPOT Div Tng Br for Dir USAREUR OPOT Div, 29 Sep 52, sub: Training Infrastructure Conference held at Bad Godesberg on 29 Sep 52. SECRET. In USAREUR OPOT Div Tng Br files (1952).

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exercises testing air-ground co-ordination; logistic training procedures; winter cadre exercises; training facilities.⁴ At the conference divergent viewpoints on certain training matters were expressed by ALFCE and EUCOM representatives. It was proposed by ALFCE that battalion tests be conducted in order to establish a yardstick for measuring the effectiveness of training in subordinate commands. The EUCOM representatives held that the proposed tests were not feasible in view of the shortage of ammunition and the lack of sufficient ranges. With regard to plans for the proposed large-scale 1952 fall maneuver, EUCOM took the position that it should not both direct and command this maneuver. ALFCE concurred in this view, but neither ALFCE nor SHAPE had the resources to direct the proposed war games. The conference also discussed the advisability of moving major headquarters during large-scale maneuvers. Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy, Commanding General, Seventh Army, opposed the movement of major subordinate headquarters of his command from their operational headquarters during the 1952 fall maneuvers.⁵

101. Tactical Readiness of Troops and Units

Inspections by an Army Field Forces team in November 1952 indicated that the status of training had improved materially over that found by a similar inspecting team in 1951.⁶ Factors adversely affecting operational readiness in 1952 were: (1) personnel losses; (2) nonavailability of training areas for certain types of training; and (3) equipment shortages including certain types of ammunition.⁷ The shortage of ammunition became of increasing importance during the year, and by the third quarter of 1952 was indicated as a leading factor in conditions which were affecting or would affect the readiness of the command. Most critical of the shortages was ammunition for the 60-mm. and 81-mm. mortars and for the 57-mm. and 75-mm. rifles.⁸

a. Seventh Army. By the end of 1952, the Seventh Army, the major army command of USAREUR, had been in a fully operational status for two

⁴(1) IRS, Dir EUCOM OPOT Div to EUCOM COFS, 1 Feb 52, sub: Report on ALFCE Training Conference, 23 - 24 Jan 52. NATO SECRET. (2) Cable N-89, CINCLANDCENT to CINCEUR, 15 Jan 52. NATO SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 381 SHAPE (1952), Vol. I, Items 22a, 14.

⁵IRS, Dir EUCOM OPOT Div to EUCOM COFS, 1 Feb 52, cited above.

⁶Report of AFF Inspection, Nov 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 333 (1953).

⁷Ltr, USAREUR to C/AFF, 28 Jul 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1952), Vol. I, Item 13.

⁸Ltr, USAREUR to C/AFF (for period ending 25 Sep 52), sub: Quarterly Narrative Reports of Operational Readiness of Major Units in Overseas Commands. SECRET. In USAREUR OPOT Div files (1952).

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years. It consisted of the V and VII Corps, with one armored division, four infantry division, three armored cavalry regiments, and one brigade of antiaircraft troops, with attached and supporting units.⁹ In 1952 troops and units of the Seventh Army were considered ready for combat and its status of training was rated as excellent.¹⁰ However, several factors continuously adversely affected operational readiness. During the first half of the calendar year, these factors, in the order of their importance, were: (1) loss of trained personnel; (2) nonavailability of certain types of training areas; and (3) equipment shortages that included certain types of ammunition.¹¹ The shortage of ammunition became increasingly serious when a steel strike in the United States reduced expected production. As a result, scheduled artillery firing training was curtailed and the level of combat readiness of Seventh Army was adversely affected.¹² The maintenance of operational readiness in the major subordinate commands of Seventh Army was made difficult by shortages in engineer equipment, including cranes, garnishing material for camouflage nets, certain types of generators, electric lighting sets, and sniper-scopes. Shortage of 37-mm. ammunition hampered the training of antiaircraft artillery units equipped with the M15A1 carriage. Critical shortages of the following training ammunitions existed: 75-mm. high explosive plastic (HEP); 90-mm. (tank) high velocity (HV) and target practice (TP); 105-mm. howitzer HEP; 155-mm. howitzer white phosphorous (WP) and high explosive (HE); and time super quick (TSQ) fuses for 155-mm. and 8-inch howitzer. In addition, target ammunition for the 60-mm. and 81-mm. mortars and for the 57-mm. and 75-mm. recoilless rifles was in short supply.¹³ While shortages in various categories of trained personnel had important bearing on the combat potential of the Seventh Army, constant adjustment and judicious assignment of available replacements minimized this factor at the end of the year.¹⁴ Adequate training areas continued to be a problem in 1952, particularly the requirement for an antiaircraft firing range, but this condition was partially alleviated by the acquisition of a range in the British Zone of Germany, near Todendorf. At the end of the year the problem of obtaining an urgently needed tank firing range was still unsolved.¹⁵

⁹USAREUR ltr, 14 Jan 53, sub: Order of Battle. AGO-322 GOT-AGO. SECRET.

¹⁰Ltr, USAREUR to C/AFF, 28 Jul 52, sub: Operational Readiness, pars. 7 & 8. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1952), Vol. II, Item 13.

¹¹Ibid., par. 3.

¹²Seventh Army Comd Rept, 1952. SECRET.

¹³Ltr, Seventh Army to USAREUR, sub: Report of Operational Readiness (for 3d Quarter of 1952). AG 353 ASECS. SECRET. In USAREUR OPOT Div files (1952).

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ltr, USAREUR to ALFCE, Jan 53, sub: Combat Effectiveness for Assigned Forces. AG 353 GOT. SECRET. In USAREUR G-3 Div files (1953).

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b. V Corps. V Corps, with headquarters at Frankfurt, consisted of the 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions, the 2d Armored Division, the 14th Cavalry Regiment, and the units of Corps Artillery.¹⁶ Factors adversely affecting the operational readiness of V Corps during the first quarter of 1952 were the large turnover of officers, key noncommissioned officers, and specialists; inadequacies of ranges and training areas; and delays in receipt of certain items of T/O&E equipment for units newly arrived from the zone of interior. The turnover of personnel required the re-emphasizing of advanced, individual unit combined arms, and maneuver training for replacements.¹⁷ The construction of several local ranges was planned in order to partially alleviate the range situation but the closing of the Kirch Goens firing range on 30 October 1952 hampered the accomplishment of qualification firing of units in the Frankfurt-Giessen area. Because of the continued turnover of personnel and the inexperience of newly assigned replacements, training directed toward the attainment of the highest possible state of tactical proficiency by the individuals and small units received priority over other types of training during the second half of the year.¹⁸

(1) 2d Armored Division. In addition to the factors that hampered operational readiness of all major units of the Seventh Army, the 2d Armored Division suffered from insufficient range and training areas required for armored units as well as from the lack of certain major items of equipment. During the first quarter of the year, the division was short 82 of the 315 medium tanks authorized but by the end of the year the remaining tanks had been received.¹⁹ Operational readiness was improved during the fall through experience gained in maneuvers, including Exercise ROSE BUSH, but declined late in the year because of the heavy loss of trained personnel. One of the favorable training factors at the end of 1952 included the intensive individual training program planned for the winter, which would facilitate the affective assimilation of the large numbers of replacements received. The division also anticipated an improvement in training following the expected receipt of T18 armored personnel carriers, which were to replace some of the M41 halftrack carriers; more than 250 of these vehicles were scheduled to be issued to the division by June 1953. The expected receipt of M41 tanks to replace M24 tanks was also expected to have good results.²⁰

¹⁶USAREUR ltr, 14 Jan 53, sub: Order of Battle as of 31 Dec 52. AGO 322 GOT-AGO. SECRET.

¹⁷Ltr, V Corps to Seventh Army, 10 Apr 52, sub: Operational Readiness. CVACT 319.1. SECRET. In USAREUR OPOT Div files (1952).

¹⁸Seventh Army Comd Rept, 1952. SECRET.

¹⁹Ltrs, 2d Armd Div to V Corps, 7 Apr 52, 31 Dec 52, sub: Operational Readiness. 319.1 ADCG. SECRET. In USAREUR OPOT Div Tng Br files (1952).

²⁰Ibid., 31 Dec 52.

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(2) 4th Infantry Division. Although heavy rotation of personnel and the arrival of inexperienced replacements hampered the maintenance of a high level of combat readiness, the division was considered operationally ready during the year. At the end of the first quarter of the year, virtually all personnel had completed combined branch training and 90 percent had completed the field exercises phase of training, including winter operations.²¹ The combat potential of the division declined during the fall when approximately 42 percent of the enlisted strength departed for the zone of interior for separation during the months of August, September, and October.²² In addition to the handicap of personnel turnover, the division did not have close-in areas for the accomplishment of yearly requirements for assault and transition firing of .30-caliber weapons. Except in major training areas, ranges were not available for tank gunnery and for qualification firing of recoilless rifles and rocket launchers. The division began a new training cycle on 1 October, and by the end of the year all personnel had completed squad training. Effective 1 January 1953, the 4th Infantry Division was to begin a training phase which would emphasize the platoon and integrate a review of required individual, squad, and section training. The new cycle was directed toward obtaining maximum combat efficiency by integrating combined arms training with the small unit phases.²³

(3) 1st Infantry Division. Operational readiness was maintained in the 1st Infantry Division, as in other major units of the Seventh Army, by frequent field and tactical training exercises during 1952. All units of the division, except the 63d Tank Battalion, the 5th Field Artillery Battalion, and the 48th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion, were accorded training for participation in combat or bulk-loaded movements by air.²⁴ Most of the replacements for key personnel lost through rotation were obtained by utilizing division, Seventh Army, or USAREUR schools. Available training areas and ranges for individual arms qualification were generally satisfactory, with the exception of the Bamberg area, where crowded conditions prevailed. The antiaircraft artillery range at Grafenwohr was considered inadequate because of the restricted firing fan (maximum of 67 degrees field of fire) and lack of a nearby landing field for tow target aircraft. In

²¹Ltr, 4th Inf Div to V Corps, 7 Apr 52, sub: Operational Readiness. SECRET. In USAREUR OPOT Div Tng Br files (1952).

²²Ibid., 2 Jan 53. In USAREUR G-3 Div Tng Br files (1953).

²³Ibid.

²⁴Draft, Seventh Army Comd Rept, 1952, Training Chapter. SECRET.

addition, training time at the range was limited, with many units sharing range allocation time.²⁵

c. VII Corps. VII Corps, with headquarters at Mohringen, had several organizational changes during the year which contributed to raising its over-all status of training. Effective 2 February, the 1st Infantry Division, which had been attached for training and administration only, was transferred to the V Corps and on 22 June VII Corps strength was increased when the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 18th Field Artillery Group were attached.²⁶ At the end of the year, the Corps had a strength of 53,712.²⁷ The problems inherent in the accelerated training program of the VII Corps, which were common to all major USAREUR units, included a high turnover of key personnel, shortages of suitable ranges for tank gunnery, insufficient close-in training areas for armored units, and restricted amounts of training ammunition.²⁸ However, VII Corps units were benefited by increased realistic field training, made possible to a large degree by the reopening of the former German Army training area at Hohenfels.²⁹ VII Corps was tested during the year by infantry and artillery battalion tests, training inspections, command post exercises, and maneuvers. Phases of the infantry tests included organizing of position and defense, conducting of delaying action and withdrawal under cover of darkness, occupying of an attack position and conducting of an attack. The tests, timed for continued action for three days and two nights, were given during May to September. Scores ranged from a high excellent in one battalion to an unsatisfactory in another, with the average receiving a medium satisfactory rating.³⁰ Artillery battalion tests also provided valuable training experience for the staffs of the tested units and of the corps headquarters. Several units were rated unsatisfactory and were retested.³¹ VII Corps participated in four command post exercises during 1952. These were: NORTH WIND, 15 - 17 January; SPRINGTIME, 14 - 18 April; MAYTIME, 19 - 23 May; and GRAND ALLIANCE, 16 - 18 July.³²

²⁵(1) Ltr, 1st Inf Div to V Corps, 2 Jan 53, sub: Operational Readiness. AG 353 DONCG. SECRET. In USAREUR G-3 Div Tng Br files (1953). (2) Ltr, 1st Inf Div to V Corps, 3 Oct 52, same sub. AG 353 DONCG. SECRET. In USAREUR OPOT Div Tng Br files (1952).

²⁶VII Corps Comd Rept, 1952, pp. 16 - 17. CONFIDENTIAL.

²⁷USAREUR Mthly Stat Rept, 31 Dec 52. SECRET.

²⁸VII Corps Comd Rept, 1952, p. 43. CONFIDENTIAL.

²⁹Ibid., p. 6.

³⁰Ibid., p. 38.

³¹Ibid., p. 40.

³²Ibid., p. 7.

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The VII Corps also received valuable training in two large fall maneuvers. In the first, Exercise EQUINOX, the corps operated under the French First Army and controlled the 28th Infantry Division and the French 4th Infantry Division in the attack.³³ Excellent co-operation was developed and it was noted that the two Allied forces worked together smoothly and effectively. The exercise revealed weaknesses in assault river crossing techniques and both VII Corps infantry divisions conducted river crossing training prior to the end of the year.³⁴ In the second maneuver, Exercise BLOW TORCH, the VII Corps operated under the Seventh Army. Although the maneuver was a success, certain additional training was regarded as desirable. It was apparent that combat readiness of the two infantry divisions had suffered a decline which could be attributed directly to personnel losses, especially in the 28th Division. The two divisions lost approximately 35 percent of their strength during the period April to July, including many high ranking noncommissioned officers and other key personnel, and another 15 percent between August and the time of Exercise BLOW TORCH (28 October - 1 November).³⁵ Despite temporary setbacks to training suffered during the year, the VII Corps at the end of 1952 was an effective, well-trained organization, ready for combat.

(1) 28th Infantry Division. The tactical readiness of the 28th Infantry Division was adversely affected during 1952 by the rapid turnover of personnel. In April, May and June, most of the National Guardsmen who had become proficient in their MOS fields were returned to the continental United States.³⁶ Training in the division during 1952 was conducted in four phases. January and February were devoted to advanced individual and squad training; a platoon and company training phase was conducted 2 March to 3 May; and from 4 May to 5 July the division conducted a battalion and regimental phase. The fourth phase, field training, continued from 6 July to 4 October with regimental combat team and division maneuvers at Hohenfels, where training was on a 7-day week basis and emphasis was given to field training at night, in keeping with lessons learned in Korea.³⁷ Operational readiness of 28th Division units, reported on a percentage basis during the third quarter of the year was as follows: 10th Regiment, 91.4; 110th Regiment, 89, and 112th Regiment, 97. The division's artillery received the low

³³Ibid., p. 35.

³⁴Ibid., p. 43.

³⁵Ltr, Lt Gen M. S. Eddy, CINCUSAREUR, to Gen. J. L. Collins, COFSA, 5 Nov 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1952), Vol. II, Item 54.

³⁶28th Inf Div Comd Rept, 1952, p. 6. CONFIDENTIAL.

³⁷Ibid., p. 28.

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rating of 67 percent, which was attributed to insufficient personnel replacements with artillery training.³⁸

(2) 43d Infantry Division. In January 1952 the 43d Infantry Division entered upon a progressive training program for the year, beginning with small unit training and culminating in the September maneuvers. Individual military proficiency tests were given during the period 15 February to 1 May, and a training program was initiated to correct deficiencies.³⁹ The three infantry regiments completed preliminary air transportability training in July, employing mock-ups constructed in Augsburg, Nuernberg, and Munich for that purpose. Losses of trained personnel were particularly heavy during May, June, and July. As of 1 October, 86 percent of the division's personnel had completed advanced individual training, 68 percent unit training, 60 percent combined arms training, and 87 percent the field exercise phase. The figures remained approximately the same during the last quarter of 1952, except that training in field exercises improved to 95 percent.⁴⁰ Weaknesses in training during 1952 were related to the large turnover in key personnel, inadequate tank training areas, and the shortage of certain types of training ammunition.⁴¹

Section II: Facilities and Programs

102. Ranges and Training Areas

Administrative procedures pertaining to usage of USAREUR training areas were clarified during the summer of 1952 when the command designated Grafenwohr, Hohenfels, Wildflecken, and Baumholder as major training areas and defined the responsibilities of subordinate commands. The Seventh Army became responsible for scheduling the training of units in

³⁸Ltr, 28th Inf Div to Seventh Army, 7 Oct 52, sub: Operational Reports of Readiness. SECRET. In USAREUR OPOT Div Tng Br files (1952).

³⁹43d Inf Div Comd Rept, 1952, p. 99. SECRET.

⁴⁰Draft, Seventh Army Comd Rept, 1952. SECRET.

⁴¹43d Inf Div, Combat Effectiveness Report for Assigned Forces, 3 Jul 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR OPOT Div Tng Br files (1952).

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the major areas, co-ordinating allocation of ranges to troops in training, and resolving day-to-day training priorities and conflicting range requirements. Subpost commanders were responsible for allocating ranges to troops in training as indicated by Seventh Army training area representatives.⁴²

a. Acquisition of Ranges and Training Areas. Inadequacy of anti-aircraft ranges provided a major training problem in 1952, and the 3-year search for a suitable range continued.⁴³ During 1952, antiaircraft artillery gun battalions of USAREUR utilized the British Army of the Rhine range at Putlos, on the North Sea coast. Because of the distance involved, and for other reasons, the units were restricted to two trips during the period April - October with three 15-day periods at the end of the season available to units failing to pass Army Field Forces tests or requiring additional time on account of inclement weather.⁴⁴ The disadvantages of the Putlos range and indications that it would not be available for U.S. troops after 1953, underlined the urgency of obtaining another antiaircraft artillery range. In August the command was advised that the range would not be available for use after 30 December. An international airway running from Copenhagen to Hamburg was routed directly over the Putlos range. The British therefore planned to abandon the range and to establish a new one at Todendorf, approximately twenty miles from Putlos on the North Sea coast.⁴⁵ In the meantime, USAREUR made an exhaustive but unsuccessful search for another range.⁴⁶ The critical training situation was believed alleviated in November when the British agreed to relinquish suitable land adjoining their antiaircraft range at Todendorf.⁴⁷ Emergency procedures were authorized for construction of the proposed range and camp, which was planned to accommodate one battalion of nine hundred men, including a permanent party of one

⁴²EUCOM ltr, 11 Jun 52, sub: Major Training Areas. AG 353 GOT-AGO. RESTRICTED.

⁴³Cable S-2101, CINCEUR to CINCLANDCENT, 6 Feb 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1952), Vol. I, Item 13.

⁴⁴IRS, Dir EUCOM OPOT Div to EUCOM COFS, 31 May 52, sub: Movement of AAA Gun Battalions to Putlos. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1952), Vol. I, Item 15.

⁴⁵IRS, Lt Col Armel Dyer, BAOR Sr Ln Off, to Dir USAREUR OPOT Div, 25 Aug 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR OPOT Div Tng Br files (1952).

⁴⁶Cable 221620Z, US CINCEUR to MAAG's in France, Denmark, Belgium, 22 Oct 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1952), Vol. II, Item 51.

⁴⁷IRS, Dir USAREUR OPOT Div to Dir USAREUR Log Div, 4 Nov 52, sub: Opening of US AA Gun Range. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR OPOT Div Tng Br files (1952).

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hundred. Unexpected difficulties developed in connection with its acquisition, and at the end of December firm commitments had not yet materialized. However, USAREUR's plans for utilization of the facility continued, and it was expected that it would be available for the 1953 training year.⁴⁸

b. Status of Major Training Areas at the End of 1952.

(1) Grafenwohr. Grafenwohr, located sixty kilometers north of Nuernberg, contained approximately 51,000 acres and could accommodate a maximum of twelve battalions of an integrated force of infantry, artillery, and armor. It was utilized in particular during the 1952 training season by units of the 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions, the V Corps, and the Seventh Army artillery units. Units of the Berlin Command, USFA and Trieste also made use of this training facility.⁴⁹ Construction of training facilities during the year included the completion of machine gun and subcaliber ranges, semipermanent housing for 15,000 men, and concrete floor tent camp housing for 7,000 men.⁵⁰

(2) Hohenfels. Located sixty kilometers southwest of Nuernberg, Hohenfels was utilized by the 43d and 28th Infantry Divisions, and by other units during the year. Semipermanent housing facilities to accommodate 10,000 men was completed in 1952 and the tent camp area had a capacity of 7,000.⁵¹ During 1952 construction of thirty-two ranges of various types was completed, including a 50-point known-distance range, a 7-lane moving-target range, combat ranges, and a combat-in-cities range. Also completed were a railroad terminal facility at nearby Parsberg and nine miles of hard surface road from the terminal to the training area.⁵²

(3) Wildflecken. Wildflecken, located fifty kilometers northwest of Schweinfurt, was used by the 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions, VII Corps Artillery, and other units during the year. The range contained 16,000 acres. Housing capacity for approximately 5,000 men was

⁴⁸Interv, Maj M. H. Hooper, USAREUR Hist Div with Maj W. D. Wade, USAREUR G-4 Div Real Estate Sec, 13 Apr 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁴⁹Interv, Maj M. H. Hooper, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col G. A. Gnau, USAREUR G-3 Div Tng Br, 2 Apr 53. SECRET.

⁵⁰Interv, Maj M. H. Hooper, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. B. R. Hutter, USAREUR Engr Div, 20 Apr 53. SECRET.

⁵¹Interv, Maj M. H. Hooper, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col G. A. Gnau, USAREUR G-3 Div Tng Br, 2 Apr 53. SECRET.

⁵²Interv, Maj M. H. Hooper, USAREUR Hist Div, with B. R. Hutter, USAREUR Engr Div, 20 Apr 53. RESTRICTED.

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available in permanent buildings, rehabilitated in 1951. Although it had a 90-mm. stationary tank firing range, it was limited to one location with a maximum 1,000-yard range. Training capacity was approximately four battalions.⁵³ Other than 30,000 square feet of hard stand, there was little training facility construction at Wildflecken in 1952. Range construction had been completed in 1951.⁵⁴

(4) Baumholder. Baumholder training area, located forty kilometers northwest of Kaiserslautern, contained 23,000 acres. Its facilities were shared with French units. Housing construction at the Baumholder training area for 10,500 troops begun during the summer of 1951, was completed by the end of July 1952. Semipermanent housing facilities for 3,000 troops were also completed. A labor service housing project, begun in the fall of 1951, was completed in November for a capacity of 668 men.⁵⁵ Ranges available at Baumholder at the end of 1952 included a known-distance range with 51 firing points, a transition range with 10 firing points, a pistol range with 15 points, a 500-inch machine gun range with 20 firing points, a whirllig for antiaircraft artillery firing, and improvised courses for rocket launcher, rifle grenade, and close combat.⁵⁶

103. Joint Training

a. Air-Ground Training. The basic provision for air-ground training was contained in EUCOM Training Circular No. 1, 28 March 1952, which directed that the Seventh Army and the Twelfth Air Force conduct such joint training as would insure effective air-ground operations in combat. During the period February - October, the Air Force supported units of Seventh Army in routine training with 932 close support missions and the two services participated in twelve major joint training exercises. A joint air-ground instruction team was organized, and use of tactical air was included in battalion tests in 1952.⁵⁷ Functions of the team included the indoctrination of Seventh Army and Twelfth Air Force personnel in organization and procedures for air-ground co-ordination.

⁵³Interv, Maj M. H. Hooper, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col G. A. Gnau, USAREUR G-3 Div Tng Br, 2 Apr 53. SECRET.

⁵⁴Interv, Maj M. H. Hooper, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. G. S. Yates, USAREUR Engr Div, 20 Apr 53. RESTRICTED.

⁵⁵WACOM Prog Rept, as of 31 Dec 52. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Engr Div files (1953).

⁵⁶(1) WACOM Comd Rept, 1952. SECRET. (2) Interv, Maj M. H. Hooper, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col G. A. Gnau, USAREUR G-3 Div Tng Br, 2 Apr 53. RESTRICTED.

⁵⁷Rept of AFF Inspection, Nov 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 333 (1953).

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In addition the team maintained information on current developments in U.S. and Allied air-ground techniques.⁵⁸ Although a close working relationship in joint air-ground training had been developed by the Seventh Army and the Twelfth Air Force, certain training deficiencies hampered the combat effectiveness of the command. Joint air defense exercises, in which air force participation included the use of interception aircraft, were not conducted. The tactical air support system was assembled as required for field exercises and maneuvers, but not on an operational ready basis, and tactical air control parties, air liaison officers, and tactical direction posts were not provided in sufficient numbers or with the required equipment.⁵⁹ During the third quarter of 1952, joint training received a setback when it was estimated that air force participation in joint training would be reduced. The percentage of support expected, as compared to previous support, was as follows: air movement, 20 percent; close support, 55 percent; tow missions, 100 percent; jet aircraft tracking, none; and tactical reconnaissance photography, 50 percent. Support for army training tests was to continue. The 1952 air transportability training program was not affected, as it had been completed prior to this reduction. The Seventh Army was informed that the curtailment was occasioned by the diversion of air support to Korea. The reduction in flying time was expected to have a profound effect on joint training in 1953.⁶⁰ During the 1952 joint air-ground training exercises, conflicting map grid referencing systems were used. USAREUR units used the Universal Transverse Mercator system while the Twelfth Air Force used maps with the Geographic Referencing (GEOREF) system. The Department of the Air Force had previously directed the use of GEOREF for all air force operations except those in support of land or amphibious forces. During the first quarter of the year units of the Twelfth Air Force had been directed to request UTM system maps.⁶¹ At the end of the year Air Force units were still using GEOREF maps for air-ground operations, although this was contrary to a policy announced by the Joint Intelligence Committee. As a result of the Army Field Forces inspection in November, the Chief, Army Field Forces, recommended that the command place more emphasis on joint Army-Air Force participation in major training exercises

⁵⁸Twelfth AF Hist, 1 Jan to 30 Jun 52, Vol. I, p. 51. SECRET.

⁵⁹Rept of AFF Inspection, Nov 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 333 (1953).

⁶⁰IRS, Dir USAREUR OPOT Div to USAREUR DCOFS, 10 Oct 52, sub: Training Involving USAF Planes. SECRET. In USAREUR OPOT Div Tng Br Files (1952).

⁶¹Twelfth AF Hist, 1 Jan to 30 Jun 52, Vol. I, p. 59. SECRET.

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and establish a joint air photography center.⁶²

b. Command Post Exercises. In addition to the several command post exercises (CPX) conducted by divisions and corps, and joint exercises held by the Seventh Army and the Twelfth Air Force, two combined and joint command post exercises of major import were conducted. Command post exercise MAYTIME, conducted during the period 19 - 23 May, was a EUCOM-FFA joint exercise with Army and Air Force participation. Headquarters participating were Group B (EUCOM), the French First Army, the U.S. Seventh Army, the U.S. Twelfth Air Force, and the French First Air Division. Subordinate units included corps and wing headquarters.⁶³ In the MAYTIME concept, an aggressor invaded Western Germany, Allied forces withdrew to a Rhine River defense line and, following friendly reinforcement, made a counterattack with counterair and close support activities. Objectives of the exercise were: (1) to develop joint air-ground co-operation procedures, teamwork, and techniques at the level of Group B and 4th Allied Tactical Air Force; (2) to test individual service and joint operation procedures at all participating levels of command; (3) to test communications and liaison within the respective Group B and 4th Allied Tactical Air Force command structures and between Army and Air Force headquarters and tactical units; (4) to provide administrative support channels within the logistical feasibility of the exercise; (5) to provide training in the establishment and transfer of command posts from garrison to field locations; and (6) to prepare the tactical echelons of certain headquarters for participation in GRAND ALLIANCE, an ALFCE-AAFCE command post exercise scheduled for July.⁶⁴ GRAND ALLIANCE, the largest CPX conducted during 1952, was held during the period 16 - 18 July. Conducted in France and Germany, the participating headquarters were: Army Group A (BAOR), including the British and the Belgian First Corps; the Second Allied Tactical Air Force; and the Flag Officer, Germany (British). Within Army Group B (EUCOM) were the French First Army and the U.S. Seventh Army; the Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force, including the U.S. Twelfth Air Force and the French First Air Division; the Commander Naval Forces, Germany (U.S.), including the U.S. Navy Rhine River Patrol; and the French Rhine Naval Forces. The purpose of

⁶²(1) Rept of AFF Inspection, Nov 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 333 (1953).
(2) C/N 2, USAREUR SGS to USAREUR G-3 Div, 10 Feb 53, sub: Army Field Forces Inspection of USAREUR, Nov 52. SECRET. In USAREUR G-3 Div Tng Br files (1953). (3) Interv, Miss M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col A. E. Calhoun, USAREUR G-3 Div Opns Br, 19 Feb 53. SECRET.

⁶³IRS, EUCOM DCOFS Opns to EUCOM Stf Divs, 10 Apr 52, CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 354.2 (1952), B/P.

⁶⁴Ltr, Joint Hq to Tactical Comds of Stf Divs, 23 Apr 52, sub: Group B - 4th Allied Tactical Air Force Joint Command Post Exercises. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 354.2 (1952), B/P.

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GRAND ALLIANCE was to exercise the command, staff, and communications of participating headquarters, with expected improvement in combat readiness, and to prepare the various command posts for participation in scheduled fall maneuvers.⁶⁵ In concept, an enemy attacked on a wide front, Allied forces delayed the aggressor with maximum use of demolitions at certain strategic rivers, and Allied forces, after a withdrawal, made a counter-offensive. The final report on GRAND ALLIANCE indicated certain deficiencies in the scenario and planning of the exercise. Basic scenario, particularly concerning phase lines, was not in consonance with the ALFCE operational plan. Documents prepared for control personnel were often distributed to the operating staff. Insufficient time was allowed for preparation of subordinate headquarters for the exercise; it was recommended that ten to twelve weeks be given to preparation in the future to similar exercises. Finally, major logistical problems could not be presented in an exercise lasting only two days.⁶⁶

c. Fall Maneuvers. Early planning for 1952 field exercises indicated that USAREUR would not conduct large-scale maneuvers, since higher headquarters had assumed responsibility for that phase of training. During the spring and summer, maneuvers were limited to division and corps exercises.⁶⁷ However, following a conference at Fontainebleau in April, the expected ALFCE maneuver, BLUE ALLIANCE, was canceled and a USAREUR staff which had been established to participate in planning the maneuver was dissolved.⁶⁸ Four major maneuvers, involving corps or higher headquarters, were conducted within USAREUR command in 1952. Objectives of the fall maneuvers were similar in that they were planned to develop and perfect staff procedures, promote co-ordination of Allied air and ground forces, and test and evaluate the operational readiness of subordinate units. Two were combined exercises, planned and executed by U.S. and Allied commands. All were joint exercises, with participating Army-Air Force units working together in close co-ordination. The four maneuvers were two-sided; they were free within prescribed boundaries; and they were short in duration. In tactical

⁶⁵IRS, EUCOM COFS to Stf Divs, 5 Jun 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 354.2 (1952), B/P.

⁶⁶Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to ALFCE, n. d., sub: Final Report CPX GRAND ALLIANCE. SECRET. In USAREUR OPOT Div Tng Br files (1952).

⁶⁷Cable SX-1562, CINCEUR to COFSA, 18 Jan 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 354.2 (1952), Vol. I, Item 4.

⁶⁸(1) IRS, EUCOM COFS to Stf Divs, 8 Apr 52, sub: EUCOM Maneuvers Planning Staff. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 354.2 (1952), Vol. I, Item 29.
(2) Interv, Maj M. H. Hooper, USAREUR Hist Div, with Col C. L. Bowen, USAREUR G-3 Div Tng Br Maneuver Sec, 28 Apr 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

concept, the 1952 fall maneuvers also followed a common doctrine: an attack by the aggressor, delaying action and withdrawal by friendly forces, and a counterattack against the aggressor.

(1) Exercise ROSE BUSH. The first maneuver, Exercise ROSE BUSH, was conducted in the Darmstadt-Bad Kissingen-Kassel-Bonn area during the period 6 - 8 September. The directing headquarters was the Seventh Army, with the USAREUR staff in a supervisory role. Friendly forces were the U.S. V Corps, with its 4th Infantry Division and 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment; the French II Corps, with the French 3d Infantry Division and one combat command of the French 1st Armored Division. Aggressor forces included the U.S. 2d Armored Division (minus), which had operational control of aggressor forces, and the French 1st Armored Division (minus).⁶⁹ Air Force participation included units of the 48th and 86th Fighter Bomber Wings, the 10th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, and the 60th Troop Carrier Wing.⁷⁰ Air support was allotted to the aggressor only; the concept of the maneuver did not include air support to friendly forces. A final report by the Seventh Army stated that the major training points learned or confirmed were as follows: (a) demolitions or other barrier operations can have decided effects on enemy advance during a delaying action on a wide front; (b) operational liaison between French and U.S. forces had shown marked improvement during the past year; and (c) the value of aggressiveness on the part of defenders was constantly demonstrated.⁷¹

(2) Exercise EQUINOX. The second maneuver, Exercise EQUINOX, was under the directorship of Commander in Chief, French Forces in Germany (CCFFA), and was held in the Speyer-Sinsheim-Freudenstadt-Strasbourg area during the period 17 - 19 September. Friendly troops were the French I Corps, the U.S. 43d Infantry Division less one regimental combat team, the French 5th Armored Group, the French 2d Regiment of Algerian Cavalry, one regimental combat team of the French 4th Division, and the French 2d Division. Participating as aggressor forces were the U.S. VII Corps, the U.S. 28th Infantry Division, the French 4th Division (minus), and one airborne group of the French 25th Airborne Division. In concept, aggressor forces approaching from the east, and moving in the direction of Karlsruhe, reached a line Sinsheim-Freudenstadt at 0001, 17 September. Friendly forces fought a delaying action while the main body took up

⁶⁹Ltr, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Nov 52. AG 354.2 ASEGC-OP. SECRET. In USAREUR OPOT Div Tng Br Maneuver Sec files (1952).

⁷⁰Twelfth AF Hist, 1 Jul to 31 Dec 52, Vol. I, p. 106. SECRET.

⁷¹Cable N-2001/AEFCE/B3, ALFCE to SHAPE, 16 Sep 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 354.2 (1952), B/P.

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defensive positions on the west bank of the Rhine. During the night of 18 September, enemy forces crossed the Rhine and established a bridgehead on the west bank. On the 19th, friendly forces counterattacked to reduce the bridgehead.⁷²

(3) Exercise BELL HOOK. The third maneuver, Exercise BELL HOOK, directed by the V Corps, was the first of two corps exercises that tested emergency roles of subordinate units. The maneuver was conducted on 13 - 18 October. The dates included concentration and dispersal of troops. The concept involved an attack by aggressor forces (the 28th Infantry Division and one combat command of the 2d Armored Division), with a delaying action and defense by friendly forces (1st Infantry Division, reinforced), and a counterattack. The exercise was conducted in the Wuerzburg-Schweinfurt-Bamberg area. Its purpose was to test the 1st Division in its emergency role and to exercise the 28th Division in attack and operations on a broad front.⁷³ The Twelfth Air Force's 22d Fighter-Bomber Squadron conducted target missions during the exercise but poor weather restricted the flights and the planned 60 sorties requiring 420 hours were reduced to 30 sorties requiring 210 hours. Air Force recommendations following the exercise included the use of different very high frequencies (VHF) by friendly and aggressor Tactical Air Control parties, to provide a more realistic situation for supporting aircraft, and the placing of distinctive markings on all vehicles and tanks of one force to aid recognition by aircraft.⁷⁴

(4) Exercise BLOW TORCH. BLOW TORCH, the final large-scale maneuver in 1952, was directed by the VII Corps in the Nuernberg-Munich-Augsburg area on 28 October - 1 November. This maneuver, as other USAREUR exercises in 1952, was free within prescribed boundaries. Friendly forces were the U.S. 28th and 43d Infantry Divisions plus the 2d and 6th Armored Cavalry Regiments (minus). The aggressor unit was the 18th Regimental Combat Team of the 1st Infantry Division. The concept followed the familiar and realistic pattern of an attack by the aggressor with a delaying action by friendly forces and a counterattack concluding the exercise.⁷⁵ The objective of the exercise was to practice tactical problems that would be encountered in emergency operations, including

⁷²Memo, USAREUR OPOT Div Maneuver Sec to USAREUR SGS, n. d., sub: Fall Maneuvers. SECRET. In USAREUR OPOT Div Tng Br Maneuver files (1952).

⁷³Ltr, EUCOM to CINCALFCE, 25 Jul 52, sub: Major Training Events during 1 Jul to 31 Dec 52. AG 353 GOT. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR OPOT Div Tng Br files (1952).

⁷⁴Twelfth AF Hist, 1 Jul to 31 Dec 52, Vol. I. SECRET.

⁷⁵Memo, USAREUR OPOT Div Maneuver Sec to USAREUR SGS, n. d., sub: Fall Maneuvers. SECRET. In USAREUR OPOT Div Tng Br Maneuver Sec files (1952).

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control of reconnaissance elements; and to impart training in the passage of command and protection of flanks.⁷⁶ Emphasis was placed on maximum troop participation, and 89 percent of the total strength of VII Corps took part in the maneuver. For the 28th and 43d Infantry Divisions, the troop participation was 85 percent and 93.5 percent, respectively.⁷⁷ Elements of the Twelfth Air Force averaged eight sorties each day in support of friendly forces and twenty-two sorties in support of the aggressor.⁷⁸ Approximately 210 hours were flown in the air support missions.⁷⁸ While the maneuver was generally a success and the most realistic and valuable which the VII Corps had performed since its arrival in Germany, many deficiencies were noted by commands and umpires, including insufficient co-ordination between infantry, engineer and other combat elements in preplanned tactical demolitions; disclosures of command post locations, and compromise of countersigns and transmission of messages in the clear which should have been classified; and too frequent movement of artillery units. It was indicated that much additional training was needed in air-ground operations; fighter-bomber unit reports revealed that communications were often unsatisfactory. It was also indicated that additional emphasis in training should be given to avoiding excessive losses due to congestion on roads. Other deficiencies revealed included a lack of dispersal in command posts and bivouac areas, and inadequacy of camouflage measures.⁷⁹

d. Air Transportability Training. In accordance with the stress placed on air support in 1952, air transportable tactical units of the Seventh Army were trained in combat or bulk-loaded movements by air, receiving a minimum of 20 hours of instruction in loading, balancing, and lashing of equipment.⁸⁰ Initially mock-ups were used extensively,

⁷⁶Ltr, Lt Gen M. S. Eddy, CINCUSAREUR, to Gen Sir Richard N. Gale, CINC BAOR, 4 Oct 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 354.1 (1952), Vol. II, Item 105.

⁷⁷VII Corps Comd Rept, Exercise BLOW TORCH. SECRET. In USAREUR OPOT Div Tng Br Maneuver Sec files (1952).

⁷⁸Twelfth AF Hist, 1 Jul to 31 Dec 52, Vol. I, p. 112. SECRET.

⁷⁹(1) Ibid. (2) VII Corps, Comd Rept, Exercise BLOW TORCH, 15 Nov 52. SECRET. In USAREUR OPOT Div Tng Br Maneuver Sec files (1952). (3) Rept of AFF Inspection, Nov 52, par. 10-c. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 333 (1953).

⁸⁰Draft, Seventh Army Comd Rept, 1952. SECRET.

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but more realistic training was provided by Twelfth Air Force planes when it was indicated in February that eight aircraft could be furnished four days per week during the training year.⁸¹ Joint air transportability exercises during the year included one in which a 557th Aerial Supply Company parachute dropped a M4A2 bridge into the Rhine River near Gernsheim on 11 March. Eight sections of the bridge, each weighing approximately 15,000 pounds, were dropped by eight C-119's from the 433d Troop Carrier Wing. The drop was considered highly successful.⁸² On 16 - 17 April, elements of the 22d Regimental Combat Team were airlifted in a 3-hour formation from the Giebelstadt airfield. After off-loading, the team made a tactical march to the vicinity of Kitzingen, where it conducted a holding exercise. In the second phase of the joint exercise, the unit was resupplied by the 557th Aerial Supply Company, when a mass flight of thirty-four Twelfth Air Force planes made a heavy drop of jeeps, ammunition, and other equipment and supplies.⁸³ During the second half of the year, the 60th Troop Carrier Wing and units of the Seventh Army completed more than six transportability training missions, which included 257 sorties flown, 3,876 army men airlifted, and 235 recorded flight hours.⁸⁴

104. Air Defense Training

Air defense training was continued under the provisions of EUCOM Training Circular No. 1, which stated that the Seventh Army and the Twelfth Air Force would conduct joint training to insure effective air defense. Emphasis was placed on radar long distance projection plotting procedures and exchange of information. The Twelfth Air Force was also directed to support the towing and tracking requirements of the Seventh Army antiaircraft artillery units. During March to June inclusive, Seventh Army antiaircraft artillery units and the Twelfth Air Force 501st Aircraft Control and Warning Group participated in live firing exercises. The realistic training was staged at the Hohenfels and Grafenwohr areas, where tow target aircraft and tactical air control parties were furnished by the Air Force.⁸⁵ In June 1952 SHAPE requested

⁸¹Rept of mtg between reps of Twelfth AF, EUCOM, Seventh Army, and 557th Aerial Resupply Co, 27 Feb 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR OPOT Div Tng Br files (1952).

⁸²Twelfth AF Hist, 1 Jan to 30 Jun 52. SECRET.

⁸³(1) Ibid., Vol. I, p. 76. (2) IRS, Dir EUCOM OPOT Div to CINCEUR, 15 Apr 52, sub: Air Transportability Exercise. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 354.2 (1952), Vol. II, Item 32A.

⁸⁴Twelfth AF Hist, 1 Jul to 31 Dec 52, Vol. I, p. 115. SECRET.

⁸⁵Ibid., 1 Jan to 30 Jun 52, Vol. I, p. 79.

that in view of the potential air threat and possible scale of attack to which land and air forces on the ground might be subjected, great stress be placed upon active and passive measures for air defense in all maneuvers and exercises. The ALFCE letter which forwarded the SHAPE request to CINCEUR pointed out that the subject was being strongly emphasized in the ALFCE training directive for 1952 - 53 then being issued.⁸⁶ On 9 August 1952, in transmitting the requests of SACEUR and CINCLANDCENT to the Seventh Army and USAREUR COMZ, US CINCEUR quoted the following remarks made by SACEUR during the course of a visit to Headquarters, Army Group B, during CPX GRAND ALLIANCE:

We must recognize that for some time to come the enemy will have air, armor, and manpower superiority in the event of war. No longer will rear areas be free from attack; we must expect deep penetration and encirclement on the part of the enemy by means of air and armor. Each soldier, no matter what other job assigned, must be alert to the requirement for camouflage and dispersion and be trained to use his preliminary weapon. Every officer must insist, at every opportunity, that proper steps are being taken to counter the effect of possible enemy armor and air activity.

US CINCEUR requested that commanders of all subordinate headquarters take positive steps to achieve the preparedness outlined in SACEUR's remarks. It was particularly desired that each individual be indoctrinated in his mission with respect to overwhelming air superiority, deep thrusts by enemy armor, and airborne operations in the rear of Allied lines. Commanders were directed to review existing plans for the purpose of making necessary adjustments in view of the anticipated enemy dominance of the air. US CINCEUR considered it mandatory that all operations, including those of rear installations, as well as tactical units, be assessed in light of this condition.⁸⁷

⁸⁶(1) Ltr, SHAPE DCOFS Plans and Opns to CINCAIRNORTH, CINCLANDCENT, CINCAIRCEN, FOCE, CINCAIRSOUTH, 26 Jun 52, sub: Maneuvers-Air Defense. NATO SECRET. (2) Ltr, ALFCE COFS to CINCEUR, 11 Jul 52, sub: Maneuvers-Air Defense. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 381 SHAPE (1952), Vol. II, Item 53b-1a atchd.

⁸⁷Ltr, COFS US EUCOM to CG USAREUR COMZ; CG Seventh Army, 9 Aug 52, sub: Defense Against Enemy Air and Armored Attack. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 SHAPE (1952), Vol. II, Item 53b-1a atchd.

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105. Supply Over the Beaches

a. Initiation and Development of the Program. In September 1951 the Department of the Army directed EUCOM to initiate planning for training in over-the-beach unloading operations in connection with the operation of the line of communications.⁸⁸ As later defined by CINCEUR, the purpose of this project was to develop experience in unloading supplies from ships to beaches without benefit of port facilities. This involved training in establishing an effective organization, in the use of proper equipment, and in unloading operations. In the event of hostilities, this training would enable the landing of supplies as an adjunct to port operations or to compensate for destruction of port facilities. The ultimate objective was to establish an organization capable of handling 8,000 tons of supplies per month in peacetime and from 100,000 to 150,000 tons per month during combat.⁸⁹ At the direction of EUCOM, COMZ prepared an over-all plan which received the tentative approval of the Department of the Army on 27 November 1951. A detailed operational plan for over-the-beach supply training was then prepared by COMZ headquarters and submitted to EUCOM on 28 January 1952. The plan provided for an amphibious support organization consisting of a beach headquarters, an engineer boat company, an amphibious truck company, a transportation truck company, and a quartermaster service company, with construction and signal elements and miscellaneous support units. The beach sites selected for the initial operations were, Pointe-de-Grave, at the tip of the Gironde Estuary, and La Pallice, both on the southwest coast of France. By the end of May all the necessary personnel and equipment had been assembled in the Base Section.⁹⁰ Meanwhile negotiations in progress with the French Government since 21 December 1951 for permission to use the selected beach sites were concluded on 28 May 1952, when an agreement was reached on the settlement of damage claims against the United States. The first ship was successfully unloaded over-the-beach on 4 - 8 June at Pointe-de-Grave.⁹¹

⁸⁸Ltr, DA to CINCEUR, 10 Sep 51, sub: Supply Over the Beaches. AGAO-S-400 (8 Sep 51), G-4. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item C.

⁸⁹Cable S-1336, CINCEUR to EUCOM COMZ, 12 Jul 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item 33 atchd.

⁹⁰EUCOM CINC's Wkly Stf Conf 12, 27 May 52, pp. 3 - 4. SECRET.

⁹¹(1) C/N 1, EUCOM JA Div to EUCOM COFS, 28 May 52, sub: Claims for Landing Exercise. SECRET. (2) Memo, EUCOM Log Div to EUCOM COFS, 7 Jun 52, sub: Supply Over the Beaches, Pointe-de-Grave. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1952), Vol. I, Items 20 atchd and 25.

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The program was continued at the rate of one ship a month, and by 1 September three ships had been successfully unloaded at Pointe-de-Grave and La Pallice. On the basis of initial experience it was decided to expand this program and for this purpose COMZ conducted a survey of the French coast north of the Loire River to locate suitable beaches. Considerable difficulty was encountered as the French Government was unwilling to permit the use of northern beaches for such exercises. COMZ enlisted the aid of ALFCE in negotiating with the French Government for the use of the additional beaches. ALFCE was willing to give this assistance, but desired that supply-over-the-beaches be converted to a NATO activity. CINCUSAREUR, however, was of the opinion that the other NATO powers should conduct their own individual training exercises. He informed ALFCE that the transfer of this expensive operation to NATO would give rise to many difficulties, especially in regard to financing, and it should, therefore, be left under COMZ direction.⁹² A survey of the French coast by COMZ and an interallied mission showed four beaches suitable for peacetime operations, four for wartime over-the-beaches supply mission, and one for peacetime debarkation of personnel.⁹³ On 17 November ALFCE informed USAREUR that the French Ministry of National Defense had agreed to the extension of the coastline available for American use to include the area between Brest and the mouth of the Loire River and had authorized the conduct of future exercises at points in this general area, which was considered most suitable by the interallied survey group.⁹⁴

b. Selection of Supplies. In January 1952, the Overseas Supply Division of the New York Port of Embarkation suggested that EUCOM send lists of monthly requirements covering the types of cargo desired.⁹⁵ EUCOM proposed to submit special requisitions for each shipload of stockage objective supplies, provided they would not be considered assets against the command's requisitioning objectives until the supplies were in EUCOM depots. Such supplies were to be fast-moving items rather

⁹²(1) Memo, USAREUR Log Div to USAREUR COFS, 4 Sep 52, sub: Over the Beach Exercise. SECRET. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CINCALFCE, 26 Sep 52, sub: Supply Over the Beaches Exercise. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1952), Vol. II, Item 42.

⁹³C/N 1, USAREUR Log Div to USAREUR Trans Div, 26 Nov 52, sub: Information on Coastal Survey of Western France. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1952), Vol. II, Item 62.

⁹⁴Ltr, ALFCE COFS to USAREUR, 17 Nov 52, sub: Unloading Exercises Over the Beach Between the Mouth of the Loire and Brest. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1952), Vol. II, Item 62 atchd.

⁹⁵Cable OSDNYP-72332-P, NYPE to CINCEUR, 4 Jan 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item C atchd.

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than heavy major end items. For special projects EUCOM proposed to submit a list of items previously requisitioned for the EUCOM Special Reserve which were acceptable for supply-over-the-beach operations. The Overseas Supply Division would then screen the list against items remaining to be shipped to EUCOM, after which selected supplies would be specially packaged and assigned the shipping designation GAMB. EUCOM specified that this procedure should not delay by more than thirty days the shipment of supplies which would otherwise be shipped to EUCOM by normal procedure.⁹⁶ The supplies to be shipped for the supply-over-the-beaches exercise would be sent in accordance with the approved EUCOM Supply Distribution Plan, that is, Special Reserve items plus Class II and IV combat-type items, in addition to Class V and nonperishable Class I supplies.⁹⁷ EUCOM recommended that cargo coming over the beaches should consist largely of supplies normally required and already requisitioned for storage or consumption in France. It was pointed out that in the absence of operating depots in France the shipping of operating stocks across France was an expensive undertaking and that supplies brought in over the beaches should therefore be those destined for depots in France.⁹⁸ Supplies to be shipped were sent in lots of 6,000 to 8,000 tons in Victory-type ships. For example, the first ship, the Nevadan, brought 8,000 tons of cargo consisting of 6,000 short tons of Class I nonperishables, such as canned fruits and vegetables and 2,000 short tons of small arms ammunition.⁹⁹ Later ships brought Class II and Class IV combat-type items and light equipment. Future plans envisaged the discharge of bulk petroleum from tankers at Donges, the sea terminus of the projected EUCOM POL pipeline. Depending upon the availability of suitable landing craft, it was planned eventually to ship tanks, 2½-ton trucks in twin unit packs, artillery, and heavy engineer equipment.¹⁰⁰

c. Landing of Supplies. The unloading of cargo in the open sea and transportation to selected sorting areas on the neighboring beaches

⁹⁶Cable SX-1766, CINCEUR to COFSA for ACOFS G-4, 26 Jan 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item 10.

⁹⁷C/N 2, EUCOM Log Div to EUCOM SGS, 15 Jan 52, to IRS, EUCOM SGS to EUCOM Log Div, 8 Jan 52, sub: Over the Beach Operations. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item C atchd.

⁹⁸Cable TT-1278, NYPE to CINCEUR, 11 Jan 52. SECRET. In file cited above.

⁹⁹Memo, EUCOM Log Div to EUCOM COFS, 7 Jun 52, sub: Supply Over the Beaches, Pointe-de-Grave. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item 25.

¹⁰⁰Cable DA-91857, COFSA to CINCEUR, 12 Jan 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item C atchd.

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constituted the major portion of the over-the-beaches exercises. The initial exercise was planned and conducted by the 7703 Transportation Major Port Detachment with approximately 1,500 troops representing some twenty-five COMZ organizations participating. The entire cargo was unloaded by lighterage, using DUKW's (amphibious trucks, 2½-ton cargo) and LCM's (landing craft, mechanized). The loading of cargo from ship to DUKW's and LCM's was hampered by the lack of well-trained winch operators. In order to train the necessary winch operators, the Commanding General, COMZ, made arrangements whereby the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation conducted a 4-week training course for winch operators on the port's land ship.¹⁰¹ In later operations there was difficulty in keeping the loaded DUKW's from swamping in rough weather. After the unloading of the first ship it was ascertained that the operation could be more efficiently conducted by the use of fewer personnel. The number of working persons was accordingly reduced to 700, and later to 500. New units participated in each exercise. The operation was conducted in two 10-hour shifts per day. By the end of the year, medical supplies, sugar, flour, and many other types of items were being unloaded successfully, demonstrating that in an emergency all types of supplies for the support of USAREUR could be unloaded over the beaches, except in rough weather, when heavier unloading equipment would be required. From the DUKW's and LCM's the supplies were unloaded on the selected beach areas or at improvised docks and delivered to hardstands prepared from steel planking. There the supplies were picked up on trucks and delivered to the nearest rail point to be shipped to various depots in France or Germany, or were taken directly to the depots by truck transportation.¹⁰²

106. Training Relationship with Other Nations

In support of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, EUCOM/USAREUR conducted a training program, intended to familiarize selected Allied personnel with U.S. Army techniques and equipment, involving attendance at regular courses in EUCOM/USAREUR schools. By the close of fiscal

¹⁰¹(1) Memo, Dir EUCOM Log Div to EUCOM COFS, 7 Jun 52, sub: Supply Over the Beaches, Pointe-de-Grave. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item 25. (2) Briefing for Gen Eddy, 27 Aug 52, sub: Status and Problems of COMZ. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337 (1952), Vol. II, Item 19a, B/P.

¹⁰²(1) Memo for recd, 15 Sep 52, sub: Telecon-Lt Col Steinmetz, COMZ G-4, and Maj J. H. Cochran, USAREUR Log Div Svc Br, 15 Sep 52, sub: Supply Over the Beaches. RESTRICTED. (2) Cable COMZ-6489, CG COMZ to CINC USAREUR, 20 Dec 52. RESTRICTED. Both in USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1952), Vol. II, Item 42.

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year 1952, approximately four thousand Allied officers and enlisted men had completed courses of instructions in various schools of the command.¹⁰³ In addition to the established schools, French aerial supply personnel were scheduled to attend a series of courses at Nellingen pertaining to supply techniques. The 3-week courses, beginning in December 1952 and extending through February 1953, were to be conducted by the 557 Quartermaster Aerial Supply Company.¹⁰⁴ A USAREUR team competed in the Prix General LeClerc Small Arms competition in July. The team, selected from a battalion of the 4th Infantry Division, finished in fourth place. A team representing the Netherlands was first in the final standings. Other competitors were Luxembourg, Great Britain, France, Belgium, Norway, and Denmark. USAREUR was to be the host at the 1953 competition, for which the Wildflecken Training Area was selected.¹⁰⁵

107. EUCOM/USAREUR Schools

With the mission of supplementing the number of school trained specialists provided by the continental United States and to provide special centralized training to meet the requirements peculiar to the command, the following ten schools were operated by EUCOM/USAREUR during 1952: Bandsmen at Dachau, Engineer at Murnau, Finance at Friedberg, Intelligence and Military Police at Oberammergau, Medical Training at Degerndorf, Ordnance at Eschwege, Quartermaster and Adjutant General courses at Lenggries, Signal at Ansbach, Troop Information and Education at Dachau, and Transportation at Mannheim. The schools offered approximately one hundred different courses. The individual capacities of the schools, and the number of graduates during 1952 were as follows:¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³Interv, Maj M. H. Hooper, EUCOM Hist Div, with Lt Col M. G. Miller, USAREUR OPOT Div, 12 Jan 53. RESTRICTED.

¹⁰⁴Ltr, USAREUR to CCEFA, 14 Nov 52, sub: Training of French Aerial Supply Personnel. SECRET. In USAREUR OPOT Div Tng Br files (1952).

¹⁰⁵(1) Ltr, Seventh Army to USAREUR, 5 Aug 52, sub: Report on the Prix General LeClerc Small Arms Competition, 1952. UNCLASSIFIED.

(2) Ltr, USAREUR to CG Seventh Army, 31 Dec 52, sub: Competition Marshall LeClerc Trophy for 1953. RESTRICTED. Both in USAREUR OPOT Div Tng Br files (1952).

¹⁰⁶Interv, Maj M. H. Hooper, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col M. G. Miller, USAREUR G-3 Div Tng Br Sch Sec, 12 Jan 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

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<u>School</u>	<u>Capacity</u>	<u>Number of Graduates</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>4,083</u>	<u>31,272</u>
Band	100	349
Engineer	633	5,041
Finance	75	794
Intelligence & Military Police	445	3,578
Medical Training	485	3,713
Ordnance	705	6,079
Quartermaster & Adjutant General	515	5,029
Signal	960	3,354
Transportation	65	512
Troop Information & Education	100	2,823

In addition to these schools, the following schools were operated by Seventh Army: The NCO Academy at Munich; the Tank Training Center at Vilseck; the Chemical, Biological, and Radiological School at Kirchheimbolanden; and the Electronic Maintenance School at Karlsruhe. A Seventh Army food service school was closed during the year when a sufficient number of cooks arrived from the continental United States. School attendance by Seventh Army personnel more than doubled in 1952, when 39,270 students were enrolled in USAREUR/Seventh Army schools as compared to 17,525 in 1951.¹⁰⁷ At a subordinate level, many schools were operated by divisions, regiments, and similar units within USAREUR. For example, the 43d Infantry Division carried out an expanded school program during 1952 and set up schools to train unit armorers, field artillery mechanics, mess management personnel, apprentice cooks, engineer construction specialists, company clerks and schools for instruction in the techniques of basic and advanced leadership. To provide centralized control, greater economy of personnel, and uniform standards of performance, the division established the 43d Infantry Division Academy at Bad Tols in November. Here, all division schools, excepting signal, were placed under the jurisdiction of the academy commandant.¹⁰⁸

108. Other Training Activities

a. Secondary Mission Training Program. The scope of the secondary mission training program was reduced approximately 80 percent in August 1952 when USAREUR directed that such training be limited to units which

¹⁰⁷Draft, Seventh Army Comd Rept, 1952. SECRET.

¹⁰⁸43d Inf Div Comd Rept, 1952, p. 101. SECRET.

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would change their character upon implementation of a USAREUR alert order. A secondary mission was defined as a task to be performed upon implementation of a USAREUR alert, by a unit not equipped, trained, or organized in the secondary role but having equipment and suitable training to function on a temporary basis. Prior to the troop augmentation program in 1951, secondary mission training had been vital to the command's tactical plans, as post and service troops were, in an emergency, to be used as combat and combat support troops.¹⁰⁹ Under the new policy, only units whose characteristics would be changed upon their assignment to the Seventh Army were to be trained by that command. Training of other secondary mission units was the responsibility of the technical service or military post to which they were currently assigned. Eight hours of military training per week were required, with a minimum of twenty hours monthly devoted to training for secondary mission assignments. There were fourteen secondary mission units in USAREUR when the directive was implemented. Eight were units to be assigned to the Seventh Army in the event of an emergency.¹¹⁰ The secondary mission training program also applied to units which would be inactivated at the time of an emergency and whose personnel would be assigned to replacement streams.

b. Labor Service Training. The Seventh Army, EUCOM COMZ, military posts (later area commands), and EUCOM/USAREUR technical services were responsible for the training of labor service units assigned to their commands. After completion of a two weeks' basic training program, labor service units entered a 24-week training cycle, given twice a year. Each week seven hours were devoted to English instruction, troop information and education, character guidance, use and care of equipment, first aid and sanitation, troop movement and bivouacs, and other subjects. Both technical and guard units received weapons training with the M1A1 carbine, including range firing twice a year.¹¹¹ While there were no major changes in training during 1952, plans were made to assign secondary missions as chemical smoke generator companies to four guard companies in the Heidelberg-Frankfurt area.¹¹² This change was not made in

¹⁰⁹(1) IRS, Dir USAREUR OPOT Div to USAREUR COFS, 6 Aug 52, sub: Secondary Mission Training. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Ltr, USAREUR to Maj Comds, 23 Aug 52, sub: Training for Secondary Missions. RESTRICTED. Both in USAREUR SGS 353 (1952), Vol. II, Items 31 and 31B.

¹¹⁰Memo, Lt Col J. C. Dalrymple, USAREUR Asst DCOFS Opns to Brig Gen J. F. Uncles, USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 13 Aug 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1952), Vol. II.

¹¹¹EUCOM ltr, 27 May 52, sub: Training of Labor Service Units. AG 353.01 LSD-AGO. RESTRICTED.

¹¹²EUCOM ltr, 29 Apr 52, sub: Transfer of Secondary Missions as Chemical Smoke Generator Companies to Labor Service Guard Companies. CONFIDENTIAL.

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1952, but the four units received training in the proposed secondary assignment.¹¹³ In another change in policy, COMZ guard units were issued light machine guns in the fall of 1952 and received a 30-hour course of instruction in the care and use of the weapons. The purpose of the training was to bolster the strength of the units in case of riots or similar disturbances.¹¹⁴

c. Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Warfare Training.

Department of Army policies relative to providing specially trained chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) defense personnel at all levels of the military structure were implemented in the spring of 1952.¹¹⁵ The functions of a newly established organization for defense against chemical attack were expanded to include biological and radiological defense. In addition to staff chemical officers on major command levels, the new organization included one officer and two NCO's down to the company or similar unit level to be designated for this purpose. The objectives of the 1952 CBR training program (which was increased from an 8- to a 10-hour course) were to provide the individual soldier with sufficient knowledge of the characteristics and potentialities of CBR agents; to minimize his fear of these weapons; to instill confidence in his equipment and his ability to protect himself under conditions presenting CBR hazards; and to enhance the operational effectiveness of all units under conditions involving any one or all of these hazards. The specialist training for instructors conducted in USAREUR was a modification of the Department of Army training directive in that it included a 35-hour instead of a 96-hour course.¹¹⁶ CBR specialist training was conducted on a decentralized basis at army, corps, division, and military post levels, and although a Seventh Army CBR school provided 84 hours of instruction for an estimated 1,800 students, this was a small portion of the total CBR training requirement. In November a sampling of the status of CBR training showed that in the 2d Armored Division 91 percent of unit CBR officers and 83 percent of NCO's were untrained, and in the 34th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade only 20 percent of unit CBR personnel were school trained. Based on an inspection in November 1952 and information then available, a team from the Army Field Forces came to the conclusion that many individuals in the command

¹¹³Interv, Maj M. H. Hooper, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col F. W. Hawksworth, C/USAREUR LSD Tng & Orgn Br, 20 Apr 53. CONFIDENTIAL.

¹¹⁴Interv, Maj M. H. Hooper, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col F. W. Hawksworth, C/USAREUR LSD Tng & Org Br, 20 Apr 53. SECRET.

¹¹⁵EUCOM ltr, 30 Apr 52, sub: Chemical Biological and Radiological Organization. 353 CML-AGO. RESTRICTED.

¹¹⁶EUCOM Tng Cir 3, 25 Jun 52. RESTRICTED.

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were not adequately instructed in defense against CBR attack and the operational readiness of units, with respect to CBR defense was rated as not more than satisfactory. It was recommended that action be taken by USAREUR to place greater emphasis on concurrent CBR training and the inclusion of CBR situations in field exercises and maneuvers.¹¹⁷

d. Organized Reserve Corps Training. There were no major changes in Organized Reserve Corps training policies during 1952. As of 31 December, of the 1,285 active reservists within the USAREUR command, 206 had been ordered to active duty training for a 15-day period, and the average reservist had attended seven ORC meetings during the 12-month period.¹¹⁸

e. Cold Weather Indoctrination. In December 1951, USAREUR units were directed to institute a cold injury indoctrination training program. In accordance with the program, divisional units formed two officer teams to check efficiency of the program, provide information, and advise commanders on aspects of the program. In addition, NCO control was exercised at company level, where discussions and demonstrations were conducted in cold injury measures. The program was re-emphasized in the fall of 1952 when it was noted that during the previous winter cold weather injuries had resulted in 260 admissions to hospitals and quarters. In addition to the basic instructions, USAREUR distributed an instruction guide and a suggested lesson plan for a 2-hour conference and demonstration-type troop orientation which pointed out the importance of heat, shelter, food, water, and the maintenance and use of cold-wet and cold-dry clothing.¹¹⁹ In furthering the program, a USAREUR quartermaster team of qualified instructors was made available to assist commanders in the orientation of unit instructors.

f. Laying, Marking, and Clearing of Mine Fields. Department of the Army policy with regard to the laying, marking, and clearing of mine fields, formerly a responsibility vested in the Corps of Engineers, was changed during the year and became the responsibility of all arms and services.¹²⁰ The new doctrine was to be implemented in USAREUR in a

¹¹⁷Rept of AFF Inspection, Nov 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 333 (1953).

¹¹⁸Interv, Maj M. H. Hooper, EUCOM Hist Div, with Maj John Foley, EUCOM OPOT Div Tng Br ORC Sec, 14 Jan 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹¹⁹USAREUR ltrs, 9 and 21 Oct 52, sub: Cold Weather Indoctrination. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹²⁰Ltr, AFF to Maj Comds Overseas, 19 Aug 52, sub: Procedures of the Panel on Tactical Aspects of Mine Warfare and Evaluation of the Research and Development Program. SECRET. In USAREUR OPOT Div Tng Br files (1952).

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3-phase indoctrination program. The first phase, briefings for senior commanders and staff officers, was conducted during the first week of December. Indoctrination of instructors was to begin 5 January 1953 at the USAREUR engineer school and to run through 1 March 1953. This instruction, comprising a four-and-a-half day course, was to deal with doctrine, techniques, new material development, and the integration of mine warfare with tactical plans. The third phase was to be conducted for all officers and men and was to be initiated when instructions were received from the Department of the Army. A similar course of instruction was scheduled for units subordinate to the Seventh Army.¹²¹

g. Defense Against Flame Warfare and Fire Bombing. Defense against flame warfare and fire bombing was added to the USAREUR training schedules in November. A minimum of one hour of instruction on the subject was to be completed prior to 1 February 1953.¹²²

¹²¹Interv, Maj M. H. Hooper, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col W. D. Gnau, USAREUR G-3 Div Tng Br, 27 Apr 53. RESTRICTED.

¹²²Ltr, USAREUR to Seventh Army, 14 Nov 52, sub: Training in Defense against Flame Warfare. AG 353 CML-AGO. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 353 (1952), Vol. II, Item 52b.

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CHAPTER 7

Logistical Support of the Command

Section I: Planning

109. Logistical Planning for 1952

EUCOM/USAREUR logistical planning for 1952 was influenced by national and international considerations. At the beginning of the year it was expected that the presidential and Congressional elections in November would result in increased emphasis upon economy measures by all government agencies and that this emphasis would be reflected in Congressional appropriations, an expectation which proved correct when a program of economies was begun even before the new administration took office. Korea continued to have first priority on materials. The program for off-shore procurement initiated at the end of 1951 was accelerated. NATO nations continued their build-up of forces and facilities; the resulting increased demands on European materials, labor, and finances led to material and labor shortages and rising prices. It was anticipated that the scope and utilization of Deutsche Mark funds would be altered by the establishment of contractual relations with the Federal Republic of Germany, with consequent increased pressure on EUCOM/USAREUR to release properties and to make facilities available for the manpower contribution of the European Defense Forces.¹ As the occupational role of the U.S. forces gradually declined in importance, the command's operations were expected to become more closely integrated with those of SHAPE and NATO.

a. Major Logistical Problems. Many of the principal problems confronting EUCOM/USAREUR's logistical agencies at the beginning of 1952

¹Log Plng Forecast, 1 Jan 52, EUCOM Log Div, p. 1. SECRET.

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arose from continuing responsibilities associated with previous programs for strengthening Western defenses as described in the EUCOM Command Report for 1951. As plans for the attainment of this objective were developed or intensified, new problems arose, the chief of which resulted from the appointment of CINCEUR as executive agent of the Defense Department for the co-ordination of all off-shore procurement activities of the forces in Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. Other important projects were planning for the implementation of the logistical aspects of the contractual agreements; the evaluation of COMZ requirements to insure adequate facilities, while at the same time preventing overconstruction; the interim storage of stocks and the rebuilding of EUCOM/USAREUR's World War II vehicles destined for MDAP countries, to be replaced with interim type vehicles from the United States; and the allocation of common-user supplies between EUCOM/USAREUR and USAFE, as well as the establishment of separate requisitioning and stock accounting. Plans called for the reorganizing and re-equipping of all labor service units. Among the continuing problems, emphasis was placed on the repair, rebuild, and reclamation of unserviceable stocks; the procurement of critical construction materials, especially steel, which presented special difficulties, and the designing of facilities in such a manner as to avoid the use of critical materials wherever possible. The provision of adequate hospital facilities both in Germany and France for use in the event of hostilities required continued attention. Despite the current building programs, the supply of quarters for dependents never equaled the demand. Problems still requiring solution included the building of new laundry facilities to meet the needs of the augmented troop strength; the provision of sufficient railroad rolling stock, including hospital trains; and the completion of supply depots west of the Rhine.²

b. Responsibilities of Major Subordinate Commands. The principal logistical responsibilities assigned to COMZ for 1952 were the acquisition of additional sites and real estate for the building of new facilities; the preparation of plans for an integrated construction program; the consummation of interservice support between the command and USAFE; the continued development and stockage of storage facilities, including a POL pipeline; the provision of housekeeping and maintenance facilities; and assistance to technical services in establishing depot maintenance facilities in France. Military posts and their successors, the area commands and military districts, were responsible for the construction and rehabilitation of housing, support facilities, and training areas; the completion of an adequate military highway net; and a positive program for the economical utilization of utilities, supplies, and equipment. The Seventh Army had the responsibility of establishing a supply support system capable of functioning by means of direct support from EUCOM/USAREUR depots

²EUCOM CINC's Wkly Stf Conf 1, 8 Jan 52, pp. 6 - 7. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

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without recourse to the military post supply system, and of continuing to assume field maintenance for all of its assigned and attached units.³ It was estimated that by January 1953 the Seventh Army's programs for becoming logistically self-supporting with respect to chemical, engineer, ordnance, and signal support would be complete.⁴ The Air Force had instituted in 1951 a program of airfield construction in the French Zone, and in the beginning of 1952 was planning to activate five wing bases at Landstuhl, Bitburg, Spangdahlem, Hahn, and Sembach. Two squadronal rotation fields, at Zweibruecken and Pferdsfeld, were to be used by Air Force units stationed in France and England, and Furstenfeldbrueck and Neubiberg were to become rotational fields after units were moved to the Rhine Military Post. In France the Air Force strength to be supported by the end of FY 1952 was estimated at 24,000, including three wing bases, and by the end of FY 1953 at 58,000, with twelve wing bases. The Navy unit of the command was engaged in expanding the Rhine River Patrol and an advanced base at Bremerhaven; plans called for augmenting the strength of naval units with a number of specialized craft.⁵ As in the case of the command itself, logistical planning on the part of its component units was influenced by the expectation that the contractual agreements signed on 26 May 1952 would become effective at an early date.

110. Logistical Aspects of the Contractual Agreements

The important articles concerned with logistics in the contractual agreements with the German Federal Republic were those on construction, supply, procurement, transportation, communications, services, and the support and use of certain accredited agencies.⁶ With respect to construction, EUCOM was committed to the agreed U.S. position which had been developed at the Washington conferences in 1951 and which provided that projects costing over DM 200,000 should be constructed by the German building authorities, with certain exceptions in cases involving substantial advantages of economy or rapid completion.⁷ During early 1952 many discussions were held between the EUCOM Liaison Group and HICOG representatives concerning the actual wording of the provisions to be incorporated into the contractual agreements with regard to the rights and privileges to be retained by EUCOM and its personnel after the occupation status came to an end. The logistical provisions of the conventions signed on 26 May 1952 were briefly as follows: the Forces were to be allowed to establish

³Ibid., pp. 8 - 9.

⁴Log Plng Forecast, 1 Jan 52, EUCOM Log Div, p. 2. SECRET.

⁵Ibid., pp. 10 - 16. SECRET.

⁶EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 382 - 91. SECRET.

⁷Summaries of the Conventions on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany and Related Conventions, 30 June 1952, EUCOM Ln Gp to HICOG, p. 10. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

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and operate their own communications systems of post offices, radio, and telecommunications, with the exception that the last would normally be used only within their own installations with certain exceptions; the Forces would have full control of their own installations provided they observed health and safety regulations comparable to, or higher than, those required by the Germans; the Forces were to be exempt from the excise tax when the materials were purchased directly from the manufacturer and they were to be exempt from the last turnover tax; all goods and property brought into the Federal territory by the Forces or their members were to be exempt from customs duties; the Forces would receive adequate accommodations from public and private properties in the Federal Republic after submitting a periodic program stating their minimum needs, but would release to the German authorities such accommodations as were no longer required; and requirements for goods, materials, and services for the Forces in the Federal territory would be satisfied by the Federal Republic upon receipt of a periodic requisition program for the quantities required.⁸ A Joint Supply Board was to be created, composed of representatives of such of the Three Powers as were subject to this provision and of representatives of the Federal Republic. The board was to be responsible for establishing by agreement periodical programs for the procurement of the requirements of the Forces, and the EDC if represented, and for the resolving of any disagreements which might arise in connection with these programs. Divergent views of HICOG and EUCOM regarding the membership and duties of the Joint Supply Board were compromised by provision for joint membership of both USAREUR and the embassy on the board, with the embassy representative as the U.S. spokesman.⁹ (The HICOG-EUCOM discussions are treated in paragraph 190.) The convention provided that the Forces would prepare a program for new construction to be implemented and paid for by the German defense contribution and carried out by the German building authorities. The Forces would participate in the planning and letting of contracts and could inspect building projects during actual construction but could exercise supervision of a project only through the German building authorities. The German authorities would be responsible for the repair and maintenance of the buildings, if so requested by the Forces, in accordance with mutual agreements. The Forces were to be authorized the use of the German air, road, and rail transportation facilities for transporting persons, animals, and materials into, through, and from the Federal territory. The Forces would also make known their requirements for civilian

⁸Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany and Related Conventions, 26 May 1952, "Convention on the Rights and Obligations of the Foreign Forces and their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany," Arts. 17 - 40. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁹(1) Memo, Dir EUCOM Log Div to EUCOM GCS, 28 Jul 52, sub: Composition of the JSB. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable S-2697, CINCUSAREUR to HICOG, 22 Aug 52. RESTRICTED. Both in USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1952), Vol. II, Item 67 atchd.

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personnel to the competent German authorities who would procure the personnel for them. German workers were to be classified and paid according to German law. The Forces would have the right to maintain civilian service organizations consisting of non-German nationals. The existing German civilian service organizations would have to be disbanded within two years after the entry into force of the contractual agreements and, in the interim, their members could not be required to serve outside the Federal territory. All goods, materials, services, or accommodations requisitioned by the Forces or procured from the Deutsche Mark budget before the date of entry into force of the contractual agreements and still required would be considered as requisitioned with binding legal effect for a period of one year from that date. If the goods, materials, services, or accommodations were required beyond the 1-year period, the Federal Republic was to guarantee their availability in accordance with the procedure of applicable Federal legislation.¹⁰

111. Deutsche Mark Support

Mr. John J. McCloy, the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, informed General Handy on 21 February 1952 that since it was almost certain that the contractual agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany would not be completed by 31 March 1952 (i.e., the end of GFY 1952), the Occupation Statute would continue in force and the Allied High Commission would expect the Federal Republic to continue its support of the Allied Forces in Germany under the provisions of that statute. He reminded General Handy, however, that the budget requirements transmitted to the Federal Government for GFY 1953 would be superseded at a later date by the transition from an occupation to a defense status.¹¹ (See par. 209.)

a. The Deutsche Mark Occupation Costs Budget for GFY 1953. The Deutsche Mark budget for the occupation forces for GFY 1952 totaled approximately DM 6.6 billion, of which approximately 45 percent was earmarked for the use of the U.S. forces and HICOG.¹² At the beginning of the calendar year 1952 the Allies submitted individual GFY 1953 estimates based on the assumption that the contractual agreements would be in effect by 1 April 1952. The EUCOM budget was designed to support 280,000 military man-years as compared to the 185,000 supported by the GFY 1952 budget, and included requirements of approximately DM 3.3 billion out of a total

¹⁰Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany and Related Conventions, 26 May 1952, "Convention on the Rights and Obligations of the Foreign Forces and their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany," Arts. 40 - 48. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹¹(1) Ltr, Gen T. T. Handy, CINCEUR, to Mr. J. J. McCloy, HICOG, 24 Jan 52, sub: DM Occupation Budget for GFY 53. RESTRICTED. (2) Ltr, Mr. J. J. McCloy to Gen Handy, 21 Feb 52, sub: DM Occupation Budget for GFY 53. RESTRICTED. Both in USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. I, Item 6A.

¹²EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 391 - 93. SECRET.

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for the three powers of approximately DM 7.5 billion. The EUCOM estimates included requirements of the Twelfth Air Force of DM 415.2 million, COMNAVGER of DM 328 million, and MSTs of DM 4.6 million. The GFY 1953 budget estimates were submitted at a meeting of the Allied High Commission on 12 February 1952, but no action was then taken on account of the delay in completing the contractual agreements.¹³ In May the Allied High Commission reached an agreement on financial controls to be exercised during the occupation costs and first defense periods and, in the light of its agreement, decided not to communicate an occupation costs budget to the Federal Republic for GFY 1953. The Allied High Commission reached an agreement with the Federal Minister of Finance to operate on a monthly expenditure allocation basis of approximately one-twelfth of the forces budgets during the interim period prior to the effective date of the contractual agreements. This agreement limited the average monthly expenditure ceiling to DM 600 million for all the Allied Forces, including the support of the activities of the High Commission. The U.S. share of this monthly allocation was set at DM 272 million.¹⁴ Previously, on 14 March 1952, however, Mr. McCloy had reached an agreement with General Binns, the EUCOM comptroller, to limit the U.S. expenditures for the period 1 April to 31 July 1952, to DM 1.02 billion, or an average expenditure allocation of DM 255 million per month, to be divided as follows: DM 250 million to the U.S. forces, and DM 5 million to HICOG. This limitation on expenditures was allowed to stand even after the Allied High Commission had prorated DM 272 million per month to the United States.¹⁵ Before the end of this four month period EUCOM requested HICOG to authorize the allocation of the difference between the amount allocated for U.S. use by the Allied High Commission and the amount agreed upon by EUCOM and HICOG. The difference between the DM 272 million per month allotted by the Allied High Commission and the DM 255 million per month agreed upon by EUCOM and HICOG amounted to DM 68 million for the four month period. Of this amount DM 32 million was earmarked by the Allied High Commission for British claims. HICOG authorized the allocation of the remaining DM 36 million for EUCOM expenses during the four month period, thus raising the total expenditure allocation for EUCOM to DM 259 million per month for the period 1 April to 31 July 1952.¹⁶

¹³(1) Cable S-3357, CINCEUR to USLO SHAPE, 18 Mar 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item 18. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to COFSA for COA, 7 Oct 52, sub: DM Financial Situation. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. III, Item 84A atchd.

¹⁴Ltr, Mr. J. J. McCloy, U.S. HICOG, to Gen T. T. Handy, CINCEUR, 9 May 52, sub: DM Budget for GFY 53. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. II, Item 39A atchd.

¹⁵(1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, same to same, 14 Mar 52, same sub. CONFIDENTIAL. In same file.

¹⁶Memo for recd, Brig Gen J. J. Binns, EUCOM Compt, 1 Jul 52, sub: General Handy — Mr. McCloy Conference, 30 June 1952. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. II, Item 60.

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Shortly before 1 August 1952 the Allied High Commission established the average monthly ceiling for the United States at DM 276 million for the period 1 August to 31 October 1952, DM 271 million per month being allocated to USAREUR.¹⁷ Since the contractual agreements were not ratified before the end of 1952, the average monthly expenditure ceiling for USAREUR was continued at DM 271 million until 31 December 1952.¹⁸

b. Preliminary Obligation of Funds. In January 1952 the EUCOM commander in chief notified the military posts and other agencies of the command of the possibility that GFY 1952 funds might lapse for expenditure on 31 March 1952 if not obligated. All Deutsche Mark unliquidated obligations as of that date would then have to be paid from GFY 1953 funds or from dollar funds, and it was therefore necessary to take immediate steps to effect payment of GFY 1952 obligations prior to 31 March, keeping unobligated and unexpended funds to a minimum.¹⁹ It was desirable that all Deutsche Mark payment documents be issued as soon as possible, and in any case prior to 31 March 1952, to cover pertinent Deutsche Mark-procured services, supplies, or construction received or partially completed on or before 31 March 1952.²⁰ Before the close of GFY 1952 EUCOM was given an opportunity to liquidate most of its GFY 1952 obligations when the Federal Minister of Finance instructed all occupation costs offices to delay closing their March 1952 accounts until 25 April 1952. This was a distinct advantage to the command in that it allowed EUCOM fiscal officers to keep their accounts open until final costs schedules were received from the costs offices subsequent to 25 April, thereby assuring the greatest possible liquidation to be recorded in GFY 1952 accounts as of 31 March 1952.²¹ The percentage carry-over from GFY 1952, amounting to approximately 20 percent of the total GFY 1952 obligations, was much smaller than the normal carry-over of previous fiscal years.²²

c. Allocation of Deutsche Mark Funds Through June 1953. The Finance Convention of the contractual agreements extended GFY 1953 from 31 March

¹⁷Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to COFSA for COA, 7 Oct 52, sub: DM Financial Situation. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. III, Item 84A atchd.

¹⁸(1) Cable 391, HICOG Bonn to State Dept, 6 Nov 52. SECRET.
(2) Cable SX-5114, CINCUSAREUR to COFSA for COA, 12 Nov 52. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. III, Item 85 atchd.

¹⁹Cable SX-1858, CINCEUR to All Comds, 29 Jan 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. I, Item 7.

²⁰Cable S-2086, CINCEUR to BMP, 5 Feb 52. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. I, Item 8.

²¹Cable S-4330, CINCEUR to COFSA for Gen Binns, 16 Apr 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. II, Item 31 atchd.

²²Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to COFSA for COA, 7 Oct 52, sub: DM Financial Situation. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. III, Item 84A atchd.

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to 30 June 1953 in order to conform with the NATO fiscal year, the period between that date and 30 June 1953 having been designated as the "First Defense Year."²³ Since in September the contractual agreements had not yet been ratified, Mr. Walter J. Donnelly, the U.S. High Commissioner, informed the Forces that for budgetary purposes it should be assumed that 1 January 1953 would be the effective date of the contractual agreements.²⁴ Due to the provision of the Finance Convention of the contractual agreements noted above, GFY 1953 became a five-quarter year and by November 1952 the EUCOM/USAREUR budget for the period 1 April 1952 to 30 June 1953 was figured at DM 3.999 billion. This figure was arrived at as follows: (1) for the 4-month period 1 April to 30 June 1952, a monthly expenditure allocation of DM 259 million, making a total of DM 1.036 billion; (2) for the 5-month period 1 August to 31 December 1952, a monthly expenditure allocation of DM 271 million, making a total of DM 1.335 billion; and (3) for the 6-month "First Defense" period 1 January to 30 June 1953, a monthly expenditure allocation of DM 268 million making a total of DM 1.608 billion.²⁵ Of this amount, the ceiling for the technical services under the general staff supervision of the USAREUR Logistics Division, and the construction ceiling, which was also a Logistics Division responsibility, were established as follows: technical services (Occupation Costs), DM 1.305 billion; and construction (Mandatory Costs), DM .761 billion, a total of DM 2.066 billion. The Logistics Division was accordingly responsible for approximately 51.6 percent of the command's budget.²⁶

d. Procedures to Facilitate Expenditures. When it was discovered early in 1952 that there was a definite possibility that GFY 1952 unexpended funds might lapse on 31 March 1952, and that all Deutsche Mark unliquidated obligations would then have to be paid from GFY 1953 funds or possibly from dollar funds, procedures were worked out to facilitate expenditures.²⁷ In spite of the February instructions on accelerating expenditures, it became evident by June that EUCOM Deutsche Mark expenditures were lagging to such an extent that total expenditures would be far short of allocations. Accordingly, on 27 June CINCEUR repeated his instructions

²³Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany and Related Conventions, 26 May 52, "Finance Convention," Arts. 3 - 4. UNCLASSIFIED.

²⁴Cable (SMC In 5586), HICOG Bonn to CINCUSAFE, 19 Sep 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 092 Germany (1952), Vol. III, Item 95.

²⁵(1) Cable SX-5114, CINCUSAREUR to COFSA for COA, 12 Nov 52. SECRET. (2) Cable EABFB-D 10937, CINCUSAFE to COFSAF, 6 Dec 52. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. III, Item 85 atchd.

²⁶Memo, Lt Col O. W. Stewart, USAREUR Log Div Fiscal Rqmts Off, to Col L. F. Wells, Dep Dir USAREUR Log Div, 24 Oct 52, sub: DM Program for GFY 53. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. III, Item 89.

²⁷Cable 2087, CINCEUR to All Comds, 6 Feb 52. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. I, Item 7 atchd.

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of February and directed that they be put into immediate effect by all fiscal officers. The subordinate commands were warned that, in the interests of good management and efficient fiscal accounting operations, it was desirable that they be certain that no payment orders be issued covering supplies and/or services which had not been, or would not be, received or performed prior to the termination of the specific period (month) to which the expenditure limitation applied. They were also reminded that expenditures would be considered as having been effected when expenditure documents were delivered to cost offices for payment after fund certification.²⁸ When it became apparent toward the end of July that Deutsche Mark expenditures for the period 1 April to 31 July 1952 would fall far short of the allocation established for that period, authority was obtained to carry over the unexpended amounts into succeeding months up to the effective date of the contractual agreements and the entry into defense status. CINCEUR directed that the procedures established by his February instructions for the acceleration of Deutsche Mark expenditures be adhered to until further notice.²⁹

Section II: Supply and Maintenance

112. EUCOM/USAREUR Supply Distribution Plan

A major factor in planning for EUCOM supply operations in 1952 was the scheduled movement of technical service stock control operations to France, beginning approximately 1 October 1953 and scheduled for completion by 1 February 1954, and the transfer of depots and warehouses from the U.S. Zone to locations west of the Rhine River.³⁰ The distribution of

²⁸Cable SX-6582, CINCEUR to All Comds, 27 Jun 52. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. I, Item 7 atchd.

²⁹Cable SX-1784, CINCEUR to 7755 DSD, SAD and BPE, 25 Jul 52. RESTRICTED. In file cited above.

³⁰Log Plng Forecast, 1 Jan 52, EUCOM Log Div, p. 2. SECRET. (2) EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 268 - 73. SECRET. (3) IRS, USAREUR G4 to USAREUR Hist Div, 24 Sep 53, sub: Review of EUCOM/USAREUR Command Report, 1952. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR Hist Div Master File 314.7 HIS (1953), Item 5.

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supplies in EUCOM was governed during 1952 by a revision of the EUCOM Supply Distribution Plan which was published on 4 January 1952. This plan provided for: (1) 45 days of special reserve stocks (strategic), less prestocked supplies for the Seventh Army, plus serviceable excesses over a 1-year level, to be stored in LOFC depots in BASEC, EUCOM COMZ; (2) 15 days of special reserve stocks, 60 days of EUCOM stockage objective supplies for U.S. forces in France, and 30 days of EUCOM stockage objective supplies for U.S. forces in Germany, to be stored in LOFC depots in ADSEC, EUCOM COMZ; (3) 30 days of EUCOM stockage objective supplies for U.S. forces to be stored in depots in Germany (all depots located in Rhine Military Post, later the Western Area Command, and elsewhere in Germany with the exception of Giessen and Munich quartermaster depots and Mannheim and Butzbach ordnance depots); and (4) continuation of stockage of peacetime items at depots in Germany.³¹ Previous supply plans had not provided for EUCOM operation of depots in either ADSEC or BASEC, since depots were considered as being static once they were filled. In November 1951 the EUCOM chief of staff had approved plans to make ordnance depots in ADSEC operational for the support of COMZ troops and Air Force units located in COMZ, and to retain the major portion of the general strategic or special reserves in BASEC, rather than dividing them equally between BASEC and ADSEC. The revised EUCOM Supply Distribution Plan of 4 January 1952 extended the policies approved for the Ordnance Division to the other technical services, making the technical service depots located in ADSEC operational insofar as supply of U.S. forces in COMZ was concerned. Peacetime or operating stocks of Class II, III, and V supplies, as well as bulky shipments, such as vehicle replacements, were, as before, to be received through Bremerhaven for shipment to depots in Germany and France. However, special reserve supplies, project items and Class II and IV combat supplies were to be received through French LOFC ports and moved to EUCOM troop units under the same procedures in wartime. Although the plan was approved by the chief of staff, he warned against the possibility of overbuilding in ADSEC for the support of Air Force units, since most EUCOM support of the Air Force in France was to be phased out by 1954 and EUCOM would then be confronted with surplus facilities.³²

³¹C/N 1, Dir EUCOM Log Div, to Chiefs, EUCOM Tech Svcs, 4 Jan 52, sub: EUCOM Supply Distribution Plan. SECRET. In USAREUR G-4 Cen Files.

³²(1) Ibid. (2) Memo for recd, Col L. F. Wells, Chief, EUCOM Log Div Sup Br, 4 Jan 52, sub: EUCOM Supply Distribution Plan. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item 1.

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113. Movement of Certain Support and Maintenance Facilities West of the Rhine

In accordance with the EUCOM Supply Distribution Plan for 1952, the Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal, Engineer, and Medical Divisions of EUCOM headquarters scheduled movement of their depots in the U.S. Zone of Germany to the Rhine Military Post (later, the Western Area Command) in the French Zone of Germany. The facilities for this transfer of operations were scheduled for completion by 1 August 1952, subject to such factors as the availability of labor, shortages of critical materials, and weather conditions. The depots to be located in the Rhine Military Post during 1952 were as follows: (1) Ordnance — Mainz Ordnance Depot, Rhine Ordnance Depot, Rhine Ammunition Depot, Pirmasens Ordnance Depot, and Gernersheim Ordnance Vehicle Storage Point; (2) Quartermaster — Nahbollenbach Depot; (3) Signal — Pirmasens Signal Depot; (4) Engineer — Rhine Engineer Depot; and (5) Medical — Rhine Medical Depot. The work completed and in progress on these facilities during GY 1952 amounted to DM 67,770,000. In addition to these depots in Germany, the Transportation Division had located a depot at Landes de Bussac in BASEC and the Chemical Division had established depots in both ADSEC and BASEC to serve COMZ as well as the U.S. areas of responsibility in Germany.³³ Primarily because of the lack of storage space along the LOFC, it became apparent in the late summer of 1952 that target objectives for the movement of stockage tonnages west of the Rhine might not be met by 31 December 1952. As construction progressed, however, the program for the relocation of stocks from depots in the U.S. Zone of Germany to locations west of the Rhine was greatly accelerated.³⁴ During October General Ridgway, then US CINCEUR, queried USAREUR as to the status of USAREUR plans to move the chiefs of the technical services to France in connection with the movement of stocks west of the Rhine and directed that this project be implemented at the earliest possible date. USAREUR replied that its plans called only for the movement of technical service stock control agencies to France and that USAREUR did not plan to move the technical services proper to France short of an emergency.³⁵ By the end of the year depot construction west of the Rhine for the Signal, Quartermaster, Engineer, Medical, and Ordnance Divisions was complete except for the dependent housing portion of the installations, in some cases.

³³EUCOM CINC Wkly Stf Conf 4, 12 Feb 52, pp. 4 - 5. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

³⁴Monthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Aug 52, USAREUR Log Div, p. 15. SECRET.

³⁵(1) Ltr, Dep US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 13 Oct 52, sub: Movement of Stock Control Elements and of the Chiefs of the Tech Svcs to France. GMT 337. SECRET. (2) 1st Ind, Hq USAREUR to US CINCEUR, 28 Oct 52, same sub. AG 370.5 GLD (13 Oct 52). SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 370.5 (1952), Vol. I, Item 31.

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114. COMZ Supply Facilities

The development of the COMZ supply facilities had begun in November 1950 when an agreement was signed with the French for the establishment of an LOFC through France. In July 1951 the LOFC organization had been designated the EUCOM Communications Zone (EUCOM COMZ), a designation changed on 1 August 1952 to that of USAREUR Communications Zone. The purpose of the COMZ was to provide an adequate base through which to supply all the materials necessary to maintain the organization of USAREUR, estimated at approximately 300,000 personnel in 1952, in the event of an emergency. The COMZ depots were planned to stock the following types of supplies: the Special Theater Reserve, all excess combat serviceable items over a 1-year level, operational supplies for the support of Army and Air Force troops in France, a 30-day level of the EUCOM stockage objective, and several special projects among which were MDAP storage and stocks for the noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) for removing EUCOM/USAREUR dependents.³⁶ The development of the COMZ supply facilities continued throughout 1951, but mainly in the preliminary construction stage. By the end of 1951, however, a number of the supply depots had become operational and had begun to receive supplies for stockage. Of the entire stockage objective of 700,000 tons, as of 1 January 1952 307,000 tons (44 percent) had been moved into the EUCOM COMZ.³⁷ The COMZ supply facilities at the beginning of 1952 were located throughout three commands, BASEC and ADSEC containing strategic storage and depot maintenance facilities, and the Orleans Area Command containing command and command support installations. These commands as well as the lateral boundaries of the area of primary interest to COMZ are shown on Map 2. In January 1952 the EUCOM director of logistics reported that the entire supply program in COMZ BASEC was stalled pending completion of the construction program, which in some cases had not yet been initiated. He made the following recommendations: (1) an over-all construction engineer with competent help and full EUCOM support should be placed in charge; (2) competent repair and utilities (R&U) engineers should be assigned to the major depots; (3) stockpiles of R&U materials should be immediately procured and located centrally in each area; (4) local labor should be procured through direct hire and the use of contract services; and (5) the chiefs of the EUCOM technical services should supervise their depots more closely.³⁸ The

³⁶ Establishment of Communications Through France, 1950 - 1951, pp. 53 - 67. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.


³⁷ Memo, Col L. F. Wells, Chief, EUCOM Log Div Sup Br, to Chief, EUCOM Log Div Exec Br Mgt Sec, 25 Feb 52, sub: Gen Handy's Proposed Letter to Gen Collins. SECRET. In USAREUR G-4 312.1 Handy (1952), Vol. I, Item 9.

³⁸ Memo, Dir EUCOM Log Div to EUCOM COFS, 14 Jan 52, sub: Report of Visit to BASEC. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 322 COMZ (1952), Vol. I, Item 2D.

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EUCOM COMMUNICATIONS ZONE Showing Reorganization as of 1 Jan 52

SOURCE: (1) EUCOM COMZ G-4 DIV INSTAL BR. (2) EUCOM LOG DIV MEMO FOR RCD, 22 SEP 51,
SUB: COPY OF LTRS. SECRET. IN SGS 371.2 (1951) VOL. IV, ITEM 268B.



Legend:

**LATERAL BOUNDARY
 AREA OF PRIMARY
 INTEREST LOFC**

**BOUNDARIES
 AD SEC & BASE SEC**

**BOUNDARY ORLEANS
 AREA COMMAND**

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situation in ADSEC early in the year was comparable to that in BASEC; the same difficulties were encountered, and in some cases the facilities were not as far advanced as in BASEC, because they had been started at a later date. By the end of 1952, of 19 supply depots in process of construction in COMZ, only 3 were more than 50 percent complete. It was expected that 3 would be completed between 1 March and 1 July 1953, 6 more would be completed by 31 September 1953, an additional 3 would be completed before 31 December 1953, and the remaining 7 would be completed some time in 1954.³⁹

115. Class II Installations in France

In August 1951 EUCOM had prescribed three phases for the development of depot installations in France, as follows: (1) Phase I, during which the depot was established under the control of the Commanding General, EUCOM COMZ (referred to as Class I status); (2) Phase II, during which the depot was organized and stocked under the control of the appropriate chief of technical service, EUCOM (referred to as Class II status); and (3) Phase III, during which the depot was again under the control of the Commanding General, EUCOM COMZ (again Class I status), normally through BASEC or ADSEC, and was either in operation or in a stand-by state of readiness for operation on short notice. The second phase of the development of the LOFC depots, during which they were in Class II status, involved a complicated organization, designed primarily to insure the proper build-up of the specific installations by the technical service concerned with its operation and having the practical experience and the technical skill to accomplish this task most efficiently.⁴⁰ As of 1 January 1952, 32 major installations were in temporary Class II status under the complete control of the EUCOM technical services. In addition 2 signal installations in COMZ were in permanent Class II status.⁴¹ During the development phase of these installations new projects were in progress involving construction and enlargement of existing facilities, stockage of the required equipment and supplies, and the staffing of the installations with adequate personnel. Between 1 January and 30 November 1952, an additional 10 installations were placed in Class II status by EUCOM/USAREUR, and 3 Class II installations, 2 quartermaster POL subdepots, and 1 engineer depot were discontinued. As of 30 November 1952, a total of

³⁹ Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Dec 52, USAREUR Log Div, pp. 34 - 35. CONFIDENTIAL.

⁴⁰ Establishment of Communications Through France, 1950 - 1951, pp. 58 - 59. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

⁴¹ (1) EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 275 - 76. SECRET. (2) EUCOM GO 7, 5 Feb 52. RESTRICTED.

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39 installations in USAREUR COMZ were in temporary Class II status.⁴² In June 1952 the Commanding General, EUCOM COMZ, recommended that all Class II depots in France be returned to Class I status and placed under his command.⁴³ Effective 1 December 1952, 35 USAREUR supply depots and sub-depots in France were returned to Class I status and responsibility for them was transferred to the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, with the exception of certain responsibilities to be retained by USAREUR, as follows: (1) over-all planning for the technical services; (2) theater stock control functions; (3) procurement within the theater for depot stocks; and (4) assignment of depot missions.⁴⁴ Only a small number of installations remained in Class II status in COMZ as of 31 December 1952.⁴⁵

116. Supplies on Hand in EUCOM Depots

The EUCOM Logistics Division early in 1952 changed its reporting criteria to reflect the logistical state of readiness of the command relative to stocks on hand in EUCOM depots. The first reporting period, covering the month of February 1952, showed over one million short tons of serviceable stocks on hand in EUCOM depots, comprising all categories. Approximately 749,000 tons (70 percent) of this total were stored in EUCOM depots in Germany. The EUCOM Stockage Objective for this period amounted to 614,000 tons and the Special Reserve No. 1 totaled over 351,000 tons. Most of the special reserve, 78 percent, was stored in LQFC depots in France. In addition to these two categories of supplies, the total serviceable stocks on hand included MDAP stocks, consisting of Stockpile A and World War II vehicles, of approximately 44,000 tons.⁴⁶ Stockpile A was located partly in Austria, partly in EUCOM, and partly in the United States. By the end of the year the total tonnage on hand had increased to approximately 1,500,000 tons. USAREUR Special Reserve No. 1 had reached 517,800 tons, an increase of approximately 159,000 tons over the 31 December 1951 figure but, because of the increase in the target objective for this category, represented only 54 percent of the 1 July 1954 target objective. The tonnages on hand in the USAREUR Stockage Objective reached 936,000

⁴²(1) EUCOM GO's 18, 12 Mar 52, RESTRICTED; 22, 1 Apr 52, RESTRICTED; 28, 9 May 52; 35, 2 Jun 52, RESTRICTED; 43, 30 Jun 52, RESTRICTED. (2) USAREUR GO's 7, 15 Aug 52, RESTRICTED; 10, 21 Aug 52; 22, 11 Oct 52, RESTRICTED; 23, 15 Oct 52; 25, 21 Oct 52.

⁴³Ltr, CG, USAREUR COMZ, to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Sep 52, sub: Additional Responsibilities for Class II Installations to be Assumed by CG, COMZ. AG 320.2 CG. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 COMZ (1952), Vol. I, Item 28B-1.

⁴⁴Ltrs, CINCUSAREUR to CG, COMZ, 29 Oct 52, 21 Nov 52, sub cited above. AG 322.011 GLD. SECRET. In file cited above.

⁴⁵USAREUR GO 34, 24 Nov 52. RESTRICTED.

⁴⁶Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Jan 52, EUCOM Log Div, p. 13. SECRET.

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tons in December or approximately 97.5 percent of the 1 July 1954 target objective for this category. As of 31 December 1952, quartermaster stocks of 384,600 tons comprised 41 percent of the total stocks on hand.⁴⁷

117. Berlin Supply Program

As in 1951, the Berlin Military Post was authorized in 1952 to stock a 150-day maximum level of supply, subject to the ability of EUCOM to support this level from its own resources. The reasons for making Berlin an exception were twofold: (1) to establish a sufficiently large reserve of supply to permit the continued operation of the post in the event of another land blockade similar to that of 1948 - 1949; and (2) to support emergency action by U.S. forces in isolated Berlin.⁴⁸ By 31 May 1952 this 150-day level of supply stockage was 100 percent complete. In addition to the 150-day level of supply in Berlin, two projects for special supplies were in existence. The first of these projects provided for the storage in Berlin of certain equipment such as radios and flame throwers for possible use against unruly or armed mobs from the East Zone during May Day, Whitsuntide, or similar celebrations. As of 31 May 1952, this project was also 100 percent complete. The second project provided for the storage of additional types and quantities of items not normally carried in the 150-day level of supplies and consisted largely of major items. This project consisted of Class I, IV (of all technical services except transportation), and V supplies. With the exception of two types of items this project was also 100 percent complete as of 31 May 1952. Class IV quartermaster supplies were approximately 99 percent complete while Engineer Class IV were only 35 percent complete. The short items, however, were on hand in EUCOM at that date and were scheduled for early shipment to Berlin.⁴⁹ In addition to the above mentioned supplies Berlin Military Post was also authorized a stockpile of 70,000 metric tons of coal, considered to be a 1-year supply. On 1 January 1952 Berlin Military Post had on hand 77,489 metric tons of coal and on 31 December 1952, 71,000 metric tons.⁵⁰

118. Special Reserve Priorities

The special theater reserves of the U.S. Army were classified as numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4. Number 1 was the 60-day level of strategic

⁴⁷Ibid., 31 Dec 52, USAREUR Log Div, pp. 14 - 15. SECRET.

⁴⁸EUCOM Comd Rept, pp. 292 - 93. SECRET.

⁴⁹EUCOM CINC Wkly Stf Conf 15, 17 Jun 52, pp. 2 - 3. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

⁵⁰Monthly Reviews of Log Actvs, 31 Jan 52, EUCOM/USAREUR Log Div, pp. 18 - 19; 30 Nov 52, p. 23; 31 Dec 52, p. 21. RESTRICTED.

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supplies held in EUCOM for emergency use; No 2 was the reserve operational stockpile of the U.S. Army; No. 3 consisted of supplies maintained in the zone of interior for automatic shipment to EUCOM in case of an emergency; and No. 4 consisted of supplies for USFA and TRUST. Change No. 1, dated 1 May 1952, to the Supply Supplement, Department of the Army, dated 1 March 1952, raised the priority of Special Reserve No. 1 from Priority IJ1 to IF5, thus placing it in Category 5 of Supply Priority Group F of the Department of the Army Supply Priority Group I (Active Army). Priority Group IF now included the following: (1) EUCOM; (2) USFA; (3) TRUST; (4) units scheduled for D-Day deployment; (5) Special Reserve No. 1; and (6) Special Reserve No. 4. Under this priority, supplies were to be furnished to the troop units of EUCOM, USFA, and TRUST for their T/O&E equipment and maintenance support on a first priority basis within this group. Units scheduled for D-Day deployment, however, would receive their equipment prior to the filling of the requirements for the EUCOM 60-day reserve (Special Reserve No. 1). At the same time, Special Reserve No. 3 was lowered from its previous priority of IJ2 to IS. This gave Special Reserve No. 2 the lowest priority in the Department of the Army Supply Priority Group I.⁵¹ Upon the declaration of an emergency, EUCOM plans contemplated the use of Special Reserve No. 1 for the immediate support of EUCOM troops with an automatic flow of supplies assured from Special Reserve No. 3. EUCOM troops were assured supplies of T/O&E and replacement items, but EUCOM feared that continued support of critical supplies for these troops in the event of an emergency might not be available until the troops scheduled for D-Day deployment received their authorized allowances. EUCOM insisted that a continuous flow of supplies must be available for the support of EUCOM units when employed on an emergency basis, and that this could only be assured if the priorities were sufficiently high to insure the maintenance of EUCOM reserve stocks at their authorized level. For this reason EUCOM requested the Department of the Army to raise the priority of Special Reserve No. 1 to Category 4, Priority Group IF, and to increase the priority for Special Reserve No. 3 sufficiently to insure that EUCOM troop units would have available a continuous supply support in the event of an emergency. Notwithstanding the urgency of this matter from the command viewpoint, the Department of the Army decided to make no further changes in the Supply Supplement during 1952. This decision was based on presidential directives placing a high priority upon MDAP commitments.⁵²

⁵¹Memo, Dir EUCOM Log Div to EUCOM COFS, 18 Jul 52, sub: Priority of Special Reserves Nos. 1 and 3. AG 400 GLD. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1952), Vol. II, Item 41.

⁵²Ltr, CINCEUR to TAG, 21 Jul 52, sub: Priority for Special Reserves No. 1 and 3. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1952), Vol. II, Item 41 atchd.

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119. Equipment Shortages

a. Shortage of Shipping Space. Early in 1952 it was determined that a shortage of shipping space for the transportation of supplies and equipment from the New York Port of Embarkation to EUCOM might develop during the early months of the year. It was felt that this would adversely affect the accomplishment of EUCOM's mission and would delay the planned storage of special reserve stocks programmed for the LOFC, as well as delay the vehicle replacement program. In January CINCEUR recommended to the Chief, Overseas Supply Division, NYPE, that every effort be made to secure the necessary shipping from civilian or other sources to relieve the backlog, and concurred in a proposal that full use be made of foreign-flag vessels for MDAP cargo. CINCEUR rejected the shipping priorities suggested previously by NYPE and proposed that backlogs be absorbed by reduction of programs in the following order of priority: (1) shipment of replacement vehicles to EUCOM and USFA; (2) shipment of 761 non-ambulance-type busses; (3) shipment of busses, 37-passenger twin coaches, ambulance-type, needed for emergency operational purposes in EUCOM; and (4) engineer projects recommended by CINCEUR. In connection with a proposal that the shipment of private cars be discontinued, CINCEUR stated that the savings effected would be negligible and that private vehicles were essential to implementation of the EUCOM noncombatant evacuation operations. The Department of the Army approved these recommendations.⁵³

b. Seventh Army Equipment Shortages. A survey of the Seventh Army divisional units in January 1952 indicated a serious shortage of critical items of equipment necessary for the combat readiness of the Seventh Army. The 43d and 28th Infantry Divisions indicated an over-all 10 percent shortage of authorized weapons. M26 tanks on hand in these divisions were only one fifth to one third of the authorized number. The 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions and the 2d Armored Division reported a serious shortage of sniper-scopes, as well as of .30-caliber rifles and M26 tanks.⁵⁴ In March 1952, General Eddy, then Commanding General, Seventh Army, became alarmed over the shortages of equipment in the Seventh Army and recommended to General Handy that the latter inform the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, of the situation.⁵⁵ General Handy wrote the recommended letter and informed General Eddy that, in the interim, all augmentation units which were arriving in EUCOM with initial shortages of T/O&E equipment because of preparation for overseas movement, would have such shortages filled from replacement stocks. Although this measure would deplete command maintenance stocks (EUCOM

⁵³(1) Cable SX-1176, CINCEUR to OSD NYPE, 8 Jan 52. SECRET. (2) Cable DA-91557, COFSA from ACOFS G-4, to CINCEUR, 9 Jan 52. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item 3A.

⁵⁴Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Jan 52, EUCOM Log Div, pp. 16 - 17, 20 - 21. SECRET.

⁵⁵Ltr, CG Seventh Army, to CINCEUR, 15 Mar 53, sub: Equipment Shortages in Seventh Army. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item 16A.

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Stockage Objective) it would render the units immediately operational.⁵⁶ The Department of the Army informed CINCEUR in May that the question of equipment shortages for EUCOM was being investigated and that remedial measures would be undertaken as soon as possible.⁵⁷ In June EUCOM was able to report to the Department of the Army that all major combat items for the 1st and 4th Infantry, and 2d Armored Divisions were on hand.⁵⁸

c. Status of Equipment as of 31 December 1952. During the latter half of the year, although shortages in some categories were filled, shortages in others appeared, and many types of equipment were still in short supply as of 31 December 1952. The status of critical items of equipment in the command on 31 December 1952 is shown in the following table, covering mainly shortages of items authorized Seventh Army and considered critical to the accomplishment of the mission of the Seventh Army and USAREUR.⁵⁹

<u>Technical Service and Items</u>	<u>Number Authorized</u>	<u>Percent on Hand</u>
<u>ENGINEER</u>		
Sniperscope	1,122	38%
Crane, truck, motor, 20 ton	56	70%
<u>ORDNANCE</u>		
Bulldozer, tank, mounting, M3E1	110	0%
<u>QUARTERMASTER</u>		
Heater, gas, 250,000 BTU	363	70%
Heater, water, gas, OP TK	1,002	85%

⁵⁶Ltr, CINCEUR to CG, Seventh Army, 28 Mar 52, sub: Equipment Shortages. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item 16A atchd.

⁵⁷Ltr, DA DCOFS for Plans and Opns, to CINCEUR, 12 May 52. SECRET. In file cited above.

⁵⁸Cable SX-6064, CINCEUR to COFSA, 11 Jun 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1952), Vol. II, Item 53 atchd.

⁵⁹Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Jan 53, USAREUR G-4 Div, p. 18. SECRET.

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<u>Technical Service and Items</u>	<u>Number Authorized</u>	<u>Percent on Hand</u>
<u>SIGNAL</u>		
Operation Center, AN/TTQ-2	5	40%
Radar Set AN/MPQ-10	24	0%
Radar Set AN/TPS-1D	22	62%
Ground Ranging Set GR-8	6	50%
Test Equipment, IE-9	43	81%
Test Set AN/MPM-2	17	47%

120. Special Reserve Shortages

a. Ammunition Shortages. The EUCOM Special Reserve No. 1 included a 60-day reserve of ammunition to support a troop strength of 259,000 (Section 14), demolitions to establish a barrier line (Section 9), and supplemental tank ammunition for the initial phase of combat. On 1 January 1952 the ammunition stocks for the special reserve were 82.7 percent complete.⁶⁰ In March General Handy queried the Department of the Army about the shipment of ammunition to fill the special reserve requirements. The Department of the Army replied that all ammunition shortages could probably be corrected by October 1952.⁶¹ Notwithstanding this assurance, by the end of October serious shortages were still reflected in the status of the ammunition requirements for the USAREUR special reserve.⁶² As of 31 December 1952, the only requirement for the USAREUR special reserve which was 100 percent complete was that for .32-caliber pistol ammunition. Of the remaining items listed as ammunition requirements for the special reserve, certain requirements for shells had not been met but delivery had been promised for some time in 1953.⁶³

b. Equipment Shortages. In March 1952 General Eddy, Commanding General, Seventh Army, became concerned over the failure of the Department

⁶⁰Ibid., 31 Jan 52, EUCOM Log Div, pp. 16 - 17.

⁶¹(1) Ltr, CINCEUR to COFSA, 28 Mar 52, sub: Special Reserve Shortages. SECRET. (2) Ltr, DA DCOFS for Plans and Opns, to CINCEUR, 12 May 52, same sub. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item 16A atchd.

⁶²Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Oct 52, USAREUR Log Div, pp. 18 - 19.

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⁶³Ibid., 31 Jan 53, pp. 20 - 21. SECRET.

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of the Army to provide EUCOM with certain theater reserve stocks, particularly ammunition and antiaircraft and artillery pieces.⁶⁴ At General Eddy's suggestion, General Handy informed Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, of the weapons and ammunition shortages which existed in the EUCOM special reserve and requested assistance in expediting shipments to EUCOM. In addition, he called attention to the shortage of certain bridging equipment in the Special Reserve which was needed in the rear areas to replace bridges destroyed by air action, the lack of which could adversely affect the movement of supplies to forward areas. Other items of engineer equipment for the special reserve, such as pumps, generators, shop equipment, compressors and pneumatic tools were also in short supply. In May the Department of the Army notified EUCOM that the question of special reserve shortages for EUCOM had been investigated and that the following answers could be given at that time: (1) none of the weapons listed as shortages were available in the zone of interior; (2) ammunition shortages could be corrected by October 1952; (3) engineer bridging equipment would be available during August and September 1952; and (4) the remaining engineer equipment would be shipped as rapidly as the requisitions were received in the zone of interior and the equipment became available.⁶⁵ No immediate improvement in the supply of antiaircraft and artillery weapons could, therefore, be expected in EUCOM.

c. Status of Special Reserve No. 1. The Special Theater Reserve No. 1 was an operational project established under the provisions of SR 730-5-1, and titled "Project Army-EUCOM-GEN-102-50-OP." As redefined by the Department of the Army in late 1951, the Special Theater Reserve No. 1 contained fifteen sections; but during 1952 was increased to twenty two sections, to meet the increased needs of the EUCOM augmentation program.⁶⁶ Table 11 indicates the nature and purpose of these sections and the percentage of their completion as of 31 December 1952, when the Special Theater Reserve No. 1 contained a total of 517,800 tons of material, or approximately 54 percent of the 1 July 1954 target objective of 960,488 tons.⁶⁷

121. Reclamation and Rebuild Program

During 1952 depot maintenance for the technical services was performed largely in the U.S. Zone of Germany, both in commercial shops and

⁶⁴Ltr, CG Seventh Army to CINCEUR, 15 Mar 52, sub: Equipment Shortages. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item 16A.

⁶⁵(1) Ltr, CINCEUR to COFSA, 28 Mar 52, sub: Special Reserve Shortages. SECRET. (2) Ltr, DA DCOFS for Plans and Opns, to CINCEUR, 12 May 52, same sub. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item 16A atchd.

⁶⁶EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 277 - 79. SECRET; Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 30 Sep 52, USAREUR Log Div, pp. 22 - 23. SECRET.

⁶⁷Ibid., 31 Dec 52, pp. 14 - 15. SECRET.

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Table 11--Status of Special Theater Reserve No. 1
31 December 1952

<u>Item</u>	<u>Technical Service</u>	<u>Short Tons</u>	<u>Percent Complete</u>
<u>Section 1</u>			
Equipment to establish communication facilities along LOFC	Signal II & IV	396	100
<u>Section 2</u>			
Establish mobile communications center	Ordnance II & IV	48	100
	Signal II & IV	82.4	100
<u>Section 3</u>			
Radio sets and allied equipment to control evacuation traffic	Chemical II & IV	.14	100
	Engineer II & IV	Negligible	100
	Ordnance II & IV	28	100
	QM II & IV	40	100
	Signal II & IV	49	100
<u>Section 4</u>			
Initial issue of clothing and equipment to Labor Service Unit, Organized Reserve Corps and Department of the Army civilians	Engineer II & IV	.8	100
	Medical II & IV	Negligible	100
	Ordnance II & IV	1,230	100
	Ordnance V	44.6	100
	QM II & IV	581	100
	Signal II & IV	84.8	100
<u>Section 5</u>			
Medical assemblies to establish hospital and similar type medical units	Chemical II & IV	1	100
	Engineer II & IV	86.3	100
	Medical II & IV	1,816	100
	Ordnance II & IV	12	100
	QM II & IV	Negligible	100
	Signal II & IV	2.5	100
<u>Section 7</u>			
Engineer bridging equipment for training and emergency use	Engineer II & IV	66,400	65
	Ordnance II & IV	900	100
	QM II & IV	.95	100
	Signal II & IV	6.2	100
	Trans II & IV	210	100

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Table 11—Status of Special Theater Reserve No. 1 (cont'd)
31 December 1952

<u>Item</u>	<u>Technical Service</u>	<u>Short Tons</u>	<u>Percent Complete</u>
<u>Section 8</u>			
Supplemental tank ammunition for classified purposes	Ordnance V	11,697 a/	100
<u>Section 9</u>			
Demolition for barrier line	Engineer II & IV	35,329	30
	Ordnance V	69,576	38
	QM II & IV	6	0
<u>Section 10</u>			
Semitrailer record vans to move machine records unit	QM II & IV	16	100
<u>Section 13</u>			
One-time issue requirement for:	Engineer II & IV	Not Avail	100
(1) Items to re-equip Army & EUCOM Hqs	Medical II & IV	245	100
	Ordnance II & IV	26	100
	QM II & IV	144.8	100
	Signal II & IV	56.6	100
(2) Protect NEO routes	Trans II & IV	516.5	100
	Ordnance II & IV	b/	100
(3) Nontactical demolition	Engineer II & IV	b/	100
	Ordnance II & IV	b/	100
	QM II & IV	b/	100
	Signal II & IV	b/	100
(4) Items for infant care	Medical II & IV	62	100
(5) Fuel contaminants	Chemical II & IV	37	100
(6) Railway cars	Trans II & IV	42,818	100
(7) Pierced steel planking	Engineer II & IV	8,743	99.5
(8) Heavy equipment for over the beach operations	Engineer II & IV	1,350	38
<u>Section 14</u>			
Army 60 days special reserve for equipment based on troop strength of 259,000	Chemical II & IV	307	95
	Chemical V	511	99
	Engineer II	6,582	90
	Engineer IV	738	80

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Table 11--Status of Special Theater Reserve No. 1 (cont'd)
31 December 1952

<u>Item</u>	<u>Technical Service</u>	<u>Short Tons</u>	<u>Percent Complete</u>	
<u>Section 14 (cont'd)</u>				
Medical	II & IV	4,394	90	
Ordnance	II & IV	46,000	63	
Ordnance	V	145,487	87	
QM	I	57,100	60	
QM	II & IV	22,000	87	
QM III (1000 gal)		38,804	60	
Signal	II	7,556	24	
Signal	IV	960	100	
Trans	II & IV	210	80	
<u>Section 15</u>				
Air Force 60 day maintenance reserve for strength of 15,000 g/	Chemical	II & IV	4.8	100
	Chemical	V	4	100
	Engineer	II & IV	475	98
	Medical	II & IV	76	100
	Ordnance	II & IV	8,600	100
	QM	II & IV	517	100
	Signal	II & IV	343	80
<u>Section 16</u>				
POL pipeline materials	Engineer	II & IV	75,450	3
	Signal	IV	1,518	0
<u>Section 17</u>				
Materials port rehabilitation	Engineer	IV	9,568	3
<u>Section 18</u>				
Items to construct water supply system	Engineer	II & IV	279	35
<u>Section 19</u>				
Materials for fire fighting	Engineer	II & IV	187	22
<u>Section 20</u>				
Materials for camouflage	Engineer	II	1,467	33

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Table 11—Status of Special Theater Reserve No. 1 (cont'd)
31 December 1952

<u>Item</u>	<u>Technical Service</u>	<u>Short Tons</u>	<u>Percent Complete</u>
<u>Section 22</u>			
Storage of censorship supplies	Ordnance	94	98
	QM	507	50
	Signal II	Negligible	50

- a/ This figure will increase upon approval of revision to include USAREUR basic load and Seventh Army prestock requirements.
- b/ Tonnage is included in part 1 of section 13.
- c/ Figures represent requirements for Air Force strength of 15,000. Increased requirement to support strength of 52,000 has been submitted to Department of the Army for approval.

Source: Mthly Reviews of Log Actvs, 30 Sep 52, USAREUR Log Div, pp. 22 - 23; 31 Jan 53, pp. 22 - 23. SECRET.

in Army depots. Existing facilities were used to the maximum to meet growing requirements resulting from troop augmentation and the MDA program. The ordnance rebuild program in the U.S. Zone was forecasted to phase down in 1953 upon the termination of the World War II vehicle exchange program for the MDAP countries. Commercial contracts were to be used in France, supplemented by base maintenance units when available. Quartermaster depot maintenance was to be performed at established facilities in Germany and at facilities to be developed at Ingrandes, France. Signal depot maintenance was to be performed at the Pirmasens Depot in the French Zone of Germany, and was to be handled at Verdun and Saumur in France when installations there were developed. Chemical depot maintenance was to be performed in France at Sampigny and Landes de Bussac and medical depot maintenance at Einsiedlerhof, Germany, and Croix Chapeaux, France.⁶⁸ At the beginning of 1952, field facilities consisted of tactical and administrative post shops. Tactical Seventh Army shops were not available because of their mission, but the administrative post shops were to be used to the maximum to expedite the program.⁶⁹ During

⁶⁸Log Plng Forecast, 1 Jan 52, EUCOM Log Div, pp. 10 - 16. SECRET.

⁶⁹Cable S-1337, CINCEUR to CCFSA, 15 Jan 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item 3A.

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1952 the EUCOM/USAREUR technical services maintenance program included the repair of items for MDAF and related programs as well as regularly scheduled depot maintenance programs. The value of items in the EUCOM/USAREUR reclamation and rebuild program repaired during 1952 was \$324,727,000 of which \$291,722,000 represented equipment repaired in Army depots, and \$33,005,000 equipment repaired in commercial shops under contract. The following table shows the value, in thousands of dollars, of equipment repaired during 1952 for the various technical services, both in Army depots and in commercial shops.⁷⁰ Approximately 82.3 percent of

<u>Technical Service</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Army Depots</u>	<u>Commercial Shops</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>\$324,727</u>	<u>\$291,722</u>	<u>\$33,005</u>
Chemical	332	332	0
Engineer	25,703	15,564	10,139
Medical	607	607	0
Ordnance	267,532	259,370	8,162
Quartermaster	15,013	6,145	8,868
Signal	14,637	9,704	4,933
Transportation	903	0	903

the total reported for all services in 1952 reflected ordnance repairs, 97 percent of which were accomplished in USAREUR ordnance rebuild depots. By 31 December 1952 the total value of unserviceable stock on hand in USAREUR depots had been reduced to \$130,366,000, a new low during 1952 for that category of stocks. Of this amount \$96,631,000 was "active" stock, i.e., scheduled for repair within the next twelve calendar months. The remainder was reparable but not scheduled for actual rebuild during the following year. The total value, in thousands of dollars, of unserviceable stocks on hand in USAREUR depots by technical service as of 31 December 1952 is shown in the following table.⁷¹

⁷⁰Mthly Reviews of Log Actvs, EUCOM/USAREUR Log Div; 30 Apr 52, pp. 42 - 43; 30 Jun 52, pp. 6 - 7; 30 Sep 52, pp. 26 - 27; 31 Oct 52, pp. 26 - 27; 30 Nov 52, pp. 30 - 31; and 31 Dec 52, pp. 40 - 41. SECRET.
⁷¹Ibid., 31 Dec 52, pp. 40 - 41. SECRET.

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<u>Technical Service</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Active</u>	<u>Inactive</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>\$130,366</u>	<u>\$96,631</u>	<u>\$33,735</u>
Chemical	105	105	0
Engineer	10,881	10,605	276
Medical	31	31	0
Ordnance	89,960	71,792	18,168
Quartermaster	10,337	4,940	5,397
Signal	18,941	9,047	9,894
Transportation	111	111	0

122. Disposition of Surplus Army Property

Under the Federal Property and Administrative Service Act of 1949 the sale of excess property in foreign fields was to be made in accordance with the foreign policy of the United States. In order to meet this requirement, whenever the total acquisition cost of property (including scrap and salvage) to be offered at any one sale at any one time was \$250,000 or more, a report of the proposed sale was to be made to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Department of the Army. In order to expedite co-ordination between the Department of the Army and the Department of State, the overseas commander was required to contact the diplomatic mission in the country in which the sale was to be held, and to include comments of that agency in the report. If the value of the property was less than \$250,000 but more than \$50,000, the proposed sale was to be reported immediately upon completion, rather than in advance, to the Department of the Army.⁷² Excess property in EUCOM/USAREUR was disposed of under two separate procedures during 1952. The first was a redistribution of excess property, including scrap, to the zone of interior and other oversea commands of the U.S. Army. The second procedure consisted of sales of property in EUCOM under four categories--usable property, salvage, scrap, and waste or production scrap. During 1952 EUCOM/USAREUR disposed of excess property worth \$88,700,000. Of this amount, 71 percent, or \$62,650,000 represented property transferred to the zone of interior, while the remaining \$26,050,000 represented sales of excess property by EUCOM to foreign individuals and governments. Proceeds from sales of the latter category amounted to \$3,513,800 in 1952. The following table shows by months the amount of excess property disposed of in EUCOM/USAREUR, the amount redistributed to other commands of the U.S. Army, and the proceeds from the sale of excess property in Europe.⁷³

⁷²Cable DA-359169, COFSA to GINCEUR, 13 Sep 52. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1952), Vol. II, Item 74.

⁷³Mthly Reviews of Log Actvs, 31 Jan - 31 Dec 52, USAREUR Log Div, pp. 23 - 24. SECRET.

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<u>Month</u>	<u>Acquisition Cost Value</u>	<u>Property Transferred to other Commands</u>	<u>Proceeds from Sales in EUCOM</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>\$88,700,000</u>	<u>\$62,650,000</u>	<u>\$3,513,800</u>
January	\$ 5,500,000	\$ 3,750,000	\$ 149,000
February	7,000,000	4,200,000	490,000
March	7,200,000	5,400,000	249,600
April	7,500,000	6,500,000	132,000
May	15,800,000	14,400,000	66,500
June	17,800,000	14,500,000	520,000
July	5,200,000	3,000,000	349,000
August	7,700,000	4,000,000	378,000
September	4,400,000	2,500,000	171,200
October	5,000,000	2,000,000	404,000
November	3,000,000	1,000,000	424,000
December	2,600,000	1,400,000	180,000

123. Port and Air Supply Operations

a. Port Operations. The port operations schedule for 1952 provided that the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation was to handle Class I and III stockage objective supplies, Class V (training ammunition), and housekeeping supplies. It was estimated that about 70,000 long tons per month of general cargo and 32,000 tons of POL would be discharged at that port. COMZ ports, operated by the 7703 Major Port, were to receive special reserve stocks, special projects supplies, Class II and IV supplies for the EUCOM stockage objective, and Air Force reserve and operating stocks. Tonnages for COMZ ports were estimated at 25,000 long tons of general cargo per month, including the supply-over-the-beaches training operation. No bulk POL was to be unloaded over the beaches until possibly 1953, but some packaged POL was scheduled to be unloaded before the end of 1952.⁷⁴ The total cargo tonnage actually handled by EUCOM/USAREUR ports during 1952 amounted to 1,897,800 long tons or approximately 44 percent more than the tonnage handled during 1951. While most of the tonnage handled by EUCOM/USAREUR ports was reported by Bremerhaven, there was a significant increase in the use of the COMZ port area. BASEC ports handled 391,400 long tons of cargo during 1952, an amount nearly four times as great as the amount handled during 1951. The total tonnage of cargo handled at Bremerhaven during 1952 amounted to 1,506,400 long tons, an increase of nearly 25 percent over the total tonnage handled by that port during 1951. General cargo discharged at Bremerhaven accounted for almost 58 percent of the total handled during the year and included material to support the Army

⁷⁴Log Plng Forecast, 1 Jan 52, EUCOM Log Div, pp. 10 - 16. SECRET.

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and Air Force troops, personal property such as household goods and automobiles, mail, EES property, and Mutual Security Program (MSP) shipments. The following table shows in thousands of long tons the total tonnages handled during 1952 at all EUCOM/USAREUR ports, the total tonnages handled at Bremerhaven and COMZ ports, and the outloaded tonnages at these ports.⁷⁵

Month	Total Handled	Bremerhaven Total	Bremerhaven Outloaded	COMZ Ports Total	COMZ Ports Outloaded
<u>Total 1952</u>	<u>1,397.8</u>	<u>1,506.4</u>	<u>104.6</u>	<u>391.4</u>	<u>27.1</u>
January	175.5	130.3	6.7	45.2	5.3
February	190.2	139.6	7.9	50.6	11.7
March	153.1	121.6	11.3	31.5	4.6
April	183.7	150.8	12.3	32.9	4.2
May	178.6	161.1	7.8	17.5	0
June	133.0	111.7	8.1	21.3	0
July	127.5	112.5	9.8	15.0	0
August	158.2	136.5	9.1	21.7	.4
September	123.3	108.4	10.3	14.9	.1
October	196.7	141.9	6.9	54.8	.1
November	132.3	85.7	8.8	46.6	.1
December	145.7	106.3	5.6	39.4	.6

The total number of persons handled through EUCOM/USAREUR ports during 1952 amounted to slightly more than 414,000, an increase of 132,000 or 47 percent, over the 282,000 persons processed at EUCOM ports in 1951. During 1952, moreover, the balance between embarkations and debarkations was more nearly restored—185,700 persons having embarked and 228,500 persons debarked, compared to 1951 when the number of incoming personnel was nearly four times as great as those leaving the command by surface transportation.⁷⁶

b. Air Operations. The total quantity moved by air in 1952 amounted to 13,600 short tons. This included the movement of 69,000 persons, of whom 28,300 were handled by contract airlift. The peak movement was reported for July, when nearly 2,000 short tons were airlifted to and from EUCOM.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Dec 52, USAREUR Log Div, pp. 44 - 45.
SECRET

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 46. SECRET.

124. Supply Economy

Under co-ordination by the Office of the Comptroller, various economy programs were in effect as continuing projects from previous years. One of the most important of these was the cost consciousness program initiated at the end of 1951. All vehicles, heavy equipment, furniture, tools, furnishings, and other items used by, and in the care of, command personnel were marked with the price of the items, and a request that the users take care of them. Posters widely displayed in the command admonished personnel to take care of government property, and publicity campaigns through the press and radio were utilized to impress upon users the need to economize by making the best use of their equipment. Another project on a continuing basis was that of conserving coal and electricity in all units. Requests by posters, press, and radio were made continuously to induce use of lights only when necessary, also to turn off heat when not required. The necessity of maintaining inventories at the minimum considered essential for the most efficient operation was impressed upon all unit, post, and field commanders. All units were continually urged to turn in all excess supplies for redistribution where needed. It was requested that all broken, damaged, or unserviceable equipment be repaired, rebuilt, or salvaged as soon as possible. Technical service teams inspected organizations and stations to insure that all units were making the proper use of their supplies and equipment. Further checks were made periodically by the USAREUR inspector general and the Director, USAREUR Military Posts Division, to ascertain the effectiveness of the programs. It was emphasized that if command personnel gave their arms, equipment, clothes, and other items proper care and maintenance, savings running into the millions of dollars annually could be effected.⁷⁸

125. POL Procurement and Issue

During 1952 the main source of supply of bulk POL products for the U.S. Zone of Germany was the port of Bremerhaven, where the POL products were discharged from tankers into storage tanks of the Farge POL depot. From there the POL was distributed monthly by tank cars and trucks to the various units, posts, and area commands, to be allocated to the user organizations. During the early part of 1952 COMZ was not included in the monthly initial allocations of POL products. Normal shipments to COMZ were for strategic storage. Operating stocks were furnished COMZ by "Standard Francaise" and were replaced by shipments from the zone of interior.⁷⁹ Plans called for beginning monthly allocations to COMZ on 1 March, at the same time that USFA was to be dropped from monthly allocations of POL from EUCOM and to begin to receive POL products to fill its

⁷⁸ Interv, Dr. G. Tays, USAREUR Hist Div, with Capt D. N. Hyett, Stf Off, USAREUR G-4 Mgt Br, 14 Jan 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁷⁹ Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Jan 52, EUCOM Log Div, p. 23.
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requirements through its own LOFC from Leghorn, Italy.⁸⁰ Monthly allocations to COMZ were begun, but USFA encountered transportation difficulties in maintaining an independent source of supply from Leghorn. By 1 September these difficulties were overcome and no further shipments from USAREUR to USFA were necessary.⁸¹ The total issues of POL in EUCOM/USAREUR for 1952 amounted to 106,600,000 gallons, an increase of nearly 27,000,000 gallons, or 34 percent, over 1951 issues. Seventh Army was the largest single user of POL products in the command, with a total consumption of 49,000,000 gallons during 1952. Toward the end of the year the allocations to COMZ showed a sharp increase which reflected the transfer of Class II installations in France to Class I status, POL support for Class I installations being provided by COMZ rather than by the USAREUR technical service administering the installation. Gasoline consumption by civilian vehicles during 1952 showed an interesting trend. While the number of vehicles increased steadily up to the end of 1952, there was a notable decrease in total consumption as reflected in retail sales. The average consumption of gasoline per vehicle decreased from 83 gallons during the month of March to 59 gallons during September.⁸²

126. Commissary Operations

Commissary operations in EUCOM/USAREUR continued to increase throughout the year. As the troop augmentation program progressed and new military installations were built west of the Rhine, new commissaries were opened to meet increased demand. The arrival of thousands of new dependents in the command brought about a marked increase in the number of accounts handled by the EUCOM/USAREUR commissaries. EUCOM began the year with 67 commissaries, including 56 operating commissaries in EUCOM proper and 11 Air Force commissaries supplied by EUCOM. At the end of 1952 the number of commissaries supplied by USAREUR had increased to 79. Accounts at the beginning of the year totaled 23,086, and total sales \$11,271,000. From January to May the number of accounts was stabilized at 23,086, but then rose steadily to 34,879 in December. Sales also rose correspondingly to reach \$12,499,000 by December.⁸³

⁸⁰Ibid., 29 Feb 52, p. 14. RESTRICTED.

⁸¹Ibid., 31 Aug 52, p. 22. RESTRICTED.

⁸²Ibid., 31 Dec 52, p. 17. RESTRICTED.

⁸³Monthly Reviews of Log Actvs, EUCOM/USAREUR Log Div, 31 Jan 52 - 31 Jan 53. SECRET. Items UNCLASSIFIED.

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Section III: Vehicle Exchange Program

127. Plans for Supply of Equipment to MDAP Countries

The World War II Vehicle Exchange Program initiated late in 1951 envisaged the replacement of all World War II vehicles in EUCOM with interim-type vehicles. The original planning called for the rebuild of vehicles to MDAP standards at the normal rate of rebuild in EUCOM, and the shipment of the remainder of the vehicles to the Far East Command. Late in 1951 EUCOM announced that it could make some 11,000 vehicles available to MDAP countries and approximately 25,000 available for shipment to FECOM.⁸⁴ In January 1952 the Department of the Army directed that all World War II vehicles in EUCOM be rebuilt to MDAP standards and instructed EUCOM to take steps to complete its Fiscal Years 1950, 1951, and 1952 maintenance rebuild program by 31 December 1952.⁸⁵ With regard to requisitioning, EUCOM recommended, and the Department of the Army later agreed, that the latter should furnish a list of total country requirements for Fiscal Years 1950, 1951, and 1952 by type and number, indicating country priority listings for which EUCOM would have supply responsibility. EUCOM announced that in order to complete the program it would undertake a 6-day week operation of current maintenance facilities wherever practical but it did not consider the multiple shifts suggested by the Department of the Army to be feasible. Moreover, the command had not budgeted dollars or Deutsche Marks in 1952 or 1953 for construction costs connected with the program, and it was essential that funds be provided for this work. EUCOM also informed the Department of the Army that the diversion of military spaces to the project had required the withdrawal of personnel from primary missions, and would delay their employment during an emergency. EUCOM emphasized the fact that actual production would depend upon availability of replacement interim-type vehicles in the command due to the necessity for maintenance of combat readiness. Availability of replacement vehicles, however, was being seriously affected by the anticipated shipping shortages.⁸⁶ In order to comply with presidential directives concerning MDAP, the Department of the Army recommended to EUCOM in February 1952 that an average of 385,000

⁸⁴EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 359 - 61. SECRET.

⁸⁵Cable DA-09055, COFSA from ACOFS G-4, to CINCEUR, 3 Jan 52.

SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item 3A.

⁸⁶(1) Cable S-1337, CINCEUR to COFSA, 15 Jan 52. SECRET. (2) Cable DA-92400, COFSA to CINCEUR, 18 Jan 52. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item 3A atchd.

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measurement tons of equipment and supplies be shipped monthly to MDAP countries through 30 June 1953. Although early release of large quantities of equipment to MDAP would create shortages for the Army, possibly through 31 December 1952, it would ultimately benefit the Army since the transfer of World War II equipment would make available funds for replacement which could then be utilized to procure modern equipment.⁸⁷ At a conference held in Washington in March, EUCOM representatives were requested to present detailed plans for the rebuild of World War II vehicles and tanks through calendar year 1953, and to furnish information on EUCOM assets of all items being replaced which could be made available to MDAP on a calculated risk basis. In reply to the latter proposal, the EUCOM representatives stated that it was EUCOM policy that all troop units must have full T/O&E equipment before materials could be made available for transfer to MDAP.⁸⁸ On 24 March the Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, approved and directed implementation of policy which authorized EUCOM 100 percent of T/O&E equipment in the hands of troops, reserves above this level to be in accordance with priorities set up by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. EUCOM was to ship items to MDAP countries on a one-for-one basis as replacements in excess of 100 percent T/O&E objectives were received.⁸⁹

128. Implementation of the Exchange Program

In March 1952, it was estimated that 31,249 vehicles out of a total of 52,226 scheduled for rebuild and rehabilitation in 1952 and 1953, would need actual rebuild. All rebuild work accomplished in EUCOM was scheduled to be done in EUCOM Ordnance Division rebuild depots. At the same time the Ordnance Division acted to further augment production for MDAP through the use of German commercial contract facilities. Commercial contractors were scheduled to recondition some 10,000 of the remaining vehicles during 1952 and 1953.⁹⁰ As shown in paragraph 121, approximately 3 percent of the money obligated by the EUCOM/USAREUR Ordnance Division for maintenance rebuild activities during 1952 was to German commercial firms. The first delivery of vehicles to MDAP countries took place in February 1952, when 2,200 vehicles which had been rebuilt under the 1951 program were delivered to NATO countries under Department of the Army requisitions. Since, however,

⁸⁷Cable DA-900926, COFSA to CINCEUR, 12 Feb 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item 20A.

⁸⁸Ltr, ACOFS G-4, to CINCUSAREUR, 26 Mar 52, sub: Letter of Transmittal - Minutes of EUCOM-DA Conference, 19 - 21 March 1952. GL/D5 - 19387. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 400.336 (1952), Item 60, B/P.

⁸⁹Cable DA-904940, COFSA from ACOFS G-4, to CINCEUR, 28 Mar 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item 3A atchd.

⁹⁰Memo, Dir EUCOM Log Div to EUCOM COFS, 11 Mar 52, sub: Delivery of World War II Type Vehicles to MDAP. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item 34A, B/P.

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approximately 20,000 interim-type replacement vehicles had already been received by EUCOM, military posts were directed to take immediate action to repair and outship World War II vehicles or evacuate them to appropriate rebuild establishments.⁹¹ The 1952 stepped-up delivery schedule developed by the Department of the Army called for the rebuild of approximately 42,000 vehicles in EUCOM facilities and their delivery to MDAP countries prior to 31 December 1952.⁹² This was in addition to the 2,200 vehicles delivered in February, bringing the total target for 1952 to approximately 44,000 vehicles. The rebuild requirements for ordnance shops in 1952 were set at 41,236 vehicles. By 31 December 1952 a total of 41,126 vehicles, or approximately 99.7 percent of the rebuild target, had been rebuilt. Of the vehicles rebuilt in EUCOM/USAREUR, 37,854 were delivered to NATO countries prior to 31 December 1952, totaling 41,054, with the 2,200 vehicles delivered in February, or approximately 91 percent of the rebuild target of 44,000.⁹³ (See par. 165a.)

a. TRUST and USFA Vehicles. Early in 1952 it was decided that EUCOM would be responsible for the rehabilitation of TRUST and USFA vehicles for the exchange program.⁹⁴ In June CINCEUR notified the Department of the Army that upon receipt of the required funds EUCOM was prepared to place contracts in Italy for the rehabilitation of 387 TRUST vehicles and 5,100 USFA vehicles. EUCOM's fund requirements for the TRUST program were \$225,000, and for USFA \$2,846,000, in addition to \$50,000 for the resident office personnel costs.⁹⁵ During the year EUCOM/USAREUR maintained continuous liaison with USFA on the over-all aspects of the vehicle rebuild program in Italy through the USFA ordnance office. In September USAREUR established the areas of responsibility for the depot maintenance portion of the rehabilitation of World War II vehicles for USFA and TRUST. Both of those commands were to deliver their vehicles to Leghorn, from which point they would be sent by USFA to Italian rehabilitation facilities, and after being reconditioned would be delivered back to Leghorn. All vehicles were to be maintained in storage at Leghorn by USFA, both before and after being repaired, pending distribution to the countries to which

⁹¹Cable, SX-2551, CINCEUR to All Mil Posts, 21 Feb 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item 27.

⁹²C/N 1, Dir EUCOM Log Div to EUCOM DCOFS Opns, 24 Jan 52, sub: Status of MDAP Supply and Stockpiles in EUCOM. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 400.336 (1952), Vol. III, Item 85.

⁹³Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Dec 52, USAREUR Log Div, pp. 22 - 23. SECRET.

⁹⁴Cable DA-904940, COFSA to CINCEUR, 28 Mar 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item 3A atchd.

⁹⁵Cable S-6501, CINCEUR to COFSA for COA, 11 Jun 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item 20A atchd.

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they had been allocated. The USAREUR responsibilities in this program consisted of placing, funding, administering the contracts, and furnishing USFA with disposition instructions received from the Department of the Army.⁹⁶

b. Allocation of Shipments. The Department of the Army informed EUCOM in July 1952 that it was imperative that equipment being furnished MDAP countries by EUCOM, USFA, and TRUST be allocated prior to shipment. EUCOM was requested to adhere strictly to a list of allocations furnished at that time.⁹⁷ CINCEUR replied that EUCOM had planned deliveries of World War II equipment in accordance with the results of the MDAP conference in Washington in March, but that a conference in Paris, 16 to 24 June, had considered the possibility of drastic reductions or changes in certain country programs in order to conserve funds for ammunition supplies. This factor had apparently not been considered by the Department of the Army in proposing allocations, particularly in vehicles for France and tanks for the Netherlands.⁹⁸ In the final allocations, however, France was given the major share of all rebuilt wheeled vehicles with the small remainder going to Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, and the United Kingdom, in that order.

c. Drive-Away Plan. In connection with the vehicle replacement program, the EUCOM/USAREUR Transportation Division initiated the movement of replacement vehicles from the port of Bremerhaven to ordnance vehicle storage points by overland convoy. Planning for this project, dubbed Operation Drive-Away, was begun early in the year and was implemented on 14 April 1952. From 14 April to 30 September convoys of approximately sixty vehicles of a given type departed daily from Bremerhaven six days a week. This operation was manned and controlled by personnel from subordinate units of the 37th Transportation Highway Transport Division. The operation was phased down after 30 September because the steady decline in the number of vehicles arriving at the port, coupled with adverse weather, made the operation impractical. The over-all savings from this operation were approximately \$1,000,000 over rail costs, in addition to freeing critical rail equipment for other uses. As a corollary to Operation Drive-Away the command undertook the movement by highway of some 9,000 World War II type vehicles from various assembly points throughout the zone to ordnance rebuild facilities and thence to MDAP outlets. The distances traveled in this operation were comparatively short, making

⁹⁶Cable S-3324, CINCUSAREUR to USFA and TRUST, 13 Sep 52. SECRET. In file cited above.

⁹⁷Cable DA-914298, COFSA to CINCEUR, 24 Jul 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1952), Vol. II, Item 65.

⁹⁸Cable SX-1898, CINCEUR to COFSA, 30 Jul 52. SECRET. In file cited above.

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the savings proportionately higher than in Operation Drive-Away, rail costs for loading, chocking, blocking, spotting, and unloading being the same regardless of distances traveled. This operation realized savings in excess of \$1,000,000, making total savings to EUCOM/USAREUR of over \$2,000,000 from use of the drive-away plan.⁹⁹

129. Spare Parts Procurement

Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's) were directed by the Department of the Army on 7 February 1952 to submit to EUCOM, on or before 1 April 1952, a 6-month maintenance spare parts requisition which was to be within fund limitations for maintenance of transport vehicles, combat vehicles, artillery and fire control, and small arms then in the possession of the recipient countries. The proposals made by the Department of the Army for the procurement of the required spare parts did not meet with EUCOM approval, nor did the EUCOM counterproposals meet with the approval of the Department of the Army.¹⁰⁰ The Department of the Army, however, insisted that the problem of developing European sources for spare parts must be solved. During the remainder of the year efforts were continued to find an acceptable solution to the problem.

130. Funding of the Vehicle Exchange Program

Early in 1952, HICOG directed that GFY 1952 and 1953 budgets contain no provision for funds required for MDAP activities. EUCOM thereupon informed the Department of the Army that in view of this decision and of the projected contractual agreements, it was mandatory that MDAP dollar funds be made available to finance the vehicle rebuild and other MDA programs on a day-to-day basis, since there would be no Deutsche Mark funds in the EUCOM budget for such purposes. It was emphasized that dollar funds for rebuild operations should be placed in German fiscal channels prior to the beginning of contract operations in order to finance the operation continuously rather than by liquidation of assets upon termination of contracts. The Department of the Army recommended that EUCOM follow normal procedures in obtaining Deutsche Mark for disbursement and, if approval could be obtained, use the funds for advance payments in connection with the program.¹⁰¹ With regard to dollar funding of the

⁹⁹37th Trans Hwy Trans Div Comd Rept, 1952, pp. 1 - 2. RESTRICTED.

¹⁰⁰(1) Cable DA-900523, COFSA to MAAG's, 7 Feb 52. SECRET. (2) Cable S-2277, CINCEUR to COFSA, 13 Feb 52. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item 20A atchd.

¹⁰¹(1) Cable S-2235, CINCEUR to COFSA for COA, 11 Feb 52. SECRET. (2) Cable DA-905064, COFSA from COA to CINCEUR, 31 Mar 52. SECRET. (3) Cable DA-905640, COFSA from COA to CINCEUR, 5 Apr 52. SECRET. All in USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item 20A atchd.

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program, requirements could only be satisfied through the use of service contracts between the United States and the German Federal Republic, under which fund advances could be made, based upon estimated rebuild deliveries to MDAP, since no other legal method existed by which U.S. appropriated funds could be advanced to finance the augmented rebuild program. A "letter of intent" was to be used pending conclusion of a service contract, in order to meet the immediate funding needs beginning 1 April 1952.¹⁰² Later the Department of the Army queried EUCOM as to the proposed reduction of surplus program credits of DM 52,000,000 for reimbursement of the MDAP rebuild program during GFY 1953, the disposition of these funds having been held in abeyance by agreement between HICOG and EUCOM. The Department of the Army recommended that EUCOM discuss with HICOG a proposal to pay the DM 52,000,000 to the Federal Republic, with the understanding that this amount would be placed in a special account available for immediate EUCOM use in financing the 1952 - 1953 rebuild program.¹⁰³ Preliminary discussions with HICOG indicated favorable progress concerning the special account funds. In May the Department of the Army informed EUCOM that no further action was being taken to provide other methods of financing the MDA Program pending advice from EUCOM and requested that EUCOM provide a firm estimate of costs, to be used as a basis for making allocations, provision having been made for the \$14,500,000 already allocated to EUCOM for the rebuild program. EUCOM replied that the program was being financed temporarily with occupation cost Deutsche Mark funds, and that a procedure to effect reimbursement to the EUCOM Deutsche Mark budget was under discussion with HICOG and the German Ministry of Finance. Actual costs for the quarter ending 31 March 1952 were \$5,015,133. The estimated cost of the entire rehabilitation program was \$30,000,000, charged against the MSA appropriation allotted to the Department of Defense.¹⁰⁴ Rehabilitated vehicles provided to NATO countries were charged against the end-item program at original purchase costs, with adjustments for rehabilitation expenditures.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰²Cable DA-904737, COFSA from COA to CINCEUR, 26 Mar 52. SECRET.
In file cited above.

¹⁰³(1) Cable DA-906497, COFSA from COA to CINCEUR, 16 Apr 52. SECRET.
(2) Cable S-4497, CINCEUR to COFSA for COA, 22 Apr 52. SECRET. Both in file cited above.

¹⁰⁴(1) Cable DA-909437, COFSA from COA to CINCEUR, 22 May 52. SECRET.
(2) Cable S-5921, CINCEUR to COFSA for COA, 6 Jun 52. SECRET. Both in file cited above.

¹⁰⁵Cable 123, State Dept to Paris, Rome, London, SUSREP, CINCEUR, 14 Mar 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item 39.

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Section IV: Procurement

131. Off-shore Procurement for the Mutual Security Program

a. FY 1952. In 1952 the great bulk of dollar procurement in EUCOM/USAREUR was carried on under the MSP off-shore procurement (OSP) program. This program was adopted as a method of procurement by the U.S. military departments from sources outside of the United States, under the approval of the MDA Materiel Program. The OSP program for FY 1952 was contained in Program A, dated 7 December 1951 and received in EUCOM just prior to 31 December 1951. The purchases to be made under Program A included such items as ammunition, spare parts, vehicles, boats, office and field equipment, steel prefabs, trucks, trailers, and small arms. The program originally totaled \$281,289,000, of which \$272,307,000 was for ordnance, \$2,364,000 for quartermaster, \$311,000 for engineer, and \$6,317,000 for signal procurement. Program A also outlined the recipient countries, the suggested country of manufacture, the U.S. price, and the quantity of each item to be procured.¹⁰⁶ By 31 December 1952, a total of 64 contracts had been let under the FY 1952 program, with total obligations of \$340,437,890. Of this amount, \$44,430,702 had been actually spent by USAREUR for delivered items. The contracts let by EUCOM/USAREUR under FY 1952 program and the amount of the obligations, by country, were as follows: (1) Belgium, 5 contracts for 2.8 percent of the total obligations; (2) France, 18 contracts for 48.7 percent; (3) Germany, 4 contracts for 0.1 percent; (4) Greece, 3 contracts for 3.2 percent; (5) Italy, 18 contracts for 27.3 percent; (6) the Netherlands, 2 contracts for 0.6 percent; (7) Norway, 3 contracts for 1.7 percent; (8) Switzerland, 1 minor contract; and (9) United Kingdom, 10 contracts for 15.6 percent.¹⁰⁷

b. FY 1953. The OSP program for FY 1953 amounted to \$605,593,164 for procurement of ordnance and signal items alone. This amount was broken down as follows: (1) ordnance-ammunition, \$475,134,053; (2) ordnance-others, \$81,692,836; and (3) signal \$48,766,275. By 31 December 1952 one contract had been let under the FY 1953 program. This was a contract let in Great Britain for Centurion tanks and for ammunition, in the amount of \$74,781,511.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶C/N 1, USAREUR Log Div to USAREUR Hist Div, 4 Aug 52, sub: Semi-Annual Historical Report to ALFCE, Incl 2. SECRET. In USAREUR G-4 Div, 314.7 (1952), Vol. I, Item 7.

¹⁰⁷Mthly Stat Rept, 31 Dec 52, USAREUR Log Div., pp. 66 - 67. SECRET.

¹⁰⁸(1) Ibid. (2) CINC Wkly Stf Conf 22, 14 Oct 52, Hq USAREUR, p. 2. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

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c. Status of OSP Program, 31 December 1952. The combined FY 1952 and 1953 OSP programs amounted to \$946,031,054. Ordnance ammunition items comprised the greater share of the program, amounting to 70.6 percent of the total ceiling. Other ordnance items amounted to 9 percent of the ceiling, quartermaster items 0.1 percent, and signal items 10 percent. The Lisbon Program amounted to 10.3 percent of the combined ceiling for FY's 1952 and 1953. (See par. 167b.) As of 31 December 1952 a total of 65 contracts had been let in nine different European countries in the amount of \$415,219,401. Of this amount \$44,430,702 had been paid out by the end of 1952 for delivered items.¹⁰⁹

132. Dollar Procurement

Dollar procurement in Europe was effected by EUCOM for three distinct procurement programs. The major share of the normal dollar procurement by EUCOM was for the MSP-OSP program previously discussed. In addition, EUCOM procured certain items for its own use in Europe from the dollar funded budget and procured items for the Department of the Army for use in other commands. Finally, COMZ agencies carried on their own procurement in France both on a general scale and for construction along the LOFC. Between 1 January 1952 and 31 June 1952, the portion of FY 1952 falling in the first half of calendar year 1952, EUCOM obligated 455.3 million dollars for dollar procurement in Europe, nearly ten times the amount of FY 1952 funds obligated in the preceding half year. During the period 1 July 1952 to 31 December 1952, EUCOM/USAREUR operated under the FY 1953 budget. During this six month period a total of 117.7 million dollars was obligated by the command. The total amount obligated by EUCOM/USAREUR during calendar year 1952 was accordingly 573.1 million dollars. Of this amount 415.2 million dollars, or 72 percent, was for the MSP-OSP program. In addition, potential procurement actions valued at 541.8 million dollars were under investigation or negotiation as of 31 December 1952. Approximately 62 percent of the amount obligated for the entire calendar year was obligated during June 1952.¹¹⁰

133. Limitations on Dollar Procurement

Excessive spending during the last months of the fiscal year as evidenced by the excessive rate of obligation of funds in June 1952, caused the U.S. Congress to take action to prevent a repetition in the future. In September 1952 the Department of the Army notified all commands of Public Law 498, Section 639, forbidding the making of obligations for the

¹⁰⁹Mthly Stat Rept, 31 Dec 52, USAREUR Log Div, pp. 66 - 67. SECRET.

¹¹⁰Mthly Reviews of Log Actvs, EUCOM/USAREUR Log Div, 31 Jan 52, p. 57, SECRET; 29 Feb 52, p. 53; 31 Mar 52, p. 51; 30 Apr 52, p. 57; 31 May 52, p. 55; 30 Jun 52, p. 53; and 31 Dec 52, p. 49. ALL CONFIDENTIAL.

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last two months of any fiscal year in excess of 125 percent of the average monthly rate of obligation during the first ten months of the fiscal year.¹¹¹ If this law had been in effect earlier, EUCOM would have been limited in June 1952 to approximately 156.8 million dollars rather than the 358 million dollars actually obligated.

134. Deutsche Mark Procurement

The major share of procurement for the support of the operations of the command in Germany was carried out with Deutsche Marks from the German occupation costs budget. Data on the Deutsche Mark procurement normally lagged behind other procurement data because the information was obtained from summaries prepared by HICOG from Forms No. 6 GA, prepared by the technical services for the accountable month and, therefore, did not necessarily denote the number of orders actually placed during the month by the U.S. forces. During the period 1 January to 31 March 1952, the fourth quarter of GFY 1952, EUCOM obligated DM 423 million, bringing the total for GFY 1952 to more than DM 2 billion, an increase of approximately 150 percent over the rate of obligation in GFY 1951.¹¹² In the period 1 April to 31 December 1952, the first three quarters of GFY 1953, EUCOM/USAREUR obligated DM 1.6 billion. Total Deutsche Mark obligations of the command for the calendar year 1952 thus amounted to more than DM 2 billion. The DM 1.6 billion obligated during the last nine months of 1952 were broken down as follows: (1) services, DM 440,494,000; (2) supplies, DM 530,111,000; (3) construction, DM 555,724,000; and (4) real estate DM 59,223,000. Of the total amount, obligations by Air Force agencies amounted to DM 325 million and obligation by U.S. Naval Forces, Germany, to DM 15 million.¹¹³

135. Berlin Deutsche Mark Procurement

Procurement in Berlin was effected by a special EUCOM procurement team of technical service representatives organized in January 1950 to stimulate the market for small manufacturers, in response to a request for such assistance by U.S. Commander, Berlin. Between 1 January and 31 March 1952 (GFY 1952), DM 4.3 million were obligated in Berlin under the current procurement program. Between 1 April and 31 December 1952 (GFY 1953) approximately DM 35.8 million were obligated. The total for the calendar year 1952 was thus DM 40.1 million. Total obligations of the program since its inception in January 1950 were DM 61.3 million.¹¹⁴

¹¹¹CINC Wkly Stf Conf 22, 14 Oct 52, Hq USAREUR, p. 4. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

¹¹²Monthly Reviews of Log Actvs, 31 Jan 52, EUCOM Log Div, pp. 58 - 59; 31 Mar 52, pp. 58 - 59. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹¹³Ibid., 31 Dec 52, USAREUR Log Div, pp. 50 - 51. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹¹⁴Ibid., 31 Jan 52, p. 55; 29 Feb 52, p. 51; 31 Mar 52, p. 54; and 31 Dec 52, p. 51. ALL UNCLASSIFIED.

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Section V: Support of Other Agencies¹¹⁵

136. Army-Air Force Interservice Support

a. The EUCOM-NEIM-USAFE Interservice Logistic Support Agreement. EUCOM had been directed by the Department of the Army on 19 June 1951 to proceed on the basis that the Air Force would establish its own supply system for common-user items in France which by the end of FY 1954 would be capable of supplying Class II, IV, and V support, both current and emergency, for Air Force operations. The European Command, through its LOFC would provide for the Air Force in France Class I and III supplies, port facilities, land transportation, and such cross servicing as might be arranged locally.¹¹⁶ A EUCOM-NEIM-USAFE Interservice Logistic Support Agreement for Metropolitan France negotiated by the three services was signed on 24 March 1952, and became effective on 6 May 1952. The major concept of the agreement was the division of administrative and logistical responsibility in France in order to prevent unnecessary duplication or overlapping of administrative and logistical support by the maximum practicable integration and utilization of personnel, facilities, equipment, and supplies. The agreement provided that EUCOM would establish depot supply and maintenance for common-user items (with the exception of Class I and III) for the Air Force in France and that the Air Force would assume responsibility for these operations before the end of FY 1954. The agreement also provided that the service having predominant personnel or interest within any specified area in France would furnish administrative and logistical functions of a housekeeping and service nature in that area insofar as possible.¹¹⁷

b. Suspension of Plan for Depot Supply and Maintenance Responsibility. EUCOM was notified by the Department of the Army on 29 February 1952 that the problem of interservice logistic support in Europe was under study in the Department of Defense and that the plan for the allocation of responsibility for depot supply and maintenance was suspended.¹¹⁸ CINCEUR protested that this action placed EUCOM in the position of establishing and continuing support of the Air Force in France without a clear directive. He pointed out that expanding Air Force requirements had placed increased demands on EUCOM manpower, facilities, funds, and material

¹¹⁵Support rendered to HICOG by EUCOM/USAREUR is discussed in Ch. VIII.

¹¹⁶EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 280 - 82. SECRET.

¹¹⁷EUCOM ltr, to CINCNEIM and CINCUSAFE, 6 May 53, sub: Interservice Logistic Support Agreement in Metropolitan France. AG 400 GLD-AGO. RESTRICTED.

¹¹⁸Cable DA-902388, COFSA from ACOFS G-4 to CINCEUR, 29 Feb 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 371.2 (1952), Vol. I, Item 9C.

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resources without a firm basis for co-ordinated programming on the part of either service.¹¹⁹ These objections notwithstanding, the Department of the Army reiterated to EUCOM on 17 June 1952 that the Army, at the direction of the Department of Defense, was responsible for the receipt, storage, issue, and maintenance of common Army purchase items in France and Germany with the exception of those items for which the Air Force had already assumed responsibility. This responsibility would be retained by the Army until its transfer to the Air Force was approved by the Department of Defense. No decision on this matter was made by the Department of Defense before 31 December 1952.¹²⁰

c. Support for International Headquarters in France. CINCUSAFE signed the interservice agreement with the proviso that it was not intended to apply to the JCS directive which required EUCOM to provide support to the U.S. element of NATO headquarters in France.¹²¹ At EUCOM insistence, the Air Force interpretation was revised to coincide with the wording of the JCS directive in question. The new Air Force interpretation of the condition placed on the agreement stated, "It is my [CINCUSAFE's] understanding that it is not intended to conflict with the JCS directive requiring EUCOM to provide or arrange for support to the U.S. element of NATO Hqs in France." This new interpretation was considered by EUCOM to be in accord with the terms of the original agreement whereby EUCOM arranged for USAFE to support all U.S. forces in the Fontainebleau area.¹²² After a series of conferences with representatives of USAFE, it was determined that all facilities in the Fontainebleau area which had been provided by EUCOM solely for the support of international military headquarters would be made available to USAFE when the Air Force assumed responsibility for the support of all U.S. forces in the Fontainebleau area in accordance with the provisions of the interservice logistic support agreement.¹²³

¹¹⁹(1) Cable SX-3042, CINCEUR to COFSA, 8 Mar 52. CONFIDENTIAL.
(2) Cable SX-3702, CINCEUR to COFSA, 27 Mar 52. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 371.2 (1952), Vol. I, Item 9C atchd.

¹²⁰(1) Cable DA-336608, COFSA from ACOFS G-4 to CINCEUR, 17 Jun 52. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable SX-1300, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 14 Jan 53. SECRET. Both in file cited above.

¹²¹Ltr, CINCUSAFE to CINCEUR, 26 Mar 52, sub: Interservice Logistic Support Agreement, Metropolitan France. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 371.2 (1952), Vol. I, Item 1B atchd.

¹²²(1) Ltr, CINCUSAFE to CINCEUR, 22 Apr 52, same sub. RESTRICTED.
(2) C/N 3, Dir EUCOM Log Div to EUCOM DCOFS Opns, 28 Apr 52, to C/N 1, Dir EUCOM Log Div to EUCOM DCOFS Opns, 31 Mar 52, same sub. RESTRICTED. Both in file cited above.

¹²³Ltr, CINCEUR to CINCUSAFE, 10 May 52, sub: Logistic Support of International Headquarters, Central Europe. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 SHAPE (1952), Vol. I, Item 26 atchd.

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d. Implementation of the Interservice Agreements. The EUCOM director of logistics on 31 March recommended that the implementation of the supply portions of the interservice logistic support agreement be withheld, pending authority from the Secretary of Defense for the Air Force to receive the supplies to be transferred from the Army, and that implementation of the service portion of the agreement be withheld pending clarification of the original interpretation placed upon the agreement by CINCUSAFE.¹²⁴ Following the clarification of this interpretation by USAFE, the EUCOM Logistics Division recommended that the service portion of the agreement be implemented immediately and that the director of EUCOM Logistics Division in conjunction with the Commanding General, COMZ, be authorized to initiate necessary staff action with USAFE and NELM. These recommendations were approved on 6 May 1952 and the agreement was published effective that date.¹²⁵ EUCOM and USAFE then proceeded with the development of command level joint regulations and standing operating procedures to carry out the arrangement in detail, to establish a procedure for joint budget and program review, and to determine the requirements and means for providing cross-servicing of personnel, facilities, and funds needed by EUCOM to continue support of the Air Force until such time as USAFE was authorized to assume responsibility for supply and maintenance operations.¹²⁶

e. Termination of Logistical Support to Certain Air Force Units in Germany. In February 1952 EUCOM changed its policy with regard to the support of small Air Force units having the status of lodger units on military posts. The new policy provided that the support furnished would be restricted to supplies that were normally available at the military post, providing that the quantity was sufficient to meet all Army requirements before satisfying those of the Air Force units. A principal change was that supplies and support would be rendered only to those Air Force units with a strength of less than 200 and which were located more than 25 miles from the nearest exempt Air Force installation. The target date for this reduction in support was set for 12 April 1952.¹²⁷ At a meeting between representatives of USAFE and Frankfurt Military Post on 11 April 1952, it developed that the Air Force could not provide full support for its units

¹²⁴C/N 1, Dir EUCOM Log to EUCOM DCOFS Opns, 31 Mar 52, sub: Interservice Logistic Support Agreement, Metropolitan France. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 371.2 (1952), Vol. I, Item 1B atchd.

¹²⁵C/N 3, Dir EUCOM Log to EUCOM DCOFS Opns, 28 Apr 52 and C/N 4, EUCOM SGS to Dir EUCOM Log, 7 May 52, to C/N 1 cited above. RESTRICTED.

¹²⁶(1) Ltr, CINCEUR to CINCUSAFE, 4 Jun 52, sub: Interservice Logistic Support Agreement in Metropolitan France. RESTRICTED. (2) 1st Ind, Hqs USAFE to CINCEUR, 13 Jun 52, sub: EMLP 400 (4 Jun 52). RESTRICTED. Both in USAREUR SGS 371.2 (1952), Vol. I, Item 1B atchd.

¹²⁷EUCOM ltr, 27 Feb 52, sub: Emergency Supplies and Equipment for Small Air Force Units in Germany. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G-4 Gen Files 322 AF (1952), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd.

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for a period of six to nine months due to budgetary limitations. The conference proposed that the new EUCOM support policy be held in abeyance for a period of six months and that in the interim all supplies and services provided to Air Force units be costed and held in jacket files in the military post concerned pending disposition instructions from EUCOM headquarters.¹²⁸ As a result of these recommendations EUCOM extended the termination date for the support of some twenty one enumerated small Air Force units in Germany for six months from 12 April 1952 and notified the Twelfth Air Force that support from EUCOM for these units would be terminated on 15 November 1952. Provisions were made for the reimbursement of EUCOM for all support rendered to the enumerated Air Force units in the interim period.¹²⁹

f. Status of Interservice Support as of 31 December 1952. Under the provisions of the Interservice Logistic Support Agreement, USAREUR at the end of 1952 was responsible for the receipt, storage, issue, and depot maintenance of common-user purchase items for the Air Force in Germany and France, with the exception of those items for which the Air Force had already assumed responsibility. For emergency purposes, USAREUR was responsible for the stockage of Army common-user supplies and equipment to support the Air Force strength in France and Germany until resupply from the zone of interior could be effected. These supplies consisted of Class I and III supplies for an Air Force strength of 52,000 personnel, and Class II and IV supplies and equipment for an Air Force strength of 15,000 personnel.¹³⁰ Although EUCOM had recommended to the Department of the Army a revision of the Air Force Special Reserves 1 and 2 to provide Class I and III support for an Air Force strength of 100,000 men, and Class II and IV support for an Air Force strength of 52,000 men, no reply had been received by the end of the year.¹³¹

¹²⁸Memo for recd, Maj E. Wilson, EUCOM Log Div Sup Br Dist Sec, 4 Jun 52, sub: Logistic Support for Small Air Force Units in Germany. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G-4 Cen Files 400LS (1952), Vol. III, Item 66.

¹²⁹(1) Cable SC-7228, CINCEUR to All Mil Posts, 5 May 52. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR G-4 Cen Files 322 AF (1952), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd.

(2) EUCOM ltr, to CG, Twelfth AF, 7 Jun 52, sub: Logistic Support of Air Force Units. AG 400 GLD-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹³⁰CINCUSAREUR Wkly Stf Conf 2, 10 Feb 53, pp. 2 - 3. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

¹³¹(1) Ltr, CINCEUR to DA, 5 Jun 52, sub: Revision of AF Special Reserves 1 & 2, AG 400 GLD. SECRET. In USAREUR G-4 Cen Files 400 Gen (1952), Vol. IV, Item 36. (2) Cable SX-1300, CINCUSAREUR to US CINCEUR, 14 Jan 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 371.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 9C atchd.

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137. Support of U.S. Naval Forces, Germany

The command in 1952 continued to furnish COMNAVGER common-user support on a reimbursable basis, while the purely naval supplies continued to be requisitioned from the zone of interior by COMNAVGER. EUCOM, however, altered the dependent housing procedure for naval personnel on 12 May 1952. The U.S. Navy regarded duty in EUCOM as shore duty during which personnel could be expected to be accompanied by their dependents; moreover, the naval tour of duty in EUCOM was for two years only, in contrast to the Army and Air Force tours of three years. EUCOM requested that billeting offices maintain separate naval rosters within each dependent housing group and give naval dependents priority at the rate of one and a half days' credit for each day of waiting, to commence with the date of departure of the sponsor from the zone of interior.¹³²

138. Support of USFA

On 2 April 1952, a plan for the support of U.S. Forces, Austria, which was submitted by that command was concurred in by EUCOM, with exception of Annex V which concerned transportation.¹³³ The revised transportation annex was finally concurred in by USAREUR on 20 October 1952 and was published by USFA on 18 November 1952.¹³⁴ The new plan was made necessary by the establishment of the USFA LOFC through Leghorn, Italy. This plan, originally drawn up in August 1951, was to become operative at phased intervals after the announcement by USFA of D Day—the first day upon which normal maintenance supplies would arrive at Leghorn from the zone of interior. Any difficulties which might arise under the implementation of the plan and which could not be resolved by the chiefs of the technical services of the two commands, were to be settled jointly by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, USFA, and the EUCOM director of logistics. Any desired changes in policy were to be referred to the Department of the Army through GINCUSFA and CINGEUR. According to the plan EUCOM was to furnish operational ordnance support in items which were normally procured or rebuilt within the command and was to furnish certain perishable or expendable Class I, II and IV supplies. USFA was to procure its own Class II supplies. EUCOM was to furnish field

¹³²EUCOM ltr, 12 May 52, sub: Dependent Housing for Personnel of U.S. Naval Forces in Germany. AG 045.93 GPA-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹³³1st Ind, Hq EUCOM to CG USFA, 2 Apr 52, sub: USFA Support Plan. AG 400 GLD (21 Aug 51). RESTRICTED. In USAREUR G-4 Cen Files, 400LS (1952), Vol. III, Item 3.

¹³⁴7th Ind, Hq USAREUR to CG USFA, 20 Oct 52, sub: USFA Support Plan. AG 400 GLD (21 Aug 51). RESTRICTED. In USAREUR G-4 Cen Files 400LS (1952), Vol. III, Item 3 atchd. (2) Ltr, CG USFA, to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Nov 52, sub: Annex V — USFA Support Plan. AG 461 GLD. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR G-4 Cen Files 400LS USFA Support Plan (1952).

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maintenance support for certain equipment and items requiring specialized maintenance beyond the capabilities of USFA. Arrangements were made for the phased change-over of certain engineer supplies from EUCOM to USFA. Medical logistical support was to continue in the same manner as before. EUCOM was to provide certain signal facilities and to continue chemical support with little alteration in the existing procedures and supplies. USFA personnel were to be processed through Bremerhaven and transported by EUCOM, while certain personnel services, such as EES, Class VI support, and Special Services tours and shows, would continue to be furnished by EUCOM.¹³⁵ A separate agreement for the logistical support of light Army aviation units of USFA by the Twelfth Air Force was concurred in by EUCOM on 13 June 1952.¹³⁶ The USFA Support Plan, with the tacit approval of the Department of the Army, was fully implemented by 1 January 1952 following the establishment of the USFA LOFC through Leghorn, Italy, during 1951. This implementation preceded the obtaining of concurrences for the plan which had originally been submitted in August 1951 but was delayed by necessary revisions.¹³⁷

139. Transfer of Support Responsibilities to Seventh Army

Plans for the Seventh Army to establish certain supply and maintenance activities for its own support included the transfer of various technical facilities to Seventh Army control. Chemical supplies were to be issued from depots at Kirchheim-Bolanden through supply points in the vicinity of Stuttgart and Frankfurt. Engineer supplies were to be issued by a Seventh Army depot company from the Seventh Army issue section of the Rhine Engineer Depot at Kaiserslautern to supply points at Hanau, Schwetzingen, and in the vicinity of Stuttgart. Ordnance supplies, Class II and IV, were to be issued from supply points at Boeblingen, Ober Ursel, Illersheim, and Esslingen. Class V supplies were to be had from supply points at Muenster and Stuttgart. Field maintenance was to be performed by field maintenance units assigned to the Seventh Army quartermaster. Class I and III supplies would be supplied from the existing military post facilities at Ludwigsburg, Hanau, Nuernberg, Munich (or Augsburg), and Kaiserslautern. Signal supplies were to be issued from supply points at Boeblingen and Hanau.¹³⁸ Provisions of this plan with regard to engineer and signal supplies were implemented during the latter part of 1952. Ordnance provisions had been put into effect prior to 1 January

¹³⁵Hq USFA, USFA Support Plan [1952]. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

¹³⁶1st Ind, Hq EUCOM to CG USFA, 13 Jun 52, sub: Logistic Support of Light Aviation, USFA. AG 360 GLD (2 Jun 52). RESTRICTED. In USAREUR G-4 Gen Files, 400LS (1952), Vol. III, Item 69.

¹³⁷Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col C. S. Carmack, USAREUR G-4 Sup Br, 31 Jul 53. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹³⁸Log Plng Forecast, 1 Jan 52, EUCOM Log Div, pp. 14 - 15. SECRET.

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1952, while the quartermaster and medical provisions were held in abeyance by agreement between USAREUR and Seventh Army.¹³⁹

Section VI: Construction

140. Construction and Rehabilitation of Casernes

The EUCOM troop augmentation program, as well as the tactical relocation of troops in Germany, had necessitated a program of construction, rehabilitation, and expansion of caserne areas for troop housing and support facilities subsequent to 1 July 1950.¹⁴⁰ As of 1 January 1952, work was in progress or already completed on the rehabilitation or construction of some seventy six installations acquired by EUCOM under the EUCOM augmentation program. Some casernes scheduled for reacquisition by EUCOM were not released as originally requested and planned. In these instances cantonment camps were being constructed to overcome the deficiency created by their nonrelease and these camps are included in construction figures. By 1 January 1952 a total of 12 of the 76 installations had been completed and were in use or ready for occupancy.¹⁴¹ During 1952 the number of projects in this program was increased to 120. By 31 October 1952, when the final report on the progress of the program was made, 96 installations were completed and in use or ready for occupancy. Of the remaining 24 projects, 12 were more than 90 percent complete and only 1 project was less than 50 percent complete. Only 4 of the 24 were scheduled for completion after 31 December 1952.¹⁴²

141. Utilization of Troop Billeting Facilities

On 1 January 1952, EUCOM had available for use approximately 345,196 troop billet spaces. The term "troop space available" employed for statistical purposes was defined as that space which was under the control of the U.S. forces and met the EUCOM criteria for troop use, or was under construction or rehabilitation for troop use. The figure for 1 January included the installations used by the labor service units (12,225 spaces)

¹³⁹Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. L. G. Becker, USAREUR G-4 Sup Br, 31 Jul 53. RESTRICTED.

¹⁴⁰EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 283 - 84. SECRET.

¹⁴¹Monthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Dec 51, EUCOM Log Div, pp. 35 - 43. SECRET.

¹⁴²Ibid., 31 Dec 52, USAREUR Log Div, pp. 36 - 37.

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and installations not tactically usable at that time (61,480 spaces). Troop billet spaces which were used as schools, hospitals, depots, headquarters, and for IRO and other non-Army activities were not included. Figures on troop billeting facilities given in January are based on the troop utilization factor in Germany. The troop housing utilization factor was the ratio of Army troop strength in Germany as compared to Army troop billeting spaces available (less Labor Services and space tactically unusable). The utilization factor for Germany for 1 January 1952 based on an actual troop strength of 220,000 was 84 percent.¹⁴³ By the end of the year USAREUR figures were broadened to include all troop billet spaces throughout the command. As of 31 December 1952 a total of 346 troop billet installations with a capacity of 351,000 troop spaces were under U.S. control in Germany and France. At that time a troop billet installation was defined as a building or group of buildings with a net usable capacity of more than 100 troops which was used for, or suitable for troop billeting, without major rehabilitation or relocation of other activities. Approximately 276,600 troops, including Army, Navy, Air Force, and Labor Services, were housed in these installations representing a troop utilization factor of 78.8 percent for the end of 1952. As of 31 December 1952 USAREUR had a total potential troop billeting capacity of 613,300 spaces. This consisted of the 351,000 spaces actually in use for troop billeting plus an additional 263,300 spaces which were utilized for other purposes.¹⁴⁴

142. Troop Housing in France

The program to provide adequate troop housing in France was slow in getting under way. Late in 1951 a program was undertaken to provide prefabricated housing for approximately 9,600 troops. The first of these prefabricated troop housing units was completed in January 1952.¹⁴⁵ In spite of the efforts to provide adequate housing for all troops in COMZ during 1952, thousands of men were still living in tents with the approach of winter. A program was started in September to winterize sufficient tents for 10,000 troops spaces, but it was anticipated that by the winter of 1953 - 54 all troops in COMZ would be adequately housed.¹⁴⁶ In addition, an emergency hospital program was planned for COMZ which provided for hospitals so constructed that they could be used for troop billeting in peacetime and would provide hospital facilities in the event of an

¹⁴³Cable S-2702, CINCEUR to COFSA for ACOFS G-4, 28 Feb 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1952), Vol. I, Item 17 atchd.

¹⁴⁴Monthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Dec 52, USAREUR Log Div, p. 25. SECRET.

¹⁴⁵Establishment of Communications through France, 1950 - 1951, pp. 49 - 51. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

¹⁴⁶Ltr, Maj Gen S. D. Sturgis, CG COMZ, to Lt Gen M. S. Eddy, CINCUSAREUR, 26 Sep 52, sub: Winterization Program in COMZ. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1952), Vol. III, Item 87A.

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emergency. Only one of these hospitals, at Bar le Due, was begun during 1952 and it was not scheduled for completion until 1 April 1955.¹⁴⁷

143. Family Housing and BOQ Construction

At the beginning of 1952, the command faced the problem of providing proper housing for thousands of additional dependent personnel expected during the year, as well as for bachelor officers at their duty stations. The relocation of most of the supply depots in 1952 from the U.S. Zone to locations west of the Rhine in the French Zone of Germany caused a sharp dislocation in the housing program. Areas where housing had been adequate before relocation now became congested, while at old locations there occurred a temporary surplus of housing. In 1952 a total of DM 402,000,000 was appropriated for the housing construction program of EUCOM/USAREUR. This brought the total for the entire EUCOM/USAREUR housing program since its inception to DM 771,000,000. Of that amount nearly one third was allotted the Western Area Command (formerly Rhine Military Post) for the construction of 5,420 family apartments and 1,598 BOQ spaces.¹⁴⁸ No housing construction was accomplished in France during 1952, because of protracted and inconclusive negotiations with the French Government.¹⁴⁹

a. Family Housing Requirements. Throughout 1952 family housing requirements continued to exceed availability, despite the progress in new construction. This condition was aggravated by the fact that many available quarters were not located within convenient distances from military assignments. In addition, where houses were located in places where they could be used, only 75 percent were available without consideration as to type, as of 1 January 1952. There were approximately 22,500 houses available for use in EUCOM as against 30,000 requirements as of 1 January, as shown in the following table:¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Dec 52, USAREUR Log Div, p. 38.
CONFIDENTIAL.

¹⁴⁸Ibid., 31 Dec 51, EUCOM Log Div, p. 34, SECRET; 31 Dec 52, USAREUR Log Div, p. 31, UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁴⁹Interv, Pvt F. B. M. Hollyday, USAREUR 10th Hist Det, with Miss Joan A. Sullivan, USAREUR Engr Div Hist, 23 Jun 53. SECRET.

¹⁵⁰Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Dec 51, EUCOM Log Div, pp. 27 - 32.
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	<u>Housing Required</u>	<u>Housing Available</u>
<u>Total EUCOM</u>	<u>30,301</u>	<u>22,753</u>
Augsburg Mil Post	1,482	924
Berlin Mil Post	502	613
Bremerhaven POE	479	672
Frankfurt Mil Post	5,396	4,659
Garmisch Mil Post	166	177
Heidelberg Mil Post	3,403	2,291
Munich Mil Post	2,217	2,681
Nuernberg Mil Post	2,761	2,646
Rhine Mil Post	3,755	329
Stuttgart Mil Post	3,051	1,806
Wuerzburg Mil Post	1,624	1,170
U.S. Air Force	5,179	4,519
LOFC	1,012	0

At the end of the year family housing requirements in USAREUR totaled some 35,700 as against an availability of approximately 26,900 family housing units. In addition to the family housing units which were available for occupancy, USAREUR controlled some 4,500 family units which were used for other purposes. Of these some 3,200 units were used as BOQ's while an additional 1,100 were used for office space, GYA centers, clubs and other administrative purposes. The following table shows the requirements and availability of family housing as of 31 December 1952, by the area commands, the Air Force, and the LOFC.¹⁵¹

<u>Housing Area</u>	<u>Housing Required</u>	<u>Housing Available</u>
<u>Total in USAREUR</u>	<u>35,742</u>	<u>26,884</u>
Northern Area Command	8,643	7,594
Southern Area Command	10,511	8,945
Headquarters Area Command	3,702	2,418
Berlin Command	254	467
Western Area Command	4,190	2,386
Bremerhaven POE	653	595
U.S. Air Force	5,267	4,479
LOFC	2,522	—

¹⁵¹Ibid., 31 Dec 52, USAREUR Log Div, pp. 26 - 30. SECRET.

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b. BOQ Requirements. Throughout 1952 the ratio of requirements to availability of BOQ rooms was generally more favorable than in the case of family housing. As of 1 January 1952 the BOQ requirements for EUCOM were 14,900 rooms with a total of 18,600 rooms available. This figure of rooms available, however, consisted of approximately 75 percent of the total rooms, 24,969, which had been acquired for use as bachelor quarters by EUCOM. The remainder of the rooms were used for transient billeting, office space, and other purposes. While there existed an excess of approximately 3,700 rooms over requirements for BOQ's at the beginning of the year, when consideration was given to the "located where usable" category, a shortage of approximately 2,000 BOQ rooms existed. The following table gives a breakdown of BOQ requirements and availability as of 1 January 1952.¹⁵²

	<u>Required BOQ Rooms</u>	<u>Available BOQ Rooms</u>
<u>Total EUCOM</u>	<u>14,904</u>	<u>18,634</u>
Augsburg Mil Post	783	893
Berlin Mil Post	620	1,006
Bremerhaven POE	190	433
Frankfurt Mil Post	3,326	5,272
Garmisch Mil Post	95	223
Heidelberg Mil Post	1,732	1,511
Munich Mil Post	1,548	2,870
Nuernberg Mil Post	1,257	1,455
Rhine Mil Post	1,071	727
Stuttgart Mil Post	1,507	1,307
Wuerzburg Mil Post	501	898
U.S. Air Force	1,963	2,039
LOFC	312	0

As of 31 December 1952 the USAREUR BOQ requirements were for approximately 14,600 rooms against an availability of some 17,600, of which only 12,500 were properly located for use. An additional 6,900 rooms were in use as transient billets or for other purposes. The following table shows the BOQ requirements and availability as of 31 December 1952 by the area commands, the Air Force, and the LOFC.¹⁵³

¹⁵²Ibid., 31 Dec 51, EUCOM Log Div, pp. 48 - 51. SECRET.

¹⁵³Ibid., 31 Dec 52, USAREUR Log Div, pp. 26 - 30. SECRET.

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	<u>Required BOQ Rooms</u>	<u>Available BOQ Rooms</u>
<u>Total for USAREUR</u>	<u>14,583</u>	<u>17,597</u>
Northern Area Command	2,994	4,315
Southern Area Command	4,348	5,213
Headquarters Area Command	1,687	2,384
Berlin Command	744	1,038
Western Area Command	1,304	1,792
Bremerhaven POE	105	234
U.S. Air Force	2,253	2,621
LOFC	1,148	0

144. Hospital Construction Program

The EUCOM program of hospital construction and rehabilitation was begun in January 1951 and was developed to provide adequate hospital support for EUCOM's FY 1952 ceiling of 259,000 troops. The hospital program for Germany envisaged the expansion of hospitals east of the Rhine to provide a total of 4,974 usable beds and the construction of new hospitals west of the Rhine to provide 3,200 beds. As of 1 January 1952 six hospitals were in the process of construction or rehabilitation in Germany to provide an additional 2,200 beds. In France the program involved the rehabilitation of old French installations and the building of a number of new hospitals, some of which would be stand-by facilities during peacetime and utilized as troop billets, but would be capable of conversion to hospital wards in the event of an emergency. Rehabilitation of allotted space in a caserne in Verdun provided a 25-bed hospital which by the end of 1952 was usable but not complete.¹⁵⁴ EUCOM plans for France during 1952 provided for hospital construction to be used as troop billets for 12,300 troop spaces during peacetime operations but would be used as 8,200 additional emergency beds in the event of an emergency.¹⁵⁵ During 1952, work was begun on an additional four hospitals in Germany, all located in Rhine Military Post. Three hospitals were begun in France, two of which were to provide a total of 400 operational beds while the third was one of those scheduled to be used as a troop housing facility during normal operations. By 31 December 1952 six hospital projects had been completed in Germany, four hospital expansion projects east of the Rhine to provide an additional 1,400 beds, and two in Western Area Command providing 700 beds. In

¹⁵⁴(1) EUCOM CINC Wkly Stf Conf 10, 15 Apr 52, pp. 2 - 3. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br. (2) Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Dec 51, EUCOM Log Div, p. 25. RESTRICTED.

¹⁵⁵EUCOM CINC Wkly Stf Conf cited above, pp. 2 - 3.

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addition an expansion program at the 97th General Hospital in Frankfurt to provide an additional 300 beds was 99 percent complete by 31 December and was scheduled for completion in early 1953.¹⁵⁶

145. Laundry Construction Program

The laundry construction program in Germany which had been initiated in 1950, contemplated an expansion sufficient to provide service, based on single shift operations, for 187,500 men. Prior to 1 January 1952 six laundry plants had been completed with a capacity for serving 58,500 men, bringing the EUCOM laundry capacity in January 1952 to approximately 122,500 or 61 percent of the projected figure. Upon completion of the laundry construction program EUCOM planned the phase-out of outmoded plants with a capacity for 37,500 men. As of 1 January 1952 construction was under way on eleven plants with a total capacity for 122,500 men. The completion of at least four of these plants had been seriously delayed because of the unusually high proportion of steam and hot water pipe necessary in such construction. These items were critical materials in short supply and were rationed to building contractors in Germany. In addition to the laundry program in Germany, EUCOM plans for COMZ called for the construction in France of plants capable of serving 35,000 troops.¹⁵⁷ During 1952 a survey was initiated both in Germany and in France in order to prevent the duplication of quartermaster and EES laundry and dry cleaning facilities.¹⁵⁸ By 31 December 1952 the program in Germany was virtually complete, with only two plants still under construction but scheduled for completion within a period of sixty days after 1 January 1953. In France the only plant under construction in 1952 was at Orleans and was also scheduled for completion in January 1953.¹⁵⁹

146. Construction at Rhine Military Post (Western Area Command)

The tactical relocation of depot facilities and installations west of the Rhine had necessitated the initiation of major construction projects in Rhine Military Post, for GFY's 1952 and 1953. A total of DM 420,000,000, or 40 percent of all GFY 1952 construction funds, were made available to the Commanding General, Rhine Military Post, for construction during GFY 1952. Due to shortages of steel, materials, and other difficulties, the program in Rhine Military Post was delayed to some extent. Because of the delays encountered, the post was not able to obligate its funds in a ratio

¹⁵⁶Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Dec 52, USAREUR Log Div, p. 38.
CONFIDENTIAL.

¹⁵⁷Ibid., 31 Dec 51, p. 25; 31 Jan 52, p. 36. EUCOM Log Div.
RESTRICTED.

¹⁵⁸Ibid., 31 Mar 52, EUCOM Log Div, p. 25. RESTRICTED.

¹⁵⁹Ibid., 31 Dec 52, USAREUR Log Div, pp. 6, 34 - 35. SECRET.

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comparable to other posts and, as a result, EUCOM withdrew DM 15,000,000 from the Rhine Military Post allocations for GFY 1952.¹⁶⁰ The total carry-over from GFY 1952 construction funds for Rhine Military Post amounted to DM 171,000,000, while the construction program for GFY 1953 was set at DM 346,000,000.¹⁶¹ By 31 December 1952, the total construction program for the Western Area Command amounted to DM 377,630,000 while the amount actually allotted to WACOM for construction was DM 298,270,000. This was by far the greatest amount allotted to any area command or military district for construction during GFY 1953, comprising approximately 48 percent of the total amount allotted for construction in USAREUR during GFY 1953. The amount allotted to WACOM for construction by 31 December 1952 amounted to approximately 80 percent of the total expenditure programmed for that command. By 31 December 1952 the total carryover from GFY 1952 construction funds had been reduced to DM 139,620,000.¹⁶²

147. COMZ Construction Program

An extensive program of construction was in progress in COMZ during 1952, comprising 25 major projects under actual construction as of 1 January 1952. Plans were under development in EUCOM for 43 additional construction projects and the construction sites for 25 of these projects had been obtained from the French.¹⁶³ On 31 December 1952 construction was in progress on a total of 35 major projects, which included port facilities, staging areas, storage and maintenance facilities, command and command support facilities, a signal communications network, and depots. Of these 35 projects, 5 were more than 50 percent complete.¹⁶⁴ A total of 7 major projects were completed in COMZ during 1952, all prior to 1 April 1952.¹⁶⁵

a. Financing and Taxation Problems in COMZ. On 6 November 1950 when the agreement for establishing the LOFC was signed, the French agreed to contribute two billion francs, or 20 percent of the total cost of the LOFC, payable after 1 January 1951. It was also agreed that if expenditures were substantially more or less than the original estimate of ten billion francs, either side might ask for a re-examination of the formula in order to arrive at a more equitable redistribution of costs.¹⁶⁶ EUCOM

¹⁶⁰EUCOM CINC Wkly Stf Conf 5, 19 Feb 52, pp. 3 - 4. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

¹⁶¹Monthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 May 52, EUCOM Log Div, p. 32. RESTRICTED.

¹⁶²Ibid., 28 Feb 53, USAREUR G-4, pp. 28 - 29. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁶³Ibid., 31 Jan 52, EUCOM Log Div, pp. 7, 35 - 36. SECRET.

¹⁶⁴Ibid., 31 Dec 52, USAREUR Log Div, pp. 34 - 35. CONFIDENTIAL.

¹⁶⁵Ibid., 31 Jan 52, pp. 40 - 41; 31 Mar 52, pp. 26 - 27. EUCOM Log Div. SECRET.

¹⁶⁶Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of France Regarding the Establishment and Operation of a Line of Communications Across France, 6 Nov 50. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 371.2 (1950), Vol. II, Item 58.

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planned its construction budget for 1952 on the assumption that France would make further contributions during that year, but negotiations were stalemated.¹⁶⁷ Another problem arose from French taxation of EUCOM/USAREUR procurement and construction in France. A study made by EUCOM in 1951 revealed that approximately 20 percent of the U.S. procurement dollar accrued to the French Government in taxes, both from construction and from other purchases from the French economy. It was estimated that these taxes, if continued, would reduce the dollar efficiency of the major construction program in France by approximately \$50,000,000. The amount lost in taxes during the first year of operation alone more than offset the initial contribution made by France.¹⁶⁸ On 13 March 1952 an agreement on tax relief was concluded with the French Government which exempted USAREUR from the following taxes on purchases made in France: (1) production tax; (2) transaction tax; (3) the local transaction tax; and (4) registration tax on contracts. In addition an exchange of letters between Mr. Philip W. Bonsal of the U.S. embassy and Foreign Minister Robert Schuman of France guaranteed the co-operation of the French Government in eliminating the services tax, the national transaction tax on services, and the local tax on services.¹⁶⁹ The necessity of making construction arrangements through the French Government instead of directly with the French contractors also led to difficulties. Every contract had to be negotiated through a French Government department, every purchase of materials and supplies had to be arranged through a French liaison officer, and all payments had to be made through the French Government. After extended negotiations USAREUR obtained the permission of French Defense Minister M. Rene Plevan in April 1952 for direct Army purchase of supplies and services up to \$10,000 for any one project, and for direct contracting up to \$50,000 with certain exceptions. M. Plevan also authorized the use of Army personnel, including engineer troops in the event that any major construction project fell more than thirty days behind schedule. In May 1952 the Johnson Construction Agreement negotiated by the Military Facilities Negotiating Group (MFNG) more clearly defined the various fields and stages in the construction cycle in which the French and American services would operate. Both of these agreements were instrumental in speeding up the construction program in COMZ.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁷Memo, USAREUR Dir of Log Div to USAREUR COFS, 13 Oct 52, sub: Negotiations for French Contribution for Support of LOFC in 1952. GLD 102-85. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 COMZ (1952), Vol. I, Item 32 B/P.

¹⁶⁸Establishment of Communications through France, 1950 - 1951, USAREUR Hist Div, pp. 115 - 16. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

¹⁶⁹Ltr, Mr. P. W. Bonsal, Charge d'Affaires, AMEMB Paris, to M. Robert Schuman, FONMIN of France, 13 Mar 52, sub: Agreement on Tax Relief for U.S. Expenditures. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 012.2 (1952), Vol. I, Item 12A.

¹⁷⁰USAREUR COMZ Comd Rept, 1952, p. 30. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

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b. Planning for a Joint Construction Agency. The COMZ construction program, already hampered by local conditions, lack of engineering personnel, and the terms of the basic LOFC agreement, was further complicated in 1952 by the growing requirements of the U.S. Air Force in France. These requirements, unco-ordinated with Army needs, threatened to lead to undesirable competition for sites, supplies, and manpower. A study of the problem was begun in May with a view to creating a single interservice agency to supervise the construction programs of both the Army and Air Force in France. On 17 September Gen. M. B. Ridgway, US CINCEUR, directed the Commanding General, USAREUR COMZ, to prepare to assume responsibility for all U.S. military construction in continental France and to prepare and submit a plan for assuming this responsibility at the earliest practicable date. The plan drawn up by USAREUR COMZ was forwarded as scheduled, approved by US CINCEUR on 31 October 1952 and forwarded to the Department of the Army. On 20 November 1952 the JCS directed the establishment of the Joint Construction Agency, authorizing its initial establishment at a lower level (USAREUR COMZ) but with the clear intent that it should become an element of Headquarters, US EUCOM. The Department of the Army on 16 December 1952, as executive agent of the Defense Department, directed the establishment of the Joint Construction Agency by 15 January 1953 in USAREUR COMZ and its transfer to US EUCOM no later than 15 April 1953. This agency was to be responsible for all U.S. military construction in Western Europe with the exception of Western Germany.¹⁷¹

c. COMZ Pipeline Project. The COMZ pipeline project remained in its preliminary stages throughout 1952. Negotiations with the French Government for the construction of the pipeline were reopened in January by the Military Facilities Negotiating Group at the direction of the U.S. Department of State, and were continued intermittently throughout the year without result.¹⁷² The pipeline, as originally projected, was to extend from Donges on the Loire estuary to Melun. A proposed extension of the pipeline to Metz was in the planning stages during 1952. Under these plans the pipeline would consist of a 12-inch line from Donges to Melun and a 10-inch from Melun to Metz.¹⁷³ At the end of November 1952, it was decided that the proposed Melun to Metz extension of the pipeline would be introduced into the negotiations with the French but that it would have to be done in such a way as to avoid the raising of any questions which might delay consummation of a pipeline agreement.¹⁷⁴ Talks continued through December 1952 without producing any concrete results.

¹⁷¹Ibid., pp. 69 - 75.

¹⁷²Cable 722, AMEMB Paris to State Dept, 23 Sep 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item 27A atchd.

¹⁷³Cable SX-5285, CINCUSAREUR to COFSA for ACOFS G-3, 18 Nov 52. SECRET. In file cited above.


¹⁷⁴(1) Memo for recd, USAREUR Log Div, 26 Nov 52, sub: POL Pipeline, France. SECRET. (2) 3d Ind, Hq US EUCOM to CINCUSAREUR, 11 Dec 52, sub: LOC Pipeline Meeting, 14 Nov 52. LPM 400 (19 Nov 52). SECRET. Both in file cited above.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PRINCIPAL HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE

31 December 1952



Names in () were commanders earlier in 1952

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CHAPTER 8

Participation in Western Defense

Section I: EUCOM/USAREUR Relationships with SHAPE and Certain Allied Powers

148. Responsibilities for Defense of Western Europe

Throughout 1952, the U.S. forces in Europe continued their support of the international military organizations which had been created for the purpose of defending Western Europe against the threat of aggression (Chart 16). This participation, the pattern for which had been established in 1951, consisted of two major areas of contribution: first, the supply of combat units to the forces organized under Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE), and, second, the supply of needed logistical and administrative support to United States and international elements of SHAPE and to U.S. elements of SHAPE subordinate headquarters, Central Europe. Additional support was rendered to other commands. These contributions were the responsibility of CINCEUR and his successor, CINCUSAREUR.¹

149. Establishment of Army Groups in Central Europe

On 19 January, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), notified the U.S. Secretary of Defense that it was his ultimate intention to constitute two army groups within the Central European command. One of these groups, composed of French and U.S. troops, was to be placed under U.S. command, and the second group, composed of Belgian, British, and

¹(1) EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951. SECRET. (2) EUCOM GO 51, 31 Jul 52, sub: Redesignation of Command. UNCLASSIFIED.

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Netherlands troops, under British command. SACEUR proposed to activate the headquarters of the French-U.S. army group in nuclear form as soon as possible and to build it up as rapidly as the necessary staff and equipment could be made available. The headquarters of the Belgian-British-Netherlands army group was to remain on a skeleton basis within the existing headquarters of the British Army of the Rhine until a later date. SACEUR requested that Gen. Thomas T. Handy, Commander in Chief, European Command, be made available for assignment as the commander of the French-U.S. army group in addition to his other duties.² At the same time that the request was made to the U.S. Secretary of Defense for assignment of General Handy, a similar request was made by SACEUR to the British Ministry of Defense for agreement to assignment of Lt. Gen. Sir Charles Harding, Commander in Chief, BAOR, as commander-designate of the Belgian-British-Netherlands army group.³ The Standing Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization approved the formation of the two army groups, which were accordingly established in skeletonized form and attached to BAOR and to the U.S. Army in Europe, respectively.⁴ Subsequently SACEUR publicly announced their formation under the over-all command of the Commander in Chief, Allied Land Forces, Central Europe (CINCLANDCENT). Emergency plans for the Central Army Group provided that the order would become operational on the general alert order.⁵

150. Logistical and Administrative Support of SHAPE and its Subordinate Headquarters

a. Changes in EUCOM Personnel on Duty with SHAPE. The Director, EUCOM Logistics Division, recommended on 15 January 1952 that steps be taken to eliminate all logistical and administrative support provided SHAPE and its subordinate elements which was not expressly authorized by the Department of the Army. He recommended that EUCOM request SHAPE to determine the facilities and personnel spaces which SHAPE would require as a result of this change, in order that they might be included in a new

²Cable 22176, SACEUR to SD, 19 Jan 52. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 SHAPE (1952), Vol. I, Item 10a atchd.

³Cable 22175, SACEUR to Min of Def London, 19 Jan 52. NATO SECRET. In file cited above.

⁴Ltr, COFS SHAPE to SG NATO, 30 Aug 52, sub: SHAPE's Policy Regarding the Status and the Financing of Allied Headquarters, par. 9. NATO CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322 SHAPE (1952), Vol. II, Item 37a-1 atchd.

⁵IRS, USAREUR DCOFS Opns to Dir USAREUR OPOT Div, 5 Dec 52, sub: Formation of Army Group Headquarters. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 SHAPE (1952), Vol. II, Item 53a atchd.

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troop basis to be established for SHAPE. He further proposed that in the interest of efficiency and economy EUCOM consolidate logistic and administrative operations in the Paris-Fontainebleau area under EUCOM COMZ. The 7961 EUCOM Detachment could then be reduced to the status of a liaison mission to SHAPE and could serve as the sole contact between EUCOM subordinate headquarters furnishing actual support, and SHAPE and its subordinate headquarters.⁶ Exploratory discussion regarding these recommendations took place on 22 January 1952. No steps were taken at the time to secure a separate troop basis for SHAPE, but SHAPE agreed to release 100 civilian spaces formerly furnished by EUCOM. It was SHAPE's position that the remaining spaces needed for providing logistical and administrative support to SHAPE should be furnished by EUCOM from its troop basis, and that it was the responsibility of EUCOM rather than of SHAPE to secure the corresponding augmentation in troop ceilings. These spaces included 124 civilians and 244 military personnel, in addition to 5 officers, 4 female medical officers, and 26 enlisted men of the 34th Station Hospital.⁷

b. Procedures for Reimbursable Support. On 23 January 1952, the EUCOM comptroller notified the EUCOM chief of staff that the Department of the Army's assignment to CINGEUR of primary responsibility for the logistical support, on a reimbursable basis, of international elements of SHAPE and of Central Europe international headquarters subordinate to SHAPE, required a formal agreement on procedures for providing such support and for effecting appropriate reimbursement. According to procedures then in effect, SHAPE requests for logistical support were directed to the 7961 EUCOM Detachment, and nonexpendable supplies and equipment were given to SHAPE on a loan or memorandum receipt basis by the 7961 Detachment. No reimbursement had been made for expendable supplies furnished SHAPE by EUCOM.⁸ On 25 March 1952, EUCOM issued two directives concerning the provision of logistical support to certain international headquarters of NATO. Their provisions applied to logistical support furnished SHAPE; its immediate subordinate commands, Central Europe; the NATO Defense College; the European Military Communications Coordinating Committee

⁶IRS, Dir EUCOM Log Div to EUCOM COFS, 15 Jan 52, sub: Logistic and Administrative Support of SHAPE and SHAPE Subordinate Headquarters. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 SHAPE (1952), Vol. I, Item 9a atchd.

⁷C/N 3, Dir EUCOM Log Div to EUCOM SGS, 8 Feb 52, sub: Logistical and Administrative Support of SHAPE and SHAPE Subordinate Headquarters. SECRET. In file cited above.

⁸IRS, EUCOM Compt to EUCOM COFS, 23 Jan 52, sub: Request for Formal Concurrence. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 SHAPE (1952), Vol. I, Item 11a atchd.

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(EMCCC); and the European Long Lines Agency (ELIA). The first directive established supply and accounting principles and procedures governing forecasting of requirements, requisitioning and shipment, and recording, evaluating, and processing for reimbursement of supplies, services, materials, and facilities furnished by EUCOM or by USAFE. The second directive outlined the manner in which logistical support would be accomplished and reimbursement effected.⁹ The Comptroller of the Army informed CINCEUR on 22 May 1952 that pending receipt of a revision to the 1951 Department of Defense Directive,¹⁰ support practices would be in accordance with the following policy. Upon receipt of requests from competent authority, the appropriate administrative agent would be responsible for providing to international military headquarters material and services normally available to such agent, either in overseas commands or through other resources of the military departments overseas or within the United States. International headquarters would not reimburse administrative agents for the cost of material or services provided, but would reflect such cost as contributions in kind to the respective international organizations concerned. Properly supported vouchers, billing the Office of the Secretary of Defense, would be forwarded by the administrative agent to the appropriate international headquarters for verification and transmittal to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for reimbursement. A copy of each voucher would be forwarded directly by the administrative agent to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.¹¹ Under EUCOM procedures for accounting for U.S. logistical support furnished International Military Headquarters, the EUCOM Finance Division transmitted properly supported vouchers (Standard Form 1080--billing the Secretary of Defense) to appropriate international military headquarters for verification and further transmittal to the Budget and Finance Division, Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Finance Division, EUCOM, then transmitted a copy of unsupported billing direct to the Finance Accounts Office, U.S. Army, which acknowledged receipt of the unsupported voucher and maintained

⁹(1) Ltr, EUCOM to EUCOM COMZ, 7961 EUCOM Det, etc., 25 Mar 52, sub: Logistical Support of Certain International Military Headquarters of NATO. AG 140 COM-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, same to same, 25 Mar 52, sub: Implementing Instructions for Army Logistical Support of Certain International Military Headquarters of NATO. AG 140 COM-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁰(1) DD Dir 600.08-1, 12 Oct 51, 600 International Programs and Administration; subtitle, .08 North Atlantic Treaty Affairs, sub: Support of Certain NATO Military Activities. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) See also EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 328-31 and Annex 32.

¹¹Cable DA-909763, COFSA from COA to CINCEUR, 26 May 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 SHAPE (1952), Vol. I, Item 19 atchd.

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a summary record reflecting data concerning reimbursements in process or completed. Initial billings covered all reimbursable support furnished to time of submission. In June the U.S. Army Chief of Staff notified EUCOM that in subsequent transactions Standard Form 1080 should be submitted not later than 60 days after completion of the transaction.¹² Considerable amounts were involved. CINCEUR forwarded to the Comptroller, U.S. Army, on 6 May 1952, a report summarizing the logistical support provided by EUCOM to international elements of SHAPE, from the inception of SHAPE to 12 February 1952. The figures were exclusive of funds obligated and expended for pay of civilian personnel (paid from national funds) who were engaged in the performance of duties for SHAPE. The expenditures were broken down as follows:¹³

<u>Total</u>	<u>\$1,912,221.10</u>
Dollar costs of supplies furnished	1,053,579.10
Funds obligated against appropriation contingency of the Army P-436 for procurement of supplies and services for SHAPE (discontinued 19 June 51)	845,996.00
Funds obligated for transportation costs incident to temporary duty travel	12,646.00

c. Miscellaneous Support Problems. A number of miscellaneous problems arose regarding EUCOM/USAREUR support of SHAPE and its subordinate commands. In February SHAPE requested the Department of Defense to authorize Allied officers making official visits to the U.S. Zone of Germany to purchase military payment certificate dollars with French francs. The Department of Defense established a procedure under which Allied officers on official visits to the U.S. Zone of Germany could receive military payment certificates upon their arrival, up to amounts specified in their SHAPE travel orders. These payments would be charged through the Secretary of Defense against Mutual Security Act (MSA) funds and eventually deducted from the U.S. contribution to SHAPE. CINCEUR would designate the U.S. Army Disbursing Officer to advance the military payment certificates. A JAMAG proposal that EUCOM establish a network of U.S. document offices to service

¹² (1) Cable S-5708, CINCEUR to COFSA, 29 May 52. SECRET. (2) Cable DA-912322, COFSA to CINCEUR, 27 Jun 52. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 SHAPE (1952), Vol. I, Item 19 atchd.

¹³ Cable SX-4925, CINCEUR to COFSA, 6 May 52. SECRET. In file cited above.

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U.S. elements of SHAPE subordinate commands was rejected. Support for Detachment A, Military Assistance Division, in Paris, was provided.¹⁴

151. Support of Central Allied Headquarters

During early 1952, discussions were held by representatives of EUCOM, USAFE, and AAFCE, in an effort to clarify their respective logistic and administrative support responsibilities. The representatives agreed that EUCOM had primary responsibility for providing or arranging logistical support of the Central Allied Headquarters at Fontainebleau and that USAFE had the major interest and predominant forces in the Fontainebleau area. It was also concluded that arrangements should be made for USAFE to serve the Central Allied Headquarters in accordance with the common service support principles established in the EUCOM-NELM-USAFE Interservice Logistic Support Agreement, for Metropolitan France, dated 6 May 1952, which provided that the service having predominant interest in an area would furnish support facilities for all services in that area.¹⁵ In September representatives of USAFE and USAREUR agreed upon a joint recommendation to be sent to the Department of Defense that the Department of the Air Force be designated administrative agent in the Fontainebleau area for headquarters, AAFCE, AIFCE, and FOCE. The recommendation was to include an estimate of funds required by USAFE for performing its new support functions. In October the completed plan was submitted to US EUCOM for approval.¹⁶ At the close of 1952 the matter was still under consideration.

152. Support of Allied Land Forces, Southeast Europe

On 27 August 1952, US CINCEUR notified the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, that the Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JAMMAT) had

¹⁴(1) Cable ALQ-742, USLO SHAPE to DD, 21 Feb 52. SECRET. (2) Cable DEF-902198, SD to USLO SHAPE & CINCEUR, 28 Feb 52. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 SHAPE (1952), Vol. I, Item 20 atchd. (3) Cable JAMAG-1092P, JAMAG to CINCUSAFE, 1 May 52. CONFIDENTIAL. (4) IRS, EUCOM AG to EUCOM SGS, sub: U.S. Documents Offices. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 381 SHAPE (1952), Vol. II, Item 38a-1 atchd. (5) Cable SX-5623, CINCUSAREUR to COFSA for COA, 2 Dec 52. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 322 SHAPE (1952), Vol. II, Item 52.

¹⁵IRS, Dir EUCOM Log Div to EUCOM COFS, 7 May 52, sub: Logistic Support of International Headquarters Central European Area. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 SHAPE (1952), Vol. I, Item 26 atchd.

¹⁶Ltr, Maj Gen E. T. Williams, USAREUR COFS, to CINCUSAFE, 22 Oct 52, sub: Logistical Support of Central Allied Headquarters. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 322 SHAPE (1952), Vol. II, Item 43a atchd.

been authorized to render interim support to Headquarters, Allied Land Forces Southeast Europe (ALFSEE).¹⁷ However, in October the Commander in Chief, Allied Land Forces Southeast Europe (CINCLAFSEE), requested USAREUR to furnish supply support on a one-time basis.¹⁸ USAREUR then furnished certain signal, engineer, ordnance, adjutant general and quartermaster equipment and supplies.¹⁹ The first shipment arrived in Izmir, Turkey, on 5 December 1952.²⁰

153. 7961 EUCOM/USAREUR Detachment

a. Revised Letter of Instructions. A letter of instructions to the 7961 EUCOM Detachment replacing a letter of 10 October 1951 was published on 20 May 1952, to consolidate changes made necessary by Department of the Army directives governing EUCOM/USAREUR logistic support of both U.S. national and international elements of international military headquarters in Central Europe.²¹

b. Logistical Support Problems. A survey of the responsibilities of the 7961 USAREUR Detachment in September 1952 indicated that although the personnel strength of the units supported had increased, the personnel strength of the detachment was unchanged. Logistical support was given to

¹⁷(1) Cable 271606Z, US CINCEUR to JAMMAT, 27 Aug 52. RESTRICTED.
(2) Cable 271614Z, US CINCEUR to COFSA, 27 Aug 52. RESTRICTED. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 SHAPE (1952), Vol. II, Item 37 atchd.

¹⁸Ltr, Lt Gen W. G. Wyman, CINCLAFSEE, to Lt Gen M. S. Eddy, CINCUSAREUR, 12 Oct 52. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 SHAPE (1952), Vol. II, Item 44 atchd.

¹⁹(1) Memo, Lt Col R. C. Ciccolella, USAREUR OPOT Div, to Brig Gen E. J. O'Neill, USAREUR DCOFS Admin, 22 Oct 52, sub: List of Equipment and Logistical Support Requested from USAREUR for U.S. Element, ALFSEE. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, Lt Gen M. S. Eddy, CINCUSAREUR, to Lt Gen W. G. Wyman, CINCLAFSEE, 27 Oct 52. UNCLASSIFIED. (3) Ltr, Brig Gen E. J. O'Neill, USAREUR DCOFS Admin, to ALFSEE COFS, 10 Nov 52. UNCLASSIFIED. All in USAREUR SGS 322 SHAPE (1952), Vol. II, Item 44 atchd.

²⁰Ltr, ALFSEE COFS, to Brig Gen E. J. O'Neill, USAREUR DCOFS Admin, 13 Dec 52. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 SHAPE (1952), Vol. II, Item 54 atchd.

²¹(1) C/N 1, Dir EUCOM Log Div to EUCOM DCOFS Admin, 2 May 52, sub: Revised Letter of Instructions (7961 EUCOM Detachment). RESTRICTED.
(2) C/N 2, EUCOM SGS to Dir EUCOM Log Div, 12 May 52, same sub. RESTRICTED. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 SHAPE (1952), Vol. I, Item 24.
(3) EUCOM ltr of instr, to 7961 EUCOM Det, 20 May 52. AG 322 GLD-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED.

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the following: 3,931 personnel of U.S. Army elements of SHAPE; 420 Air Force personnel with 1,156 expected by 1 January 1953; 76 US EUCOM personnel; and COMZ personnel which was expected to total 265 persons by the end of 1952. In addition, partial support was provided for MAAG personnel and for 20 retired officers. Support was also provided for Metropolitan Paris, SHAPE, SHAPE Village, Orly field, Bleriot plant, and U.S. dependent schools. There was no central office of record for U.S. military strengths in the area nor was there a central office to consider support problems as a whole. Co-ordination of logistical support between the U.S. Air Force and the 7961 USAREUR Detachment was inadequately developed, being limited to the most urgent problems. The interservice logistical support agreement excluded Paris from its provisions. Support responsibilities of the Army, Navy, and Air Force were neither standardized nor clearly defined. There were indications that difficulties experienced in providing logistical support would be accentuated by the prospective increase in the number of troops stationed in France. The Commanding Officer, 7961 USAREUR Detachment, concluded that his command was understrength and requested authority to increase his table of distribution. The survey recommended the establishment of a joint "U.S. Support Command" reporting directly to US EUCOM, to assume responsibility for co-ordinating logistical support of U.S. military establishments in Europe, and that support should be furnished by each service in proportion to its determined degree of responsibility, as defined by US EUCOM. This memorandum formed the basis for USAREUR discussions with US EUCOM.²²

154. Construction Procedure Agreement, Metropolitan France

On 5 March 1952, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, requested CINCEUR's comments and recommendations on the text of a proposed Franco-American agreement concerning construction procedures applicable to construction work in Metropolitan France, for U.S. Armed Forces in that country.²³ The U.S. ambassador to France, in forwarding the agreement to the State Department, explained that the text was based on proposals of the French Government and that he considered it the best agreement obtainable under conditions then existing.²⁴ CINCEUR notified the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, on 8 March that the text of the proposed agreement was not acceptable

²² Memo, Col R. C. Kyser, Dep Dir USAREUR Log Div, for Dir USAREUR Log Div, 22 Sep 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322 SHAPE (1952), Vol. I, Item 24 atchd.

²³ Cable DA-902782, CCFSA to CINCEUR, 5 Mar 52. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 381 SHAPE (1952), Vol. I, Item 12 atchd.

²⁴ (1) Cable Emb-98, AMEMB Paris to State Dept, 1 Mar 52. SECRET.
(2) Cable Emb-97, AMEMB Paris to State Dept, 1 Mar 52. SECRET. Both in file cited above.

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for the reason that it did not eliminate existing difficulties in the construction program for U.S. forces in France. Specific objections to the text included the absence of provisions for direct contracting and for the enforcement of schedules and the removal of contractors for nonperformance. On several subjects the wording was contrary to U.S. interests.²⁵ Although EUCOM's objections had not been met entirely, CINCEUR on 13 May concurred in a revised text and the Construction Procedures Agreement was signed on the same day.²⁶ The agreement specified that its procedures did not apply to contracts of 17,500,000 francs (\$50,000) or under and authorized direct contracting up to that amount for purchases in connection with construction on projects previously authorized by the French, and for maintenance and repair for purchase of construction materials, and for new construction not connected with a project in progress. It also specified that in the event a contract was 30 days behind schedule the French Government would cancel or modify the contract at the request of the U.S. Armed Forces, which might then either assume management of the project or recontract directly with another French contractor or with a French firm jointly associated with an American firm. If neither of these alternatives was satisfactory, engineer units of the U.S. Armed Forces were to complete the project.²⁷

155. U.S. and French Air Forces Agreement

CINCEUR objected early in 1952 to a provision in a proposed U.S.-French Air Force agreement requiring the flying of the French flag over U.S. installations in France, but withdrew his objection when it was made clear in the proposed agreement that the agreement applied to the U.S. Air Force only and not to the U.S. Armed Forces in general.²⁸ EUCOM representatives, at the request of CINCUSAFE, participated in the establishment of a co-ordinated U.S. Army, Air Force, and Navy position on the

²⁵Cable SX-3043, CINCEUR to COFSA, 8 Mar 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 SHAPE (1952), Vol. I, Item 12.

²⁶(1) Cable SX-4855, CINCEUR to COFSA, 2 May 52. SECRET. (2) Cable SX-5126, CINCEUR to SRE Paris, 13 May 52. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 381 SHAPE (1952), Vol. I, Item 12 atchd; Vol. II, Item 42 atchd.

²⁷(1) Cable Emb-177, AMEMB to State Dept, 14 May 52. SECRET. (2) Cable MAAG-14, MAAG France to SD, 26 Apr 52. SECRET. Both in SGS 381 SHAPE (1952), Vol. I, Item 12 atchd; Vol. II, Item 38b atchd.

²⁸(1) Memo, EUCOM COFS to CINCEUR, 3 Jun 52. SECRET. (2) Cable SX-5911, CINCEUR to AMEMB Paris, 5 Jun 52. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 381 SHAPE (1952), Vol. I, Item 12 atchd.

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command relationship between the U.S. and French Air Forces in France as defined in the proposed agreement. At EUCOM insistence the following provision was inserted in the agreement:

The provisions of the present agreement between the Air Forces of Europe and the United States concern only the particular case of principal bases assigned to USAF in Europe, in application of the agreement signed between governments on () and is not applicable to installations of U.S. services.²⁹

156. Acquisition for USAFE of Airfields in the French Zone

CINCEUR informed SAGEUR on 16 June 1952 that EUCOM's efforts to expedite the acquisition of airfields for USAFE had encountered two problems which had to be resolved at the SHAPE level. The first of these problems followed a SHAPE decision to assign two airfields in the French Zone of Germany to the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF). This assignment was to be made from U.S. airfields in the French Zone. The Commander in Chief, French Forces in Germany, desired to conclude a separate agreement with the RCAF and, consequently, opposed the allocation of U.S. airfields in the French Zone to the Canadians. This question became involved in the negotiations then in progress between EUCOM and CGFFA for an agreement on the occupancy and construction by U.S. forces of certain airfields in the French Zone. CGFFA was willing to conclude the agreement, providing the airfields in question would not be assigned to the Canadian forces. The agreement signed on 21 June 1952 by General Handy, CINCEUR, and General Roger Noiret, CGFFA, provided for the transfer of five airfields in the French Zone of Germany to the control of the U.S. forces. These airfields were located at Landstuhl, Hahn, Sembach, and two at Bitburg.³⁰ The second problem concerned the expenditure of Deutsche Mark funds for airfield construction purposes. EUCOM had the necessary funds for construction of airfields for USAFE in the French Zone, but there was no provision for expenditure of these funds for airfields to be assigned to the RCAF. CINCEUR held that SHAPE should undertake the development of a definite program for airfields in Germany. Until a definite program was formulated, CINCEUR believed that he should withhold the funds for the construction of airfields for USAFE. However, in view of the urgency of the airfield

²⁹Cable EOLPL-469, U.S. AIRA Paris to COPS USAF, 31 Jul 52. SECRET. In file cited above.

³⁰Ltr, EUCOM to CG Twelfth AF, 26 Jun 52, sub: Transfer of Five Airfields in the French Zone of Germany to the U.S. 12th Air Force. AG 323.3 GLD-AGO. SECRET. In USAREUR AG Liby.

program, EUCOM agreed to release Deutsche Mark funds upon assurance that the airfields were definitely assigned to the U.S. forces.³¹

157. EUCOM/USAREUR Responsibilities for the SHAPE Infrastructure Programs

In late December 1951, ALFCE notified EUCOM that lack of time had prevented consultation with EUCOM before the submission to SHAPE of ALFCE's 1952 program of infrastructure requirements. Work was being started on the compilation of programs for 1953 and 1954, and ALFCE desired an interchange of views with EUCOM on the subject.³² On 21 March 1952 a meeting was held at ALFCE headquarters in Fontainebleau to clarify the responsibilities of EUCOM in connection with the preparation of the periodic infrastructure programs. The EUCOM Logistics, Signal, OPOT, and Engineer Divisions and comptroller were represented. A detailed memorandum of information obtained at the conference was subsequently issued by the Logistics Division. The memorandum stated that the purposes of the meeting were to provide the most recent information on the SHAPE infrastructure program, to define EUCOM responsibilities in connection with it, and to instruct EUCOM representatives in basic definitions of infrastructure. The basic definition of infrastructure was as follows:

The static items of capital expenditure which are required to provide the material backing for operational plans necessary to enable the higher command to function and the various forces to operate with efficiency. Infrastructure covers not only logistical installations such as depots, warehouses, roads, railways, etc., but defense installations, of a permanent nature such as gun emplacements, harbor defenses as well as field communications and radar coverage.

There were three qualifications for a SHAPE infrastructure project: (1) it would have to be a fixed immovable installation, (2) it would have to be used by more than two nations (echelons immediately subordinate to ALFCE were to be considered multinational for this purpose), (3) and it would have to be intended for wartime use. The conference emphasized that "common infrastructure," for "common use by more than two nations," was to be financed internationally. Projects of interest to only two nations were to be financed bilaterally. Projects qualifying for common infrastructure in 1952 included airfields, military headquarters, and signal communications. In the event further programs were called for by SHAPE,

³¹(1) Cable SX-6235, CINCENR to SHAPE, 16 Jun 52. SECRET. (2) Cable ALO-1252, USLO SHAPE to CINCENR, 18 Jun 52. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 SHAPE (1952), Vol. I, Item 31a atchd.

³²IRS, EUCOM SGS to Dir EUCOM Log Div, 2 Jan 52, sub: Transmittal of Letter. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 SHAPE (1952), Vol. I, Item 1a.

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ALFCE agreed to give guidance to EUCOM as to the types of projects to be included beyond the "basic three." CINCEUR responsibilities in Germany and France included submitting to SHAPE, through ALFCE, any projects properly chargeable against infrastructure funds, together with all supporting data and justification, and implementing, as JCS representative in Europe, the construction of any approved infrastructure projects. In submitting projects for approval and inclusion in the SHAPE program, EUCOM should accompany the detailed justification with the best available cost estimates. EUCOM was informed at the meeting that the 1952 ALFCE infrastructure program included no allocation for the establishment of training areas, but that ALFCE was attempting to meet the requirements of each nation by a series of bilateral agreements.³³

158. Land-Air Warfare Organization Procedures

In response to a request of the USAREUR OPOT Division, USAREUR dispatched a letter to CINCLANDCENT commenting on a draft NATO letter entitled, "Land/Air Warfare Organization Procedures—Resolution of Differences." USAREUR stated that it was preferable to have a uniform system of air-ground operations within NATO forces, but recommended that if this proved to be impossible the U.S. system be followed in the Central Army Group, to be modified by the French to meet their capabilities. The USAREUR comment noted that the French were in complete agreement with this recommendation.³⁴

159. Logistical Responsibilities and Co-ordination under ALFCE

a. EUCOM Comments on ALFCE Pamphlet. EUCOM headquarters on 20 June 1952 recommended to ALFCE that certain changes be made in the ALFCE pamphlet entitled, "Administration of Forces Comprising Formations or Units of Different National Armies." EUCOM took exception to certain portions of the pamphlet which dealt with the assumption of control over military forces of one nation by an ally. The pamphlet stated that national authorities which were responsible for logistical support of

³³ (1) ALFCE rept, sub: Notes on Informal Meeting at Hq ALFCE on 21 March 1952. NATO SECRET. (2) Memo, Dir EUCOM Log Div to EUCOM Stf Divs, 21 Apr 52, sub: Infrastructure Information. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 381 SHAPE (1952), Vol. I, Item 33a; Vol. II, Item 38.

³⁴ (1) IRS, Dep Dir USAREUR OPOT Div to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 30 Oct 52, sub: Land/Air Warfare Organization Procedures—Resolution of Differences. AG 373.21 GOT. SECRET. (2) Ltr, Brig Gen J. F. Uncles, USAREUR DCOFS Opns, to CINCLANDCENT, 13 Nov 52, same sub. AG 373.21 GOT. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 381 SHAPE (1952), Vol. III, Item 78a atchd.

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tactical elements, including those under an ally, must give such elements mobile support. EUCOM objected that this concept assumed that the higher Allied formations would furnish support for which there had been no prior planning, a concept which would involve a "large degree of risk." It was recommended that the objectionable portions of the pamphlet be modified to maintain the principle of national responsibility for support of national units except in emergencies.³⁵

b. Logistical Responsibilities of Command Subordinate to SHAPE.
The defining of the logistical responsibilities of commands subordinate to SHAPE was a continuing problem which was not entirely solved in 1952. On 12 July 1952 SACEUR informed the commanders of the three Central European commands that they were responsible for the over-all guidance and co-ordination of the logistical planning of their forces within the framework of SHAPE plans and policies. On the same day in a separate memorandum to the national representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the BENELUX countries, SACEUR requested the assistance and the co-operation of their respective national military commanders in implementing his instructions to his Central European commanders. An analysis of SACEUR's memorandum by the director of the USAREUR Logistics Division indicated that the probable effect on USAREUR would be that it would be required to draw up logistic support plans, inspect the strategic reserves, and make detailed examinations of U.S. plans of resupply for the Seventh Army only.³⁶ In addition, USAREUR would probably have to make a study of the logistical systems of the U.S. Seventh and French First Armies, to make certain that there were no conflicts. The analysis then noted that in a letter of 5 August to US CINCEUR, CINCLANDCENT had stated that he would henceforth deal directly with national authorities within the general framework of SHAPE directives. The USAREUR analysis concluded that, although Allied commanders were directed to co-ordinate among themselves and national authorities in areas where logistical support of two or more commanders in chief was involved, the Allied commanders were evidently not authorized to co-ordinate the logistic requirements of individual services of a single nation. While in theory it was possible for one service to gain supplies requested by another, such as USAFE gaining supplies at the expense of

³⁵Ltr, Brig Gen E. T. Williams, EUCOM COFS, to CINCLANDCENT, 20 Jun 52, sub: AIFCE pamphlet AG 400 GOT. NATO SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 SHAPE (1952), Vol. II, Item 35 atchd.

³⁶(1) C/N 1, USAREUR DCOFS Opns to Dir USAREUR Log Div, 8 Aug 52, sub: Logistical Responsibilities, Central European Sector, Allied Command Europe. NATO SECRET. (2) C/N 2, Dir USAREUR Log Div to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 15 Aug 52, same sub. NATO SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 SHAPE (1952), Vol. II, Item 35_a atchd.

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USAREUR requirements, through the intervention of CINCLANDCENT, there was very little possibility that this would occur.³⁷

c. ALFCE Survey of Heavy Maintenance Facilities. CINCLANDCENT on 3 October 1952 informed his subordinate commanders that the responsibilities delegated to major subordinate commands for providing adequate heavy repair facilities for damaged or worn equipment which had to be returned to service in the shortest practicable time ranked high in importance. In order that CINCLANDCENT might be informed of the plans of each nation for meeting emergency maintenance requirements, information on the following basic items of interest was requested: (a) the number of items in principal categories which required heavy maintenance monthly during combat; (b) maintenance facilities which were available to perform the repair and rebuild tasks for forces that would be committed on D Day; (c) additional facilities that could be made available later; and (d) location of maintenance facilities and their capacity to meet wartime requirements. CINCUSAREUR was requested to render a preliminary progress report by 31 October 1952, the definitive report to follow as soon as possible. Preparation of the report was assigned to the Director, USAREUR Logistics Division.³⁸ The initial report of data pertaining to heavy maintenance facilities was submitted to ALFCE on 30 October 1952. The term "heavy maintenance facilities" as used in the original ALFCE request was construed by USAREUR to be similar to the USAREUR depot maintenance facilities at which the highest category or echelon maintenance was performed. After careful evaluation of the ALFCE request, USAREUR concluded that the requested data could best be furnished through the medium of forms filled out by technical services. Accordingly each technical service was requested to furnish the desired data on forms prepared by the Logistics Division, utilizing records currently available to them, or making estimates in the absence of factual data. These forms

³⁷ (1) Ltr, Marshal A. Juin, CINCLANDCENT, to Gen Sir John Harding, CINC BAOR; Gen T. T. Handy, Dep US CINCEUR; Gen de C. A. de Noiret, CGFFA; Lt Gen Tromme, CINC BFG, 5 Aug 52. N/628/ALFCE/S.G. NATO SECRET. In file cited above. (2) C/N 2, Dir USAREUR Log Div to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 15 Aug 52, cited above.

³⁸ (1) Ltr, USAREUR GOFs to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Oct 52, sub: Adequacy of Heavy Maintenance Facilities for ALFCE Forces (RCS: ALFCE/MAINT 1). NATO CONFIDENTIAL. (2) C/N 1, USAREUR Asst SGS to Dir USAREUR Log Div, 9 Oct 52, sub: ALFCE Request for Report on Adequacy of Heavy Maintenance Facilities for ALFCE Forces. NATO CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 381 SHAPE (1952), Vol. III, Item 73a-1a atchd.

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were assembled and served as a final report, to be reviewed periodically to record subsequent changes.³⁹

160. Reports to ALFCE

a. Combat Effectiveness Reports. In response to a request from ALFCE, EUCOM on 14 February 1952 submitted to that headquarters a "Combat Effectiveness Report for Assigned Forces," covering the Seventh Army, as of 25 December 1951. Similar reports on the combat effectiveness of Seventh Army were submitted for 25 March and 25 June 1952. Although these reports concluded that the command was combat ready, information was given on principal problems adversely influencing combat effectiveness, including the lack of sufficient training areas and ranges, the extensive rotation of military personnel, and equipment shortages. The reports also discussed measures taken to solve these problems.⁴⁰

b. Monthly Status Reports. CINCLANDCENT notified EUCOM on 20 February 1952 that the monthly status report required of ALFCE subordinate commands was being replaced by a considerably revised form. The purpose in each case was to provide ALFCE with information for inclusion in its own monthly activities report to SHAPE. The new monthly status report was to contain appropriate information grouped under the following headings: (1) development of command structure including changes in staff organization; (2) important planning activities (excluding intelligence) scheduled, under consideration, and completed; (3) matters impeding planning; (4) improvements in supply, material, and infrastructure (excluding items quoted in Log Forms A to D); and (5) any other important matters not included in other reports. In addition, information on communication material was required by ALFCE for submission every quarter, since it was not subject to considerable monthly change.⁴¹ On 10 March 1952, the EUCOM deputy chief of staff for operations designated the EUCOM comptroller as the responsible agency for compilation of the monthly

³⁹(1) C/N 2, Dir USAREUR Log Div to USAREUR SGS, 24 Oct 52, sub cited in C/N 1 above. SECRET. (2) Ltr, USAREUR to CINCLANDCENT, 30 Oct 52, sub: Adequacy of Heavy Maintenance Facilities for ALFCE Forces (RCS: ALFCE/MAINT 1). SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 381 SHAPE (1952), Vol. III, Item 73a-1a atchd.

⁴⁰Ltrs, EUCOM DCOFS Opns to CINCLANDCENT, 14 Feb, 25 Apr, 17 Jul 52, sub: Combat Effectiveness Report for Assigned Forces (RCS: SH-OET-2). SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 381 SHAPE (1952), Vol. I, Items 26, 38a, and 53b atchd.

⁴¹Ltr, CINCLANDCENT to EUCOM, 20 Feb 52, sub: Monthly Status Report (RCS: SH-STAT-1). NATO CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 381 SHAPE (1952), Vol. I, Item 23g atchd.

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status report. Preparation of items to be included was to be the responsibility of staff divisions having primary interest. Appointment of the comptroller to perform this function was in line with the EUCOM policy of making the comptroller the co-ordinator and monitor of all reports to ALFCE.⁴²

c. Report on Locally Raised Auxiliary Units. A report on "locally raised auxiliary units" was submitted to CINCLANDCENT on 21 May 1952, in compliance with a request from CINCLANDCENT dated 12 February 1952. The report noted that locally raised auxiliary units fell into two categories: (1) units directly supporting U.S. technical service and tactical units, and (2) units organized as guard units and employed in internal security. The dependability of the units in the event of an emergency was considered "questionable." It was estimated that 80 percent of the displaced persons and 50 percent of German personnel in these units would choose to remain with U.S. forces in case of an emergency. The report noted that a reduction or loss of these auxiliary units would have to be balanced by an increase in U.S. troops to replace them. In time of war, it was the intention to utilize them to the maximum, principally as technical and administrative units and as security units to support local and military police in controlling refugees.⁴³

161. Location of Belgian Brigade in Kassel Area

Negotiations had begun in October 1951 on the stationing of an armored brigade of the Belgian Army in the area of Kassel. Representatives of EUCOM, the Belgian Forces in Germany (BFG), the British Army of the Rhine, and the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany met on 17 October 1951 to review the facilities required by the Belgians, and determined that sufficient installations existed, although some of them were held by the Germans and could therefore be acquired only through action by HICOG. CINCLANDCENT requested CINCENR on 26 October 1951 to negotiate an agreement with the Belgians effecting the release of the facilities required for the brigade, and installations in the Kassel area were surveyed by representatives of Frankfurt Military Post and the Belgian Army. At a second meeting held in Heidelberg on 17 January 1952, the Belgians reduced their original request for 6,100 troop spaces to 3,000 spaces. CINCENR agreed to release the necessary casernes held by U.S. forces and to request the U.S. High Commissioner to arrange for the release of those held by

⁴²C/N 2, EUCOM SGS to EUCOM OPOT Div & EUCOM Compt, 10 Mar 52, sub: Monthly Status Report (RCS: SH-STAT-1), February 1952. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

⁴³Ltr, EUCOM to CINCLANDCENT, 21 May 52, sub: Locally Raised Auxiliary Units. AG 322 GOT. NATO CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 381 SHAPE (1952), Vol. II, Item 41a atchd.

the Germans. The draft cover agreement, together with the proposed tripartite administrative agreement on stationing troops without regard to zonal boundaries, was forwarded in February to the BACR commander for his concurrence. The Belgians sent a detachment to Kassel to initiate planning and organize requirements for rehabilitating the casernes and constructing new facilities, but funding difficulties between the Belgian forces and the BACR somewhat delayed the project.⁴⁴ On 5 March representatives of the U.S. and U.K. High Commissioners signed an agreement authorizing the stationing of Belgian forces in the U.S. Zone of Germany and providing that the military commanders concerned make the arrangements necessary to maintain their respective forces. To implement this agreement, a draft military level agreement was prepared for presentation at a meeting held on 13 March by representatives of the U.S. and U.K. High Commissioners and the Belgian forces.⁴⁵ The latter agreement, signed on 1 May 1952 by Maj. Gen. Aaron Bradshaw, Jr., Director, EUCOM Logistics Division, and Gen. C. J. G. Dalton of the BACR, released to the Belgians an EES barracks, the Luettich caserne, and the Arolsen caserne, all three of which were located in or near Kassel. The approximately 3,000 Belgian troops stationed in the Kassel area were members of engineer, reconnaissance, artillery, and armored infantry units.⁴⁶ In September 1952 difficulties developed with the Germans in obtaining a training area for use by the Belgian forces. USAREUR authorities attempted to procure for the Belgians 1,622 acres of land near Arolsen in Land Hesse and refused an alternate site offered by Hessian officials on the grounds that the other area was too small and too remote. Because of the large size of the training area requested, clearance was required both from the German Federal Government and from Land Hesse. In view of the impasse existing between the Belgian military authorities and the Hessian state officials, HICOG was approached by USAREUR on 24 September and again on 24 November through Mr. Zinn Garrett, the Civil Military Relations Officer with HICOG. These efforts proved unavailing, however, and the matter was still pending at the end of the year.⁴⁷

162. Support of Canadian Units

a. Support of the 27th Canadian Brigade Group. The Canadian view that BACR should act as the agent for Canada in procuring necessary

⁴⁴EUCOM CINC's Wkly Stf Conf 4, 12 Feb 52, pp. 3 - 4. SECRET.

⁴⁵EUCOM CPOT Div Jnl, 12 Mar 52, Item 5, CONFIDENTIAL; 12 Feb 52, Item 1, SECRET.

⁴⁶Interv, Miss M. L. Geis, USAREUR Hist Div, with Lt Col J. A. Requarth, USAREUR G-3 Div Opns Br, 19 Feb 53. RESTRICTED.

⁴⁷Memo, ACOFS G-4 to CINCUSAREUR, 21 Jan 53, sub: Difficulty in Acquiring a Training Area near Arolsen for the Belgian Forces, Tab VIII. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 337 (1953), Vol. I, Item 13, B/P.

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supplies and equipment from the United States was not supported by the U.S. Department of the Army.⁴⁸ The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, pointed out that support of the Canadian brigade had to be furnished under authority of Section 408(E), Public Law 329 as amended, and that this law implied negotiation on a government to government basis. The U.S. Army Chief of Staff declined to approve the requisitioning of equipment for the Canadians from the zone of interior on the ground that this would be uneconomical. He requested CINCEUR to work out a solution with the Commander, 27th Canadian Brigade, by which EUCOM would receive the materials for Canadian use. Delivery of material, and vehicles and equipment for repair, through the British LOFC was authorized if it did not require the use of the United Kingdom as the agent for Canada. The United States would bill Canada in advance on a per diem per capita basis for support furnished. Actual support was not required before 1 June 1952.⁴⁹ In reply CINCEUR stated that procedures for the supply and maintenance of the Canadians must be the same in war as in peace. This principle could best be implemented by stocking the British LOFC establishments from Bicester, England, to the 27th Brigade. He pointed out that the brigade was a tactical unit located in the British Zone of Germany and that it was fundamental that a British or Canadian representative in the British supply system submit requisitions for items needed and distribute supplies in the British LOFC. Both a Canadian directive to the 27th Brigade and a British War Office directive to the BAOR had stated that the Canadians would be maintained through the BAOR supply system. If EUCOM were to act in accordance with Department of the Army directives, personnel, time, and money would be wasted. Nor was the Department of the Army plan practicable in time of war. CINCEUR suggested that a U.S. agency in England or the Overseas Supply Division of the New York Port of Embarkation monitor the processing of supplies, requisitions, and receipt of material. He also recommended that shipment be made directly from the zone of interior to the British LOFC. SHAPE supported these recommendations, and the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, concurred.⁵⁰

⁴⁸See EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, p. 353.

⁴⁹(1) Cable DA-91277, COFSA from ACOFS G-4 to CINCEUR, 7 Jan 52. SECRET. (2) Cable DA-91481, COFSA to CINCEUR, 8 Jan 52. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 SHAPE (1952), Vol. I, Item 5 and atchd.

⁵⁰(1) Cable SX-1423, CINCEUR to COFSA for ACOFS G-4, 16 Jan 52. SECRET. (2) Cable ALO-642, SHAPE to COFSA for ACOFS G-4, 21 Jan 52. SECRET. (3) Cable DA-92823, COFSA from ACOFS G-4 to USLO SHAPE, 24 Jan 52. SECRET. All in USAREUR SGS 322 SHAPE (1952), Vol. I, Item 5 atchd.

b. Logistical Support of the RCAF. The U.S. Air Force, on 3 April 1952, requested that EUCOM furnish rations, POL, land transportation, and medical services (above the base level) to the RCAF on a reimbursable basis through USAFE. The director of the EUCOM Logistics Division objected that according to a Department of Defense directive, EUCOM had been charged only with logistical support of the international headquarters NATO, and not with operational support. Furthermore, a SHAPE directive had established the principle that logistical support of the national elements of Allied Command, Europe, would be provided, insofar as feasible, by the respective nations. It also limited direct negotiations between national governmental agencies to those authorized by NATO. Department of the Air Force agreements with the RCAF concerning support would accordingly only apply to EUCOM when approved by NATO and when implemented by the Department of Defense as the executive agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The director of the Logistics Division, further noted that the agreements concerning the support of Canadian land forces had provided for support through the British LOFC and direct shipment of required U.S. items to British bases. He insisted that EUCOM had neither the current nor the emergency capability to furnish the RCAF the support desired by USAFE. Advance personnel authorizations and allocation of funds as well as adequate authority would be needed to support the RCAF.⁵¹ In accordance with these suggestions, CINCENR informed CINCUSAFE that EUCOM lacked the necessary authority to furnish support to RCAF. He suggested that USAFE acquaint the Department of the Air Force with this fact and added that the requirements for RCAF support were beyond the capabilities of EUCOM.⁵² CINCENR, however, informed the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, that plans were being made to furnish support to RCAF, if such support was authorized. He pointed out that in addition to the items of support requested by USAFE, provision would have to be made for the inclusion of items in the Special Reserve Land 3, since EUCOM could not divert its own supplies to the RCAF in time of emergency. He stated that support should be in existence by the time the Canadian units arrived in Europe and that consideration should be given to the time lag for the conversion of dollars to facilities and for the increase of stocks. EUCOM would be able to support the RCAF in France and in Germany on the basis on which it supported USAF in France. He preferred to have the Air Force act as agent for RCAF support, and he desired to deal with the RCAF as units of the Air Force.⁵³ In a later cable CINCENR noted that

⁵¹(1) IRS, Dir EUCOM Log Div to EUCOM COFS, 9 May 52, sub: Logistical Support of the RCAF. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 SHAPE (1952), Vol. I, Item 30. (2) See also DD Dir 600.08-1, 12 Oct 51, and SHAPE Dir No. 1, 24 Apr 51.

⁵²Ltr, CINCENR to CINCUSAFE, 23 May 52, sub: Logistical Support of the RCAF. AG 400 GLD. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 SHAPE (1952), Vol. I, Item 30 atchd.

⁵³Cable SX-5950, CINCENR to COFSA for ACOFS G-4, 8 Jun 52, Pt. IV. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 SHAPE (1952), Vol. I, Item 33 atchd.

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EUCOM had given USAFE no information concerning funds, facilities, or personnel required. Information concerning total logistical requirements was not available in EUCOM, and hence no realistic estimate could be made. He pointed out that service plans did not envision emergency support of the RCAF and asked that this omission be corrected. In August CINCUSAREUR brought to the attention of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, the fact that, despite USAFE requests that USAREUR furnish Class I and III support for the RCAF beginning 20 September 1952, no authorization had been given even for interim support. Department of the Air Force nonconcurrence with EUCOM support proposals for the RCAF therefore held up the authorization for support.⁵⁴ The Canadians then withdrew their requirement for land transportation.⁵⁵ No action on the remaining support requested had been taken by the end of the year.

Section II: Participation in the Mutual Security Program

163. The Mutual Security Program

An essential feature of Western Defense was the program of military materiel and monetary assistance developed by the United States to aid its partners in the North Atlantic Community in their efforts to create an efficient military force capable of warding off Soviet aggressive moves in Western Europe. The United States had insisted on the establishment of relatively high mobilization quotas for its Allies in the North Atlantic Community considering the military production potentialities of the countries concerned. Without monetary and materiel assistance from the United States those manpower quotas would be meaningless since the Western European nations did not have sufficient financial strength or available productive capacity to meet defense requirements. In October 1951 the United States consolidated its programs for aid to the free nations of the world in the new Mutual Security Program (MSP). The new Mutual Security Agency (MSA) which was authorized by the consolidated Mutual

⁵⁴(1) Cable S-1743, CINCUSAREUR to COFSA, 24 Jul 52. SECRET. (2) Cable SX-2853, CINCUSAREUR signed Eddy to COFS US Army for ACOFS G-4, 29 Aug 52. SECRET. (3) Cable EGCS-7105, CINCUSAFE to COFSAF, 18 Sep 52. SECRET. All in file cited above.

⁵⁵Cable EMLP-7466, CINCUSAFE to COFSAF, 24 Sep 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 USAFE (1952), Vol. II, Item 48 atchd.

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Security Act of 1951 became effective 1 January 1952, with W. Averell Harriman as its first director. The new consolidated program combined U.S. military, economic, and technical assistance to friendly nations under the authority of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 and previous legislation: the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 (MDAA), as amended; the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 (ECA), as amended; and the Act for International Development (AID). The Mutual Security Program contained three principal elements, appropriations for which were specifically made under the authority of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as follows: (1) the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) which covered the furnishing of military assistance, consisting of military equipment, supplies and training and technical assistance and advice, under the authority of the MDAA of 1949 as amended, the purposes and provisions of which were included in and amended by the Mutual Security Act of 1951; (2) the Defense Support Program which covered the rendering of assistance by the United States to eligible countries in the form of raw materials, industrial equipment, and commodities required by those countries to sustain and expand their defense programs and which was previously provided under the ECA of 1948 as amended, the purposes and provisions of which were included in and amended by the Mutual Security Act of 1951; and (3) the Technical Assistance Program (Point IV aid), which included the supply of technical assistance, training and guidance in industrial and agricultural operations to relatively undeveloped areas for the purpose of promoting economic and political stability. During 1942, EUCOM/USAREUR was concerned only with the first element of the Mutual Security Program, the MDAP. Under the Mutual Security Act of 1951 and within the definition of this act, the Department of Defense was given primary responsibility for the determination of the end-item content of MDAP. For this purpose the Department of the Army was designated as the executive agent of the Department of Defense. The MDAP, as administered by the Department of the Army, contained the following four general segments: (1) MDA Materiel Program of military end items, components, spare parts and supplies, together with related costs incident to their delivery to foreign recipients; (2) the MDA Off-shore Procurement Program, which was a method of procurement by the military departments from sources outside of the United States under the approval of the MDA Materiel Program; (3) the MDA Training Program which provided military training on a grant basis for foreign students in the U.S. service schools, both in the zone of interior and in oversea commands, and tactical or technical training at the country or regional level by U.S. military personnel; and (4) the MDA Reimbursable Assistance Program, which, under section 408(e) of the MDAA of 1949 as amended, provided for the sale of military equipment, materials and services to, and the training of military personnel of

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eligible foreign countries on a reimbursable basis, i.e., without cost to the United States.⁵⁶

a. EUCOM/USAREUR Responsibilities. In the European area the Department of the Army's responsibilities for the implementation of MDAP devolved upon EUCOM until 1 August 1952, at which time the redesignation of the command and the establishment of US EUCOM led to a transfer of the responsibilities for military assistance in Europe to the new headquarters, US EUCOM. Responsibility for the budget, funding, fiscal and civilian personnel administration, and other related reporting activities pertaining to military agencies primarily engaged in military assistance activities in Europe was redelegated to CINCUSAREUR by US EUCOM without authority for further delegation.⁵⁷

b. Credits Authorized for the European Area. The Mutual Security Act of 1952, signed by the President on 20 June 1952, authorized \$3,415,614,750 for military aid in the European area, and \$1,282,433,000 for defense support.⁵⁸

164. The MDA Materiel Program

On 9 January 1952 President Truman issued a directive to the Department of Defense which outlined a stepped-up program of furnishing military assistance and equipment to the NATO countries, and which stipulated that such equipment would be furnished on the same priority basis as that utilized for equipment furnished to troops in EUCOM. The President, at the same time, issued a corollary directive which dealt with fiscal and financial aspects, placing ceilings on expenditures by the Army and from MDAP funds through FY 1953, and preventing the transfer of funds from one to another. The major provision of these directives was a guarantee of the delivery of equipment to the NATO countries. This equipment could come from either one of two sources: new equipment coming off the production lines, or equipment turned in by U.S. Army units, rehabilitated, and made ready for turnover under MDAP. Since deliveries were guaranteed under MDAP, it followed that, if the old equipment was not made available for such delivery, the new equipment would have to be turned over to the NATO countries. If the latter course

⁵⁶Memo, Maj Gen G. H. Olmstead, Dir OMA-CSD, to Brig Gen G. C. Stewart, DA Dep ACCFS G-4 FMA, 22 Apr 52, sub: Definitions and Abbreviations of Programs under the MSA of 1951. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 400.336 (1952), Vol. II, Item 60B.

⁵⁷Ltr, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Nov 52, sub: Delegation of Authority. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Compt Div MDAP Ctl Gp Admin file (1952).

⁵⁸MDAP, Department of Defense Operations, May 1952, p. V. UNCLASSIFIED. OMA CSD, Washington, D. C.

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of action was necessary, the U.S. troops would be left with the old equipment, while the NATO forces would be furnished the newer modern equipment.⁵⁹

a. EUCOM Responsibilities. Responsibilities for the delivery of rebuilt equipment to NATO countries devolved upon the Department of the Army, as well as upon EUCOM. In the first place, it was a Department of the Army responsibility to ship to EUCOM, as promptly as possible, the new items of equipment which would replace the older items then in the possession of EUCOM troops. Secondly, EUCOM was responsible for the rehabilitation of the older equipment then in the hands of its troops as rapidly as could be accomplished. One disadvantage for EUCOM was that the turning in of old equipment prior to the receipt of the new replacements would result in the loss of the use of needed equipment by EUCOM for varying periods of time. The Department of the Army felt that this was a calculated risk worth taking, since it would result in the equipping of EUCOM troops with the most modern equipment available, while, at the same time, the NATO countries would be supplied with equipment with which they could fight in case of necessity.⁶⁰

b. EUCOM-Department of the Army Conferences. As a result of the President's directive, the Department of the Army scheduled a series of conferences for the period 19 - 21 March 1952 whose primary purpose was to determine EUCOM capabilities for supporting the program. EUCOM was invited to send representatives to these conferences in order to insure a clear understanding of EUCOM responsibilities under this program, determine EUCOM's capabilities for speeding up the rebuild facilities then in operation, determine what additional items EUCOM could supply to meet MDAP requirements, and permit discussions and understanding of problems of particular interest to EUCOM incident to the program.⁶¹ EUCOM's insistence at the conferences that its troops be equipped to 100 percent of their T/O&E requirements before any shipments be made to NATO countries was referred to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, who on 24 March 1952 directed implementation of the following policy with regard to EUCOM material required for NATO: (1) EUCOM was authorized 100 percent of T/O&E equipment in the hands of troop units; (2) further build-up, i.e., reserves, of equipment in EUCOM beyond that necessary for attaining this goal of 100 percent of T/O&E equipment, would be as indicated by the

⁵⁹Ltr, Asst CCFSA G-4 to CINCEUR, 26 Mar 52, sub: Ltr of Transmittal - Minutes of EUCOM-DA Conference, 19 - 21 Mar 52, Incl 1, pp. 1 - 4. G4/D5 - 19387. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 400.336 (1952), Vol. II, Item 60, B/P.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹Ibid., Incl. 2.

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priorities established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and (3) EUCOM was directed to ship items to NATO on a one-for-one basis, as replacement items in excess of the requirement for 100 percent of T/O&E in the hands of troop units were received. The Department of the Army, however, requested EUCOM to rebuild equipment in the hands of troops for eventual NATO requirements, to the extent that such a reduction of items below the authorized 100 percent might be acceptable to EUCOM.⁶²

165. The World War II Vehicle Program

During the latter part of 1951, the Department of the Army developed a large-scale project known as the "World War II Vehicle Replacement Program," which was designed to give extensive support to the MDAF, as well as to replace with more modern types all World War II type vehicles then in the hands of troops in EUCOM. Included in the program was the projected rebuild of some of the older type vehicles for distribution to the MDAF countries.⁶³ The 1952 program for the delivery of World War II type vehicles to NATO countries was actually begun during December 1951 with the first turnover to recipient countries taking place in February 1952. Deliveries during February and March 1952 were applied against Department of the Army requisitions totaling 2,200 vehicles.⁶⁴ As a result of the EUCOM-Department of the Army conferences, discussed in the preceding paragraph, a greatly stepped-up program of transfer of vehicles to NATO countries was developed and the program was broken down into two separate elements, the wheeled vehicle program and the tracked vehicle program.

a. Wheeled Vehicle Program. Under the stepped-up delivery schedule developed by the Department of the Army, approximately 42,000 wheeled vehicles were to be rebuilt in EUCOM facilities and delivered to the NATO countries between 1 April and 31 December 1952, in addition to the 2,200 vehicles which had been delivered during February and March under Department of the Army requisitions, bringing the delivery target for wheeled vehicles for the year 1952 to approximately 44,000. These vehicles were scheduled for delivery as follows: France—36,000 vehicles; Belgium—5,000 vehicles; and the Netherlands—3,000 vehicles.⁶⁵

⁶²Cable DA-904940, COFSA from ACOFS G-4, to CINCENR, 28 Mar 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item 3A atchd.

⁶³EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 359 - 60. SECRET.

⁶⁴Monthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 May 52, EUCOM Log Div, p. 23. SECRET.

⁶⁵C/N 1, Dir EUCOM Log Div to EUCOM DCOFS Opns, 24 Jun 52, sub: Status of MDAF Supply and Stockpiles in EUCOM. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 400.336 (1952), Vol. III, Item 85.

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Priorities for deliveries of vehicles were changed somewhat during the year, and Norway, Denmark, and the United Kingdom were added to the list of recipient countries. By 31 December 1952 41,200 vehicles, or approximately 91 percent of the provisional target of 44,000 vehicles, had been delivered to NATO countries (Chart 17). The rebuild requirement for EUCOM/USAREUR ordnance shops had been set at approximately 41,200 vehicles for the year 1952, not including the 2,200 vehicles rebuilt under the 1951 program and delivered to NATO countries in February and March 1952. By 31 December 1952, 41,100 vehicles had been rebuilt in EUCOM/USAREUR ordnance shops, fulfilling nearly all of the imposed requirement. Items produced above Department of the Army commitments for 1952 were stockpiled for subsequent MDAP allocations. During 1952, actual deliveries of wheeled vehicles to eligible NATO countries was accomplished as follows: France--33,407; Belgium--2,886; the Netherlands--1,516; Norway--332; Denmark--1,810; and United Kingdom--124. The breakdown of requirements, completed rebuild, and delivery of vehicles under the stepped-up Department of the Army program from 1 April to 31 December 1952 is shown in Table 12.⁶⁶

b. Tracked Vehicle Program. The exchange of tracked vehicles in EUCOM was planned late in 1951 when the Department of the Army notified EUCOM that the new M47 tank would be shipped to replace the M26 tanks then being utilized by combat troops. No firm commitments were made as to the delivery of the new tanks but a tentative schedule was set up under which the M26 tanks would be rehabilitated and delivered to NATO countries. In January 1952 the Department of the Army notified EUCOM that no firm commitment could be made on the delivery of the M47 tanks to EUCOM but that the deliveries of the M26 tank to NATO countries under the MDAP vehicle exchange program would have to begin in May as scheduled.⁶⁷ EUCOM felt it could not weaken its combat strength in the light of the military situation in Europe and reported that it could not ship the M26 tanks to NATO countries until the full EUCOM T/O&E requirements for medium tanks were met. This situation was discussed during the EUCOM-Department of the Army conferences in Washington in March, at which the Department of the Army repeated the urgent requirements for the transfer of M26 tanks to NATO countries. The Department of the Army then promised the delivery of M47 tanks to EUCOM and proposed the transfer of the M26 tanks to NATO countries on a one-for-one basis, i.e., EUCOM would deliver one M26 tank to a selected eligible NATO country for every M47 tank received in the command. EUCOM, however, refused to depart from its stated position that the EUCOM T/O&E requirements for medium tanks would have to be met before


⁶⁶ Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Dec 52, USAREUR Log Div, p. 22.
SECRET.

⁶⁷ Cable DA-92980, CCFSA from ACQFS G-4 to CINCEUR, 25 Jan 52. SECRET.
In USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item 3A atchd.

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EUCOM/USAREUR WHEELED VEHICLE DELIVERIES TO NATO COUNTRIES
(1 January - 31 December 1952)



Source: USAREUR G-4 Div, Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Dec 52,
p. 22. SECRET.

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Table I2 —EUCOM/USAREUR MDAP Wheeled Vehicle Program

(1 April - 31 December 1952)*

Type	Rebuild Requirements	Completed	Delivered
<u>Total</u>	<u>41,236</u>	<u>41,126</u>	<u>37,854</u>
Truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4	8,615	7,421	7,396
Truck, 3/4 ton, 4x4, ambulance	1,639	1,621	1,252
Truck, 3/4 ton, 4x4, WC	3,000	4,904	4,654
Truck, 2 1/2 ton, 6x6, cargo, LWB	10,484	11,188	10,484
Truck, 2 1/2 ton, 6x6, cargo, SWB	739	753	739
Truck, 1 1/2 ton, 6x6, P&C	1,403	1,466	1,403
Truck, 2 1/2 ton, 6x6, dump	1,230	1,506	1,230
Truck, 2 1/2 ton, 6x6, gas tank, 750 gallon	100	298	187
Truck, 4 ton, 6x6, cargo, LWB and SWB	314	381	234
Truck, 6 ton, 6x6, PM	277	180	124
Truck, 7 1/2 ton, 6x6, PM	13	19	13
Truck, 5-6 ton, 4x4, tractor	136	144	135
Truck, 5 ton, 4x2, M426 (M425)	399	452	399
Truck, 6 ton, 6x6, tractor	116	124	0
Truck, 4 ton, 6x6, dump	95	79	49
Truck, 4 ton, 6x6, wrecker	392	101	101
Truck, 4-5 ton, 4x4, tractor	29	57	29
Truck, 6 ton, 6x6, heavy wrecker, M1 series	430	75	75
Trailer, 1/4 ton, 2 wh, cargo	4,529	3,828	3,811
Trailer, 1 ton, 2 wh, cargo	5,138	5,882	5,138
Trailer, 1 ton, 2 wh, water tank, 250 gal	783	268	249
Semitrailer, 6 ton, 2 wh, A & C	82	42	0
Semitrailer, 6 ton, 2 wh, van	1,133	177	0
Car, armored, M-8	160	160	152

* Deliveries during February and March, totaling 2,200 vehicles, were applied against Department of the Army requisitions and are not included as part of the total rebuild requirement or delivery summary as shown on this table.

Source: Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Dec 52, USAREUR Log Div, p. 22.
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any tanks could be transferred from NATO stocks.⁶⁸ The problem was resolved by the decision of the Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, that EUCOM would be authorized 100 percent of T/O&E requirements in the hands of troops but was to ship items to NATO on a one-for-one basis, as replacement items in excess of T/O&E requirements were received.⁶⁹ On the basis of this decision, EUCOM was authorized a medium tank strength of 1,640 including both the M26 and M47 tanks. As soon as EUCOM/USAREUR reached this figure in medium tank strength, the release of M26 tanks to MDAP was scheduled to commence on the basis of one M26 tank to MDAP for each additional M47 tank received from the zone of interior.⁷⁰ At the time of the Washington conferences, the Department of the Army scheduled the rebuild and delivery of 1,000 M26 tanks between 1 September and 31 December 1952. This requirement was later increased to 1,005, due to an urgent requirement by Belgium for five tanks for training purposes. These five tanks were delivered to Belgium prior to the scheduled delivery date upon authorization from the Department of the Army.⁷¹ Under this program all authorized M47 tanks had been received and distributed to troop units prior to 31 December 1952. As of 31 December 1952, the USAREUR ordnance shops had rebuilt a total of 988 M26 tanks, or approximately 98.3 percent of the target for that date. The rebuilt tanks were delivered to NATO countries, as follows: France--447; Belgium--333; and Italy--208.⁷²

166. Transfer of Equipment under the MDAP Materiel Program

The World War II Vehicle Replacement Program was only a part of the over-all MDA Materiel Program. The remainder of this program consisted of the rebuild and delivery of ordnance, engineer, and signal equipment to meet MDAP requirements for the eligible countries. First deliveries under this program for 1952 were scheduled to take place during July 1952, with the bulk of deliveries scheduled for the period September - December 1952.⁷³

⁶⁸Ltr, DA ACOFS G-4 to CINCEUR, 26 Mar 52, sub: Ltr of Transmittal-- Minutes of EUCOM-DA Conferences, 19 - 21 Mar 1952, Incls 1 & 2. G4/D5 - 19387. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 400.336 (1952), Vol. II, Item 60, B/P.

⁶⁹Cable DA-904940, COFSA from ACOFS G-4, to CINCEUR, 28 Mar 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item 3A atchd.

⁷⁰Cable DA-916509, COFSA to CINCUSAREUR, 20 Aug 52. SECRET. In file cited above.

⁷¹C/N 1, Dir EUCOM Log Div to EUCOM DCOFS Opns, 24 Jun 52, sub: Status of MDAP Supply and Stock Piles in EUCOM. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 400.336 (1952), Vol. III, Item 85.

⁷²Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Dec 52, USAREUR Log Div, pp. 6, 22. SECRET.

⁷³C/N 1, Dir EUCOM Log Div to EUCOM DCOFS Opns, 24 Jun 52, cited above.

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The ordnance small arms program which provided for the rebuild of 12,181 items was completed during November, but the scheduled deliveries were not completed. Instead the items which had been scheduled for delivery were frozen in stocks for Stockpile B. The one exception in the ordnance program was the delivery of twenty-two .50-caliber machine gun mounts to Belgium from serviceable stocks, no rebuild being required. In like manner, the Department of the Army objective of rebuilding 1,200 pieces of engineer equipment was reached before 31 December 1952. In all, 1,072 pieces of engineer equipment were actually delivered to NATO countries under MDAP delivery schedules for 1952. By far the largest portion of this program was concerned with the rebuild and turnover by EUCOM/USAREUR of various items of signal equipment. The rebuild requirements for the 1952 signal rebuild program remained firm throughout the year at 20,200 items. By 31 December 1952 a total of 12,200 items of equipment had been processed by the USAREUR signal depots, or approximately 60 percent of the total program requirements. By the end of 1952 a total of 9,700 items of signal equipment had been delivered according to schedule, with radio sets comprising more than half of the equipment delivered. A total of 5,500 radio sets had been delivered for NATO use, with 2,762 sets allotted to France and 1,183 sets furnished to USAREUR ordnance shops for installation in vehicles for delivery under the World War II Vehicle Replacement Program of MDAP. In addition, twenty-six of the 158 trucks, Type K43 and K44, which were delivered for NATO use were placed in MDAP Stockpile A. In general, the USAREUR rebuild program for MDAP equipment, other than wheeled vehicles and tanks, was carried out successfully. The quotas for the rebuild of ordnance and engineer equipment were met before 31 December 1952, while the rebuild of signal equipment reached 60 percent of the MDAP requirement quotas.⁷⁴

167. MSA Off-shore Procurement

The MSA Off-shore Procurement Program was adopted as a method of procurement by the U.S. military departments from sources outside of the United States, under the approval of the MDA Materiel Program. MSA procurement for the NATO countries turned out to be quite different from normal procurement in the United States due to the unusual restrictions imposed by the Mutual Security Act of 1951. The Off-shore Procurement Program for FY 1952 was embodied in Program A dated 7 December 1951, which was received in EUCOM just prior to 31 December 1951. This program, which was scheduled for completion between 1 January and 30 June 1952, included such items as ammunition, spare parts, vehicles, boats, office and field equipment, steel prefabricated buildings, trucks, trailers, and small arms. The program originally amounted to \$281,298,000, of which

⁷⁴ Mthly Review of Log Actvs, 31 Dec 52, USAREUR Log Div, pp. 23 - 24.
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\$272,307,000 was ordnance, \$2,364,000 was quartermaster, \$310,000 was engineer, and \$6,317,000 was signal equipment. Program A also outlined the recipient countries, the suggested country of manufacture, the U.S. price, and the quantity of each item to be procured.⁷⁵ At the third U.S.-European Military Procurement Co-ordination Conference, which was held in Paris the first week in January 1952, the designation of EUCOM as the executive agency for the co-ordination of Department of Defense activities in OSP was announced.⁷⁶

a. Difficulties in Implementing OSP. Shortly after the first of the year the Defense Department removed three major obstructions to proceeding with the OSP program, namely acceptable tax, labor, and renegotiation clauses. A number of operational or administrative difficulties remained to be overcome before EUCOM could effectively implement the OSP program. These included lack of personnel; delay by the Department of the Army in furnishing drawings and specifications; inability of the Department of the Army to provide small-arms ammunition gauges for from nine to twelve months, necessitating the provision of the gauges by local manufacture; omission of Germany as a source in the list of countries in which procurement was authorized; and lack of confirmation from the MAAG's that recipient countries would take title to materials at the manufacturing origin and arrange for transportation. These difficulties, however, were all eventually overcome by EUCOM.⁷⁷

b. Status of Off-shore Procurement, 31 December 1952. By 31 December 1952, EUCOM/USAREUR had let a total of sixty-five contracts in the amount of \$415,219,401, out of the combined FY 1952 and FY 1953 programs of \$946,031,054. The letting of contracts and the obligation of funds under the combined FY 1952 and 1953 OSP programs is shown in the following table:⁷⁸

⁷⁵C/N 1, USAREUR Log Div to USAREUR Hist Div, 4 Aug 52, sub: Semi-Annual Historical Report to ALFCE, Incl II. SECRET. In USAREUR Log Div 314.7 (1952), Vol. I, Item 7.

⁷⁶SUSREP Bi-Weekly News Rept No. 14, 8 Jan 52. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 400.12 (1952), Vol. I, Item 6I.

⁷⁷Memo, Maj Gen A. A. Bradshaw, Dir EUCOM Log Div, to Gen T. T. Handy, CINCEUR, 11 Jan 52, sub: Difficulties being Encountered with the Offshore Procurement Program. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 400.12 (1952), Vol. I, Item 1.

⁷⁸Mthly Stat Rept, 31 Dec 52, USAREUR Log Div, pp. 66 - 67. SECRET.

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<u>Technical Service</u>	<u>Number of Contracts</u>	<u>1952-53 Programs in Dollars⁷⁹</u>	<u>Obligations in Dollars</u>
<u>Totals</u>	<u>65</u>	<u>\$946,031,054</u>	<u>\$415,219,401</u>
Ordnance-Ammo	26	667,386,372	210,413,424
Ordnance-Other	6	84,855,988	59,783,558
Engineer	3	317,617	317,617
Quartermaster	9	1,055,853	1,055,853
Signal	11	94,888,268	46,121,993
Lisbon Program	10	97,526,956	97,526,956

The Lisbon Program referred to in the table above was the Emergency French Procurement Program agreed upon at the Lisbon Foreign Ministers' Conference held in February 1952. While the MSA-GSP mission primarily aimed at procurement, with the resulting financial assistance to the contracting NATO countries in a secondary role, in the case of the Lisbon Program the United States made financial assistance to France the primary objective, a distinct deviation from normal procurement objectives.⁸⁰

168. MSP (MDAP) Training in the Command

Training of foreign students under the MDA Training Program was initiated in EUCOM during 1950 as a part of the "Formal Training" portion of the regular Mutual Defense Assistance Programs for each of the recipient countries. At the close of FY 1952 approximately 4,000 MDAP students had completed training in EUCOM, while the FY 1953 Mutual Security Training Program (MSTP), which absorbed the MDA Training Program at the beginning of FY 1953, provided for a total of 514 student spaces. Non-English speaking students were accepted in the EUCOM/USAREUR courses in a ratio of four non-English speaking students to one English speaking student through the utilization of student interpreters. In addition to the training conducted in the formal EUCOM/USAREUR schools during 1952, an additional 500 persons visited the command during the year for periods ranging from three to thirty days for orientation outside of the MDA program and at no expense to the United States. Requirements for training in USAREUR originated with the respective country through its local MAAG to JAMAG (Military Assistance Division, Headquarters, US EUCOM, after 1 August 1952), which co-ordinated with EUCOM/USAREUR to determine if

⁷⁹ FY 1952 program represents value of contracts actually placed.

⁸⁰ C/N 1, USAREUR Log Div to USAREUR Hist Div, 4 Aug 52, sub: Semi-Annual Historical Report to ALFCE, Incl II. SECRET. In USAREUR Log Div 314.7 (1952), Vol. I, Item 7.

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profitable training would be available at the cost of the course. These co-ordinated programs were normally submitted once a year to the Department of the Army for approval. The FY 1953 program was finalized in May 1952 at a conference attended by representatives of the Department of the Army, JAMAG, the various MAAG's, and EUCOM. This program was then submitted to the Department of the Army for approval, with the first courses under the FY 1953 program scheduled to begin shortly after 1 September 1952.⁸¹

a. EUCOM/USAREUR Training Objectives. The objective of the training conducted by EUCOM/USAREUR was to orient Allied military personnel in the operation, maintenance, and repair of the military equipment turned over to the various foreign governments by the United States. The attendance of instructor-type students was encouraged, in order to train a nucleus of instructors capable of conducting further training without continued U.S. guidance and assistance. It was expected, moreover, that each foreign country would utilize its own funds and resources to the maximum in providing training in its own schools, both civilian and military, and in industry, both in formal schooling and in on-the-job training.⁸²

b. Courses Available in EUCOM/USAREUR. MDAF students were accepted by EUCOM/USAREUR for all applicable courses which were listed in the EUCOM School Catalog Annex to EUCOM Training Circular No. 1, dated 25 January 1952. EUCOM/USAREUR limited the number of foreign students to be accepted in most courses to 10 percent of the normal capacity of the course. In addition to the regular courses at the EUCOM/USAREUR schools, special courses offered by the EUCOM technical services and Seventh Army were also open to qualified MDAF students. These special courses included the tank commanders course for either light or medium tanks, conducted by the Seventh Army Tank Training Center at Vilseck; the special ordnance supply parts course provided by the EUCOM Ordnance School; and the engineer supply course offered by the EUCOM Engineer School. No other special courses were to be offered unless they were essential for the requirements of a country just entering the program. Finally, although urged to offer on-the-job training, EUCOM/USAREUR announced that for FY 1953 neither on-the-job training nor orientation visits could be provided under the Mutual Security Program.⁸³

⁸¹ USAREUR OPOT Div Stf Study, 7 Oct 52, sub: MDAF Training in USAREUR. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 350.2 (1952), Vol. II, Item 78.

⁸² C/N 1, Dir EUCOM OPOT Div to EUCOM DCOFS Opns, 14 Mar 52, sub: Policy for MSP Training in EUCOM, Incl I. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 350.2 (1952), Vol. I, Item 41B atchd.

⁸³ (1) Ibid. (2) C/N 2, EUCOM DCOFS Opns to Dir EUCOM OPOT Div, 21 Apr 52, same sub. RESTRICTED. In same file.

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169. The MDAP Stockpiling Program

During the first part of 1951, the original "MDAP Program for Stockpiling Material for Title I Countries" was redesignated as Stockpile A (MDAP supplies for Austria) and plans were laid for the future establishment of a corollary Stockpile B when necessary.⁸⁴ As of 31 December 1952 Stockpile A consisted of approximately 227,000 measurement tons of material stored in the USAREUR technical service depots in both Germany and France. The bulk of this equipment, 200,000 measurement tons, which included some 5,000 vehicles, was stored at Fontenet Ordnance Depot along the USAREUR LOFC in France. Stockage of approximately 87 percent of the items in Stockpile A was complete, as of 31 December 1952, with the deficiency in the program consisting of ordnance items to be shipped from the zone of interior. While this stockpile was destined for Austria, it was decided for political reasons, and with the approval of SHAPE, that it should be stored in EUCOM. During 1952, requests were forwarded to the Department of the Army asking that these stocks either be transferred to USFA or delivered to other Western European countries. The development of the USFA LOFC through Italy provided the necessary depots for storage of the items in question. USFA concurred in the proposal but delivery to USFA was not implemented during 1952.⁸⁵

a. Stockpile B. Early in 1952, the Department of the Army announced the plans for the establishment of Stockpile B for the purpose of providing MDAP supplies for European Defense Community (EDC) countries. Major items to be included in Stockpile B were tanks, artillery, and ammunition for both. Total value of Stockpile B was estimated at approximately \$600,000,000, with a total tonnage of approximately 1.8 million measurement tons. On 25 June 1952 EUCOM advised the Department of the Army that it did not have capabilities for receiving, storing, and maintaining such tonnages, and recommended that all items generated in the zone of interior for Stockpile B be stored in zone of interior depots adjacent to the eastern seaboard for direct shipment to the recipient countries. The Department of the Army approved this recommendation in principle but required that a few items generated in USAREUR be held in USAREUR depots and earmarked as Stockpile B. Revision of the Stockpile B program shortly before the end of 1952 increased the dollar value of the program to approximately \$815,000,000, representing an increase of approximately 2.5 million measurement tons. The bulk of this increase was expected to come from excesses generated in USAREUR under

⁸⁴EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 357-58. SECRET.

⁸⁵Memo for recd, Lt Col M. E. Naylor, C/USAREUR G-4 Div Sup Br MDAP Sec, 7 May 53, sub: Status of Stockpile A. SECRET. In USAREUR G-4 Div Sup Br MDAP Sec files (1953).

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the equipment exchange program, particularly since the bulk of allocations to other MDAF countries had been received and deliveries were nearing completion.⁸⁶

170. Establishment of Headquarters, US EUCOM

The redesignation of EUCOM as USAREUR and the establishment of the new headquarters, US EUCOM, on 1 August 1952, occasioned a shift in the responsibilities for the carrying out of the Mutual Security Program in Europe. General Handy, as Commander in Chief, European Command, had been designated as Military Representative for Military Assistance in Europe (MILREP) on 15 November 1950, a position which carried with it responsibility for the carrying out of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program in Europe. This responsibility necessitated the creation of a new organization in Europe, that of JAMAG.⁸⁷ General Handy had three separate responsibilities for the MDAF. As MILREP he was the representative of the Department of Defense in the military assistance program for the NATO countries and was responsible for carrying out the duties assigned to the Department of Defense by the MDAF and JAMAG. As CINCEUR, he was operationally responsible for carrying out the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Finally, as CINCEUR, he was responsible for the Army portion of MDAF.⁸⁸ Under the Mutual Security Act of 1951, General Handy, as MILREP, assumed the primary responsibility for the functions assigned to the Secretary of Defense by paragraph 506 (a) of the act.⁸⁹ It was apparent from this division of responsibilities that certain functions would remain with USAREUR after its redesignation while others would necessarily pass to the newly established US EUCOM. Of the responsibilities passing to US EUCOM, certain of them would have to be redelegated to USAREUR for operational control because of the fact that Headquarters, US EUCOM, was designed as an administrative and not an operational headquarters.

a. Transfer of MSP Functions. As of 1 August US EUCOM assumed the functions of MILREP and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Representative, Europe (JCSRE), and responsibility for the co-ordination of off-shore procurement among the three services in Europe as the executive agent for OSP. Under the transfer of functions of MILREP to US EUCOM, the command,

⁸⁶ Ibid., 8 May 53, sub: Stockpile B. SECRET.

⁸⁷ EUCOM and the MDAF, 1 Jan 49 to 30 Jun 50, pp. 18 - 19. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Ref Lib.

⁸⁸ Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. V. C. Jones, USAREUR MDAF Ctl Gp, 22 May 53. SECRET.

⁸⁹ Cable S-5745, CINCEUR to SACEUR, 2 Jun 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 EUCOM, Vol. I (1952), Item 8A atchd.

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control, and functions of JAMAG were assumed by Headquarters, US EUCOM, on 1 August 1952. Specified JAMAG missions /formerly Military Assistance Program Advisory Group (MAPAG) functions/ were carried out after that time by the Director, Military Assistance Division, Headquarters, US EUCOM. Instructions effective 1 August 1952 were issued to the Title I MAAG's in European NATO, stating that command and control were transferred from MILREP to US CINCEUR, current missions would remain unchanged, and Title I MAAG's would report to US CINCEUR through the Director, Military Assistance Division, Headquarters, US EUCOM.⁹⁰ Included in the transfer of military assistance functions were the command and control of both the Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JAMMAT) and the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group to Greece (JUSMAG).⁹¹

b. Redelegation of Authority. After the transfer of primary responsibility for these functions to US EUCOM, certain responsibilities were redelegated, without power of redelegation, to CINCUSAREUR. These included responsibility for the budget, funding, fiscal, civilian personnel administration, and related reporting activities pertaining to military agencies primarily engaged in military assistance activities in Europe, specifically in the Title I MAAG's; the MDAF Control Group; Headquarters, USAREUR; the Department of the Army field procurement offices; and the Military Assistance Division, Headquarters, US EUCOM. Responsibility for similar functions with regard to JAMMAT and JUSMAG were similarly delegated to CINCUSAREUR, to the extent that the performance of such functions were the responsibility of Headquarters, US EUCOM. CINCUSAREUR was to consult with Headquarters, US EUCOM, on all questions involving policy, and was to keep it informed on all matters concerning the designated responsibilities other than routine operations.⁹²

c. Functions Remaining in USAREUR. While the primary responsibility for all military assistance functions in Europe and the co-ordination of OSP for all three services was transferred to US EUCOM, certain functions which General Handy had performed as CINCEUR remained with its successor, USAREUR. These functions included responsibility for carrying out the Army portion of the military assistance program as well as the responsibility for procurement for Army items under the OSP program. These purely

⁹⁰ Cable SX-1884, CINCEUR to COFSA for JCS, 29 Jul 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322 EUCOM (1952), Vol. I, Item 8A atchd.

⁹¹ Cable (SMC In 211), US CINCEUR to JAMMAT and JUSMAG, 31 Jul 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322 EUCOM (1952), Vol. I, Item 8A atchd.

⁹² Ltr, US CINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Nov 52, sub: Delegation of Authority. (GMT). UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR MDAF Ctl Gp files (1952).

Army operational functions were not included in the transfer of responsibility to US EUCOM but remained with USAREUR.⁹³

171. The USAREUR MDAF Control Group

The European Command established the EUCOM MDAF Control Group on 15 March 1950 and attached this agency to the EUCOM Office of the Comptroller, for supervisory purposes. This agency was not part of the organic structure of the comptroller staff division for the reason that it was the agency of CINCEUR, who maintained operation control over the entire MDA Program. The control group was responsible for the control of all budgeting, funding, fiscal, and related report activities of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. By agreement with the Director, EUCOM Personnel and Administration Division, a civilian personnel representative was detailed to the group to insure effective utilization and administration of civilian personnel within authorized funds.⁹⁴ Under the redesignation of command this group was redesignated the USAREUR MDAF Control Group and continued its functions under the redelegation of authority described above.

a. Budget and Funding Responsibilities. The USAREUR MDAF Control Group was responsible for the preparation and submission of the dollar budget to the Department of the Army on a fiscal year basis for the Mutual Defense Assistance Program for Headquarters, USAREUR, including the technical services; Headquarters, US EUCOM; Detachment A, US EUCOM; JUSMAG; JAMMAT; the seven MAAG's of the Title I countries; Army Ordnance subprocurement field offices; and SHAPE and its subordinate commands (U.S. civilians under NATO terms of employment). In addition it was responsible for local currency budgeting, including contributed and/or counterpart funds, for the above named agencies; Headquarters, USAF; Air Force procurement field teams; and the Navy Shipbuilding Liaison Office. In addition to the preparation and justification of budgets, this agency was made responsible by the Department of Defense for the complete funding control of all funds, both dollar and local currency, made available for each operating agency as justified within the budget. The agency was also responsible for the proper control of funds for the preparation and implementation of procedures not covered by the existing Army Regulations and Special Regulations.⁹⁵

⁹³ Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. V. C. Jones, C/USAREUR MDAF Ctl Gp, 22 May 52. SECRET.

⁹⁴ EUCOM memo to Heads of All Stf Divs, 14 Mar 50, sub: EUCOM MDAF Ctl Gp. AG 334 COM-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR MDAF Ctl Gp files.

⁹⁵ Memo, C/USAREUR MDAF Ctl Gp to C/USAREUR G-1 Div Civ Pers Br Classification and Wage Sec, 28 Jan 53, sub: Position Reclassification. SECRET. In USAREUR MDAF Ctl Gp files (1953).

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b. Commercial Vouchers for CSP. The MMAP Control Group was also responsible for the preparation and certification of all commercial vouchers required for payments due contractors who participated in the Army CSP program. The amount involved in the calendar year 1952 was \$210,413,424.⁹⁶

c. Civilian Personnel. The MMAP Control Group was responsible to the Department of the Army for the justification of all U.S. civilian spaces in the Army agencies engaged in military assistance activities. By agreement with the USAREUR G3, the group was responsible for the issuance of Civilian Personnel Authorizations (EC 16's) to each operating agency, as well as the maintenance of records relative to space allocations and controls. In addition, the group was responsible for the administration and servicing of all civilian personnel requirements of agencies operating under the U.S. Army as executive agent for MSP. The authorized strength of U.S. civilian personnel thus administered by the MMAP Control Group as of 31 December 1952 was 278.⁹⁷

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

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CHAPTER 9

Relations with HICOG

172. Area of HICOG-EUCOM/USAREUR Co-operation and Co-ordination

Relations between EUCOM/USAREUR and the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany underwent sweeping changes in 1952. The completion of the contractual negotiations with the German Federal Republic necessitated long-range planning for the anticipated change-over in the status of U.S. forces in Germany from that of occupation troops to defense forces. The expected change-over of the U.S. High Commission for Germany to embassy status created a number of problems which occupied the attention of both HICOG and EUCOM/USAREUR during the latter half of 1952, particularly in connection with logistical support, budgets, housing, German-American relations, and the like. Although EUCOM/USAREUR made plans to assume responsibility for military liaison with the Federal Republic, HICOG still retained an over-all authority in certain fields. In these fields the military authorities could approach the Federal Government only through the medium of the U.S. High Commission. Finally, relations with the Soviet Zone of Germany, with the Soviets along the Czechoslovak-Bavarian border, as well as with the Soviet sector of Berlin, created problems which necessitated close co-ordination between HICOG and EUCOM/USAREUR in order that a firm U.S. position could be presented with regard to Soviet-American relations.

173. HICOG-CINCEUR/CINCUSAREUR Monthly Meetings

An effective means of co-ordination between the U.S. High Commission for Germany and EUCOM/USAREUR was the practice of holding monthly HICOG-CINCEUR/CINCUSAREUR meetings attended by representatives of the major U.S. elements in Germany. These meetings were usually attended by the U.S. High Commissioner and several of his administrative assistants from the High Commission as well as the four Land commissioners of the Laender within the U.S. sphere of

influence. On the part of EUCOM they were attended by CINCEUR (and his successor CINCUSAREUR) together with his staff division heads, major commanders, and military post commanders.¹ At these meetings problems of interest to both HICOG and EUCOM were discussed in the presence of interested parties with the possibility of a final decision being made at the level of the U.S. High Commissioner and CINCEUR. These monthly meetings did not always produce definitive decisions but they did serve to air the views of both HICOG and EUCOM on the question at hand. More often than not they resulted in a mutually satisfactory agreement on the part of the U.S. High Commissioner and CINCEUR on how to settle the problem under consideration. In addition to the regular monthly meetings which mainly handled routine problems, special meetings were arranged between HICOG and CINCEUR from time to time to discuss problems of particular importance. One such occasion was the full-scale budget meeting at Garmisch in February attended by Mr. J. J. McCloy, the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, and Gen. T. T. Handy, CINCEUR. At this meeting the budget for GFY 1953 was discussed in order to iron out the differences of opinion between the High Commission, the Federal Republic, and the European Command. The main purpose of this meeting was to obtain agreement on certain budgetary principles which would be binding upon both HICOG and EUCOM.²

174. Disposition of the Question of Quarters Attendants

One of the problems discussed at the Garmisch budget conference, and one which had been a source of contention between HICOG and EUCOM for some time,³ was the continued provision in the GFY 1953 budget for quarters attendants utilized in the billets of EUCOM personnel. EUCOM's budget estimates for GFY 1952 had provided for approximately 24,250 quarters attendants at a total cost to the occupation budget of DM 45,105,000. It was anticipated that expenditures for this purpose would be higher in GFY 1953 as a result of the EUCOM troop augmentation program.⁴ At the Garmisch conference Mr. McCloy obtained the agreement of General Handy to eliminate employment of quarters attendants, but on a tripartite basis only, the cost of such personnel to be deleted from the

¹ HICOG-CINCEUR Mthly Mtgs with Heads of Maj U.S. Elements.
UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1952), Vol. I, B/P's 1 - 12.

² Memo for rcd, Brig Gen J. J. Binns, EUCOM Compt, 8 Feb 52,
sub: Conference of Mr. McCloy--General Handy at Garmisch, 7 February
1952. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 092 GER (1952), Vol. I, Item 24.

³ EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, p. 388. SECRET.

⁴ Cable S-4121, CINCEUR to COFSA for CQA, 10 Apr 52. RESTRICTED.
In USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. I, Item 20 atchd.

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budget in the event that tripartite agreement was secured. Mr. McCloy, however, reserved the right to hold his position that unilateral action should be taken by the United States in the event that tripartite agreement could not be effected.⁵

a. EUCOM Objections to Unilateral Action. EUCOM refused to retreat from its position that action in this matter must be effected only on a tripartite basis. General Handy pointed out that similar unilateral actions taken by HICOG to set an example for the British and the French had resulted only in the loss of the affected privileges by U.S. personnel and had not stirred the British and French to similar action.⁶

b. Department of the Army Instructions. Before long, however, the publication of stories in U.S. newspapers, coupled with criticism from Congressional committees, took the decision out of the hands of EUCOM. Early in April the Department of the Army notified EUCOM that it was considered essential that all EUCOM Deutsche Mark expenditures should meet with U.S. military appropriations standards by 1 June 1952, regardless of whether such standards differed from those maintained by the British and the French in Germany. The Department of the Army, moreover, did not desire to justify continuing non-U.S. standards in Germany merely because they were similar to those maintained by the British and the French. On 29 April the Department of the Army directed EUCOM to bring EUCOM Deutsche Mark expenditures in line with U.S. military appropriations standards by 30 June 1952. The Department of the Army recommended that the initial public announcement of the elimination of expenditures for maintaining non-U.S. standards be made by CINCEUR in order that public opinion might give appropriate credit to him and to his command.⁷

c. Final Disposition. In pursuance of the directive from the Department of the Army, EUCOM and HICOG issued the following directive simultaneously at 1400 hours, Saturday, 3 May 1952:

In contemplation of an early signing and ratification of the contractual agreements, Headquarters EUCOM is directing that steps be initiated at once to reduce according to

⁵Memo for recd, Brig Gen J. J. Binns, EUCOM Compt, 8 Feb 52, cited above.

⁶Memo, Gen T. T. Handy, CINCEUR, to Senior Unit Comdrs and Stf Off, 25 Sep 51, sub: EUCOM Position on Future German-American Relations. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 014.1 GER (1951), Vol. IV, Item 157.

⁷(1) Cable DA-906187, Vice COFSA to CINCEUR, 11 Apr 52. SECRET.
(2) Cable DA-907569, COFSA to CINCEUR, 29 Apr 52. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. I, Item 20 atchd.

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an orderly phased program designed to effect the termination of these activities by 30 June of this year, certain support services which do not meet U.S. military appropriations standards and which are furnished the U.S. Forces in Germany from indigenous sources of the Federal Republic. Support affected comprises several categories, principally for personal services This action is being taken prior to the termination of occupation in the hope that it will in a measure advance the contribution of German military forces to her own and the common defense of free nations.⁸

175. Clemency for HICOG Prisoners in Landsberg Prison

Late in 1951, HICOG requested and received permission from EUCOM to transfer HICOG prisoners convicted of espionage in HICOG courts to the EUCOM War Criminal Prison No. 1, at Landsberg.⁹ These prisoners remained under the jurisdiction of HICOG even though lodged in a EUCOM prison, and the U.S. High Commissioner reserved the right of clemency for, and release of, these prisoners. Mr. McCloy informed EUCOM in July 1952 that he desired to apply the normal clemency procedures exercised by the HICOG Clemency Board to these prisoners and requested that EUCOM direct the prison authorities to work out the details of this procedure with a representative of the board.¹⁰ At that time, there were 69 prisoners convicted of espionage offenses by HICOG courts incarcerated in EUCOM War Criminal Prison No. 1. The EUCOM judge advocate confirmed the jurisdiction of the U.S. High Commissioner over these prisoners and concluded that the proposal for the exercise of clemency as requested, including visits by clemency boards and other interested parties, and the appointment of a parole officer from the staff of War Criminal Prison No. 1 would not

⁸(1) Cable, no number, HICOG Bonn to State Dept (2620), 2 May 52, RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. II, Item 20 atchd.

(2) Cable SX-4860, CINCEUR to all mil post comdrs, 3 May 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 092 GER (1952), Vol. II, Item 62.

⁹EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, p. 381. SECRET.

¹⁰Ltr, Mr. J. J. McCloy, HICOG, to Gen T. T. Handy, CINCEUR, 15 Jul 52, sub: Clemency for HICOG Espionage Cases at Landsberg Prison. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 000.5 (1952), Vol. II, Item 50A.

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interfere with the normal operations of the prison.¹¹ General Handy then informed Mr. McCloy that he would do everything possible to assist HICOG in exercising its jurisdiction over these prisoners and that the director of War Criminal Prison No. 1, had been instructed to co-operate with the HICOG Clemency Board.¹²

176. Transfer of Housing to HICOG

a. EUCOM-HICOG Housing Agreement. Early in 1952 Mr. McCloy decided that all HICOG personnel would be given 100 percent of their housing requirements in the U.S. Zone of Germany. Included in this decision were the personnel and their dependents assigned to the following agencies: (a) Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany; (b) U.S. consulates; (c) Voice of America; (d) Land observers; (e) Civil Aviation Authority (HICOG); and (f) the U.S. Department of Justice. Maj. Gen. A. A. Bradshaw, EUCOM director of logistics, met with Mr. Glenn Wolfe, Director of Administration, HICOG, on 10 January 1952, to work out the details of implementation of this decision.¹³ The meeting produced a provisional agreement between EUCOM and HICOG which was formally signed by HICOG on 21 January. According to the terms of the agreement, EUCOM allocated to HICOG for exclusive assignment jurisdiction all family and BOQ housing physically occupied by HICOG personnel on 10 January 1952. Provision was made, however, for the return of such housing to EUCOM control as soon as each unit became surplus to the immediate needs of HICOG. HICOG, for its part, agreed to assign the allocated housing to personnel of appropriate categories in accordance with the principles established for EUCOM personnel. EUCOM agreed to support and maintain all such housing

¹¹C/N 2, EUCOM JA to EUCOM SGS, 28 Jul 52, to C/N 1, EUCOM SGS to EUCOM JA, 22 Jul 52, sub: HICOG Board Jurisdiction of War Criminal Prison No. 1, Landsberg. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 000.5 (1952), Vol. II, Item 50A atchd.

¹²(1) Ltr, Gen T. T. Handy, CINCEUR, to Mr. W. J. Donnelly, HICOG, 26 Aug 52, sub: Clemency for HICOG Espionage Cases in Landsberg Prison. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Ltr, CINCEUR to Dir War Criminal Prison No. 1, through CO AMP, AG 383 JAG, 4 Aug 52, sub: Clemency for Espionage Cases in War Criminal Prison No. 1. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 000.5 (1952), Vol. II, Item 50A atchd.

¹³C/N 1, Dir EUCOM P&A Div to EUCOM COFS, 11 Jan 52, sub: HICOG Housing. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 620 (1952), Vol. I, Item 2.

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in accordance with current directives.¹⁴ The agreement covered the transfer of 310 family units physically occupied by HICOG families and 109 family units physically occupied by HICOG bachelors on 10 January 1952.¹⁵

b. Status of HICOG Housing in Frankfurt. Housing in Frankfurt, one of the most critical housing areas in the U.S. Zone of Germany, was not brought under the terms of this agreement because the move of HICOG agencies to Bonn rendered unnecessary the retention of any properties other than the HICOG-owned Carl Schurz Development. The creation of the new US EUCOM headquarters in Frankfurt on 15 August 1952 intensified the already critical housing situation there. On 1 August, however, HICOG was still occupying 56 houses and 24 apartments in addition to the Carl Schurz Development. HICOG had agreed to return a total of 50 family housing units to the control of Frankfurt Military Post between 15 July and 1 August but by late August none had actually been turned over. The reasons given for the failure to return housing in Frankfurt were that office space was not yet available at Bonn for certain HICOG agencies and certain HICOG families were too large for the three-bedroom apartments available to HICOG personnel in Bonn, necessitating the retention of larger houses in the Frankfurt area. No material change in this situation occurred before the end of 1952.¹⁶

177. Transfer of the I. G. Farben Building

In July 1952, Brig. Gen. B. F. Perry, Commanding General, Frankfurt Military Post, forwarded a request to EUCOM that space control in the I. G. Farben Building be transferred from the jurisdiction of HICOG to Frankfurt Military Post. General Perry based his request on the fact that military elements by 1 July were the major users of space in

¹⁴(1) EUCOM ltr, to All Mil Post Comdrs, 23 Jan 52, sub: Transfer of Assignment Jurisdiction for Dependents and BOQ Housing to HICOG. AG 624 GPA-AGO. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Memo, Brig Gen J. B. Murphy, Dir EUCOM P&A Div to EUCOM DCOFS Admin, sub: Notes for HICOG-CINCEUR Monthly Meeting. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1952), Vol. I, B/P 1.

¹⁵C/N 1, cited above, TAB C & D. UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁶Memo, Dir USAREUR P&A Div to CINCUSAREUR, 25 Aug 52, sub: Status of HICOG Housing in Frankfurt. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 620 (1952), Vol. II, Item 39.

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the building.¹⁷ A joint EUCOM-HICOG conference was held in Frankfurt on 17 July to determine the future control of office space and quarters in Frankfurt Military Post. Due particularly to the imminent creation of the new US EUCOM Headquarters in Frankfurt, HICOG agreed that, as of that day (17 July), space control of the I.G. Farben Building should pass to the Commanding General, Frankfurt Military Post. With regard to the space still occupied by HICOG in the building, it was agreed that HICOG office personnel who were scheduled to move to Bonn would do so by 15 August at the latest, while those scheduled to remain in Frankfurt would complete their move to the neighboring building, Annex A, as soon as practicable, assisted by Frankfurt Military Post.¹⁸

178. Logistical Support for Bremen Area

During January EUCOM completed the program of phasing-out support activities in the Bremen area which had been begun late in 1951 when EUCOM decided to withdraw all Army elements from that area. Part of the program had been completed before the end of 1951 but the quartermaster gas station was not transferred to HICOG control until 2 January, while the theater and PX were transferred on 26 January. At the end of the first school semester, the dependent school was placed under the administrative control of HICOG.¹⁹

179. Planning for Withdrawal of Logistical Support of HICOG

Early in 1952 it was realized by EUCOM that the signing of the contractual agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany would necessitate certain changes in the U.S. State Department agencies in Germany which would have important effects upon their relations with EUCOM. With the transformation of the Office of the U.S. High

¹⁷C/N 1, Dir EUCOM Log Div to EUCOM COFS, 11 Jul 52, sub: I.G. Farben Building, Frankfurt a/M. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 620 (1952), Vol. II, Item 29A.

¹⁸Memo for recd, Brig Gen J. J. Binns, EUCOM Compt, 21 Jul 52, sub: HICOG-EUCOM Conference in re Office Space and Quarters, FMP (17 July 1952). UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 620 (1952), Vol. II, Item 29A atchd.

¹⁹(1) EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 366 - 67. SECRET. (2) Memo for recd, EUCOM Log Div Svcs Br, 24 Jan 52, sub: Curtailment of EUCOM Logistic Support Activities in Bremen. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. I, Item 2 atchd.

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Commissioner for Germany into the U.S. embassy to the Federal Republic of Germany, as contemplated in the contractual agreements, the State Department personnel in Germany would be placed in the same status as those in other countries where normal diplomatic relations were maintained.²⁰

a. EUCOM Recommendations. In view of the fact that only 250 of the 1200 persons whom the State Department intended to employ in Germany after the change-over to embassy status would be located in the U.S. Zone of Germany, the heads of the interested staff divisions of EUCOM felt the continuation of logistical support of this portion of the HICOG personnel would constitute no burden on existing EUCOM facilities and that such continuation should, therefore, be considered. The following recommendations were made concerning support of the remainder of the HICOG personnel, who would be stationed in Germany outside of the U.S. Zone: (1) ~~EUCOM should provide no support outside the U.S. Zone~~ which would require the use of military personnel or appropriated funds; (2) ~~EUCOM foresaw no objections to the provisions of nonappropriated fund supplies and services subject to full reimbursement;~~ and (3) there was no objection to permitting State Department personnel stationed outside the U.S. Zone to use EUCOM nonappropriated fund facilities when temporarily within the U.S. Zone. Included within these recommendations was a provision for the close-out of PX activity at Koblenz and Essen but a request to retain the EES facilities at Bonn inasmuch as \$30,000 had recently been spent by EES on its installations there.²¹ The deputy chief of staff for administration, however, directed that a further study be made with a view to possible elimination at Bonn of all EUCOM nonappropriated fund activities. This study was to include the matter of PX, Class VI, and other activities.²²

b. Separate EUCOM Recommendations for Bonn Area. After a further study of the problem, the interested staff divisions of EUCOM agreed that after HICOG headquarters at Bonn assumed embassy status it would no longer be entitled to any more support from EUCOM than that received by any other U.S. embassy. Such a policy would mean the withdrawal of

²⁰C/N 1, EUCOM DCOFS Admin to Dir EUCOM LOG Div, 14 Jan 52, sub: Logistical Support to State Department Personnel after Change to Embassy Status. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 400 (1952), Vol. I, Item 4A-1.

²¹C/N 2, Dir EUCOM LOG Div to EUCOM DCOFS Admin, 11 Feb 52, to C/N 1 cited above.

²²C/N 3, EUCOM DCOFS Admin to Dir EUCOM P&A Div, 28 Feb 52, to C/N 1 cited above.

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nearly all nonappropriated fund support from HICOG, Bonn.²³ It was recommended that EUCOM continue to furnish HICOG with the following major items of both appropriated and nonappropriated fund support: (1) recruitment of teachers for the dependent school at Bad Godesberg; (2) use of U.S. controlled rail transportation in Germany; (3) bulk procurement of POL products; (4) procurement of Army supplies subject to availability; and (5) procurement of exchange merchandise, Class VI supplies, and motion picture films and spare parts on a cost-plus basis.²⁴

c. HICOG Concurrence. HICOG concurred in the EUCOM recommendations for the discontinuance of support to HICOG, at Bonn, on 14 July 1952 and set up a timetable for the assumption of the responsibility for various logistic support functions currently performed by EUCOM. At the same time HICOG expressed appreciation for the support which had been rendered by EUCOM to HICOG after its move from Frankfurt to Bonn.²⁵

180. Termination of Logistical Support to HICOG, Bonn

Both EUCOM and HICOG agreed that support rendered to HICOG in the Bonn Enclave, should be terminated at a fixed date without waiting for the transformation to embassy status. The uncertainty as to the ratification date for the contractual agreements and consequently as to a set date for transformation from High Commission to embassy status led to the decision to establish target dates for the termination of support in the Bonn area, at which time the support functions would be assumed by HICOG, or its successor, the U.S. embassy.²⁶

²³C/N 4, Dir EUCOM P&A Div to EUCOM DCOFS Admin, 10 Mar 52, to C/N 1 cited above.

²⁴Memo, Dir EUCOM P&A Div to EUCOM COFS, 2 Apr 52, sub: Logistical Support of HICOG (Bonn). UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. I, Item 6A.

²⁵Ltr, Mr. Glenn Wolfe, Dir HICOG Admin, to Gen T. T. Handy, CINCEUR, 14 Jul 52, sub: Phase-out of EUCOM Support Activities at Bonn. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. I, Item 18.

²⁶(1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, Maj Gen E. T. Williams, EUCOM COFS, to Mr. G. Wolfe, Dir HICOG Admin, 30 Jul 52, sub: Phase-out of EUCOM Support Activities in Bonn Area. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. I, Item 14A atchd.

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a. Commissary. EUCOM had originally intended to transfer all responsibility for the operation of the commissary in the Bonn Enclave on 1 September 1952, with provision made for HICOG purchase of bulk subsistence supplies from EUCOM for a short period of time until the State Department commissaries could operate independently. The cut-off date for this bulk subsistence support was set for no later than 1 November 1952.²⁷ HICOG moved the date forward to 1 August for the reason that EUCOM was closing out the commissaries at Koblenz and Essen on 31 July 1952 and these accounts would henceforth have to be serviced from Bonn.²⁸ Under the final arrangement HICOG was authorized to make bulk purchase from quartermaster stocks until 1 July 1953. EUCOM agreed to the transfer of equipment needed by HICOG for the operation of the store on an interim basis. The final date for the settlement on equipment was established as 1 January 1953.²⁹

b. EES Service. HICOG agreed to take over immediately after the 31 July 1952 inventory the operation of all EES services in the Bonn Enclave and to continue them on a reduced scale. HICOG also made arrangements to purchase certain equipment for the PX and snack bar as well as certain other EES equipment.

c. Class VI Store. HICOG requested the transfer of the Class VI store at Bonn from EUCOM on condition that HICOG be authorized to purchase Class VI merchandise on the same terms as EUCOM clubs and installations and that a monthly rebate be made to HICOG of the profits which, in the case of EUCOM installations, went into the EUCOM Welfare Fund.³⁰ HICOG's proposal for the purchase of Class VI supplies was concurred in by EUCOM but special provisions were made for the supplies on hand on the turnover date of 1 August. Supplies included in the inventory in the Bonn Enclave branch of the Frankfurt Class VI Fund at the close of business on 31 July 1952 would be turned over to HICOG.³¹

²⁷Ltr, Brig Gen J. B. Murphy, Dir EUCOM P&A Div to Mr. G. Wolfe, Dir HICOG Admin, 5 Jun 52. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 331.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item 31A atchd.

²⁸Ltr, Mr. G. Wolfe, Dir HICOG Admin, to Gen T. T. Handy, CINCEUR, 14 Jul 52, sub: Phase-out of EUCOM Support Activities in Bonn Area. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. I, Item 14A.

²⁹Ltr, Maj Gen E. T. Williams to Mr. G. Wolfe, 30 Jul 52, cited above.

³⁰Ltr, Mr. G. Wolfe to Gen T. T. Handy, 14 Jul 52, cited above.

³¹Ltr, Maj Gen E. T. Williams to Mr. G. Wolfe, 30 Jul 52, cited above.

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d. APO Service. The question of APO service for the Bonn Enclave area could not be settled as easily as the other support problems. EUCOM was bound by the provisions of Department of the Army Special Regulations 65-10-5 which provided that U.S. citizen employees of governmental departments and agencies, including dependents of such personnel, were entitled to use the facilities of the Army-Air Force postal service when consistent with the service capabilities as determined by the commander requested to provide such service. Definitions of "Forces" and "members of the Forces" in the contractual agreements, however, did not include the embassy or consular offices, or their personnel. Article 18 of the "Convention on the Rights and Obligations of the Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany," as interpreted by the Germans during the negotiations, prohibited the embassy and the consular offices from using the Army-Air Force postal system.³² Upon agreement by HICOG to take necessary action to avoid all possible conflict with Article 18, it was determined to establish for HICOG a "unit mail service plan" which would furnish HICOG adequate postal facilities but would make it unnecessary for EUCOM to operate an APO unit in the Bonn Enclave.³³ EUCOM would continue full APO service to HICOG until the contractual agreements became effective, when the proposed unit mail system for HICOG would be placed in operation.³⁴

e. Grant of Funds to HICOG. The problem of the termination of support activities in the Bonn Enclave area by EUCOM included the question of the ability of HICOG to liquidate the outstanding nonappropriated fund indebtedness which had been incurred with various EUCOM agencies for PX facilities at Bonn, loans outstanding for sundry funds, etc. The following outstanding loans were involved: (a) American Chapel Fund, \$5,000; (b) Berlin Element HICOG Club, \$5,000;

³²C/N 4, EUCOM AG to EUCOM SGS, through EUCOM Compt and Dir EUCOM P&A Div, 17 Jul 52, to C/N 1, EUCOM SGS to EUCOM AG, 11 Jun 52, sub: Letter from HICOG to General Handy, dated 9 June 1952, sub: Official-Personal Mail Service to HICOG Hq. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. I, Item 14A atchd.

³³(1) Ltr, Maj Gen E. T. Williams, EUCOM COFS, to Mr. G. Wolfe, HICOG Dir Admin, 30 Jul 52, sub: Phase-out of EUCOM Support Activities in the Bonn Area. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, Mr. G. Wolfe to Maj Gen E. T. Williams, 12 Aug 52, sub: APO Service for HICOG and Embassy. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. I, Item 14A atchd.

³⁴Ltr, Maj Gen E. T. Williams, EUCOM COFS, to Mr. Sam Reber, Act HICOG, 23 Jul 52, sub: Continuation of APO Service at Bonn. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. I, Item 14A atchd.

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(c) golf course club house at Bonn, \$2,000 and (d) Rhine-Mosel Club, \$500.³⁵ At the 6 May 1952 meeting of the EUCOM Welfare Board, it was decided to grant \$100,000 to the Director, EUCOM Special Activities Division, for the purpose of negotiating the liquidation of all the nonappropriated fund indebtedness of HICOG with EUCOM agencies. Any funds of this grant which were not expended were to be returned to the EUCOM Welfare Fund.³⁶ These funds made possible the purchase by HICOG of the equipment necessary for the operation of PX, snack bar, etc., as well as Class VI merchandise, from EES and EUCOM agencies.

181. Withdrawal of Military Police Support, Bonn Area

Late in 1951 EUCOM informed HICOG that the transformation to embassy status would necessitate the withdrawal of military police support from the Bonn area and normal provision would have to be made by the State Department for the security of the embassy.³⁷ No action was taken until February 1952, at which time a detachment of U.S. Marines arrived in Bonn to take over the security duties at the HICOG headquarters building in Mehlem in line with the policy of providing Marine detachments for the security of U.S. embassies. The HICOG headquarters building itself was the only installation in Bonn affected by this change-over. EUCOM military police continued to patrol the Bonn Enclave area, to provide security for all other HICOG installations in Bonn, and to serve with the tripartite security forces at Petersburg, the headquarters of the Allied High Commission.³⁸ During the same month, the Commanding General, Frankfurt Military Post, was directed to transfer permanently one officer and fifty enlisted men from the 709th MP Battalion to the 7792 HICOG Detachment, in order to enable the 709th MP Battalion to requisition the same number of personnel for the Frankfurt area.³⁹ HICOG believed that the U.S. Marine Detachment, which arrived on 18 February, was sufficient for all military police duties in the Bonn Enclave area, and proposed that EUCOM military police activities in the area be phased out. HICOG felt that by working with the German

³⁵Ltr, Maj Gen E. T. Williams to Mr. G. Wolfe, 30 Jul 52, cited above.

³⁶EUCOM Welfare Board, min of 6 May 52 mtg. 123 GPA. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. I, Item 14A atchd.

³⁷Ltr, Brig Gen E. T. Williams, EUCOM DCOFS Opns to Mr. G. Wolfe, Dir HICOG Admin, 27 Nov 51, sub: MP Service for HICOG, Bonn. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1951), Vol. II, Item 91.

³⁸The Stars and Stripes, February 19, 1952, p. 2.

³⁹EUCOM FM Div Stf Jnl, 27 Feb 52, Item 1. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

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police through the British authorities, it would be able to establish sufficient safeguards to permit withdrawal of the Bonn military police detachment by 1 September 1952. HICOG proposed the transfer of vehicle registration to Frankfurt until German vehicle registration and plates were provided them in the normal manner accorded all diplomatic missions.⁴⁰ Shortly after the withdrawal of the Bonn military police detachment, however, HICOG requested permission from EUCOM to take over the vehicle registry at Bonn and operate it for the benefit of the personnel in that area. On 11 September Frankfurt Military Post was notified that it was relieved of the duty of registering vehicles of HICOG personnel and the vehicle registry records were transferred to the Public Safety Division of HICOG.⁴¹

182. Projected Phase-out of the 7792 HICOG Detachment

As early as July 1952 HICOG implementation of planning for the transition to embassy status made possible the release of a certain number of the military personnel assigned to HICOG as members of the 7792 HICOG Detachment under EUCOM T/D 77-7792. On 22 July 1952 the HICOG director of administration informed Brig. Gen. E. J. O'Neill, EUCOM deputy chief of staff for administration, that it was possible for HICOG to release immediately certain space authorizations and personnel to EUCOM and to establish a timetable for the release of certain other personnel whom HICOG would require until civilian replacements could be obtained from the United States.⁴² HICOG recommended that EUCOM immediately initiate action to accomplish the following: (1) delete 29 spaces from T/D 77-7792; (2) transfer 45 spaces to Frankfurt Military Post; (3) transfer 9 spaces to Headquarters, EUCOM; (4) authorize the retention of 7 spaces on T/D 77-7792. Included in the transfer of 45 spaces to Frankfurt Military Post was the Frankfurt contingent (1 officer

⁴⁰Ltr, Mr. G. Wolfe, Dir HICOG Admin, to Gen T. T. Handy, CINCEUR, 14 Jul 52, sub: Phase-out of EUCOM Support Activities in Bonn Area. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. I, Item 14A.

⁴¹EUCOM FM Div Stf Jnl, 12 - 14 Sep 52, Item 3, p. 7. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

⁴²Ltr, Mr. G. Wolfe to Brig Gen E. J. O'Neill, 22 Jul 52, sub: Reduction in size of 7792 HICOG Detachment. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. II, Item 19A atchd.

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and 35 enlisted men) which was engaged in providing security for the I. G. Farben Building in Frankfurt.⁴³

a. EUCOM Recommendations. EUCOM concurred in the deletion of the 29 spaces which HICOG felt could be immediately released but, since only 3 officers and 50 enlisted men would be left, recommended that the 7792 HICOG Detachment be discontinued and that all of the remaining personnel be transferred to Frankfurt Military Post for duty with HICOG.⁴⁴ In November Mr. Wolfe informed USAREUR that HICOG concurred, and the 7792 HICOG Detachment was discontinued as of 31 December 1952.⁴⁵

b. HICOG Support Detachment. USAREUR informed HICOG on 29 December 1952 that, effective 1 January 1953, a HICOG support detachment would be established as previously indicated. The authorization for this detachment had been increased to four officers and seventeen enlisted men, in order to provide for the personnel requirements for the Joint Supply Board, previously known as the HICOG Requirements Liaison Section. The personnel of this detachment, including the Joint Supply Board personnel, would be available to the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany for as long as they might be required.⁴⁶

183. Phase-out of the HICOG Field Organization

The anticipated completion of the contractual agreements and the consequent transformation of the High Commission to embassy status made necessary a contraction of the State Department agencies in Germany and

⁴³(1) Memo, Mr. G. Wolfe to Brig Gen E. J. O'Neill, 20 Jul 52, sub: Disposition of Military Personnel in Support of HICOG. UNCLASSIFIED.

(2) C/N 1, EUCOM Dir OPOT Div, to EUCOM DCOFS Admin, 1 Aug 52, sub: Disposition of Personnel in Support of HICOG. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. II, Item 19A and atchd.

⁴⁴(1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, Brig Gen E. J. O'Neill to Mr. G. Wolfe, 7 Aug 52, sub: Reduction of personnel in 7792 HICOG Detachment. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. II, Item 19A atchd.

⁴⁵(1) C/N 2, Dir USAREUR OPOT Div to USAREUR DCOFS Admin, 5 Dec 52, to C/N 1, USAREUR SGS to Dir USAREUR OPOT Div, 29 Nov 52, sub: Letter to Gen O'Neill from G. Wolfe, Exec. Dir. HICOG. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. II, Item 19A atchd. (2) USAREUR GO 41, 22 Dec 52, Sec III. RESTRICTED.

⁴⁶Ltr, Brig Gen E. J. O'Neill to Mr. G. Wolfe, 29 Dec 52, sub: HICOG Support Detachment. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. II, Item 19A atchd.

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the cessation of State Department administration of certain liaison and supervisory activities in connection with the Federal Republic of Germany. Even before the signing of the contractual agreements, HICOG began to plan for the contraction of the HICOG field organization, particularly with regard to the Kreis resident officer (KRO) program at the local level. In December 1951 EUCOM had decided that it was not practicable to base plans for the assumption of responsibility for military liaison on ratification of the contractual agreements and had suggested that EUCOM and HICOG agree on a date, set as early as practicable, for the assumption of this duty by EUCOM.⁴⁷

a. HICOG Proposals. Mr. McCloy informed General Handy in April 1952 that HICOG had decided to eliminate the Office of the Land Commissioner in the various Laender of the U.S. zone within sixty days after the signing of the contractual agreements but in no case later than 1 July 1952. HICOG planned to designate the consuls general as the representatives of the U.S. High Commissioner in their respective areas. EUCOM would conduct its own relations with the governments of the Laender, with the consuls general available to the military for advice and assistance. Since the problem below the Land level would be legally one of actual troop relations with the local population, including the familiar relation of post and unit commanders with the local authorities and people, HICOG had determined that this responsibility would fall solely upon EUCOM, rendering unnecessary the continuation of Kreis resident officers in the HICOG program. The KRO staffs would cease to function at the same time as the offices of the Land commissioners.⁴⁸

b. Final Phase-out. On 22 April 1952 EUCOM directed the military posts to establish S-5 sections at appropriate post and subpost levels as soon as practicable to enable them to receive on-the-job training from the HICOG resident officers before the actual phase-out of the HICOG field organization.⁴⁹ Effective 5 June 1952, EUCOM assumed from HICOG responsibility for the conduct of civil affairs (U.S. Military-German Relations)

⁴⁷Ltr, Maj Gen D. Noce, EUCOM COMS, to Mr. Chauncey Parker, Asst HICOG, 7 Dec 51, sub: EUCOM Position on Military Liaison. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1951), Vol. II, Item 100.

⁴⁸Ltr, Mr. J. J. McCloy, HICOG, to Gen T. T. Handy, CINCEUR, 3 Apr 52, sub: Establishment of Military Liaison to Replace HICOG Field Organization. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. I, Item 3B atchd.

⁴⁹Cable SX-4474, CINCEUR to All Mil Post Comdrs, 22 Apr 52, RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. I, Item 3B atchd.

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at the local (Kreis) level.⁵⁰ Effective 1 July 1952, the consuls general at Munich, Bremen, Frankfurt, and Stuttgart were appointed Land commissioners for their respective Laender as an additional duty. The functions previously exercised by the Land commissioners were either discontinued or reassigned between EUCOM and the consuls general, making possible the elimination of the separate offices of the Land commissioner.⁵¹

184. Departure of Mr. McCloy

On 15 July 1952, Mr. J. J. McCloy, the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, announced his retirement from that position. Mr. McCloy's departure marked an important step in the change-over from an occupation organization to a full-scale diplomatic post staffed with career foreign service personnel. Mr. McCloy's successor, Mr. Walter J. Donnelly, formerly U.S. High Commissioner for Austria, assumed the combined position of high commissioner and ambassador.⁵²

185. Support of Accredited Agencies

By EUCOM definition, "accredited agencies are those agencies not part of the Allied Forces but which, with their personnel, are accredited to HICOG, or this headquarters [EUCOM], for the purpose of providing certain services exclusively to the Allied Forces, other accredited agencies, and their personnel."⁵³ The problem of support of these agencies had been discussed at great length by EUCOM and HICOG during 1951 and an agreed EUCOM-HICOG position on the matter had been published effective 1 October 1951. This agreed position, however, proved unsatisfactory even before the end of 1951.⁵⁴ EUCOM and HICOG, therefore, considered several aspects of this problem during 1952, including the restoration of support privileges to certain agencies and the termination of support to other agencies affected by the completion of the contractual agreements.

⁵⁰C/N 1, EUCOM Dir CAD to all EUCOM Stf Divs, 9 Jul 52, sub: Establishment of EUCOM LRO's in Bavaria, Baden-Wuerttemberg, and Hesse. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. II, Item 18.

⁵¹HICOG, Stf Announcement 315, 26 Jun 52, sub: Termination of the Separate Offices of the Land Commissioners. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. I, Item 15A.

⁵²The Stars and Stripes, July 15, 1952, p. 1.

⁵³EUCOM Cir 2, 30 Jun 50, sub: Assistance to Non-Military Agencies and Individuals. UNCLASSIFIED.

⁵⁴EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 372 - 73. SECRET.

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a. Restoration of Privileges to Certain Agencies. On 3 January 1952 HICOG concurred in a EUCOM plan to restore to various accredited banks, the ESSO Corporation, automobile insurance companies, and certain EES contractors, equal logistical support to the same extent as that authorized for the accredited information media and their personnel. In addition, HICOG, in the interests of uniformity requested that certain voluntary relief organizations, including the Jewish Restitution Successor Organization, receive the same support as that prescribed by EUCOM for all accredited agencies. In this action support privileges were restored to certain accredited agencies and their personnel who had lost them in the redefinition of accredited support on 1 October 1951.⁵⁵

b. Support of Voluntary Agencies. The Allied High Commission General Committee in November 1951 had agreed that the support of voluntary agencies affiliated with the IRO should be continued. Consequently arrangements were made at that time for the continued provision of occupational facilities until 31 March 1952, or until the effective date of the contractual agreements, whichever occurred earlier, for those agencies which were supporting the program of the Displaced Persons Commission. Since, by 1 March 1952, it was evident that the contractual agreements would not be completed by 31 March, HICOG requested EUCOM to continue the support of these agencies until the date of signing of the contracts. During this period the agencies concerned could make their own arrangements with the German authorities. Since many of these agencies were prepared to pay rental to German owners for office and housing facilities, EUCOM aid was requested in derequisitioning such properties.⁵⁶ EUCOM concurred in the HICOG request for the continued provision of support of the agencies in question but stipulated that the real properties occupied by these agencies and their personnel would remain under requisition with the tenants required to pay monthly Deutsche Mark charges to the military post concerned, based on the actual Deutsche Mark costs borne by the EUCOM occupation costs Deutsche Mark budget in providing the property

⁵⁵(1) C/N 2, EUCOM Dir LOG Div to EUCOM DCOFS Admin, 17 Jan 52, to C/N 1, EUCOM DCOFS Admin, to EUCOM Dir LOG Div, 21 Dec 51, sub: List of Sponsored Organizations. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, Mr. G. Wolfe, Dir HICOG Admin, to Maj Gen A. A. Bradshaw, Dir EUCOM Log Div, 3 Jan 52, sub: Restoration of Modified Support for Certain Accredited Support. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 400 (1952), Vol. I, Item 4A and atchd.

⁵⁶(1) Cable 340, HICOG Bonn to CINCEUR, 12 Mar 52. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable 37, HICOG Bonn to CINCEUR, 20 Mar 52, UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 400 (1952), Vol. I, Item 10 and atchd.

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and services incident thereto.⁵⁷ HICOG, on the other hand, insisted that derequisition of property where tenancy agreements could be arranged was necessary to facilitate the placing of these voluntary agencies on an independent basis immediately after the signing of the contractual agreements.⁵⁸ Since EUCOM was not prepared to authorize a blanket release of all properties occupied by the voluntary agencies, a compromise agreement was reached which provided for the release of property in individual cases when the following conditions were met: (a) property was not required by the post commander concerned; (b) lease arrangements were made between occupant and owner; and (c) the lease arrangements had received the formal approval of HICOG.⁵⁹

c. Plans for Termination of Support. HICOG's request for the extension of support privileges to the voluntary agencies had named the date of signing the contractual agreements as the terminal date for the provision of support to these agencies.⁶⁰ The contractual agreements were signed on 26 May 1952, but no steps were taken by HICOG at that time to implement the termination of support to these agencies. EUCOM notified HICOG on 16 July 1952 that it was considered appropriate to take steps to reduce the number of agencies accredited for logistic support, particularly since the German economy could provide adequate facilities. EUCOM requested HICOG concurrence in the termination of support to certain voluntary and relief agencies and suggested the termination of limited support for all foreign consular representatives of governments other than those of France, Great Britain, and the United States.⁶¹ HICOG, did not concur in the EUCOM proposal and renewed its request for the continuation of logistical support to the agencies in question until the date of the ratification of the contractual agreements. HICOG, also opposed EUCOM's proposal to terminate the limited support of consular representatives of nations other than France, Great Britain, and the United States on the grounds that both Great Britain and France were continuing such support in their zones until ratification of the contractual agreements, and in the interest of uniformity it was desired that the same procedure be followed in the U.S. Zone of

⁵⁷Cable SC-14964, CINCEUR to HICOG Bonn, 28 Mar 52. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 400 (1952), Vol. I, Item 10 atchd.

⁵⁸Cable 428, HICOG Bonn to CINCEUR, 4 Apr 52. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

⁵⁹Cable SC-15718, CINCEUR to HICOG Bonn, 10 Apr 52. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

⁶⁰Cable 340, HICOG Bonn to CINCEUR, 12 Mar 52. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

⁶¹Ltr, Maj Gen E. T. Williams, EUCOM COFS, to Mr. J. J. McCloy, HICOG, 16 Jul 52, sub: Termination of Logistic Support to Certain Accredited Agencies. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 400 (1952), Vol. I, Item 17 atchd.

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Germany.⁶² USAREUR concurred in the renewed HICOG request, but opposed a blanket commitment and reserved the right to review the support program in the event that the ratification of the contractual agreements was delayed for an extended period of time.⁶³

186. Withdrawal of Property from Foreign Consulates

In January 1952 it was ascertained that the Commanding General, Munich Military Post, had not fully carried out a joint HICOG-EUCOM decision of 1949 to withdraw all logistical support from agencies of nonoccupation powers with the exception of special facilities for diplomatic purposes. The commanding general of Munich Military Post at the time of this decision believed that it was essential to retain under requisition the property occupied by the consuls of nonoccupation powers and their personnel, while requiring them to pay all Deutsche Mark costs directly to the German owners and agencies concerned. When this situation was discovered in January 1952, EUCOM notified HICOG of its intention to withdraw real estate support from the consuls concerned and their employees on or before 30 June 1952. Six months was regarded as sufficient time to enable the agencies concerned to procure accommodations on the German economy.⁶⁴ The instructions to Munich Military Post, however, made provision for the immediate derequisition of the properties occupied by these agencies with the following exceptions: (1) real property occupied by a consulate since before the occupation; and (2) property that had been rehabilitated at a considerable expense by the country concerned.⁶⁵

⁶²Ltr, Mr. G. Wolfe, Dir HICOG Admin, to Maj Gen E. T. Williams, USAREUR COFS, 7 Aug 52, sub: Termination of Support to Certain Voluntary Agencies. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

⁶³(1) C/N 2, Dir USAREUR Log Div to USAREUR COFS, 16 Aug 52, to C/N 1, USAREUR SGS to Dir USAREUR Log Div, 7 Aug 52, sub: Letter to COFS from Mr. Wolfe, dated 7 Aug 52, sub: Discontinuance of Occupational Facilities to Voluntary Agencies and Individuals. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, Maj Gen E. T. Williams to G. Wolfe, 20 Aug 52, sub: Termination of Support to Certain Accredited Agencies. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file cited above.

⁶⁴(1) C/N 1, Dir EUCOM LOG Div to EUCOM COFS, 2 Jan 52, sub: Real Estate Support of Consuls of Non-Occupation Powers in Munich. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Ltr, Maj Gen D. Noce, EUCOM COFS, to Maj Gen G. P. Hays, Dep HICOG, 2 Jan 52, sub: Withdrawal of Real Estate Support to Certain Consulates. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in USAREUR SGS 400 (1952), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd.

⁶⁵EUCOM ltr, to CG MMP, 3 Jan 52, sub: Termination of Real Estate Support of Consuls of Non-Occupation Powers in Munich. UNCLASSIFIED. AG 400 GLD.

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187. Transfer of Emergency Property to HICOG

With the virtual phase-out of the 7792 HICOG Detachment in the Bonn Enclave after 1 September 1952, HICOG assumed the responsibility for emergency planning as well as for noncombatant evacuation in the Bonn Enclave. At the request of HICOG certain emergency equipment necessary for the accomplishment of NEO was left in Bonn by USAREUR. HICOG took the position that since the military was responsible for the evacuation of U.S. citizens in Germany, including those attached to HICOG headquarters, a transfer of the property in question could be arranged on memorandum receipt. In view of the rigid HICOG budget which made no provision for the cost of such supplies, HICOG requested a favorable USAREUR decision with regard to the transfer of emergency property valued at \$7,054.26.⁶⁶ USAREUR denied the HICOG request on the grounds that applicable Army directives provided for the furnishing of supplies and equipment to other governmental agencies solely on a reimbursable basis, except in cases of emergency or disaster.⁶⁷ Upon resubmission of the request by HICOG, USAREUR considered approaching the Department of the Army for the necessary authority to loan the supplies and equipment in question. However, since the requested items were not in critical supply and the monetary value involved was comparatively small, USAREUR decided not to refer the question to higher authority and concurred in the HICOG request for loan of the desired items on memorandum receipt.⁶⁸

188. Planning for the Council of Ambassadors

Section 3 of Article I of the first convention of the contractual agreements stated that "the Three Powers will thenceforth conduct their relations with the Federal Republic through Ambassadors who will act jointly in matters the Three Powers consider of common concern under the present convention and the related conventions."⁶⁹ A draft tripartite protocol

⁶⁶Ltr, Mr. G. Wolfe, Dir HICOG Admin, to Brig Gen E. J. O'Neill, USAREUR DCOFS Admin, 26 Sep 52, sub: Transfer of Property to HICOG Control. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. II, Item 23B.

⁶⁷Ltr, Brig Gen E. J. O'Neill to Mr. G. Wolfe, 16 Oct 52, sub: Transfer of Property to HICOG. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. II, Item 23B atchd.

⁶⁸(1) C/N 1, USAREUR SGS to Dir USAREUR Log Div, 6 Oct 52, sub: Letter from Glenn Wolfe, HICOG, to Gen O'Neill, sub: Transfer of Property to HICOG Control. SECRET. (2) C/N 2, USAREUR Dir Log Div, to USAREUR DCOFS Admin, 10 Oct 52, to C/N 1 cited above. (3) Ltr, Brig Gen E. J. O'Neill to Mr. G. Wolfe, 16 Oct 52, sub: Transfer of Property to HICOG. SECRET. All in file cited above.

⁶⁹Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany and Related Conventions, 26 May 1952, p. 2.
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defining the powers of the Council of Ambassadors after the effective date of the contractual agreements was presented to the Allied High Commission by the French members of that group on 28 March 1952. This protocol envisaged the exercise of joint powers by the three ambassadors with regard to: (1) stationing of armed forces in Germany; (2) proclamation of a state of emergency; (3) Berlin; and (4) Germany as a whole, including unification of Germany and a final peace treaty. The protocol considered the three ambassadors as the successors of both the commanders in chief and the high commissioners in the relation of the Allied authorities to the Soviet commander in chief, having final responsibility for all relations with the Soviet occupation authorities. The protocol provided that all instructions to the Allied Kommandatura in Berlin from the respective governments would emanate from the three ambassadors.⁷⁰

a. EUCOM Objections. EUCOM objected to the provisions of the protocol that transferred to the U.S. ambassador to Germany, certain authority delegated to CINCEUR by executive orders and Joint Chiefs of Staff directives, particularly with regard to the proclamation of a state of emergency and the conduct of the military under such a proclamation. EUCOM's specific objections were as follows: (1) with regard to the stationing of troops, SACEUR was authorized to deal directly with national authorities to meet NATO requirements and should not be subject to control by the three ambassadors; (2) the right of the ambassadors to proclaim a state of emergency should not impinge upon the right of military authorities to take certain unilateral action in this regard; (3) in regard to relations with the Soviet commander in chief, the three ambassadors should be regarded as the successors of the Allied commanders in chief only in their capacity of military governors; and (4) EUCOM desired to maintain the dual personality of the U.S. commander in Berlin, who, in the past, had received directives of a political nature from HICOG and of a military nature from CINCEUR.⁷¹

b. State Department Instructions. The State Department in July directed HICOG to rewrite the draft protocol governing the powers of the three ambassadors. Certain provisions were to be included in the new draft in order to meet the objections of EUCOM. Although the proclamation of a state of emergency would be a tripartite action, other issues relating to a state of emergency might well be unilateral, e.g., measures taken in a state of emergency proclaimed for a specific locality only. With reference to the designating of the Council of Ambassadors as the successors

⁷⁰Cable, no number, HICOG Bonn to State Dept (2181) Inform Defense, 28 Mar 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 092 Germany (1952), Vol. II, Item 41 atchd.

⁷¹Cable SX-3964, CINCEUR to COMSA for ACOFS G-3. SECRET. In file cited above.

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of the commanders in chief, the State Department held that the ambassadors were to be considered the successors of the commanders in chief only insofar as the latter were military governors. The State Department, moreover, expected the question of the relation between the U.S. ambassador and the U.S. commander in Germany to be the subject of a future presidential executive order and possible unilateral action.⁷²

c. Final Decisions. On 25 July 1952, HICOG transmitted the revised draft protocol to Washington, having embodied in it the requested changes. The State Department approved the draft but notified HICOG that since the instructions would not be issued to the ambassadors until the contractual agreements became effective, no further action would be required until that time. USAREUR on 19 August requested the Department of the Army to secure certain additional changes in the draft.⁷³ The Department of the Army replied that it considered the HICOG draft protocol satisfactory, particularly since the early EUCOM objections were included in the revision, and that it was not feasible to request additional changes until after the instructions were implemented. USAREUR made no further requests to the Department of the Army for amendment to, or changes in, the draft protocol.⁷⁴

189. Planning for Military Attaches to the Embassy

The expected transition of HICOG to embassy status necessitated planning for the establishment of military attache offices for the proposed embassy. The three services in May concluded an agreement in Washington and the draft was transmitted to EUCOM by the Department of the Army. The proposed strengths for the attache offices were as follows: (1) Air Force—4 officers, 4 to 6 enlisted men, and 4 U.S. civilians; (2) Army—7 officers, 11 enlisted men, and 3 U.S. civilians; and (3) Navy—6 officers and 2 U.S. civilians. The responsibility for joint communications and for fiscal matters for the Army and the Air Force was to

⁷²Cable, no number, State to HICOG Bonn (45); London (56); and Paris (43), 2 Jul 52. SECRET. In file cited above.

⁷³(1) Cable, no number, HICOG Bonn to State (33); London (65); and Paris (83), 25 Jul 52. SECRET. (2) Cable, no number, State to HICOG Bonn (643); London (930); and Paris (770), 8 Aug 52. SECRET. (3) Cable SX-2568, CINCUSAREUR to COFSA, 19 Aug 52. SECRET. All in USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. I, Item 14 and atchd.

⁷⁴(1) Cable DA-919413, COFSA to CINCUSAREUR and CINCEUR, 25 Sep 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1952), Vol. II, Item 41 atchd. (2) C/N 1, Dir USAREUR OPOT Div to USAREUR COFS, 30 Sep 52, sub: Draft Instructions on Joint Action by the Ambassadors. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. I, Item 14 atchd.

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be delegated to the Department of the Army. The Department of the Army informed EUCOM that it would be required to furnish required fiscal and communications support during the period of establishing the offices. The Department of the Army, stated that it expected no overlap of functions between the attaches and the U.S. troop elements which would remain in Germany, and that the Army attache would be thoroughly briefed in that regard before his departure for Germany.⁷⁵ EUCOM concurred in the establishment of the attache offices but pointed out that CINCEUR's responsibilities with respect to the U.S. Armed Forces stationed in Germany required him to discharge some of the functions which normally were the responsibility of service attaches. For this reason EUCOM felt that the assignment of seventeen officers to this function, as outlined in the interservice agreement, was excessive. EUCOM considered it essential that the attaches be thoroughly briefed on the relationship of CINCEUR to the ambassador prior to their arrival in Europe.⁷⁶ The Department of the Army agreed with EUCOM's concern over CINCEUR's continuing responsibility with respect to U.S. forces in Germany and stated that every effort would be made to insure that the functions to be performed by the attache offices did not duplicate the functions which had to be performed by EUCOM. The Department of the Army also concurred in the EUCOM suggestion for an additional briefing and orientation of the attaches, and informed EUCOM that the attaches would visit EUCOM headquarters for this purpose before assuming their duties. The proposed strengths for these offices, however, were defended as being the minimum number necessary for permanent establishment of effective attache operations in Germany.⁷⁷

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190. Planning for the Projected Joint Supply Board

Section 2 of Article 39 of the "Convention on Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany" provided for the establishment of a Joint Supply Board (see par. 110) composed of representatives of those of the Three Powers to which the provisions of the article applied (representation was not guaranteed to EDC) and of representatives of the Federal Republic. The principal duty of this board was to establish, by agreement, periodical programs for the procurement of the requirements of the Armed Forces of the Three Powers

⁷⁵Ltr, DA ACOFS G-2 to CINCEUR, 15 May 52, sub: Establishment of Service Attache Offices, Germany. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 091.1 (1952), Vol. I, Item 3.

⁷⁶Ltr, CINCEUR to DA ACOFS G-2, 4 Jul 52, sub: Establishment of the Service Attaches' Offices, Germany. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 091.1 (1952), Vol. I, Item 3 atchd.

⁷⁷Ltr, DA ACOFS G-2 to CINCEUR, 1 Aug 52, sub cited above. RESTRICTED. In file cited above.

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and of the EDC, if represented. In addition the board was to resolve any difficulties which might arise in the course of implementation of the programs previously developed.⁷⁸ At a meeting held on 15 July between representatives of HICOG and EUCOM divergent positions were presented with regard to the make-up of the Joint Supply Board. The HICOG representatives maintained that the function of the Joint Supply Board was to deal with highly technical matters concerning the German economy and, that the U.S. embassy economics adviser or a designated assistant should, therefore, be the U.S. member of the board, with the military acting as merely a claimant agency before the board. EUCOM, on the other hand, maintained that the Joint Supply Board was a Forces' body, as were the other boards created by the "Rights Convention," with the mission of programming military requirements only, and that the membership of the board should accordingly be military, since only CINCEUR could estimate, defend, or alter the requirements for his forces. The basic position of USAREUR was that no agency should have the power to veto, for economic reasons, the military efforts to achieve adequate supply and maintenance unless such economic reasons were definitely paramount.⁷⁹ On 14 August HICOG proposed a compromise plan according to which USAREUR and the embassy would be jointly represented on the Joint Supply Board, the embassy representative being the U.S. spokesman. At first this compromise was considered unfavorably by USAREUR on the grounds that it also provided the possibility of interference with CINCUSAREUR's discharge of his supply responsibility, but after closer study the USAREUR logistics director concluded that the HICOG compromise plan would satisfy the desired USAREUR position, provided the U.S. High Commissioner would give the commander in chief assurances that no veto would be exercised without the matter being referred for final decision to the U.S. High Commissioner and the USAREUR commander in chief. The plan was then accepted by USAREUR.⁸⁰

⁷⁸Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany and Related Conventions, 26 May 1952, p. 77.
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⁷⁹(1) Cable SC-12177, CINCUSAREUR to HICOG Bonn, 5 Aug 52. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 400.3 (1952), Vol. I, Item 67 atchd. (2) Memo, USAREUR Dir Log Div to USAREUR COFS, 20 Aug 52, sub: U.S. Representation on the JSB. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1952), Vol. I, B/P 8.

⁸⁰Ibid.

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CHAPTER 10

Relations with the German Federal Republic

Section I: EUCOM Participation in the Development of Contractual Relations with the German Federal Republic

191. Status of Negotiations, 1 January 1952

The Allied High Commission for Germany (HICOM) had initiated tripartite negotiations early in 1951 for the development of contractual arrangements with the Federal Republic of Germany and late in September 1951 had entered upon negotiations with the representatives of the Federal Republic. By 1 January 1952 the Allied High Commission had succeeded only in obtaining tentative German approval of a Convention on General Relations. None of the corollary agreements necessary to implement this convention even approached the finalization stage. In further negotiations, the Three Powers were extremely careful not to suggest changes in the Convention on General Relations, in order to avoid giving the Germans an opportunity to withdraw their approval and ask for renewed negotiations on that portion of the contractual agreements. Meanwhile negotiations progressed with the purpose of obtaining the earliest possible approval of the entire structure of conventions necessary to establish contractual relations between the Federal Republic and the Three Powers represented on the Allied High Commission for Germany.

192. EUCOM-HICOG Co-ordination

Independent action by the U. S. High Commission for Germany (HICOG) in the negotiations during 1952 was not possible because the accepted U. S. position for the negotiations had been co-ordinated on a State-Defense Department level in Washington and basic changes could only be made in Washington, where the State and Defense Departments had developed

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a system for co-ordination to effect desired changes as promptly as possible. Problems referred by HICOG to Washington for settlement, however, rarely included the EUCOM position, until January 1952 when the State Department notified HICOG that, in view of the imminent completion of the negotiations, any problems affecting the military which were transmitted to Washington for settlement should include the EUCOM viewpoint, if possible, to facilitate prompt action. If this could not be done, HICOG was to indicate in its communications that the views stated were those of HICOG and was to insure that the State Department would receive the EUCOM viewpoint as soon as possible. The Department of the Army transmitted similar instructions to EUCOM with regard to communications on the contractual negotiations addressed by EUCOM to the Department of the Army for settlement.¹

193. EUCOM Liaison Group with HICOG

A EUCOM liaison group with HICOG had been created for the chief purpose of preventing the compromising of EUCOM and U. S. military interests during the final stages of the negotiations. This group was present during the discussions at Bonn from January until completion of the negotiations and the signing of the conventions on 26 May 1952. The EUCOM Liaison Group received full co-operation from Mr. McCloy and his office during the later stages of the negotiations.²

194. The German Financial Contribution

A major problem facing the U.S. Forces in Germany was the continuation of financial support of the forces by the German Government. Notwithstanding the development of contractual arrangements, troops of the Three Powers would remain on German soil and the Three Powers believed that Germany should contribute in some degree to their support. With the build-up of German contributions to the proposed European Defense Force (EDF) this amount would decline, but the Three Powers felt that, until that time, they had a just claim on the German financial contributions for defense. This problem was one of the most difficult to resolve and the negotiations continued for months without producing a final settlement.

¹Cable DA-91501, COFSA from ACOFS G-3 to CINCEUR, 9 Jan 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1952), Vol. I, Item 4A.

²Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Cols J. F. Hanley and W. A. Huntsberry, EUCOM Ln Gp, 25 Jul 52. UNCLASSIFIED.

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a. Decision of the London Meeting of Foreign Ministers. The foreign ministers of the Three Powers, meeting in London in February, issued a set of general instructions for the guidance of the Allied high commissioners in their future negotiations on the German financial contribution. They directed that the uses to which the contribution were to be devoted during 1952 - 53 (i.e., the 12-month period from the date of entry into force of the agreements) should be finally negotiated at Bonn and written into the contracts. The sum to be requested for the support of the Forces of the Three Powers was limited by the foreign ministers to DM 6.8 billion. All nonmilitary items were to be eliminated from these costs and the Three Powers were directed to use their best efforts to achieve the maximum possible economies, with particular attention to costs which were politically objectionable in Germany. The high commissioners were further directed to obtain agreement as soon as possible with the Federal Republic on the amount to be provided for the support of the Forces of the Three Powers during 1952 - 53.³

b. HICOG Proposals. After receiving the instructions from the foreign ministers' meeting in London, the Allied High Commission conducted another costing exercise similar to those conducted in 1951, taking into account the German contribution to the EDC, the costs of the EDC itself, and the amount needed for the support of the forces of the Three Powers in Germany. HICOG was of the opinion that this costing exercise answered some of the questions in the minds of the negotiators but failed to settle the problem of the division of German defense appropriations. HICOG believed that the many conflicting criteria, applied to the division of the German contribution, were making a solution of the problem nearly impossible,⁴ and that the division of the German contribution into two fixed amounts, as suggested by the costing experts, would satisfy no one. As alternatives HICOG produced four substitute plans which were submitted to the State Department for decision. Each of these plans was based upon a flexible arrangement according to which the division of the contribution was made dependent upon the date of ratification of the conventions.⁵

³Tripartite Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of France, United Kingdom, and the United States, London - Lisbon, February 1952. "German Financial Contribution to Defense. Foreign Ministers' Instructions to the Allied High Commission, London 19 February 1952." SECRET. U. S. State Department, Washington, D.C.

⁴Cable, no number, HICOG Bonn to State Dept (2618) pass Defense and MSA, 2 May 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. II, Item 37A atchd.

⁵Cable, no number, HICOG Bonn to State Dept (2627) pass Defense and MSA, 2 May 52. SECRET. In file cited above.

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c. EUCOM Viewpoint. The HICOG proposals were immediately protested by EUCOM on the following grounds: (1) all four plans were based upon political considerations rather than upon the practical needs of the German defense contribution to the EDC; (2) all were based upon an unknown date of ratification; and (3) none of the four plans provided for a financial commitment upon which the Forces of the Three Powers could base firm plans for operations for the coming year.⁶ EUCOM recommended that all four substitute plans be discarded and that the Department of Defense participate in the financial discussions in progress in Paris in connection with planning for the EDC.

d. Final Decisions. In general the completed finance convention followed rather closely the suggestions of EUCOM with regard to the German contribution for defense and the support of the Forces of the Three Powers in Germany. The convention provided for an annual defense contribution by the Federal Republic comparable to that of other Western countries based on NATO criteria. From the effective date of the conventions until 30 June 1953 this contribution would be at the rate of DM 850 million per month. After that date the contribution would be determined under the same principles and procedures and by the use of the same NATO criteria as those applying to the defense expenditures of other countries participating in Western defense. For the first six months after the effective date of the contractual arrangements, DM 551 million of the DM 850 million contribution per month were to be used for the support of the Forces of the Three Powers stationed in Germany, while for the next three months the amount available for such support would be DM 319 million per month. For each of the months thereafter, prior to 30 June 1953, the amount to be made available for the support of the Forces of the Three Powers would be determined by direct negotiations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic. Later negotiations were to determine what portion of the German contribution after 30 June 1953 would be allotted to the Forces of the Three Powers in Germany not part of the EDC, while the amount allotted to the Forces of the Three Powers prior to that date would be divided by agreement of the Three Powers themselves. In return the Three Powers agreed to hold all defense expenditures to the minimum compatible with military efficiency and to utilize the funds efficiently and economically.⁷

⁶Cable SX-4883, CINCEUR to COFSA, 5 May 52, Pt. I. SECRET. In file cited above.

⁷Summaries of the Conventions on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany and Related Conventions, prepared at direction of EUCOM COFS by EUCOM In Gp to HICOG, 30 Jun 52. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Bn.

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As a result of preliminary decisions made in Washington with regard to the payment of claims arising from the occupation, little trouble was experienced by EUCOM in this regard in the negotiations after 1 January 1952. The fact that a waiver of postwar claims is normal in any valid peace treaty left little room for argument. The "Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and Occupation," (one of the related agreements) signed 26 May 1952, contained provisions by which the Federal Republic waived its right to claims against the Three Powers for incidents arising out of the war and the occupation. The Federal Republic waived all unsettled claims against the Three Powers arising from incidents which occurred between 5 June 1945 and the effective date of the conventions, on behalf of the Federal Republic itself and persons subject to its jurisdiction. The Federal Republic, moreover, assumed responsibility for the decision and satisfaction of all claims for compensation from occupation damages which occurred between 1 August 1945 and the effective date of the conventions. All decisions concerning claims arrived at by the authorities of the Three Powers prior to the effective date of the conventions and not settled by that date, would be put into effect by the Federal Republic. Likewise, the Federal Republic would have the right to determine and satisfy all other claims arising from incidents which occurred prior to the effective date of the conventions.⁸

The question of the payment of claims arising after the effective date of the conventions was made difficult for the negotiators because the agreed State-Defense position was that all such claims would be settled by the power whose forces were responsible for the damage or injury, in accordance with the applicable laws and regulations of that country.⁹ This was the procedure applicable to all NATO nations when their forces were stationed in the territory of another power.

a. Application of the U.S. Foreign Claims Act. This position by the State and Defense Departments led to considerable disagreement since it meant that all claims against the U.S. Forces in Germany after the effective date of the conventions would be determined and settled by

⁸Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany and Related Conventions, 26 May 1952 (hereafter cited as Convention on Relations), pp. 11 ff. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

9U.S. State Dept Bureau of Ger Aff, GER Contractual No. 5/4, 21 Sep 51, Annex 5, "Agreement Relating to the Logistical and Financial Support of the Armed Forces of the U.S., U.K., and France in the Federal Republic." SECRET. Washington, D.C.

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U.S. claims agencies under the application of the Foreign Claims Act of the United States. Payments in satisfaction of these claims would be made from the German contribution for the support of the U.S. forces as long as funds were available from that source and subsequently from U.S. dollar appropriated funds earmarked for the settlement of foreign claims against the United States.¹⁰ This procedure was explained in detail to the negotiators at Bonn by EUCOM representatives who had had experience in applying the Army foreign claims procedure in connection with EUCOM activities in the United Kingdom and France. EUCOM insistence upon the application of the Foreign Claims Act for payment of claims against the Forces after the effective date of the conventions was opposed by HICOG, which held that the United States should make some concession to German opinion on this matter. The problem was complicated by the apparent willingness of the British and the French to accept a provision for arbitration of claims in dispute.¹¹

b. German Objections. German objections to the proposal centered around the fact that it provided no opportunity for judicial review of the decisions of the administrative claims agencies. The Germans recommended review by a mixed tribunal, and suggested that since the applicable American statutes and U.S. Army Regulations governing claims procedures did not permit review of the decisions of the claims agencies, the existing American laws be so amended as to permit such a review and to allow the Germans a voice on the reviewing tribunal.¹²

c. EUCOM Views. EUCOM contended that the U.S. laws and regulations governing the settlement of foreign claims should apply in Germany just as they did in any other foreign country. Any change in foreign claims procedure, effective only in Germany, would open the door to strong pressure by every other country to benefit by the same change. Such a change would necessitate a change in appropriation and budget procedures by the Department of Defense and was consequently opposed by that agency on the same grounds. For administrative reasons it was opposed by EUCOM since it would be necessary to double the EUCOM staff handling claims procedures in order to protect American interests.¹³

¹⁰Cable 433, HICOG to State Dept (2336) pass Defense, 10 Apr 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1952), Vol. II, Item 41 atchd.

¹¹Cable S-4243, GINCEUR to COFSA for ACOFS G-3, 12 Apr 52. SECRET. In file cited above.

¹²Cable 433 cited above.

¹³Cable, no number, HICOG to State Dept (2429) pass Defense, 18 Apr 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1952), Vol. II, Item 41 atchd.

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d. Final Concessions. The State Department submitted a proposal involving a partial concession to German opinion without compromising U.S. laws and regulations on the subject. The State Department proposal provided for the establishment of an advisory panel of nonvoting German members to assist the U.S. claims agency in the adjudication of claims. Settlement of claims, however, would be made under U.S. law, and payments would be made according to the plan suggested by HICOG. The door would be left open for further discussion with the Germans, dependent upon future modification of applicable U.S. laws.¹⁴

197. Payment of Contract Claims

Paragraph 4, Article 3, Chapter IX, of the "Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and Occupation" specifically exempted from the established claims procedure all contracts to be paid from the national funds of any of the Three Powers. Thus no contracts to be paid from the dollar appropriated funds of the United States after the effective date of the conventions would be subject to the normal claims procedures established by this convention. The proposal on claims involving contracts was subject to severe criticism by the Germans as were all other proposals involving claims. Once again the British and the French submitted proposals which involved arbitration in the event of dispute between parties to the contract. The U.S. proposals provided for eventual appeal to a Board of Contract Review, but the Germans insisted upon the right of the contractor to sue the power concerned in German courts. EUCOM representatives pressed for a uniform procedure for both dollar and Deutsche Mark expenditures under the standard forms and procedures provided by the U.S. armed services procurement regulations and U.S. Army procurement procedures, in the interests of economy and manpower savings. It was felt the Federal Republic might not be able to meet its defense contribution or to liquidate its carry-over at the end of the first defense period, thus necessitating the payment of Deutsche Mark contracts for the U.S. forces from U.S. dollar appropriations. If such Deutsche Mark contracts did not fully conform with U.S. laws and regulations, suspension of payment by the U.S. General Accounting Office would further complicate matters. EUCOM was of the opinion that the German contractors were adequately protected by the contract appeals procedure provided by U.S. law.¹⁵ Since HICOG supported the German view, the question was referred to Washington for decision on the State-Defense Department level. The State Department agreed with EUCOM that U.S. laws and regulations offered sufficient

¹⁴Cable, no number, State Dept to HICOG (2716), 23 Apr 52.
SECRET. In file cited above.

¹⁵Cable 486, HICOG to State Dept (2660) pass Defense, 5 May 52.
SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 150 (1952), Vol. II, Item 26.

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protection to the German contractor and that there was no need for a German contractor to sign a contract if he felt that he was the object of discrimination.¹⁶

198. Logistical Support of EUCOM

The necessity of logistical support for the Forces of the Three Powers which would remain in Germany after the effective date of the conventions was recognized by all concerned. The foreign ministers of the Three Powers at their meeting in London in February pointed out to Chancellor of the Federal Republic, Konrad Adenauer, that considerable forces of the Three Powers were likely to remain in Germany, and that this necessitated the continuance of special arrangements to provide for their material support, covering such matters as supply, transport, communications, and housing. Arrangements would not necessarily be the same as those worked out in the EDC or those governing the stationing of NATO forces in another member country. The foreign ministers felt that it was essential that the Forces of the Three Powers in Germany not only be certain of obtaining the facilities they needed but that they have this assurance over a period of time, so that administrative plans could be formulated on a durable basis.¹⁷

a. Basic Principles of Logistic Support. HICOG listed seven basic factors to be considered in a convention on logistical support. The drafting of provisions concerning these seven basic factors caused extensive debate with the Germans and wide divergence of opinions between HICOG and EUCOM. The seven factors were as follows: (1) procurement and construction — direct procurement by the Three Powers versus German control; (2) enforcement of procurement — requisition versus German legal control; (3) priorities for allocation and availabilities; (4) priorities for military use; (5) standards; (6) price levels; and (7) terms regarding retention and release of present accommodations. While the Germans recognized the right of the Forces of the Three Powers to logistical support, they favored complete German control over all of the above matters.¹⁸

¹⁶Cable, no number, State Dept to HICOG (2997), 7 May 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 150 (1952), Vol. II, Item 26 atchd.

¹⁷Tripartite Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of France, United Kingdom, and United States, London - Lisbon, February 1952. "German Financial Contribution to Defense. Foreign Ministers' Statement to the Federal Chancellor, London, 18 February 1952." SECRET. State Dept., Washington, D.C.

¹⁸Cable 338, HICOG Bonn to State Dept (1917) inform Defense, 11 Mar 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1952), Vol. II, Item 41.

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b. EUCOM Position. EUCOM opposed the German demands for complete control over procurement and construction, enforcement of procurement, and priorities, contending that such concessions would seriously jeopardize the ability of EUCOM to insure the minimum essential support obtainable only from local sources.¹⁹ In regard to construction, EUCOM had statistical data tending to prove that the U.S. system of complete control was more economical than the British system of partial German control which the Germans were using as an example to justify their claims. On the question of priorities and availabilities, EUCOM pointed out that it had not used the requisition system for the past two years but had depended upon the existing German priority and allocation laws.²⁰ EUCOM insisted upon retention of the articles on procurement and allocation which had been prepared in Washington as part of the agreed State-Defense position for the contractual agreements.²¹

c. Final Decisions. Article 37 of the "Convention on the Rights and Obligations of the Foreign Forces and Their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany" guaranteed that the requirements of the Forces and their members within the Federal territory of Germany would be satisfied in the following fields: (1) accommodations; (2) goods, materials and services, including public utilities; (3) transport services; (4) communication services; and (5) other public services. In addition the Federal Republic agreed to make available civilian personnel required by the Forces, consistent with military needs. With respect to direct procurement, Article 39 of the same convention gave to the powers concerned the right to procure goods, services, and materials either directly through their normal contract channels or through the agency of the West German Government. If German procurement channels were used, the Forces retained their right to make specifications, to determine the delivery period for services and goods, to inspect and reject, and to certify the acceptance of the fulfillment of a contract.²²

¹⁹Cable SX-3541, CINCEUR to COFSA, 22 Mar 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1952), Vol. II, Item 41 atchd.

²⁰Cable 348, HICOG to State Dept (1974) inform Defense, 13 Mar 52. SECRET. In file cited above.

²¹U.S. State Dept Bureau of Ger Aff, GER Contractual No. 5/4, Annex 5, 21 Sep 51, "Agreement Relating to the Logistical and Financial Support of the Armed Forces of the U.S., U.K., and France in the Federal Republic." SECRET. Washington, D.C.

²²Convention on Relations, 26 May 1952, pp. 75 - 76. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

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199. Status of Accredited Agencies

Due to the fact that during 1951 HICOG generally opposed continued EUCOM support of accredited agencies, EUCOM was deeply concerned regarding this aspect of the negotiations for the contractual agreements.²³ The first draft of a related convention entitled "Concerning the Rights of the Forces in Connection with their Logistic Support" (later entitled "Convention on the Rights and Obligations of the Foreign Forces and Their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany") contemplated authorizing the Forces to make use of non-German organizations. The wording of this draft would have allowed EUCOM and HICOG to continue the status quo regarding the accreditation and authorization of logistical support to certain non-military and non-U.S. governmental agencies and their personnel in Germany.²⁴

a. HICOG Position. HICOG, however, did not intend to support a retention of the status quo in the negotiations with the Germans and pointed out that the contractual agreements would change the status of the accredited agencies, and would entitle them to certain important privileges such as exemption from German criminal jurisdiction and tax exemptions. It was the opinion of HICOG that only certain organizations, such as EES, The Stars and Stripes, and the American Red Cross, and their employees, were entitled to full status. For the remainder of the accredited organizations HICOG made the following recommendations: (1) newspaper reporters should lose PX, club, and POL privileges, but retain rail travel privileges; (2) welfare agencies, including the JRSO, should lose all privileges; (3) U.S. and Swiss insurance companies should lose all privileges with the exception of the use of the Army Post Office and Military Payment Certificates, while their employees should lose all privileges; (4) Coca-Cola, Pepsi-Cola, Canada Dry, Sears Roebuck, Montgomery Ward and the Societe Generale du Surveillance (EES freight forwarder) should lose all privileges; and (5) American Express Company and the Chase National Bank should retain their privileges as organizations to enable them to perform their functions, but their employees should lose all privileges. The Forces would retain the right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over employees of the last two organizations for offenses committed against the Forces.²⁵

²³EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 370 - 73. SECRET.

²⁴C/N 2, Dir EUCOM Log Div to EUCOM DCOFS Admin, 21 Dec 51, sub: List of Sponsored Organizations. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 400 (1952), Vol. I, Item 42A.

²⁵Cable 373, HICOG Bonn to State Dept (2064) for Defense, 19 Mar 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 400 (1952), Vol. I, Item 4A atchd.

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b. EUCOM Position. It was the opinion of EUCOM that the American Express Company and the Chase National Bank, the automobile insurance companies, and other agencies such as the Coca-Cola Corporation, which provided service exclusively to the armed forces and their members, must continue in operation for both practical and morale reasons. EUCOM feared that the termination of minimum logistical support would result in a decision by these agencies to cease operations in Germany, with a resultant increase in costs to the United States, as well as a serious impact upon the morale of the Forces and their dependents stationed in Germany.²⁶

c. Final Decisions. The "Convention on the Rights and Obligations of the Foreign Forces and Their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany" solved the problem by allowing the Forces to utilize the services of non-German commercial enterprises to the extent that the needs of the Forces could not be satisfied by German enterprises. Such enterprises could be assimilated to the Forces under certain conditions, but their assimilation would vary in proportion to the services rendered directly to the Forces or their members. Assimilation would have to be based on the necessity for their contribution to the defense mission of the Forces, and would not be accomplished until after notification of the German authorities in the case of organizations providing technical service under contract to the Forces, or until after consultation with the German authorities in all other cases. The organizations and enterprises, and their employees, assimilated to the Forces under this convention could at no time engage in private commercial activities. This solution left the question of the identity of the organizations and enterprises to be accredited and assimilated to the discretion of EUCOM, in consultation with the German authorities, without the necessity of consulting HICOG or being bound by HICOG's decisions or opinions in the matter. Non-commercial organizations organized by the Forces or the power concerned, for the benefit of the Forces, or serving the welfare of the Forces, could be assimilated in whole or in part after proper notification to the German authorities. Clubs organized by the Forces might be assimilated only to the extent that such clubs were part of the catering or sports arrangements of the Forces. Under this arrangement, EES, The Stars and Stripes, various welfare organizations, and clubs would receive the same support as before the effective date of the contractual arrangements.²⁷

²⁶Cable SX-3791, CINCEUR to COFSA, 31 Mar 52. SECRET. In file cited above.

²⁷Convention on Relations, 26 May 52, pp. 74 - 75. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

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200. Security Measures

The draft of the Convention on General Relations which had been agreed upon by the Three Powers and the German representatives in 1951 had limited the use of the "reserved rights" of the Three Powers to the protection of the security of the armed forces stationed in Germany under the following conditions: (1) in accordance with the provisions of the proclamation of an emergency; and (2) in the event that the Forces were "imminently menaced." Since both of these conditions involved emergency situations, EUCOM felt that their inclusion in the Convention on General Relations would divest responsible military commanders of their authority during the pre-emergency period to make necessary provisions for the security of their forces.²⁸

a. Pre-emergency Rights. EUCOM notified the Department of the Army in December 1951 that it had no alternative but to accede to the HICOG view that it would be impossible to include provisions for pre-emergency rights in the Convention on General Relations.²⁹ EUCOM, however, continued to press HICOG for a revision of the security measures in the Convention on General Relations in such a manner as to make some provisions for pre-emergency rights. In view of EUCOM's strong desires, HICOG in January 1952 prepared an amended text for possible inclusion in the general convention. This amended text would have allowed the senior commander of the armed forces of each of the Three Powers to take necessary action to protect his forces and to comply with the directives of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. Since this amended provision appeared to satisfy EUCOM requirements for the pre-emergency period, HICOG presented it to the British and French members of the Allied High Commission for tripartite agreement prior to presentation to the Germans.³⁰

b. Objections of the British and French. Britain and France objected to any attempt to reopen the negotiations on the general convention, for the reason that it would lead to German demands of a similar nature, particularly in the light of political developments in Bonn subsequent to the agreement of the Three Powers and the Federal Republic on this convention. Both nations, however, expressed a willingness to consider the inclusion of an appropriate provision in the Convention on Rights and Obligations (logistics convention), including

²⁸Cable SX-5300, CINCEUR to COFSA, 26 Nov 51. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 014.1 Ger (1951), Vol. V, Item 240B.

²⁹EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 388 - 89. SECRET.

³⁰(1) Cable, no number, HICOG Bonn to State Dept (1376), 1 Feb 52. SECRET. (2) Cable, no number, HICOG Bonn to State Dept (1543), 12 Feb 52. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1952), Vol. I, Item 15 and 27.

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the stipulation that action under such a provision would not be subject to arbitration.³¹

c. HICOM Proposals. The Allied High Commission, in keeping with EUCOM demands for some provision regarding pre-emergency rights, submitted a proposed draft consisting of two paragraphs for inclusion in the Convention on Rights and Obligations. This proposed draft guaranteed to the Three Powers the right to conduct maneuvers and other training exercises throughout the territory of the Federal Republic, and provided that, if such maneuvers were to be carried on outside of the accommodations of the Forces (actual caserne areas, training areas, etc.), the German authorities would be informed by the Forces at a reasonable time in advance of the exercise. Any administrative measures necessary for the maneuver or exercise would be taken by the German authorities after prior consultation with the Forces. These administrative measures were to be sufficiently broad to enable the Forces themselves to take such particular measures as might be necessary for the accomplishing of the maneuver or exercise.³²

d. German Proposals. Chancellor Adenauer approved the provisions cited above and proposed two additional paragraphs which he contended would further guarantee EUCOM's desires for pre-emergency rights. These paragraphs dealt with defense installations and special measures of protection to be taken by the Forces of the Three Powers. The first guaranteed the erection or adaptation of security installations by the Federal Government in such amounts, areas, and types as might be needed for the common defense. Where a special need for secrecy or security existed, the Federal Republic was willing to permit the erection or adaptation of security installations by the Forces themselves, after prior consultation. The second paragraph guaranteed the co-operation of the Federal Government in insuring that military and civil measures of protection necessary in emergencies could be implemented by the Forces and the German authorities efficiently and without delay.³³

e. EUCOM Objections. The new German proposal met with objection from EUCOM on four major points: (1) the authority to take pre-emergency measures was not tied in with the "reserved rights;" (2) the proposal was subject to arbitration; (3) the underlying principle was founded on "prior agreement" and not on a "right;" and (4) the reference to "special situations of crisis" in the second paragraph of the proposal did not

³¹Ibid.

³²Cable 431, HICOG Bonn to State Dept (2322) for Defense, 9 Apr 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1952), Vol. II, Item 49A.

³³Ibid.

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accurately reflect EUCOM's pre-emergency concept. In justification of its insistence on more adequate pre-emergency rights, EUCOM pointed out that the United States, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had placed well over 250,000 military personnel and noncombatants within a few hours' road distance from the formidable forces of a possible aggressor. Responsibility for the safety of these Americans should be stated clearly and not be permitted to rest merely upon co-operation with elected German officials whose tenure of office would have no permanency.³⁴

f. Final Decisions. Security measures with regard to the declaration of a state of emergency were provided for in Article V of the Convention on General Relations. The security of the Forces of the Three Powers in all other respects was governed by the provisions of the related convention entitled, "Convention on the Rights and Obligations of the Foreign Forces and their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany." This convention contained two articles incorporating the provisions necessary for the protection of the rights of the military commanders in the pre-emergency period. The first, Article 19, "Maneuvers and Training Exercises," contained unchanged the provisions concerning the conduct of maneuvers and training exercises which had been proposed by HICOM (as described in subpar. g above). The second, Article 20, "Defensive Works and Measures," contained Chancellor Adenauer's proposal (as cited in subpar. d above), with the wording changed in several places in order to make it more acceptable, e.g., the phrase "in special situations of crisis" which had met with EUCOM objection was changed to read "to meet special security requirements." A third paragraph of Article 20 contained the German concessions with regard to limitation of the rights of the Arbitration Tribunal governing claims arising as a result of the implementation of Articles 19 and 20.³⁵

201. Criminal Jurisdiction over Dependents

By the end of 1951 neither EUCOM and HICOG in Germany, nor the State and Defense Departments in Washington, had reached agreement with regard to the question of criminal jurisdiction over U.S. dependents in Germany. EUCOM insisted throughout the negotiations that it was necessary for the U.S. Armed Forces to retain criminal jurisdiction over the dependents accompanying the Forces but HICOG and the State Department insisted that this jurisdiction be granted to the Germans.³⁶ Since it appeared that the

³⁴Cable SX-4125, CINCEUR to COFSA, 11 Apr 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1952), Vol. II, Item 49A atchd.

³⁵Convention on Relations, 26 May 52, p. 68. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

³⁶EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 389 - 91. SECRET.

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question could not be solved, even on the departmental level in Washington, the State Department in January notified HICOG that it was submitting the problem to the President for executive settlement. By the middle of January, however, EUCOM and HICOG had come to an agreement on the matter and they jointly requested the Department of State not to refer the question to the President. This action was based on a German proposal at a steering committee meeting in Bonn on 5 January that the Forces have exclusive criminal jurisdiction over dependents provided such dependents were subject to the jurisdiction of military service tribunals.³⁷ Since the dependents of the armed forces in Germany were subject to the jurisdiction of military service tribunals for offenses committed within the federal territory of Germany according to the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, agreement was now possible with the Germans on this question.³⁸ The new draft agreement simply stated, "The authorities of the Forces shall have exclusive criminal jurisdiction over members of the Forces in accordance with the service law applicable to them."³⁹ This draft provision became Article 6 of the "Convention on the Rights and Obligations of the Foreign Forces and their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany." Since Article I of the same convention defined the term "members of the Forces" to include dependents of all uniformed personnel or civilians serving with or attached to the Forces, EUCOM was assured of exclusive criminal jurisdiction over dependents.⁴⁰

202. War Criminals

The question of the disposition of criminals convicted by the Allied War Crimes Commission and serving time in the Allied war criminal prisons in the occupation zones of Germany presented a serious problem to the negotiators of the contractual agreements. EUCOM believed that there should be no change in the custody of war criminals and that responsibility for the custody of the war criminals and for the administration of EUCOM War Criminal Prison No. 1 at Landsberg should remain with the United States, with the Federal Republic continuing to furnish

³⁷Cable 217, HICOG Bonn to State Dept (1116) pass Defense, 15 Jan 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1952), Vol. I, Item 1Q atchd.

³⁸Manual for Courts Martial, United States, 1951. App. 2, "Act of May 5, 1950," pp. 413 - 14. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.

³⁹Cable 232, HICOG Bonn to State Dept (1244) pass COFSA for ACOFS G-3, 24 Jan 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1952), Vol. I, Item 1Q atchd.

⁴⁰Convention on Relations, 26 May 52, p. 59. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

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the cost of upkeep of both the prison and its inmates. EUCOM believed that no change should be made in this policy prior to the formulation of plans for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Germany.⁴¹

a. Agreed U.S. Position. In February the Department of the Army notified EUCOM that an agreed position had been worked out by the Department of the Army and the Department of State in conjunction with the Senate Armed Services Committee. The plan would return the war criminals to German custody, provided the German authorities would undertake to carry out the sentences and would, in addition, either expressly accept the judgments, or undertake not to contest them in any way, while the Three Powers would retain the right to inspect the German prisons. A board with equal Allied-German membership would be created to advise on clemency matters, but the actual exercise of clemency would remain with the government which originally issued the judgment.⁴²

b. Legal Difficulties. While this proposal met with the approval of the Allied High Commission and of the German representatives at the Bonn negotiations, it developed at a meeting between the High Commissioner and the Federal Chancellor on 27 April that the Federal Republic under the Basic Law (Articles 103 and 104) could not legally assume the custody of war criminals.⁴³ Accordingly, the United States would have to retain custody of the war criminals in Landsberg Prison and EUCOM would have to continue to administer the prison for an indefinite period of time, until the Federal Republic could devise some method of assuming custody.

c. EUCOM Objections. EUCOM objected to the activation of the mixed clemency board provided by the convention before the assumption of custody by the Federal Republic, considering it unrealistic that this board should undertake jurisdiction over releases for good behavior since this was a matter for administrative determination by the custodian. EUCOM pointed out that political criticism would certainly result if it failed to follow the recommendations of the Board, and that, since the onus for detention of war criminals would rest upon the custodian, the Bundestag might deliberately delay passage of legislation designed to effect the transfer of custody in order to discredit the U.S. position in Germany.⁴⁴

⁴¹Cable SX-1010, CINCEUR to COFSA, 30 Jan 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 000.5 (1952), Vol. I, Item 2A atchd.

⁴²Cable DA-901544, COFSA to CINCEUR, 19 Feb 53. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 000.5 (1952), Vol. I, Item 2A.

⁴³Cable S-4787, CINCEUR to COFSA for ACOFS G-3, 1 May 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1952), Vol. II, Item 41 atchd.

⁴⁴Cable S-5096, CINCEUR to COFSA for ACOFS G-3, 13 May 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1952), Vol. II, Item 49A atchd.

d. Final Decisions. Notwithstanding the EUCOM position and the desire of the Departments of State and of the Army that the mixed board should not become operative until after custody of war criminals was transferred to the Federal Republic, HICOG advised EUCOM on 22 May that the original proposal had been agreed upon with the German representatives. While the United States would retain custody of the war criminals, the mixed board would control the modification and termination of the sentences of such criminals. HICOG believed that the interests of the United States were adequately protected by the presence of a U.S. representative on the mixed board, since in all major clemency matters the United States would be bound only by the unanimous recommendations of its membership.⁴⁵

203. Elimination of Zonal Boundaries

The question of the elimination of zonal boundaries after the signing of the contractual arrangements was complicated by the fact that their existence was implied in the quadripartite agreement of 1945 with the Soviet Union. Elimination would accordingly jeopardize not only the U.S. position with regard to Berlin but might even involve the U.S. right to remain in Germany. Early in January 1952 the Special Committee of the Allied High Commission took the matter under consideration in order to arrive at an agreed tripartite position. The committee reported that the most important consideration was to avoid any wording in the contracts which would terminate, or would imply the termination of, the existence of the zones. The tripartitely agreed HICOM position was that the concept of the zonal division of the Federal Republic would have to be continued under the contractual arrangements, but the question would not be discussed in negotiations with the Germans unless it was raised by the German delegates themselves. HICOM felt that if the Germans did raise the questions, the Three Powers were armed with effective arguments for persuading them to tolerate the situation.⁴⁶

⁴⁵(1) Cable SX-5420, CINCEUR to COFSA for ACOFS G-3, 22 May 52. SECRET. (2) Cable 573, HICOG Bonn to State Dept (2997), 22 May 52. SECRET. (3) Cable DA-909635, Asst SA to HICOG Bonn, pass Nash, 23 May 52. SECRET. All in USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1952), Vol. II, Item 49A atchd.

⁴⁶(1) HICOM Paper, HICOM/P(52)7, 14 Jan 52, sub: The Future of the Zones. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br 319.2/1 (1952), Vol. I. (2) Cable, no number, HICOG Bonn to State Dept (1148), 17 Jan 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1952), Vol. I, Item 7A-2.

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204. Signing of the Contractual Arrangements

The formal signing of the contractual arrangements, which bore the official title of "Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany and Related Conventions," took place in Bonn on 26 May 1952. The agreements were signed by Secretary of State Dean Acheson for the United States, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden for the United Kingdom, Foreign Minister Robert Schuman for the Republic of France, and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (who also held the post of Foreign Minister) for the Federal Republic.⁴⁷

205. Contents of the Contractual Agreements

In addition to the Convention on General Relations and its annexed Charter of the Arbitration Tribunal, the contractual agreements consisted of four related conventions as follows: (1) the "Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and Occupation;" (2) the "Convention on the Rights and Obligations of the Foreign Forces and Their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany;" (3) the "Finance Convention;" and (4) and "Agreement on the Tax Treatment of the Forces and their Members." The contractual agreements also contained an official exchange of seven letters covering vital points not included in the conventions proper as follows: (1) Control Council legislation; (2) taxes on successor organizations; (3) validity of international agreements; (4) status of the Saar; (5) exercise of reserved rights; (6) radio frequencies; and (7) private prewar obligations.⁴⁸

206. Effective Date of the Contractual Agreements

The contractual agreements were to enter into effect immediately upon the deposit of the instruments of ratification of the Convention on General Relations by the nations concerned, and the entry into force of the "Treaty on the Establishment of the European Defense Community." The archives of the Federal Republic were designated as the repository for the original documents as well as the instruments of ratification.⁴⁹ Even before the actual negotiations with the Germans had begun, the foreign

⁴⁷"Germany Becomes Partner in Western Community," Department of State Bulletin, XXVI, No. 676 (1952), 887.

⁴⁸(1) C/N 1, POLAD to CINCEUR, 10 Jun 52, sub: Highlights of the Contractual Agreements. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1952), Vol. III, Item 83. (2) "Summaries of the Contractual Agreements," Department of State Bulletin, XXVI, No. 676 (1952), 888 - 94.

⁴⁹Convention on Relations, 26 May 52, p. 4. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

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ministers of the Three Powers had made the ratification of the EDC and German participation in that organization a prerequisite for entry into force of the contractual agreements.⁵⁰

207. Status of the Contractual Agreements, 31 December 1952

As of 31 December 1952 the prospects for early ratification of the contractual agreements and their entry into force were not favorable. In the seven months which had elapsed since the signing of the contractual agreements and the EDC Treaty, only the United States (on 1 July) and the United Kingdom (on 1 August) had ratified the contractual agreements. Neither France nor Germany had ratified either the contractual arrangements or the EDC Treaty, nor had the remaining EDC nations yet ratified the treaty.

Section II: Relations with the German Federal Republic

208. Channels of Relationship with the Federal Republic

EUCOM could maintain relationships with the government of the Federal Republic prior to 1 June 1952 only through the U.S. High Commission for Germany as provided by the Occupation Statute. Certain changes resulted from the signing of the contractual agreements and the planning for the eventual transformation of HICOG to embassy status. The phase-out of the HICOG field organization (discussed in par. 183) necessitated the assumption by EUCOM of the military liaison activities formerly performed by the HICOG Kreis resident officers and the offices of the Land commissioners. Certain phases of the relationship between EUCOM and the Federal Republic became EUCOM military responsibilities while the High Commissioner for Germany authorized EUCOM to exercise the authority vested in HICOG under the hunting and fishing ordinances. EUCOM designated the Land relations officers and the S-5 as the agencies of these functions. HICOG, however, retained responsibilities for certain relations with the Federal Republic that would not be passed to USAREUR

⁵⁰Tripartite Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of France, United Kingdom, and the United States, Washington, September 1951, "Instructions from the Three Foreign Ministers to the Allied High Commission, 13 September 1951." SECRET. State Dept., Washington, D.C.

until after the ratification of the contractual agreements. Even under the contractual agreements the ambassador would retain certain responsibilities for the relationship of USAREUR and the Federal Republic of Germany (as has been discussed in paragraph 188).

209. Deutsche Mark Budget for Occupation Costs

EUCOM/USAREUR relationships with the Federal Republic were particularly concerned with the preparation of the Deutsche Mark budgets for occupation costs. (See par. 111.) Because the German fiscal year began on 1 April, EUCOM operated for the first three months of each calendar year on the budget of the previous fiscal year. During the first three months of 1952 negotiations were in progress with HICOG for the development of the Deutsche Mark budget for the ensuing fiscal year. EUCOM was apprehensive that a delay in the signing of the contractual agreements beyond 1 April 1952 might have a serious effect upon the continuation of Deutsche Mark support for the U.S. Forces in Germany during the coming fiscal year. Since the Occupation Statute would continue in force after 1 April if the contractual arrangements were not in effect by that time, HICOG notified EUCOM that Allied occupation costs budgets would be submitted by HICOG prior to 1 April 1952, and the Federal Republic would be advised of the Allied requirements under the Occupation Statute.⁵¹

a. EUCOM-HICOG Budget Conference. A full-scale budget conference attended by EUCOM and HICOG fiscal representatives was held at Garmisch on 7 February in the presence of Mr. McCloy and General Handy so that any problems arising might be settled at the HICOG-CINCEUR level. The conferees paid special attention to the elimination of "frill items" from the GFY 1953 budget and discussions were held on the solid fuel requirements of the Forces, transportation adjustments for EUCOM, and capital expenditures for projects which returned dollar collections to the U.S. Treasury. At the conference, EUCOM agreed to take the following steps with regard to budget requirements: (1) determine the dollar cost of laundry machinery, etc., and the dollar value of collections on an expected annual basis; (2) reduce the coal requirement for the U.S. forces from 2,340,620 tons to 2,000,000 tons, and make the necessary monetary adjustments in the budget; and (3) provide transportation experts to meet with HICOG experts to study the utilization of trains. A policy disagreement with regard to the utilization of quarters attendants and personnel support for clubs

⁵¹(1) Ltr, Gen T. T. Handy, CINCEUR, to Mr. J. J. McCloy, HICOG, 24 Jan 52, sub: DM Occupation Budget for GFY 53. RESTRICTED. (2) Ltr, Mr. J. J. McCloy to Gen T. T. Handy, 21 Feb 52, sub: DM Occupation Budget for GFY 53. RESTRICTED. Both in USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. I, Item 6A and atchd.

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and Class "B" messes was temporarily resolved by Mr. McCloy and General Handy (as previously described in par. 174).⁵²

b. Budget Requirements for GFY 1953. EUCOM submitted its budget for GFY 1953 (1 April 1952 - 31 March 1953) to the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany on 19 February 1952. The EUCOM GFY 1953 Deutsche Mark occupation cost budget request totaled DM 3,277,000,000. (See par. 111a.)⁵³ The Allied High Commission, however, decided not to approve the Deutsche Mark budgets of any of the Three Powers in Germany, but agreed to operate on a monthly expenditure allocation basis approximately equivalent to one twelfth of the Forces' budgets during the interim occupation period prior to the ratification of the contractual agreements. The Allied High Commission made a commitment to operate on an average monthly expenditure ceiling of DM 600 million for the Forces of the Three Powers, including support of the high commissioners' activities.⁵⁴

c. German Objections. The proposed budgets for the Forces of the Three Powers for GFY 1953 met with serious opposition from German political circles. The Allied High Commission on 25 April received an official German report commenting on the estimates. This report stated that budget estimates could be reduced by one third (DM 2.3 billion), and warned that continued insistence by the Three Powers on a budget of DM 6.9 billion would seriously jeopardize the acceptance of the contractual agreements by the Germans. The report criticized the following points in the budget: (1) the large number of local employees, especially mess, club, hotel, and household personnel; (2) construction of what the Germans called "civilian buildings," particularly high unit dwelling costs; (3) French and Belgian Deutsche Mark pay; (4) French, British, and Belgian motor vehicle purchases; and (5) high U.S. solid fuels requirements. The report, however, failed to recommend specific expenditure cuts in support of the proposed one-third reduction.⁵⁵

⁵²Memo for recd, Brig Gen J. J. Binns, EUCOM Compt, 8 Feb 52, sub: Conference of Mr. McCloy - Gen Handy at Garmisch, 7 Feb 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1952), Vol. I, Item 25B.

⁵³Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to COFSA for COA, 7 Oct 52, sub: DM Financial Situation. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. III, Item 84A atchd.

⁵⁴(1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, Mr. J. J. McCloy, HICOG, to Gen. T. T. Handy, CINCEUR, 9 May 52, sub: DM Budget for GFY 1953. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. II, Item 39A.

⁵⁵Cable, no number, HICOG Bonn to State Dept (2572) pass Defense and MSA, 26 Apr 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. II, Item 34.

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d. Allied High Commission Decisions. As a result of the decision by the Allied High Commission not to approve the Deutsche Mark occupation cost budgets for GFY 1953, a series of discussions were held between the members of the Allied High Commission and the financial experts of the Federal Republic in an attempt to arrive at a monthly expenditure plan for the interim occupation period prior to the ratification of the contractual agreements. As a result of these discussions, agreement was made to cover the 4-month period from 1 April to 31 July inclusive. This agreement provided for a total U.S. occupation costs expenditure of DM 1,020,000,000 for the 4-month period, or a monthly average of approximately DM 255 million. The Allied High Commission agreed at the same time that if the contractual agreements were not in effect by the end of the 4-month interim period, the question would be re-examined in the light of the then existing conditions.⁵⁶ Accordingly, subsequent agreements established an average monthly expenditure ceiling of DM 276 million per month for the remainder of the year.⁵⁷ (See par. 111g.)

e. Extension of GFY 1952. Shortly after 1 April 1952, the German occupation costs offices were instructed by the Federal Ministry of Finance to delay the closing of the March 1952 accounts until 25 April 1952. This directive was a distinct advantage to EUCOM since it enabled fiscal officers to keep their accounts open until final schedules were received from the occupation costs offices subsequent to 25 April 1952, thereby assuring the greatest possible liquidation of obligations to be recorded in GFY 1952 accounts as of 31 March 1952.⁵⁸

210. Efforts to Diminish Carry-Over from GFY 1952

Early in 1952, before the closing of the March 1952 accounts was delayed, EUCOM was greatly concerned by the possibility that GFY 1952 funds would lapse for expenditure as of 31 March 1952, in which event all unliquidated Deutsche Mark obligations as of 31 March would have to be paid from GFY 1953 funds, or even possibly from dollar appropriated funds. In order to reserve GFY 1953 funds for GFY 1953 operations, EUCOM

⁵⁶ (1) Ltr, Mr. J. J. McCloy, HICOG, to Gen T. T. Handy, CINCEUR, 14 Mar 52, sub: DM Occupation Costs Budget for GFY 1953. CONFIDENTIAL.
(2) Ltr, same to same, 9 May 52, same sub. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. II, Item 39A.

⁵⁷ (1) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to COFSA for COA, 7 Oct 52, sub: DM Financial Situation. SECRET. (2) Cable 391, HICOG Bonn to State Dept (2100) 6 Nov 52. SECRET. (3) Cable SX-5114, CINCUSAREUR to COFSA for COA, 12 Nov 52. SECRET. All in USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. III, Items 84A and 85 atchd.

⁵⁸ Cable S-4330, CINCEUR to COFSA for Binns, 16 Apr 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. II, Item 31 atchd.

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instructed all commands on 29 January to take immediate steps to insure that EUCOM would complete as far as possible payment of its portion of GFY 1952 obligations prior to 31 March 1952.⁵⁹ HICOG informed EUCOM that in appreciation of the EUCOM concern over the amount of Deutsche Mark obligations that would remain unliquidated on 31 March 1952, HICOG was prepared to notify the Federal Ministry of Finance that the U.S. expenditure program had been greatly accelerated and to request the ministry to take the necessary steps to expedite payment of obligations by the appropriate German offices. However, since Federal Finance Minister Schaeffer had indicated to Mr. McCloy a willingness to continue an "as is" occupation costs basis subsequent to 1 April 1952 if the contractual agreements were not in effect by that time, HICOG desired that the carry-over from GFY 1952 be liquidated according to existing procedures.⁶⁰ EUCOM efforts to reduce the unliquidated Deutsche Mark obligations of GFY 1952 were successful to the point that the actual carry-over amounted to only approximately 20 percent of the GFY 1952 obligations, a much smaller carry-over than normal. The efforts, in fact, were so successful that they evoked a protest to Mr. McCloy from Federal Finance Minister Schaeffer.⁶¹

211. Delay in Payment of EUCOM Obligations

Early in the year EUCOM was informed by its military post agencies that some of the German occupation costs offices were not honoring U.S. payment documentation (6 GR's) as promptly as prescribed in the applicable HICOG-EUCOM directives. The known instances of delay gave rise to the suspicion in both HICOG and EUCOM that the delays were resulting from instructions from the Federal Ministry of Finance. A survey of the situation at the Land level was ordered by HICOG so that remedial measures could be initiated at the Federal Government level.⁶² The situation in Land Bremen, however, did not improve and by the middle of 1952 action had to be taken to compel the Land Bremen Senator for Finance to honor payment documentation submitted by Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation. At a meeting held on 4 September, attended by HICOG and USAREUR officials and representatives of the Bremen occupation costs office, arrangements

⁵⁹Cable SX-1858, CINCEUR to All Comds, 29 Jan 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. I, Item 7.

⁶⁰Cable 276, HICOG Bonn to CINCEUR, 15 Feb 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. I, Item 9.

⁶¹Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to COFSA for COA, 7 Oct 52, sub: DM Financial Situation. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. III, Item 84A atchd.

⁶²Cable 198, HICOG Bonn to OLC's Bavaria, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Hesse, and Bremen, 8 Jan 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. I, Item 4.

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were made to effect payment of the documents delayed by that office.⁶³ Notwithstanding this agreement the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation reported to USAREUR that the schedule of expenditures for the period 10 through 20 September 1952 prepared by the Bremen occupation costs office included less than 500 of the 1,600 payment documents which had been delayed. As a result of this delay the Staurei Trans Genossenschaft, Bremerhaven, notified Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation that outstanding payments totaling DM 180,198.40 were still unpaid by the Bremen occupation costs office. This firm, which provided stevedoring service for the port of embarkation, declared that the delay in payment for its services had placed it in dire financial straits. Information obtained by Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation indicated that this firm was not the only one in such financial circumstances as a result of nonpayment of obligations.⁶⁴ Fearing that a continuation of the situation might result in a stoppage of operations at the port, with serious results not only upon the operations of the U.S. Forces in Germany but on NATO operations as well, USAREUR requested the aid of HICOG. On 10 October HICOG reported to USAREUR that an investigation of the matter showed that by that date approximately one half of the payment documents in question had been processed and a definite promise had been made to HICOG that the remainder would be completed within ten days. HICOG notified USAREUR that it would continue to follow closely the financial developments in Land Bremen, and requested immediate notification by USAREUR upon the recurrence of this or similar payment problems elsewhere in the Federal Republic, in order that remedial action could be taken as soon as possible.⁶⁵

212. Comparative Cost of the Support of U.S. Troops in Germany

The EUCOM/USAREUR comptroller in 1952 conducted a staff study on occupation costs and U.S. dollar support to the Federal Republic of Germany in order to arrive at a comparison of the costs to the Federal Republic and to the U. S. Government of support of the U.S. Forces in Germany. The following table, prepared as a result of this study, indicates that the approximately two billion dollar value of German Deutsche Mark expenditures in support of the U.S. Forces in Germany from V-E Day to 30 June 1952 was more than offset by U.S. aid to Germany from dollar appropriated funds amounting to some four billion dollars. The

⁶³Cable SC-15490, CINCUSAREUR to HICOG Bonn, 24 Sep 52. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. III, Item 82.

⁶⁴Cable BPE-5589, BPE to CINCUSAREUR, 23 Sep 52. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. I, Item 7 atchd.

⁶⁵(1) Cable SC-15490, CINCUSAREUR to HICOG Bonn, 24 Sep 52. UNCLASSIFIED. (2) Cable 324, HICOG Bonn to CINCUSAREUR, 10 Oct 52. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. III, Item 82 and atchd.

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U.S. dollar appropriated aid to the Federal Republic was extended through such items as the Economic Cooperation Administration programs, Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA), incentive programs to revive German industry, assistance to German agriculture, the transfer of U.S. surplus supplies, the return of captured material, and relief for the civil population in the Berlin Airlift. The table also shows additional benefits to the German economy attributable to the presence of the U.S. Forces in Germany amounting to 295 million dollars between V-E Day and 30 June 1952. These benefits constituted an invisible export to the United States since they brought U.S. dollar exchange into the German economy in return for German goods and services.

U.S. Aid Compared to German Support of the U.S. Forces
(V-E Day to 30 June 1952)

Appropriated Dollar Aid to Germany	\$4,263,000,000
Deutsche Mark Expenditures for U.S. Forces	\$2,276,000,000*

*Converted at official rates.

Additional Benefits to the Germany Economy
Attributable to the U.S. Forces

<u>Grand Total</u>	<u>\$295,000,000</u>
1. Appropriated Fund Purchases	\$ 12,000,000
2. Individual and Nonappropriated Fund Expenditures	\$283,000,000
a. EES Procurement	\$ 21,000,000
b. ET Taxi Service	30,000,000
c. Telecommunications Service	13,000,000
d. Purchase of Deutsche Marks	215,000,000
e. Miscellaneous	4,000,000 66

66Stf Study, USAREUR Compt 15 Nov 52, sub: Comparative Cost to West Germany and the U.S. Government in Supporting U.S. Forces in Germany. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. III, Item 97.

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The greater share of the \$295 million which entered the German economy through the presence of the U.S. Forces in Germany was derived from the purchase of Deutsche Marks by individual members of the Forces and by the military nonappropriated fund agencies. The rapid acceleration of these purchases as a result of the completion of the EUCOM/USAREUR troop augmentation program is indicated in the following table.

EUCOM/USAREUR Deutsche Mark Purchases

<u>V-E Day to FY 1951</u>	<u>FY 1952</u>	<u>Estimated FY 1953</u>
\$96,000,000	\$119,000,000	\$170,000,000 ⁶⁷

a. "Invisible" Exports to the U.S. Forces. A comparison between the German "invisible" exports to the U.S. forces and "visible" exports to the United States shows that the invisible exports to the U.S. forces amounted to approximately two thirds of the value of the visible dollar trade with the United States proper. In United States FY 1952 alone the value of the invisible exports to the U.S. forces amounted to \$159 million out of the \$295 million shown in the table above, as compared with the total 232 million dollar value of the visible German exports to the United States during the same fiscal year.

b. German Support of the Allied Occupation. The total expenditure of the Federal Republic in support of the occupation forces of the three Western occupation powers amounted to approximately DM 7 billion annually from V-E Day to 30 June 1952. Thus approximately 7 percent of the Federal Republic's gross national product was provided for the support of the Forces of the Three Powers, hence, for Western Germany's own national defense. The United States, however, spent over 20 percent and France and the United Kingdom each spent more than 10 percent of their respective gross national products on defense.⁶⁸

213. Establishment of a Military Liaison System

HICOG laid before EUCOM late in 1951 the problem of assumption of the duties of the HICOG field organization which was expected to phase out with the ratification of the contractual agreements. In December 1951 EUCOM and HICOG determined that the Kreis resident officer program

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Stf Study, USAREUR Compt, 15 Nov 52, sub: German Financial Support of the Occupation Forces. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 112 (1952), Vol. III, Item 98.

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should continue on a curtailed basis until EUCOM could establish S-5 sections at the military post and appropriate subpost levels.⁶⁹ A study of the problem submitted by the EUCOM Civil Affairs Division in February concluded that all military liaison functions with the German Federal Republic would have to be assumed by EUCOM following the phase-out of the HICOG field organization. The establishment of S-5 organizations at post and subpost levels would necessitate a certain amount of supervision at the EUCOM level. The Civil Affairs Division recommended that it be designated as the staff agency of EUCOM to exercise general supervision and co-ordination of the military liaison functions at both the local and Land levels, and also that it be designated as the co-ordinating and liaison agency of EUCOM with the proposed U.S. ambassadorial group and with the German Federal Government agencies and officials. The Civil Affairs Division concluded that the liaison function at the Land level could be conducted more effectively through the agency of the Civil Affairs Division than through the military posts. Resident liaison personnel and support would be required at each of the German Land governments of Bavaria, Baden-Wuerttemberg, and Hesse and with the Federal Government at Bonn. Since Land Bremen contained only two Kreise and one military post, the Bremen post commander could carry out both the local and Land level liaison with additional EUCOM representation. The Civil Affairs Division also recommended that a period of six weeks be allowed before the transfer of military liaison functions, to allow EUCOM sufficient time to organize and orient personnel and to provide preliminary on-the-job training.⁷⁰ On 5 March 1952 the EUCOM deputy chief of staff for operations approved the Civil Affairs Division recommendations and directed the division to co-ordinate the plans with the proper agencies in HICOG as soon as possible through the HICOG-EUCOM Working Group. The new table of distribution for the Civil Affairs Division was approved and the number of additional personnel needed for the S-5 organization at military post level was determined to be as follows: 55 officers, 48 enlisted men, 12 Department of the Army civilians, and 150 Germans.⁷¹

a. Phase-out of the HICOG Field Organization. Mr. McCloy informed General Handy in April that he expected the offices of the Land commissioners to pass out of existence approximately sixty days after the signing of the contractual agreements but in no case later than 1 July 1952. It was his opinion that the consuls general would be designated

⁶⁹EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 385 - 87. SECRET.

⁷⁰Memo, Dir EUCOM CAD to EUCOM COFS, 14 Feb 52, sub: Plans for the Establishment of a Military Post S-5 Organization. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. I, Item 3B atchd.

⁷¹C/N 2, EUCOM DCOFS Opns to Dir EUCOM CAD, 5 Mar 52, to C/N 1, Dir EUCOM CAD to EUCOM DCOFS Opns, 14 Feb 52, sub: cited above. SECRET. In file cited above.

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as the State Department representatives and would be responsible for the over-all relationships within their respective areas of influence. The Army would conduct its own relations with the Land governments but the consuls general would be available to the military for advice and assistance. Mr. McCloy felt that below the Land level, where the problem would be one of actual troop relations with the local population, including the familiar relationship of the post and unit commanders with the local authorities and the German people, the responsibility for all functions of relationship would pass to the military. It was Mr. McCloy's intention to phase out the Kreis resident officer staffs coincident with the phase-out of the offices of the Land commissioners.⁷² By agreement with the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, EUCOM assumed responsibility for the conduct of civil affairs (U.S. military-German relations) at the local (Kreis) level effective 5 June 1952 and at the Land level effective 1 July 1952.⁷³

b. Post and Subpost S-5 Organization. The military post S-5 organization, proposed as replacement for the military liaison functions of the Kreis resident officer, was based on the study by the Civil Affairs Division, EUCOM. According to this study the size and type of the organization to carry out the military liaison functions of the particular post would be governed by the following factors: (1) size of the supported population, including troops, civilians, and dependents projected as of 1 July 1952; (2) the density of the German population in relation to the U.S. and Allied supported population; (3) the extent of the military liaison problems peculiar to the particular area; and (4) the size of the geographical area of the military post or subpost to be covered. The Civil Affairs Division informed the EUCOM chief of staff that, because of the magnitude of the liaison responsibilities that would have to be assumed, as well as the imminence of such assumption, expeditious action in organizing the S-5 staffs at military post level was necessary.⁷⁴ Accordingly, a EUCOM letter of instructions was dispatched to all military posts on 11 March 1952, outlining the plans for the proposed S-5 organization at post and subpost levels. On 22 April all military post commanders were directed to organize S-5 staff sections at post and appropriate subpost levels as soon as practicable, in accordance with the plans previously submitted, but within presently authorized strengths and/or overstrengths.

⁷²Ltr, Mr. J. J. McCloy, HICOG, to Gen T. T. Handy, CINCEUR, 3 Apr 52, sub: Phase-out of the HICOG Field Organization. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

⁷³C/N 1, EUCOM Dir CAD to All EUCOM Stf Divs, 9 Jul 52, sub: Establishment of EUCOM IRO's in Bavaria, Baden-Wuerttemberg and Hesse. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. II, Item 18.

⁷⁴Memo, Dir EUCOM CAD to EUCOM COFS, 14 Feb 52, sub: Plans for the Establishment of a Military Post S-5 Organization. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. I, Item 3B atchd.

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At the same time HICOG dispatched a letter to all Land commissioners in the U.S. Zone, directing them to render all possible assistance to the respective post commanders by allowing the selected S-5 personnel to commence familiarization training with the remaining Kreis resident officers. In order to arrange for this on-the-job training, the post commanders were authorized direct contact with the offices of the Land commissioners.⁷⁵ By the middle of May, the majority of the post commanders had not yet made arrangements with the Kreis resident officers for the proposed on-the-job training. Accordingly HICOG directed that each resident officer, before closing his office, contact the military post commander in his area and request that an officer be assigned to discuss the transfer of functions. The resident officer was instructed to brief the selected post officer on the functions that he had been performing, work out the various administrative details of the transfer, and, if time permitted, introduce him to the proper local authorities. When EUCOM was informed of these instructions, immediate steps were taken to insure that post commanders complied with EUCOM directives in regard to the establishment of S-5 staff sections and arrangements for receiving on-the-job training by the selected personnel.⁷⁶

c. EUCOM S-5 Orientation Conference. The EUCOM Civil Affairs Division held a three day orientation conference beginning 14 May for personnel selected for the S-5 organizations and for the staffs of the EUCOM Land relations offices. Mr. McCloy and General Handy addressed the first session of the conference and key HICOG officials were included among the speakers.⁷⁷ Approximately 120 officers and/or civilians attended this orientation conference in preparation for their new assignments in the EUCOM military liaison program. Also present were representatives of interested EUCOM staff divisions.⁷⁸

d. Designation of Civil Affairs Officers. The Seventh Army raised the question of the propriety of designating the civil affairs officers at the post and subpost levels as S-5 officers. Since the designation

⁷⁵Cable SX-4474, CINCEUR to CO's of All Mil Posts, 22 Apr 52. RESTRICTED. In file cited above.

⁷⁶Cable SX-5467, CINCEUR to All Mil Posts (except Wiesbaden and Berlin), 23 May 52. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. I, Item 12.

⁷⁷C/N 1, Dir EUCOM CAD to EUCOM DCOFS Opns, 25 Apr 52, sub: Progress of EUCOM's Plans for Establishing an S-5 Organization to Replace the Kreis Resident Officers. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. I, Item 3B atchd.

⁷⁸C/N 1, Dir EUCOM CAD to All EUCOM Stf Divs, 2 May 52, sub: Civil Affairs, U.S. Military-German Relations Conference. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. I, Item 10.

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at EUCOM, Seventh Army, and corps levels was that of civil affairs officers rather than G-5 officers, the Seventh Army felt that in the interest of uniformity of designation it might be better to use the term "civil affairs officers" as the proper designation at the post and sub-post levels as well.⁷⁹ EUCOM, on the other hand, considered it desirable that the civil affairs officers at the post and subpost level be designated as S5's in order that they might have equal status with the other principal staff sections of the post organization, particularly in view of the staff co-ordination and policy recommendations required in the exercise of their functions, both under normal conditions and in the event of an emergency. As a practical matter, however, and to simplify dealings and relations with the German people, EUCOM intended to emphasize civil affairs on a functional basis and encouraged reference to this agency in many cases as a "civil affairs" rather than an "S-5" organization.⁸⁰

e. Scope of Military Liaison. The scope of military liaison functions to be performed by the S-5 officers at post levels and the Land relations officers at Land level was defined by EUCOM in co-ordination with HICOG. Important functions previously performed by the Kreis resident officers and Land commissioners included the acquisition of real estate for the use of the Forces and the obtaining of trespass rights for field training exercises and maneuvers. These now fell within the scope of the EUCOM military liaison program and would be co-ordinated with the appropriate German officials by the S-5 officer or Land relations officer concerned. In the event that an appeal to the Federal Government at Bonn became necessary EUCOM proposed to use the good offices of HICOG until the EUCOM liaison agency was established at Bonn. EUCOM S-5 officers also assumed the rendering of assistance in marriage cases for civilians subject to Article 2 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. EUCOM assumed, in addition, the issuance of certificates of consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by German courts in legitimation and paternity proceedings where EUCOM personnel were concerned. This was necessary since Mr. McCloy had issued general authorization to the German courts for the exercise of such jurisdiction provided that a certificate of consent was issued by EUCOM. Finally, the post S-5 officers assumed operational responsibility of the KRO's with respect to hunting and fishing by members of the occupation forces, while the

⁷⁹Ltr, Seventh Army GOFs to CINCEUR, 19 Jun 52, sub: Designation of Civil Affairs Officers. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. I, Item 3B atchd.

⁸⁰Ltr, EUCOM GOFs to CG Seventh Army, 31 Jul 52, sub: Designation of Civil Affairs Officers. 310.6 CAD. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. I, Item 3B atchd.

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EUCOM Land relations officers assumed the powers formerly conferred on the Land commissioners by the HICOG hunting and fishing ordinances.⁸¹

f. Establishment of the Land Relations Offices. In view of the semiautonomous position of the various Laender in relation to the Federal Republic of Germany, Land level liaison was considered important by EUCOM. It was anticipated that the importance of this liaison would increase as a result of EUCOM's augmented troop program and the proposed formation of German defense forces. In addition, military liaison would become more sensitive with the increased sovereignty enjoyed by the German Government under the contractual agreements, requiring the U.S. forces to substitute co-operation, negotiation, and persuasion for the exercise of authority. Included among the functions which would be performed at the Land level were the following: (1) co-ordination of matters affecting emergency planning, since German public safety agencies were co-ordinated at the Land level through the Federal Minister of the Interior; (2) keeping military post commanders informed and advised of German policy effected at the Land level as it affected the military; (3) assisting in effecting co-ordination between the military posts and German Land governmental officials and agencies; (4) assistance to the designated representatives of exempted air installations under the Twelfth Air Force within the Land; (5) keeping EUCOM informed regarding the operational effectiveness of military liaison activities within the Land, and fostering the successful accomplishment of these activities through established personal contacts with pertinent German officials and agencies of the Land and Regierungsbezirk level; and (6) informing and advising EUCOM of actual and proposed infringements by the German Land governmental officials on the rights of the Forces established by the contractual agreements.⁸² By agreement between the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany and EUCOM, two officers were assigned to each of the Land capitals at Munich, Stuttgart, and Wiesbaden in preparation for the assumption of civil affairs (U.S. military-German relations) at Land level.⁸³ On 1 July 1952 EUCOM Land relations offices were opened in the Land capitals of the three Laender comprising the U.S. Zone of Germany.⁸⁴

⁸¹Ltr, CINCEUR to Mr. Sam Reber, Act HICOG, 17 Jun 52, sub: Scope of Military Liaison Assumed by EUCOM. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. I, Item 12A atchd.

⁸²Memo, Dir EUCOM CAD to EUCOM COFS, 14 Feb 52, sub: Planning for the Establishment of a Military Post S-5 Organization. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. I, Item 3B atchd.

⁸³C/N 1, Dir EUCOM CAD to EUCOM DCOFS Admin, 13 Jun 52, sub: Quarters for EUCOM Land Relations Officers. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 620 (1952). Vol. II, Item 25A.

⁸⁴C/N 1, Dir EUCOM CAD to All EUCOM Stf Divs, 9 Jul 52, sub: Establishment of EUCOM LRO's in Bavaria, Baden-Wuerttemberg and Hesse. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. II, Item 18.

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g. Establishment of the HICOG Military Relations Offices. HICOG announced on 2 June 1952 that the consuls general would be designated as the Land commissioners for the various Laender from 1 July 1952 until the effective date of the contractual agreements. While it was the intention of HICOG to relieve the consuls general to the maximum extent possible of the operational responsibility for functions previously conducted by the Land commissioners, the consuls general were instructed to make available to EUCOM whatever assistance that the command might require in dealing with the German public as well as with the Land governments and the local officials. For this purpose HICOG established military relations offices in each of the consulates concerned.⁸⁵ In addition, HICOG in September created the Civil-Military Relations Office in the HICOG Office of the Deputy High Commissioner. This office was responsible to the Deputy U.S. High Commissioner for discharging the following functions: (1) served as a channel for co-ordinating relations between EUCOM and the German Federal governmental authorities when requested to do so by either party, particularly in those matters in which the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany had final authority; (2) handled all matters of interest to EUCOM which might be referred to HICOG and which did not fall specifically under the purview of any other HICOG functional office or division, e.g., co-ordinating relationships between EUCOM and German governmental authorities concerning military requirements in the fields of requisitioning real estate, chlorination of water, the establishing of hunting and fishing policies for Allied personnel, and other related activities; (3) acted in a liaison capacity to provide for co-ordination of those functions of the military relations offices of the American consulates general which might be of direct interest to EUCOM; (4) co-ordinated the handling of all questions arising in the field of U.S. military-German relations which might be referred to HICOG headquarters by EUCOM, the German Government, or the consulates, and which fell within the specific fields of responsibility of two or more HICOG offices or divisions; and (5) informed the Deputy U.S. High Commissioner of the status of U.S. military-German relations.⁸⁶ (Chart 18.)

h. Assumption of Responsibility for Hunting and Fishing. Prior to the closing of the offices of the Land commissioners and the abolition of the Kreis resident officer positions by HICOG, Mr. McCloy reassigned to EUCOM, effective 5 June, the functions previously performed by those

⁸⁵ Ltr, Mr. Sam Reber, Act HICOG, to Gen T. T. Handy, CINCEUR, 2 Jun 52, sub: Scope of Military Liaison. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. I, Item 23A atchd.

⁸⁶ HICOG Stf Announcement No. 338, 6 Sep 52, sub: Establishment of Civil-Military Relations Office. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. II, Item 23A atchd.


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officials under HICOG Ordinances No. 11 (Fishing Code for Occupation Personnel) and No. 15 (Hunting Code for Occupation Personnel). Mr. McCloy transferred to EUCOM headquarters effective 1 July 1952, the powers conferred on the Land commissioners under these ordinances and he requested the minister presidents of the Laender within the U.S. Zone to deal with the appropriate EUCOM agencies in all matters relating to hunting and fishing after the transfer.⁸⁷

214. Liaison with the Federal Republic of Germany at Bonn

In anticipation of the completion of the contractual agreements the EUCOM Civil Affairs Division prepared a study of the liaison functions being performed by the EUCOM staff divisions with the Federal Republic and HICOG at Bonn and the possible requirements for liaison with the ambassador's office and the Federal Republic. The purpose of this study was to make recommendations as to the best method for maintaining liaison between EUCOM and the Federal Republic after the contractual agreements were signed and to examine the need for establishing a EUCOM liaison office at Bonn.⁸⁸ The Civil Affairs Division concluded in its study that there were several workable methods of maintaining and conducting liaison at Bonn, all of which envisaged the conducting of liaison by the same personnel with both the ambassador and the Federal Republic. The most feasible method was that of liaison conducted independently by each staff division, as in the past. Under this method the interested staff division requiring information or coordination at Bonn on some specific problem would seek out the most appropriate agency to contact, either at the ambassador's office or in the Federal Government. The principal advantage of this method lay in the freedom allowed to each division in executing staff liaison. The principal disadvantages lay in the possibilities for unco-ordinated action, duplication, lack of unity in presenting requirements, and differences in interpretation of policy.⁸⁹ The EUCOM chief of staff on 20 May 1952 approved the plan for the conduct of liaison at Bonn independently by each staff division and directed that it be adopted.⁹⁰

⁸⁷Ltr, Mr. J. J. McCloy, HICOG, to Gen T. T. Handy, CINCEUR, 26 May 52, sub: Assumption of Responsibility by EUCOM for Administering Hunting and Fishing Codes. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. I, Item 12A atchd.

⁸⁸C/N 1, EUCOM DCOFS Opns to Dir EUCOM CAD, 1 May 52, sub: Liaison at Bonn. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322.01 (1952), Vol. I, Item 16A-1 atchd.

⁸⁹Memo, Dir EUCOM CAD to EUCOM DCOFS Opns, 9 May 52, sub: Liaison at Bonn. SECRET. In file cited above.

⁹⁰C/N 3, EUCOM COFS to Dir EUCOM CAD, 20 May 52, to C/N 1, EUCOM DCOFS Opns to Dir EUCOM CAD, 1 May 52, cited above. SECRET.

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215. EUCOM/USAREUR German-American Advisory Councils

In an effort to find a method of improving German-American relations, General Eddy, then Commanding General, U.S. Seventh Army, suggested to EUCOM in April 1952 that the Army Advisory Committee Program which had been in effect throughout the United States for approximately four years might have its counterpart in furthering better relations with the German people. The goal of advisory committees would be the promotion of mutual assistance and understanding between the U.S. authorities and the German people. Nearly every field of interest could be aired at committee meetings and many problems could be resolved at the local level. General Handy, on the other hand, believed that the establishment of official liaison through the military post and subpost S-5 program and the EUCOM Land relations officer program was sufficient for the time being. He did, however, instruct the director of the Civil Affairs Division, EUCOM, to co-ordinate with the Seventh Army civil affairs officer in preparing recommendations and plans on General Eddy's proposal.⁹¹

a. Make-up of the German-American Advisory Councils. On the basis of its findings the EUCOM Civil Affairs Division recommended the creation of German-American councils of three different types on three different levels. The most numerous would be the local level councils which would be composed of the following types of members; (1) German Kreis and city or town officials; (2) representatives of business, industry and labor, religion, education, and other appropriate civic leaders; (3) post and/or subpost commanders; (4) Seventh Army senior lodger unit commanders; (5) local S-5 officers; (6) post or subpost public information office; (7) chaplain; (8) provost marshal; (9) appropriate U.S. Air Force representatives located within the area; and (10) appropriate U.S. Navy representatives located within the area. For each of the four Laender within the U.S. area of authority, Land level councils should be created, composed of the following types of members; (1) the Land minister president and/or such representatives as he might designate; (2) corps commander if the headquarters was located within the Land; (3) army division commanders if such headquarters were located within the Land; (4) all military post commanders located within the Land; (5) the U.S. consul general located within the Land; (6) the EUCOM Land relations officer; and (7) the public information office at the Munich, Stuttgart, or Frankfurt Military Post as appropriate. Finally, there should be a Federal-EUCOM level council composed of the following types of members: (1) the Federal Chancellor

⁹¹(1) Ltr, Lt Gen M. S. Eddy, CG Seventh Army, to Gen T. T. Handy, CINCEUR, 24 Apr 52, sub: German-American Relations. CONFIDENTIAL.
(2) Ltr, Gen T. T. Handy, CINCEUR, to Lt Gen M. S. Eddy, CG Seventh Army, 14 May 52, same sub. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1952), Vol. I, Item 7A-1 atchd.

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and/or such representatives as he might designate; (2) the Commander in Chief, EUCOM; (3) the Commanding General, Seventh Army; (4) the Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force; (5) the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Germany; (6) the Director, Civil Affairs Division, EUCOM; (7) the Political Adviser, EUCOM; and (8) the Chief, Public Information Division, EUCOM.⁹² At the end of June machinery was set in motion to create the various councils defined in the proposals.⁹³

b. Co-operation of Seventh Army and HICOG. General Handy informed Mr. McCloy in July that he believed that the State Department personnel stationed throughout the U.S. Zone of Germany were in a position to make a positive contribution to the success of the proposed program and that, with Mr. McCloy's approval, he desired to extend invitations to appropriate State Department officials to participate in the German-American councils proposed for their areas. He also requested the support of the U.S. High Commissioner in obtaining the best possible German representation at all levels on the councils.⁹⁴ Mr. Walter Donnelly, who replaced Mr. J. J. McCloy as U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, indicated wholehearted approval of the EUCOM proposal. He expressed his belief that, on the basis of previous HICOG experience, the local groups were the most important and expressed his hope that it could be made clear to the German members that the local councils would be entirely independent of control by the councils formed at higher levels. He added that he was requesting the consuls general at Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Munich, and Bremen to assist EUCOM officers in every way possible in bringing about effective councils, and suggested that the consuls general, as well as their military relations officers and public affairs officers, would be available not only for membership on the proposed councils but for such other assistance as they might be able to render to EUCOM in setting up and operating the program.⁹⁵ General Handy also urged General Eddy, to impress upon the senior tactical commanders of the Seventh Army the importance which he, General Handy, attached to this program.⁹⁶ General Eddy replied that

⁹²C/N 1, Dir EUCOM CAD to EUCOM COFS, 24 Jun 52, sub: German-American Advisory Councils. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

⁹³C/N 2, EUCOM SGS to Dir EUCOM CAD, 30 Jun 52, to C/N 1, Dir EUCOM CAD to EUCOM COFS, 24 Jun 52, cited above.

⁹⁴Ltr, Gen T. T. Handy, CINCEUR, to Mr. J. J. McCloy, HICOG, 15 Jul 52, sub cited above. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

⁹⁵Ltr, Mr. Walter J. Donnelly, HICOG, to Gen T. T. Handy, CINCEUR/CINCUSAREUR, 6 Aug 52, sub: German-American Advisory Councils. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1952), Vol. II, Item 53 atchd.

⁹⁶Ltr, Gen T. T. Handy, CINCEUR, to Lt Gen M. S. Eddy, CG Seventh Army, 15 Jul 52. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1952), Vol. I, Item 7A-1 atchd.

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since the program had followed from a Seventh Army suggestion it had already been discussed fully at previous conferences of Seventh Army senior tactical commanders. He assured General Handy that he would again personally bring it to the attention of his commanders and that he was having the contents of General Handy's letter incorporated into a directive to all Seventh Army commanders down to, and including, company level.⁹⁷

c. German Reaction to the Federal Level Council. When the invitation to form a Federal level council was transmitted to the Federal Chancellor by HICOG, it was received with some hesitancy on the part of the Germans. The proposal to include some members of the legislative branch of the government on the Federal level council raised the question of legislative invasion of the executive field and Chancellor Adenauer decided to discuss the matter with the Federal Cabinet before giving an answer. Mr. Donnelly took the position that USAREUR would have to take into account the jealousy between the legislative and executive branches and make some provision to adapt the plan to fit the circumstances.⁹⁸ General Eddy, who had meanwhile assumed command of USAREUR, informed Mr. Donnelly that he intended to hold in abeyance the first meeting of the USAREUR Federal level council until the local and Land level councils had been functioning long enough to indicate that common problems might merit discussion at the Federal level. Since this provided a solution to the problem of the Federal level councils for the time being, the suggestion met with the approval of Mr. Donnelly, who felt that the experience gained from the local level meetings would be invaluable in determining how Federal level meetings could most profitably be conducted.⁹⁹

d. Problems Discussed. By 1 November 1952 a total of fifty-four German-American councils had been formed at the various levels and had held one or more meetings each, with the result that USAREUR could draw the following conclusions from the findings of the meetings. The open and frank discussions of problems at these meetings had resulted in

⁹⁷Ltr, Lt Gen M. S. Eddy, to Gen T. T. Handy, 25 Jul 52, sub: German-American Advisory Councils. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1952), Vol. II, Item 53 atchd.

⁹⁸Ltr, Mr. Walter J. Donnelly, HICOG, to Gen T. T. Handy, CINCUSAREUR/ CINCUSAREUR, 6 Aug 52, cited above.

⁹⁹(1) Ltr, Lt Gen M. S. Eddy, CINCUSAREUR, to Mr. Walter J. Donnelly, HICOG, 15 Aug 52, sub: German-American Advisory Councils. UNCLASSIFIED.
(2) Ltr, Mr. Walter J. Donnelly to Lt Gen M. S. Eddy, 6 Sep 52, same sub. UNCLASSIFIED. Both in file cited above.

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the undertaking of positive programs for the purpose of bettering German-American relations in such fields as religious services, recreational activities, festivals, historical and educational tours, Christmas charities, and other worthwhile programs. The co-operation of local authorities with the post commanders could be measured in such diverse activities as venereal disease control, traffic control, removal of obsolete commercial and military signs, and joint participation in sports activities. The area of greatest friction in council meeting discussions was that involving requisitioned property. The problem next in importance was the damage inflicted on roads and property by military vehicles. While it was agreed that there would always be some damage resulting from tanks, it was felt that the open discussion of this problem at council meetings was doing much to reduce the number of incidents and the extent of damage. Rumors concerning property releases and/or new requisitions of property and allegations that requisitioned buildings were unoccupied were other sources of dissatisfaction to the Germans. The reports of the various council meetings made it evident that the German dissatisfaction originated to a certain extent in gross misrepresentations of USAREUR policy in the German newspapers. Councils which referred frictional problems to subcommittees for presentation of findings to the council seemed to have had the best results. Similarly, informal meetings between the German authorities and subpost commanders were effective in solving problems of mutual interest.¹⁰⁰

216. Requisition of Property

The continued exercise of the power of requisition of real property for use by the Forces constituted a most important problem in German-American relations. The EUCOM/USAREUR troop augmentation program necessitated an increase in the number of casernes in use by the U.S. forces, while the tactical requirements of SHAPE and NATO resulted in the relocation of airfields and supply depots, the creation of new training areas, and other changes involving the need for real properties. Since EUCOM had announced its policy of refraining from the requisition of living quarters for dependents even though the size of the U.S. forces was increasing, a potential cause for friction was removed.¹⁰¹ The retention of previously requisitioned dependent-type living quarters, however, remained a bone of contention with the German people, notwithstanding the fact that the consulate general at Munich had furnished figures to the German press proving that for every dwelling unit occupied by American

¹⁰⁰C/N 1, Dir USAREUR CAD to USAREUR COFS, 13 Nov 52, sub: Report on the German-American Advisory Council Program. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1952), Vol. III, Item 108.

¹⁰¹EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, p. 393. SECRET.

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dependents of members of the U.S. forces, the United States had provided two new dwelling units through monetary aid to the Federal Republic.¹⁰²

a. German Demands. Since the question of the requisition of real property for the use of troops concerned with the defense of Western Germany and Western Europe was of paramount interest to the German people during 1952, the Bundestag of the Federal Republic decided that the conduct of negotiations for contractual agreements to replace the Occupation Statute provided an opportunity to alter the existing requisitioning procedure in the Federal Republic. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundestag on 2 April 1952 presented a resolution to the Bundestag calling for the opening of negotiations with the Three Powers on the question of requisitioning and for placing control of the program in the hands of the Federal Government rather than in the hands of the Allied High Commission where it rested at that time.¹⁰³ The Bundestag on 4 April adopted a modified version of the Foreign Affairs Committee resolution to the effect that the following provisions be obtained through negotiations with the three occupation powers: (1) that requisitions of real estate as well as government and privately owned buildings by the occupation powers for the construction of airfields, for troop training areas, and for the accommodation of troops, be undertaken through Federal agencies and only with the approval of these agencies; and (2) that requisitions be distributed evenly throughout the Federal Republic. The resolution was transmitted to HICOG with a request for immediate approval for undertaking the desired negotiations.¹⁰⁴

b. HICOG View. The HICOG reply reminded the Federal Republic that the procedure for requisition of real property insured close consultation between U.S. and German authorities at both Land and Federal levels. Reasoning that it was unwise to upset a system which worked so well, until after the changes resulting from the ratification of the contractual agreements had been made, HICOG stated that it desired to continue the existing procedure during the interim period.¹⁰⁵ At the time of the transfer of military liaison functions from HICOG to EUCOM in mid-1952,

¹⁰²C/N 1, Dir USAREUR CAD to USAREUR COFS, 13 Nov 52, cited above.

¹⁰³C/N 1, EUCOM POLAD to EUCOM SGS, 17 Apr 52, sub: Bundestag Action of Interest to EUCOM. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 601 (1952), Vol. I, Item 34.

¹⁰⁴Ltr, Herr Theodore Blank, Rep of Fed Chancellor for Matters Connected with Increase of Allied Trps, to Mr. Zinn Garrett, Sp Asst to U.S. High Commissioner for Laender Opns, 12 May 52, sub: Requisition of Property. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. I, Item 12A atchd.

¹⁰⁵Ltr, Mr Z. Garrett to Herr T. Blank, 28 May 52, sub: Requisition of Real Property. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

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EUCOM raised the question of possible changes in the procedure for the requisitioning of real property. In reply, HICOG notified General Handy that the authority to acquire real property by requisition would not be relinquished before the entry into force of the contractual agreements. After 1 July 1952 all negotiations for real property would be conducted by EUCOM directly with the Land authorities rather than through the Land commissioners as previously. If EUCOM should be unable to reach an agreement with the Laender authorities, or if consultation with the Federal Government was required, EUCOM was authorized to deal directly with the appropriate Federal agency. If EUCOM desired the assistance of HICOG in these relations with the Federal Government, the office of the military relations officer would always be available.¹⁰⁶

c. Increase in Holdings. For the first time in several years there was an increase in the number of active property requisitions by EUCOM, resulting mainly from the implementation of the EUCOM troop augmentation program, for which all planning and property requisitioning was practically completed by mid-1952. On 30 June 1952 EUCOM was holding a total of 30,529 active property requisitions as opposed to 23,797 on 31 July 1951, constituting a net increase of some 6,732 property holdings. During this period, EUCOM had derequisitioned 2,223 properties, and had acquired a total of 8,955 properties through new requisitions. Of the 7,298 new requisitions reported in statistics available for the period in question, 6,883 consisted of parcels of open land acquired for use by the U.S. Forces, and only 415 of other types of property. Because of the political repercussions that might follow the release of information with regard to property requisitions, particularly in view of the considerable increase in their number, EUCOM regarded it as unwise to publicize its property requisitioning program.¹⁰⁷

217. Evacuation of Requisitioned Casernes by the Germans

The EUCOM troop augmentation program necessitated the recovery of a number of casernes under requisition to the U.S. forces but loaned for German use until they might be needed again. The original conditions of the loan had stated that they would be returned to U.S. military control by the Germans when and if they were desired for use by the U.S. forces. Delay in the troop augmentation program during 1951 resulted in deferment of the reacquisition of 25 of the 52 casernes requested from the Germans. These 25 were deferred to 1 April 1952, or sooner, upon 60-day notice.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶Ltr, Mr. Sam Reber, Act HICOG to Gen T. T. Handy, CINCEUR, sub: Scope of Military Liaison. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 HICOG (1952), Vol. I, Item 12A atchd.

¹⁰⁷C/N 1, Dir EUCOM Log Div to EUCOM DCOFS Admin, 18 Jul 52, sub: News Article on Derequisitioning. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 602 (1952), Vol. II, Item 33A.

¹⁰⁸EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 393 - 94. SECRET.

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Not all of the undeferred 27 casernes were turned over by the German Government on schedule. For example, the date for evacuation of the Rhine Caserne at Biebrich, originally set at 7 February, was extended by the EUCOM Logistics Division to 15 February. The German Government, however, complained that this was not in keeping with the original agreement of a 60-day notice and requested extension of the evacuation deadline to 15 May, ninety days after the deadline set by USAREUR.¹⁰⁹ Since this caserne was not one of the 25 deferred by EUCOM until 1 April and subject to a 60-day evacuation notice, EUCOM refused to honor the German request. The evacuation of this caserne had previously been co-ordinated with the Land commissioner for Hesse and no objections had been raised by the government of Land Hesse. Provision of suitable alternate housing for the displaced persons occupying the caserne was the responsibility of the Federal Government but no alternate housing had been provided within the evacuation deadline since the West German Government felt that EUCOM should not expect the return of casernes needed for emergency housing, even though they were confiscated property subject to U.S. control. EUCOM, however, refused to accept the German reasoning and insisted on compliance with the reacquisition measures.¹¹⁰

218. Derequisitioning of Property

Because the number of active property requisitions held by EUCOM had greatly increased in the period 31 July 1951 - 30 June 1952, EUCOM considered it neither prudent nor timely to release information to the German press regarding derequisitioning of German property during the same period. This attitude was contrary to previous EUCOM policy to publicize the derequisitioning program as widely as possible. Property derequisitions in the period 1 January 1948 - 30 June 1952 numbered 9,589. Derequisitions accomplished by EUCOM in the period 31 July 1951 - 30 June 1952 are shown in the following table:¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹Cable 305, HICOG Bonn to CINCEUR, 25 Feb 52. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 601 (1952), Vol. I, Item 24 atchd.

¹¹⁰Cable S-2706, CINCEUR to HICOG Bonn, 28 Feb 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

¹¹¹C/N 1, Dir EUCOM Log Div to EUCOM DCOFS Admin, 18 Jul 52, sub: News Article on Derequisitioning. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 602 (1952), Vol. II, Item 33A.

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Properties Released or Partially Released
(1 August 1951 - 30 June 1952)

<u>Total</u>	<u>2,223</u>
Private homes	983
Apartment houses	56
Hotels	33
Schools	14
Casernes and barracks type buildings	167
Warehouses	21
Shops	21
Offices	153
Garages	78
Restaurants	36
Theaters	18
Factories and factory buildings	27
Hospitals and hospital buildings	28
Miscellaneous commercial	155
Other types	433

219. Use of Casernes by German Police

A problem fraught with political implications was presented to EUCOM in April 1952 when it was discovered that units of the Federal Border Police (Bundesgrenzschutz) had illegally taken possession of Luttensee Caserne, Mittenwald, in Garmisch Military Post. This caserne had been under International Refugee Organization control and with the phase-out of that organization should have been evacuated and returned to the control of Garmisch Military Post. Prior to 1 April, however, and while the caserne was still under nominal control of IRO, the German police units had moved into the caserne without obtaining proper EUCOM authority. Although EUCOM policy during the augmentation program provided for the retention of all caserne type facilities, the problem was complicated by the fact that EUCOM had no present or foreseeable future plans for the use of the caserne, and, while the German police units could be evicted with the aid of HICOG, EUCOM would be liable to severe criticism if the caserne was not used for military purposes within a short period of time.¹¹² Because of the unusual circumstances, the EUCOM Logistics Division recommended immediate

¹¹²Memo, Dir EUCOM Log Div to EUCOM COFS, 24 Apr 52, sub: Luttensee Kaserne, Mittenwald. AG 602 GLD. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 602 (1952), Vol. I, Item 23A-1.

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release of the property to the West German Government. On 3 June 1952 Garmisch Military Post was directed to take steps to release the caserne to the German authorities as soon as possible under the provisions of EUCOM Circular 37.¹¹³

220. Joint German-American Use of Farge POL Depot

Late in 1951, the president of the senate of Land Bremen and the Land commissioner for Land Bremen proposed to the commanding officer of the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation a program for joint utilization of facilities at the Farge POL Depot in Bremerhaven by the United States and the German Federal Republic. In January 1952 the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation referred the proposal to EUCOM for consideration. The Commander of the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation pointed out that the existing facilities at Farge POL Depot were far in excess of the U.S. military requirements but that the proposed plan involved complications which had not been noted by its proponents.¹¹⁴ Prior to Germany's surrender the Farge POL Depot had been the property of the Wirtschaftliche Forschungsgesellschaft, commonly known as WIFO, an agency of the Third Reich. Under international law it was adjudged public property subject to use by the U.S. forces without liability for compensation.¹¹⁵ Several conferences were held between representatives of HICOG, EUCOM, WIFO, and the West German Government to discuss plans for the joint use of the Farge Depot. In April, Dr. Spitta, acting president of the senate for Land Bremen, notified HICOG that WIFO was ready to agree to a proposal which would prevent a division of the Farge Depot and leave the operation of the depot in the hands of EUCOM. The plan provided that a total capacity of 140,000 cubic meters of tank space, or seven container blocks, would be made available for use by the Germans. The storage and discharge operations would be performed by EUCOM in return for a fee to be negotiated between WIFO and EUCOM. EUCOM would have the entire depot, including the seven container blocks allotted to WIFO, at its disposition at all times.¹¹⁶ After extensive study of the problem USAREUR notified

¹¹³(1) C/N 1, EUCOM SGS to Dir EUCOM Log Div, 3 Jun 53, sub: Luttensee Kaserne, Mittenwald. RESTRICTED. (2) Cable SX-5850, CINCEUR to Garmisch Mil Post, 3 Jun 52. RESTRICTED. Both in USAREUR SGS 602 (1952), Vol. I, Item 23A-1 atchd.

¹¹⁴Ltr, CO BPE, to CINCEUR, 19 Jan 52, sub: Division of Farge POL Depot. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 602 (1952), Vol. I, Item 7B.

¹¹⁵C/N 3, EUCOM JA to EUCOM QM, 16 Jul 52, to C/N 1, EUCOM Compt to EUCOM QM, 9 Jul 52, sub: Farge POL Depot (BPE). RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 602 (1952), Vol. I, Item 7B atchd.

¹¹⁶Ltr, Dr. Spitta, Act Pres of Senate, Land Bremen, to RAdm C. R. Jeffs, LC for Bremen, 23 Apr 52, sub: Joint German-American Use of Farge POL Depot. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

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the commander of the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation on 16 September 1952 that it had given favorable consideration to providing the Federal Republic of Germany with the use of no more than eighteen of the one million gallon capacity tanks at the Farge POL Depot on a service charge basis. USAREUR, however, did not consider it practicable or in the best interest of the U. S. Government to subdivide the facility for use by two or more agencies.¹¹⁷

221. Relations with the Federal Housing Agency (Bundesbauverwaltung)

Upon request of the Federal Finance Minister, Mr. McCloy in June 1952 sent a personal letter to Brig. Gen. J. J. Binns, EUCOM comptroller, requesting that EUCOM permit the German Federal Housing Agency to compete with other bidders for current EUCOM construction.¹¹⁸ A conference was held soon after in Heidelberg between representatives of the Bundesbauverwaltung and the EUCOM Engineer Division in an effort to reach general agreement on a practical approach to the development of procedures for handling construction pursuant to the terms of the contractual agreements. It was agreed that several projects, both housing and other types, should be selected and assigned to the Bundesbauverwaltung, thus complying with Mr. McCloy's request, and providing test cases for the development of procedures necessary to implement the provisions of the contractual agreements.¹¹⁹

222. Water Supply Problems for Cantonment Camp, Frankfurt Military Post

In order to comply with SHAPE directives for the strategic placing of troops, EUCOM/USAREUR planned to locate a regimental combat team near Friedberg and for this purpose undertook construction of a cantonment camp at Kirch Goens near Butzbach in Frankfurt Military Post. To provide a water supply for the camp, which was planned for occupancy by 1 January 1953, Frankfurt Military Post requested authority to acquire three acres of land for the drilling of eight wells, plus easement rights for electric lines and pipelines. On 10 September 1952 the government of Land Hesse rejected the request of Frankfurt Military Post on the grounds

¹¹⁷1st Ind, Hq USAREUR to CO BPE, 16 Sep 52, sub: Division of Farge POL Depot. AG 322 CQM (19 Jan 52). CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

¹¹⁸C/N 1, EUCOM COFS to Dir EUCOM Log Div, 11 Jun 52, sub: Bidding on Construction Projects. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1952), Vol. II, Item 59.

¹¹⁹C/N 3, EUCOM Engr Div to EUCOM Log Div, 25 Jun 52, to C/N 1, EUCOM COFS to Dir EUCOM Log Div, 11 Jun 52, cited above. Item 59 atchd.

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that the Land geologists had determined that the drilling of the proposed wells would deprive the local communities of their water supply, since the water bearing strata of the area were insufficient to cover the increased demands. As a counterproposal the government of Land Hesse requested that USAREUR contribute DM 7.5 million to expand the existing water works at Allendorf, including a 40-mile pipeline which would serve a number of communities including Marburg, Giessen, Butzbach, and, incidentally, Camp Kirch Goens. The USAREUR engineers disagreed with the German geologists with regard to the available water supply and estimated that the desired wells would cost DM 750,000 as contrasted to the DM 7.5 million required for the plan proposed by Land Hesse.¹²⁰ Since the plan for the expansion of the Allendorf water works dated back to 1938 and since USAREUR believed that the Land Hesse officials were attempting to obtain USAREUR financial participation in a public utility expansion which would have to be accomplished in any event, USAREUR requested aid in the matter from HICOG. The Land Hesse request was contrary to the HICOM regulation which stated that expenditures on public services including water supplies were normally the responsibility of the German authorities and were not chargeable as occupation costs or mandatory expenditures even in cases in which the Allied authorities themselves ordered the execution of the service. HICOG agreed to take up the matter with the Federal Government at Bonn.¹²¹

a. Federal Government Proposals. Although the government of Land Hesse refused to withdraw its objections to the proposed USAREUR water project, the Federal Chancellery on 4 November offered a plan for solving the problem. According to this plan, the Federal Chancellery would not oppose the USAREUR action and would use its good offices in keeping the protests of Hesse officials and newspapers at a minimum, provided USAREUR agreed to certain conditions. USAREUR would have to undertake the necessary drilling at its own risk and in the event the wells were inadequate, USAREUR would agree not to demand additional water. USAREUR would agree to ration the supply of water to the cantonment area whenever it appeared that its use was creating a water shortage for the neighboring communities. If rationing and other water saving measures failed to prevent such shortages and if it could be conclusively proven that such shortages were due directly to the USAREUR project, USAREUR would agree to undertake at its own expense the least costly measures to restore a normal supply of

¹²⁰Memo, Dir USAREUR Log Div to CINCUSAREUR, 8 Oct 52, sub: Acquisition of Sites for Wells, Water Pipes, and Power Lines. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1952), Vol. I, B/P 10, Item 6.

¹²¹(1) HICOM Reg P-64 (final), Addendum No. 1, 25 Apr 52. (2) Ltr, Lt Gen M. S. Eddy, CINCUSAREUR, to Mr. W. J. Donnelly, HICOG, 23 Sep 52, sub: Water Supply for Camp Kirch Goens. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1952), Vol. I, B/P 10, Item 6. (3) Ltr, Mr. W. J. Donnelly, to Lt Gen M. S. Eddy, 25 Sep 52, sub: Sites for Water Wells at Camp Kirch Goens. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 602 (1952), Vol. II, Item 49 atchd.

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water to the affected communities. This last provision did not mean acceptance of the Hesse proposal to join in the Allendorf project, but that, if the USAREUR wells actually drained off the water from the surrounding communities, USAREUR would have to remedy the situation either by bringing in its own water supply from a different source, or by some other measure.¹²²

b. USAREUR Acceptance of the Federal Proposal. USAREUR agreed to provide the assurances requested by the Federal Chancellery, with one exception. Instead of the German phrasing, "restore normal supply of water," in the event of a water failure in the surrounding communities, USAREUR substituted the phrase "to take the least expensive measures to preserve the water supply equivalent to that which existed immediately prior to the initiation of the USAREUR project." This gave both the German Government and USAREUR the assurances each desired in the carrying out of the project.¹²³

223. Custody of War Criminals

The custody of German war criminals convicted by the Allied War Crimes Tribunal and by military and military government courts after the end of World War II, continued to constitute a serious problem in German-American relations in 1952. Because of the negotiations in progress between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany for the development of contractual agreements, the problem assumed even greater importance than before. The Federal Government consistently refused to recognize the validity of the War Crimes Tribunals and had granted numerous privileges to the convicted war criminals, indicating that the government regarded them as prisoners of war rather than as convicted criminals.¹²⁴

a. Status of War Criminals, 1 January 1952. As of 1 January 1952, there was a total of 487 prisoners confined in EUCOM War Crimes Prison No. 1 at Landsberg. Four hundred and twenty of these prisoners were convicted war criminals, either sentenced by military courts and under the jurisdiction of the Commander in Chief, EUCOM, or convicted by military

¹²²Cable 386, HICOG Bonn to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Nov 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 602 (1952), Vol. II, Item 49 atchd.

¹²³Cable S-5071, CINCUSAREUR to HICOG Bonn, 10 Nov 52. SECRET. In file cited above.

¹²⁴Memo, EUCOM JA to CINCEUR, 16 Jan 52, sub: Recommended Position of the Future Status of War Criminals and the Administration of Landsberg Prison No. 1. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 000.5 (1952), Vol. I, Item 2A atchd.

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b. Token Release Proposal. Chancellor Adenauer proposed to Mr. McCloy on 11 June 1952 that a token release of war criminals would be of great help to him in gaining support for ratification of the contractual agreements.¹²⁶ The refusal to accede to this proposal led to intimations in official German circles that the U.S. authorities had adopted a policy of refusing consideration of all further clemency cases pending the creation of the tribunals provided for under the contractual agreements. Neither General Handy nor Mr. McCloy believed that a general review of all cases was appropriate at that time in view of the exhaustive review which they had completed just before the end of 1951. Mr. McCloy informed Chancellor Adenauer of this decision but assured him that both he (Mr. McCloy) and General Handy were prepared at any time to consider any particular case on the basis of any new facts which could warrant the granting of clemency.¹²⁷

125(1) Ibid. (2) EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 379 - 82. SECRET.

127(1) Ltr, J. J. McCloy, HICOG, to Chancellor Adenauer, 3 Jul 52, sub: Clemency for War Criminals. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 000.5 (1952), Vol. II, Item 47 atchd. (2) EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 379 - 82. SECRET.

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officially approved by USAREUR on 5 December 1952 and instructions were issued to the director of the Landsberg prison to effect the release of the fifteen prisoners in a staggered sequence. The initial release was to commence upon the receipt of the USAREUR directive and the final release was to be effected on or before 22 December 1952. Effective upon the date of release of each prisoner, his sentence of confinement would be deemed to have been reduced to time served. Although HICOG desired that the Christmas clemency program be publicized, USAREUR directed that every effort be made to avoid publicity of any kind in connection with the USAREUR portion of the program.¹²⁹

224. Proposals for the Creation of the Mixed Clemency Board

While the contractual agreements provided for the creation of a mixed clemency board to administer clemency matters for all persons convicted by Allied courts within the Federal Republic of Germany, the German legal barriers to the transfer of custody of war criminals (described in par. 202b) created the opinion among the Three Powers that the mixed board should not become operative until these legal barriers were removed and custody was actually assumed by the Federal Republic. In any event the mixed clemency board was not to become operative until the effective date of the contractual agreements, or until the legal barriers had been removed if that was not done prior to ratification of the contractual agreements.¹³⁰ Nevertheless, Chancellor Adenauer proposed to the Allied High Commission on 16 September 1952 that the mixed board be created and that it be empowered not only to recommend clemency measures for war criminals but to review convictions in these cases as well.¹³¹

a. French Objections. Mr. A. Francois Poncet, the French High Commissioner and chairman of the Allied High Commission, replied to Chancellor Adenauer's proposal that he could not accept any arrangements under which the proposed mixed board would be empowered to review the convictions of German war criminals. He could not give any assurance that the French Government would agree to the creation or operation of

¹²⁹(1) C/N 1, USAREUR JA to USAREUR DCOFS Admin, 5 Dec 52, sub: Xmas Clemency for War Crimes Prisoners. RESTRICTED. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to Dir, War Crimes Prison No. 1, 6 Dec 52, sub: Xmas Clemency. RESTRICTED. Both in USAREUR SGS 000.5 (1952), Vol. II, Item 77 atchd.

¹³⁰Cable, no number, State Dept to HICOG Bonn (3125), 15 May 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 092 Ger (1952), Vol. II, Item 49A atchd.

¹³¹Cable, no number, HICOG Bonn to State Dept (1193), 16 Sep 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1952), Vol. I, B/P 10, Item 2.

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the mixed board prior to ratification of the contractual agreements. The USAREUR Judge Advocate Division reported that the French position was legally sound inasmuch as Article XI of the Convention on General Relations required ratification or approval by all signatory states and the entry into force of the Treaty for the Establishment of the European Defense Community as conditions precedent to the application or enforcement of any of the conditions constituting the contractual agreements.¹³² Notwithstanding the position of the French on this matter and the legal arguments used to support their position, Mr. Walter Donnelly submitted a series of four proposals to General Eddy at the October monthly HICOG-CINCUSAREUR meeting. These four proposals dealt with: (1) immediate establishment of the mixed board; (2) uniform clemency procedures pending ratification and establishment of the mixed board; (3) medical parole for certain ill prisoners; and (4) an increase of time off for good behavior.¹³³

b. USAREUR Objections to the HICOG Proposals. USAREUR raised immediate objections to the HICOG proposals, particularly to the provision for the immediate creation of the mixed clemency board. The USAREUR judge advocate pointed out that there was no legal basis for the creation of the mixed board in advance of the effective date of the contractual agreements and that there was little likelihood that the French would agree to its creation. Unilateral action by the United States would serve no useful purpose. The announcement of the creation of the mixed board would have a favorable political effect in weakening German resistance to the ratification of the contractual agreements, but USAREUR felt that it could not retain jurisdiction of, and responsibility for, the prisoners concerned without the power to exercise clemency. It was the conviction of USAREUR officials that the mixed board should function only when, and if, the Germans accepted full responsibility for the war criminals.¹³⁴

225. Termination of Military Police Customs Units

Mr. McCloy informed General Handy on 27 May that after the ratification of the contractual agreements there would be no basis for the continuation of the export control functions exercised by the EUCOM military police customs units, and that the 7751 Military Police Customs Unit should be relieved of these functions no later than the effective date of the contractual agreements. HICOG would at the earliest suitable

¹³² Memo, USAREUR JA to CINCUSAREUR, 9 Oct 52, sub: Present Position of this Headquarters Relating to War Criminals. SECRET. In file cited above.

¹³³ Memo, USAREUR COFS to CINCUSAREUR, 23 Oct 52, sub: War Criminals. SECRET. In file cited above.

¹³⁴ (1) Ibid. (2) Memo, USAREUR JA to CINCUSAREUR, 9 Oct 52, cited above.

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time co-ordinate with EUCOM concerning the actual timing of this step. With the departure of Mr. McCloy, this arrangement was apparently overlooked, for HICOG informed the State Department on 16 October 1952 that the time had come to terminate, as soon as possible, the USAREUR military police customs activities, and that HICOG intended, unless instructions to the contrary were received from the State Department, to notify USAREUR on 21 October that the military police customs activities would terminate as of 1 November 1952.¹³⁵

a. State Department Instructions. The State Department directed HICOG to postpone action with regard to the termination of military police customs control pending receipt of more detailed instructions from Washington. In the meantime HICOG should discuss the matter with USAREUR and cable USAREUR comments as soon as possible. The proposed conference between USAREUR and HICOG authorities was held at Bonn on 24 October.¹³⁶ HICOG pointed out at the conference that the German customs service was by then efficiently organized and no longer required the support of U.S. military personnel, and that prompt removal of 7751 Military Police Customs Unit personnel would be instrumental in influencing the Germans to ratify the contractual agreements.¹³⁷ The USAREUR representatives made no commitments but suggested that a staff study on the matter be continued and recommendations be made to HICOG at a later date.

b. USAREUR Views. The USAREUR Provost Marshal Division was of the opinion that removal of the U.S. military customs personnel would result in an increase in shipments of restricted materials across the inter-zonal and international borders, but proposed to make use of the personnel of the 7751 Military Police Customs Unit for the customs control of members of the U.S. forces at the international borders of the British and French Zones of Germany in accordance with the terms of the contractual agreements.¹³⁸ Since the new assignment for the military police customs

¹³⁵(1) Ltr, Mr. J. J. McCloy, HICOG, to Gen T. T. Handy, CINCEUR, 27 May 52, sub: Operations of the 7751st MPCU. CONFIDENTIAL. (2) Cable, no number, HICOG Bonn to Secy State (1724), 16 Oct 52. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1952), Vol. I, Item 8; Vol. II, Item 24.

¹³⁶(1) Cable, no number, State Dept to HICOG Bonn (1856), 20 Oct 52. SECRET. (2) C/N 1, USAREUR POLAD to USAREUR P&A Div, 22 Oct 52, sub: Proposed Termination of MP Customs Unit. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1952), Vol. II, Items 24 and 23A atchd.

¹³⁷C/N 5, Dir USAREUR P&A Div to USAREUR DCOFS Admin, 30 Oct 52, to C/N 1, USAREUR POLAD to USAREUR P&A Div, 22 Oct 52, cited above.

¹³⁸C/N 3, USAREUR PM to Dir USAREUR Intel Div, 29 Oct 52, to C/N 1, USAREUR POLAD to USAREUR P&A Div, 22 Oct 52, cited above.

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personnel had previously been approved by CINCUSAREUR on 14 October 1952, the USAREUR Personnel and Administration Division recommended that HICOG be advised that USAREUR had no objections to removing the 7751 Military Police Customs Unit personnel from the eastern inter-zonal and international borders at once. This recommendation was concurred in by USAREUR.¹³⁹

c. Final Decisions. HICOG informed the Department of State on 1 November 1952 that USAREUR had approved the termination of military police export control activity in the Federal Republic of Germany and that HICOG would await final instructions from the State Department on the matter. The State Department approved the HICOG proposal and instructed HICOG to impress upon the authorities of the Federal Republic the fact that the 7751 Military Police Customs Unit was being withdrawn as a result of the widespread improvements in the customs service of the Federal Republic. The Defense Department concurrence in the proposal was forwarded to USAREUR by the Department of the Army with instructions that the spaces saved by the discontinuance of this function would be held without commitment in the operational reserves pending further Department of the Army instructions, unless a justification for other essential requirements was presented by USAREUR.¹⁴⁰

226. Planning for Border Customs Control Under the Contractual Agreements

Preparations for the implementation of the Convention on General Relations and related conventions included planning to accomplish specified changes in the control of German zonal and international frontiers. Paragraph 5 of Article 35 of the "Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany" provided that the Forces should establish frontier crossing points in conjunction with the German customs authorities, to exercise customs control over members of the Forces and their property. From the effective date of the conventions until 30 June 1953 USAREUR could expect the French customs officials to continue to exercise responsibility on behalf of the U.S. forces at the Franco-German border but not at the Luxembourg or Swiss borders in the French Zone. HICOG therefore suggested the placing

¹³⁹C/N 5, USAREUR Dir P&A Div to USAREUR DCOFS Admin, 30 Oct 52, cited above.

¹⁴⁰(1) Cable, no number, HICOG Bonn to State Dept (2020), 1 Nov 52. SECRET. (2) Cable, no number, State Dept to HICOG Bonn (2174), 5 Nov 52. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1952), Vol. II, Item 24 atchd. (3) Cable DA-924003, COFSA from ACOFS G-3 to CINCUSAREUR, 17 Nov 52. SECRET. In same file, Item 27.

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of U.S. customs personnel at points in the French Zone at which substantial numbers of U.S. personnel would cross international borders. HICOG also believed that it would be advantageous to the U.S. forces to establish the customs control at frontier crossing points in the British Zone in order to eliminate potential differences of interpretation between the U.S. and British officials for customs treatment both of official consignments and members of the U.S. forces.¹⁴¹ A USAREUR staff study of the HICOG suggestion recommended that the personnel of the 7751 Military Police Customs Unit be utilized for this purpose after their withdrawal from the eastern interzonal and international borders. The study further recommended that the French and British customs services be utilized as long as possible and that the U.S. forces be prepared to exercise customs control at all the international borders of Germany simultaneously on the effective date of the contracts.¹⁴² General Eddy informed HICOG on 14 October 1952 of his concurrence with the HICOG proposal, and requested HICOG to begin negotiations with German officials to put the proposal into effect as early as possible. He attached a list of locations in the French and British Zones where USAREUR proposed to place U.S. customs personnel and added that he would keep HICOG informed on changes in the list. The proposed customs control points included the following areas (general location -- "H" indicates highway control point and "R" indicates railroad control point): (1) Helmstedt - H & R; (2) Emmerich - R, Heuthum - H, Elton - H, Baberich - H; (3) Aachen - R, Vailserquartier - H, Bildchen - H; (4) Trier area, Wasserbillig - H, Igel - R; (5) Kaiserslautern area, Bruchmuel Bach - R, Vogelbach - H; (6) Strasbourg area, Kehl - H & R; (7) Basel - R, Weil - H; (8) Schaffhausen - R, Neuhaus - H; (9) Lindau - H, Ziegelhaus - R; and (10) Kaldenkirchen - H & R.¹⁴³

227. German Request for Border Control over Allied Military Personnel

A French military bus with twenty men in French uniform, attempting to leave Germany at the German border crossing at Schweigen on 13 November

¹⁴¹Ltr, Mr. W. J. Donnelly, HICOG, to Lt Gen M. S. Eddy, CINCUSAREUR, 22 Sep 52, sub: Establishment of MP Customs Personnel at International Borders. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1952), Vol. II, Item 23A.

¹⁴²Comment of CO, 7751 MPCU, 1 Oct 52, sub: Proposed Assumption of Border Customs Control Under the Contractual Agreements. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1952), Vol. II, Item 23A atchd.

¹⁴³Ltr, Lt Gen M. S. Eddy, CINCUSAREUR, to Mr. W. J. Donnelly, HICOG, 14 Oct 52, sub: MP Customs Control at Border Check Points under the Contractual Agreements. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

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1952, was stopped by a group of German officials, apparently in conspiracy, who blocked the road at the crossing point and demanded the right to inspect the bus and the identification of its passengers, who were allegedly German personnel recruited in Germany for service with the French Foreign Legion. The German request was refused as a matter of course by the French gendarme stationed at the border check point, since it was beyond the scope of authority of the German customs officials.¹⁴⁴ As a result of this incident the West German Government transmitted an official request to the Allied High Commission that the latter: (a) prevent the recruiting of German nationals in German territory for military units of foreign powers; and (b) transfer to German authorities, as soon as possible, border control over members of the occupation forces.¹⁴⁵

a. HICOG Position. HICOG informed the State Department that since Articles 24 and 25 of the "Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany" would govern the matter in question when the contractual agreements became effective, and that the German request was in line with other transfers of border control to the Federal Republic which had already taken place, HICOG was willing to accede to Chancellor Adenauer's request, subject to the concurrence of USAREUR. HICOG added that although the French had indicated their usual reluctance to put any portion of the contractual agreements into effect prior to French ratification, HICOG might be able to persuade them that this action was merely an extension of the transfer of border travel control already begun by the Allied High Commission.¹⁴⁶

b. USAREUR Objections. General Eddy notified Mr. Donnelly on 3 December 1952 that he was opposed to granting the German request for the following reasons: (1) such control would conflict with the operational requirements of the U.S. Army, Europe; (2) any implementation of individual articles of the contractual agreements prior to their effective date would constitute a dangerous precedent and provide the Germans an opening for requesting premature implementation of other provisions of the contractual agreements; and (3) the control exercised under an implementation of Articles 24 and 25 of the "Convention on the Rights and Obligations of the Foreign Forces and their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany" would not prevent a recurrence of

¹⁴⁴Cable (SMC In 4723) HICOG Bonn to State Dept (2323), 21 Nov 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 014.1 (1952), Vol. II, Item 54.

¹⁴⁵Cable, no number, HICOG Bonn to State Dept (2359), 22 Nov 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 014.1 (1952), Vol. II, Item 54 atchd.

¹⁴⁶Cable 447, HICOG Bonn to State Dept (2393), 25 Nov 52. SECRET. In file cited above.

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incidents such as the one in question for the reason that Article 24 provided that when members of the Forces were traveling in groups under orders and military command, their uniforms would be conclusive proof of identity, and that certification by the appropriate authorities of the power concerned that a person was a member of its Forces would be conclusive proof. ¹⁴⁷

c. State Department Decisions. The State Department informed HICOG on 4 December that it considered the use of the incident at the French border merely as a convenient excuse by the Germans to obtain a transfer of border control prior to the time previously agreed upon, and agreed with USAREUR that it would be a dangerous precedent to set. The State Department noted that it considered the border control question to have very little relation to the recruitment problem in the Federal Republic and suggested that the Allied High Commission reply to Chancellor Adenauer as follows: (1) German desires with regard to recruitment on German soil would be met by the Allied High Commission without reference to any of the legal issues involved, in order to avoid further irritation to Allied-German relationships; and (2) that the Allied High Commission did not wish to entertain a proposal for anticipating procedures which would be governed by the contractual agreements when they became effective and presumed that, with the cessation of recruitment, this matter would be considered of no importance by the Federal Government. ¹⁴⁸

228. Relations with the German Border Police

To provide a lightly armed, mobile force against security threats to the West German borders and against serious threats of an internal nature, the Bundesgrenzschutz (BGS) or German Federal Border Guard had been formed as a police organization in 1951 with an authorized strength of 20,000 men. The Bundesgrenzschutz became operational on 15 February 1952, when it began patrolling the German borders somewhat to the rear of the Land border police. As the result of planning between EUCOM and Seventh Army in 1951 a liaison bureau between the Seventh Army and the Bundesgrenzschutz was established in Stuttgart on 15 February 1952. The liaison bureau was composed of one officer and four enlisted men from the Seventh Army and an equal number from the Federal Border Police. The purpose of the bureau was to exchange information of mutual interest

¹⁴⁷Ltr, Lt Gen M. S. Eddy, CINCUSAREUR, to Mr. W. J. Donnelly, HICOG, 3 Dec 52, sub: Transfer of Border Control to German Authorities. SECRET. In file cited above.

¹⁴⁸Cable 60, State Dept to HICOG Bonn (1217), 4 Dec 52. SECRET. In file cited above.

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concerning border control, including reports from the German representatives to Seventh Army regarding the routes, frequency of patrol, and location of Federal Border Police units. Prior to the actual establishment of the bureau two conferences were held with officials of Federal Border Police, one at Bonn attended by U.S., British, and German representatives, and the other at Heidelberg attended by EUCOM, Seventh Army, and German representatives. As a result of these conferences, certain major points were agreed upon by EUCOM and the Federal Border Police: (1) the Federal Border Police was not an intelligence gathering agency and had no intention of employing agents or making a collection effort; (2) any information or personnel of intelligence interest which came to the attention of the Federal Border Police in the pursuit of its normal mission would be turned over to the appropriate Allied or German intelligence agencies; and (3) co-ordination of patrolling would be effected with the Seventh Army through the liaison bureau at Stuttgart and in the field with the constabulary squadrons.¹⁴⁹ On 31 October 1952 the liaison bureau at Stuttgart was discontinued since co-ordination between the Federal Border Police and Seventh Army units in the field had advanced to such a stage that the bureau was no longer necessary.¹⁵⁰

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229. Release of Classified Information to the Germans

EUCOM issued a set of definitive instructions early in 1952 with regard to the release of classified information to European governments, including the Federal Republic of Germany, in accordance with Department of the Army instructions. The directive governed only the release of classified information originating within the European Command. Classified information originating outside of the European Command could be released only on the authority of the State-Defense Military Information Control Committee. Release to the German Federal Republic was limited to two types of information, counterintelligence information and positive intelligence information. Counterintelligence information which was classified no higher than SECRET could be released to official Federal Republic security agencies, when such information was of direct concern to the security of the Federal Republic of Germany. The release of positive intelligence information to the Federal Republic was limited to the following: (1) indication of critical changes in the military or political situation relating to the imminence of war,

¹⁴⁹C/N 1, Dir EUCOM ID to EUCOM DCOFS Opns, 15 Feb 52, sub: West German Frontier Police. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 231.4 (1952), Vol. I, Item 3.

¹⁵⁰Interv, Mr. J. R. Moenk, USAREUR Hist Div, with Maj Philip Grant, Seventh Army Opns Off G-2, 13 Apr 53. SECRET.

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through TOP SECRET; and (2) finished intelligence information through SECRET produced wholly within EUCOM and relating to the USSR and its satellites and of direct concern or essential to, or involving the Federal Republic of Germany. For purposes of this provision neither Finland nor Yugoslavia were to be considered satellite nations. At no time would any release be made of intelligence information which might reveal the source or methods of collecting such information or the degree of exploitation of this information by sensitive sources.¹⁵¹ Some months later a directive was received from the Department of the Army listing certain exceptions to the national disclosure policy which had recently been approved by the State-Defense Military Information Control Committee. The new directive allowed for the release to the Federal Republic of Germany of military information classified no higher than SECRET and pertaining to the emergency plans of US EUCOM and such subordinate headquarters as US CINCEUR might direct, when such information was of direct concern to and involved the Federal Republic, and was required for the execution of the civil measures set forth in the HICOG-EUCOM agreement of 30 June 1952.¹⁵²

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¹⁵¹EUCOM ltr, 20 May 52, sub: Guide for the Release of Classified Military Information to European Governments by EUCOM. AG 380.01 GID-AGO. SECRET.

¹⁵²Cable DA-916717, COFSA from ACOFS G-2 to US CINCEUR and CINC-USAREUR, 22 Aug 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 380.01 (1952), Vol. II, Item 86A.

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CHAPTER 11

Relations with the Soviets

230. Areas of Friction with the Soviets

The most serious problem in EUCOM/USAREUR relations with the Soviets and their satellites involved the long frontier separating the Eastern Zone of Germany from the Western Zones and the border between Czechoslovakia and the U.S. Zone of Germany. Border patrols, border violations, and border incidents served to heighten the tension on either side of the demarcation line. Closely related were the problems involving the western sectors of Berlin, and the difficulties associated with travel and transit through the Soviet Zone between that city and the Western Zones. And finally the Western liaison missions stationed in the Soviet Zone of Germany continued to encounter difficulties in 1952. There were constant reminders throughout the year that the Soviets were determined to make the Western Allies as uncomfortable as possible, both in Germany and elsewhere in Western Europe.

231. USAREUR Border Responsibilities

USAREUR was careful to maintain a clear distinction between the terms "civil police border security" and "military border security" as they affected the eastern boundaries of the U.S. Zone of Germany. USAREUR held that it was responsible for the military security of the frontier and would continue to have this responsibility after the effective date of the contractual agreements, at least until the EDC began to function. To implement this responsibility USAREUR maintained a permanent system of military patrols along the eastern border of the U.S. Zone and kept the sensitive portions of that border under close surveillance by light aircraft and ground observation. During 1952 the German Federal Republic assumed an increasing degree of responsibility for purely police and customs activities, including the control of riots and civil disturbances within thirty kilometers of the border and jurisdiction over border

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crossings of all kinds, except by occupation personnel, including the Soviets.¹

232. Sensitive Border Areas

The EUCOM Intelligence Division in June 1952 prepared a study on sensitive border areas. The report listed five areas along the Soviet Zone boundary where trouble might be expected, including areas of present interest to the Soviets, and areas which had been the subject of past disputes that could be revived by the Soviets and the East Germans in the campaign of harassment and fear inaugurated during 1950 along the zonal boundary. The two areas regarded as being of present interest were as follows: (1) the Untermuehle-Obermuehle area on the zonal boundary east of Kassel; and (2) the Ostheim Enclave area, approximately twenty miles north of Bad Kissingen. The three areas regarded as being of possible interest were: (1) the Philippsthal area; (2) the "Neutral Road" area, which was an east-west road some twenty miles from Kassel; and (3) the Eschwege area.²

233. Border Incident in Land Hesse

Before the EUCOM Intelligence Division had completed its estimate of areas of possible dispute on the zonal boundaries, an incident occurred in the Untermuehle-Obermuehle area. On 20 June 1952 the Seventh Army transmitted to EUCOM a report received from its constabulary units in the field to the effect that the two towns of Untermuehle and Obermuehle had been taken over by the Soviets on 19 June. Residents of Untermuehle had been informed by four Soviet officers, headed by a colonel and accompanied by East German Volkspolizei, that the town belonged to the Soviet Zone and that no one was authorized entry or exit until further notice. The residents of the town who maintained that the town lay in the U.S. Zone requested aid from U.S. Zone officials.³

a. HICOG Report. The first HICOG report to the State Department declared that the area occupied by the Soviets and the East German Volkspolizei was well within the U.S. Zone as defined by an early agreement between the Soviet and U.S. military officials covering the exchange of


¹Ltr, Maj Gen E. T. Williams, USAREUR COFS, to Maj Gen C. S. Sugden, BAOR COFS, 3 Nov 52, sub: USAREUR Border Responsibilities. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1952), Vol. II, Item 25 atchd.

²C/N 1, Dir EUCOM ID to EUCOM DCOFS Opns, 28 Jun 52, sub: Possible Dispute Areas on Eastern Boundary of the U.S. Zone. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1952), Vol. I, Item 17.

³Cable 6536, Seventh Army to CINCEUR for Dir USAREUR Intel Div, 20 Jun 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1952), Vol. I, Item 14 atchd.

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THE UNTERMUEHLE--OBERMUEHLE BOUNDARY AREA



LEGEND:

— • — • — • KREIS BOUNDARY

—•••••NEGOTIATED BOUNDARY

SCALE

KILOMETERS

Q.5.

2.

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
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THE SEXTON — ASKALEPOV BOUNDARY AGREEMENT

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Thuringian for Hessian territory in order to simplify the operation of an important railroad which crossed the old Iaender boundaries at several points. HICOG reported that at some time subsequent to the agreement, when EUCOM constabulary had replaced a number of boundary markers for the guidance of its patrols, the boundary markers in the disputed sector had been placed along a road well within the U.S. Zone, rather than along the brook which actually formed the interzonal boundary.⁴

b. EUCOM Intelligence Survey. The EUCOM Intelligence Division dispatched Col. L. H. Gallogly to conduct an on-the-ground inspection of the border area in question. Colonel Gallogly discovered that, according to the boundary line on maps furnished by the 24th Constabulary Squadron, the boundary patrol unit for this area, and the EUCOM Intelligence Division Analysis Branch, the two points in question near Asbach were within the Eastern Zone of Germany, and that this fact was substantiated by maps in the possession of the 316th Military Intelligence Platoon. Colonel Gallogly concluded that no violation of the boundary at Asbach had occurred up to that time and that the German contention that the boundary had been violated could not be supported by the documents in the possession of EUCOM (Map 3).⁵

c. The Sexton-Askalepov Agreement, 17 September 1945. One of the documents upon which Colonel Gallogly based his report was the agreement signed at Wanfried, Saxony, on 17 September 1945 between Brig. Gen. W. T. Sexton, 3d Division commander, and Maj. Gen. V. S. Askalepov, 77th Soviet Guard Infantry Division commander. This agreement had adjusted the boundary between the U.S. and Soviet Zones in the Kreise of Witzenhausen and Heiligenstadt and had brought within the U.S. Zone a 2.7-mile stretch of railway on the Goettingen-Bebra line which had previously been within the Soviet Zone. Since the use of this line by the United States had been persistently refused by the Soviet commanders, the agreement placed the entire line in the U.S. Zone. The Soviet Zone had received approximately four square kilometers of land east of Allendorf in exchange for about the same amount of land ceded to the U.S. Zone just north of Allendorf (Map 4). Under the agreement, troops were to be withdrawn to the newly established lines of demarcation, but the residents of the area were to remain with their property.⁶

⁴Cable 19, HICOG Bonn to State Department (3484), 24 Jun 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1952), Vol. I, Item 13.

⁵Memo, Col L. H. Gallogly, EUCOM Intel Div Opns Br, to Act Dir EUCOM Intel Div, 25 Jun 52, sub: Report of Inspection of Border Area in Vicinity of Asbach, Germany. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1952), Vol. I, Item 14 atchd.

⁶International Aspects of the Occupation, Vol. 16, pp. 169 - 71, in Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945 - 46. RESTRICTED. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

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d. Final Decision. Following the survey, EUCOM informed HICOG that the incident did not constitute a border violation and that an examination of the documents establishing the Soviet-U.S. zonal boundary in dispute, especially the Sexton-Askalepov agreement of 1945, indicated without a doubt that the area in question lay within the Soviet Zone of Germany.⁷ HICOG in turn reported to the State Department that the alleged "incident" of Soviet violation of the U.S. zonal boundary did not constitute a violation but that the "incident" had resulted from extremely poor liaison between the Soviet authorities and the officials of the German Democratic Republic (East German Government).⁸

e. New Incident. While surveys of the demarcation line in this area were in progress, a new incident was reported to USAREUR by intelligence authorities. Although the time and date of the incident were not reported, the USAREUR Intelligence Division had received information on 28 August that two Soviet soldiers, two Soviet citizens in civilian clothing, and four members of the Volkspolizei had entered the town of Untermuehle and forcibly evacuated the occupants and their household goods. Since the demarcation line in the area was under study at the time, no action was taken on the report until HICOG should officially define the proper location of the boundary in question.⁹

234. State Department Instructions Concerning Border Incidents

In its first report to the State Department regarding the Untermuehle-Obermuehle incident, HICOG noted that it was hesitant about making specific recommendations for handling the problem because the facts were not firm in the minds of HICOG officials. Precise information as to the exact geographical location of the boundary was lacking, even on the part of officials on the spot, and German authorities were undecided as to where the responsibility for resistance to overt actions by the Soviet authorities and the East German Government lay.¹⁰ The State Department responded by issuing instructions for guidance in this and in similar matters. First, the State Department suggested a complete review of the boundary maps and boundary agreements in order to eliminate uncertainties concerning the exact line of demarcation. This action was to be co-ordinated with both

⁷C/N 1, Dir EUCOM Intel Div to EUCOM SGS, 25 Jun 52, sub: Occupation of West German Towns by the Volkspolizei. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1952), Vol. I, Item 10.

⁸Cable 21, HICOG Bonn to State Dept (3527), 25 Jun 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1952), Vol. I, Item 13 atchd.

⁹C/N 1, Dir USAREUR Intel Div to USAREUR SGS, 28 Aug 52, sub: Border Incident. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1952), Vol. I, Item 23.

¹⁰Cable 22, HICOG Bonn to State Dept (3543), 25 Jun 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1952), Vol. I, Item 13 atchd.

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EUCOM and the British authorities in Germany in order to indicate clearly the portions of the line regarding which there had never been any dispute, and the portions which, on the basis of local agreements, might conceivably be disputed. Next, the State Department recommended that any trespass by representatives of the East German Government beyond hitherto disputed lines should be immediately resisted by whatever forces were on the spot, regardless of whether they were German police or troops of the United States or the United Kingdom. The State Department believed that the problem of border protection should be regarded as a joint Allied-German responsibility, and that the United States should be prepared to support the Federal Republic in all cases by assuming final responsibility for border protection. The State Department desired that the Allied High Commission should inform the Federal Republic of this stand in the event that HICOG could obtain the concurrence of the French and British. The German police, however, should be instructed to avoid taking any action where Soviet military personnel might be involved. The State Department suggested that HICOG raise in the Allied High Commission the question of providing Allied reinforcements in the uncertain or disputed border areas.¹¹

235. Border Delineation, U.S.-Soviet Zones

Prior to the arrival of the State Department instructions, HICOG had developed an understanding with EUCOM on the points covered in the instructions. At the regular monthly HICOG-CINCEUR meeting on 30 June 1952, Mr. McCloy and General Handy discussed the problems involved in reaching a firm U.S.-Federal Republic understanding on the respective responsibilities and roles of the United States and the Federal Republic in regard to border violations and the delineation of the frontier to be protected. EUCOM and HICOG set up a joint program to assemble all agreements and other data pertaining to the U.S.-Soviet zonal boundary and agreed to co-ordinate their findings before undertaking discussions with representatives of the Federal Republic.¹² The first meeting between HICOG and EUCOM representatives relative to the determination of the actual border between the U.S. and Soviet Zones was held on 22 July. At this meeting it was agreed that EUCOM would direct the Seventh Army to perform a survey along the border in question and to mark on a set of maps the boundary as the border patrol units believed it to be. The HICOG-EUCOM working group established at this meeting agreed to meet again upon completion of the Seventh Army survey.¹³

¹¹Cable 1, State Dept to HICOG Bonn (22), 1 Jul 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

¹²Cable 11, HICOG Bonn to State Dept (47), 3 Jul 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

¹³(1) Ltr, Maj Gen E. T. Williams, USAREUR COFS, to Mr. S. Reber, Dep HICOG, 4 Aug 52, sub: Study of German-U.S. Responsibility for Border Incidents. SECRET. (2) C/N 1, Dir USAREUR Intel Div to USAREUR SGS, 10 Sep 52, sub: Border Delineation Progress. CONFIDENTIAL. Both in USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1952), Vol. I, Item 6A atchd; Vol. II, Item 23A-1.

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a. Seventh Army Survey. EUCOM directed the Seventh Army on 24 July 1952 to undertake the required survey. A set of maps of the border line was furnished to the Seventh Army, on which it was requested to indicate where the border as understood by the Seventh Army coincided with, or deviated from, the border marked on the furnished map, and where the border was marked adequately, inadequately, or not at all. The Seventh Army was directed to use the medium of ground reconnaissance, rather than engineer- or artillery-type survey. The reasons for discrepancies were to be included, if available. In addition, the Seventh Army was to mark any point along the border where roads or railroads used by West German and/or U.S. personnel traversed East German territory. Conversely, any road or railroad used by the East Germans which traversed West German territory was to be similarly marked. One purpose of the maps was to determine points where border incidents might occur due to doubtful jurisdiction, or to the existence of a road, water pipe line, or power line serving West German residents which ran into the Soviet Zone.¹⁴ The Seventh Army border survey revealed three sensitive areas which might lead to incidents along the interzonal border. First, in the area defined in the Sexton-Askalepov agreement, the Seventh Army and the West Germans were honoring a boundary which did not coincide with the agreed boundary. Secondly, changes in the interzonal boundary had been made in two locations but no agreements existed to legally support the alterations. One of these changes was in the vicinity of Falkenstein and the other near Tann. In both cases small parcels of land had apparently been exchanged. Finally, a source of potential trouble had developed in the vicinity of the East German town of Liebau, which lay in a Soviet Zone salient projecting into the U.S. Zone. The Soviet authorities, entirely within their own rights, had created a plowed barrier across the top of the salient, thus isolating the town from its normal East German contacts.¹⁵

b. HICOG Statement of Principles. On the basis of the Seventh Army survey and available documents on the subject, HICOG on 22 October forwarded to USAREUR for concurrence a proposed statement of principles with regard to border delineation which should form the basis of detailed information to be transmitted to the appropriate West German officials as soon as possible. The HICOG statement contained two parts, a definition of the legal line of demarcation, and a set of principles of operation for the disputed areas. The legal line of demarcation between the U.S. and Soviet Zones of Germany was established as the old Laender boundaries as they existed in 1941 and as they had been established by the European

¹⁴Ltr, USAREUR to CG Seventh Army, 24 Jul 52, sub: Border Survey. AG141.8 GID. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1952), Vol. I, B/P 10, Item 3.

¹⁵Memo, Dir USAREUR Intel Div to USAREUR COFS, 22 Oct 52, sub: Border Delineation Between the U.S. Zone of Germany and the Soviet Zone of Germany. CONFIDENTIAL. In file cited above.

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Advisory Commission (EAC) in 1944. The EAC agreement established the interzonal boundaries along the Laender boundaries of Thuringia-Hesse, Thuringia-Bavaria, and Saxony-Bavaria. The exception to this line lay in Landkreis Witzhausen, Land Hesse, where the legal line of demarcation was established by the 1945 Sexton-Askalepov agreement. HICOG noted that in some instances this legal zonal border did not coincide with the areas then under the administrative control of East Zone German and West German authorities, either because of local verbal agreements between the Soviet and U.S. military authorities in 1945 and 1946, or because of practices recognized by both East and West German authorities since the early days of the occupation. HICOG proposed that the West German governmental subdivisions concerned should continue to exercise administrative control over such areas notwithstanding their location in respect to the legal zonal line of demarcation, or U.S. Army troop dispositions. The Untermuehle-Obermuehle area, however, was to be considered as a part of the East Zone since the line of demarcation as established by written agreement clearly placed it within the East Zone. West German authorities were not to attempt to move into any territory which was legally within West Germany but under the control of East German authorities. Any attempt on the part of East German authorities to move into areas legally within the East Zone but under the nominal control of West Germany would be opposed by whatever actions were practicable without resorting to force. If necessary, the West German and U.S. Army patrols would fall back to the legal line of demarcation, where force could be resorted to if deemed advisable and necessary. HICOG expected the U.S. Army to continue token patrols in areas which were legally within the East Zone but lay within the line of demarcation as established by usage.¹⁶

c. USAREUR Objections. The principles governing the delineation of the legal boundary, as contained in the HICOG statement, were concurred in by USAREUR. The proposals regarding principles of operations in disputed areas, however, met with serious objection from USAREUR as attempting to establish principles of operation in vague areas with shades of responsibility that varied in accordance with local usage or local agreements.¹⁷ USAREUR notified HICOG that, in order for USAREUR to adequately carry out its responsibilities and to properly implement a directive of this nature, it was considered imperative that only one boundary be recognized which U.S. forces would patrol and defend. USAREUR felt

¹⁶Ltr, Mr. S. Reber, Dep HICOG to Maj Gen E. T. Williams, USAREUR COFS, 22 Oct 52, sub: Border Delineation. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1952), Vol. II, Item 23A-1 atchd.

¹⁷C/N 1, Dir USAREUR OPOT Div to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 4 Nov 52, sub: Delineation of U.S.-Soviet Border of Germany. SECRET. In file cited above.

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that official U.S. sanction of local administrative control by the German authorities over areas not considered by written agreements to be included within the area of the German Federal Republic would serve only to promote a potentially dangerous political situation.¹⁸ In December USAREUR withdrew its objections to the continuation of West German administration of such questionable areas but insisted that even token enforcement of the security of the areas in question could not be undertaken by U.S. forces.¹⁹ By the end of the year no final agreement had been reached by USAREUR and HICOG.

236. Joint U.S.-German Responsibility for Border Incidents

The U.S. State Department informed HICOG that protection of the border should be regarded as a joint German-Allied responsibility and that in all cases the United States should assume final responsibility. The Federal Border Police, however, should avoid taking any action where Soviet military personnel were involved.²⁰ A HICOG-EUCOM working group was established to draft recommendations to be discussed with the appropriate Federal and Laender authorities in order to prepare the way for drafting clear and detailed directives on principles of operation for dissemination to the U.S. and German frontier units.²¹

a. EUCOM-HICOG Position. The report prepared by the EUCOM-HICOG working group concluded that the security of the U.S. Zone was a U.S. responsibility and that the delegation of partial authority to the Federal Republic would not affect the right of the U.S. military commander to take immediate action in the event of Soviet or satellite aggression. The Federal Republic was to be delegated authority to take initial steps necessary to control border incidents and, in the absence of U.S. military units, to detain members of the Soviet or satellite forces and to turn them over to the jurisdiction of the U.S. forces without subjecting them to arrest. When the border control authorities of the Federal Republic determined that Soviet forces or other military units were involved in a border incident, they were to notify the local U.S. commander who would take charge immediately and would assume operational control of the Federal and Land Border Police in the area. When no West German border police units were present, U.S. border patrol units would detain and turn over to the West

¹⁸Ltr, Maj Gen E. T. Williams, USAREUR COFS, to Mr. Eli W. Debevoise, Act Dep HICOG, 5 Nov 52, sub: Guiding Principles for Border Delineation. SECRET. In file cited above.

¹⁹Ltr, Gen Williams to Mr. Debevoise, 8 Dec 52, sub: Border Delineation. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1952), Vol. II, Item 23A atchd.

²⁰Cable 1, State Dept to HICOG Bonn (22), 1 Jul 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1952), Vol. I, Item 13 atchd.

²¹Cable 11, HICOG Bonn to State Dept (47), 3 Jul 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1952), Vol. I, Item 13 atchd.

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German authorities any person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Republic who violated the border. This provision did not preclude the detention of apprehended personnel for a reasonable period of time for intelligence interrogation. Finally the working group stressed the importance of close co-operation and the exchange of information between German border authorities and the U.S. military personnel.²²

b. Final Agreement. The U.S. High Commissioner concurred in the recommendations of the working group paper. Since these views had previously been approved by EUCOM, the recommendations became the basis for discussions between HICOG and the Federal Republic.²³ The working group paper was used to develop a new policy on German implementation of border operations, which was agreed to by the Federal Government on 18 August 1952.²⁴

237. Implementing Instructions for Border Responsibilities

USAREUR felt that it was of the utmost importance that final implementing instructions should be issued simultaneously by the German authorities and the U.S. Army authorities. In order to facilitate the development of the agreement between HICOG and the Federal Republic, USAREUR drew up two papers, one containing the points to be covered in detail by the Federal Republic in its instructions to the Federal Border Police, and the other containing detailed instructions for units of the U.S. Seventh Army.²⁵ The USAREUR paper on German implementation of border control delineated the German responsibilities in connection with border incidents by assigning initial control of all border incidents to the authorities of the Federal Republic. Initial control was defined as including the following steps: (1) initial estimate of the situation and line of action to be followed by the Laender and/or customs police and the Federal Border Police; (2) arrest or detention, as appropriate, of all personnel involved in border incidents; (3) keeping the local U.S.

²²Memo, Dir EUCOM OPOT Div to EUCOM COFS, 8 Jul 52, sub: HICOG-EUCOM Position Regarding U.S.-German Responsibility for Border Incidents. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1952), Vol. I, Item 6A atchd.

²³Ltr, Mr. S. Reber, Dep HICOG, to Maj Gen E. T. Williams, EUCOM COFS, 17 Jul 52, sub: HICOG-EUCOM Working Group Paper on U.S.-German Responsibility for Border Incidents. SECRET. In file cited above.

²⁴(1) C/N 1, USAREUR COFS to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 25 Aug 52, sub: German Implementation of HICOG-EUCOM Policy on Border Operations. SECRET. (2) Ltr, Maj Gen E. T. Williams, COFS USAREUR, to Maj Gen C. S. Sugden, COFS BAOR, 3 Nov 52, sub: USAREUR Border Responsibilities. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1952), Vol. I, Item 6A atchd, Vol. II, Item 25 atchd.

²⁵Ltr, Maj Gen E. T. Williams, USAREUR COFS, to Mr. S. Reber, Dep HICOG, 7 Aug 52, sub: Implementing Instructions on Border Responsibility. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1952), Vol. I, Item 6A atchd.

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commander informed; and (4) release of apprehended, detained, or arrested personnel to the U.S. forces for interrogation as appropriate under these and other existing policies. The paper described in detail the conditions under which the Federal Republic or the U.S. Army would act in the various types of border incidents and provided for close co-operation and co-ordination between all West German border authorities and U.S. military personnel engaged in border operations. This USAREUR paper served as a basis for conferences between HICOG and the Federal Ministry of the Interior on the subject. It was approved by representatives of both agencies at Bonn, Germany, on 18 August 1952.²⁶

a. Co-ordination with Seventh Army. USAREUR instructions on border control were co-ordinated with, and contained the views of, the U.S. Seventh Army.²⁷ In addition, the operating instructions to be issued by the Federal Republic were to be submitted to USAREUR for agreement prior to being issued to the operating agencies. These instructions, as well as the USAREUR instructions, were to be co-ordinated with the Seventh Army and returned to the Federal Republic through HICOG with the notation that the implementing instructions should be issued to the U.S. troops and West German border agencies on the same date and would become effective simultaneously.²⁸

b. Implementing Instructions for German Border Police. On 24 September 1952, HICOG forwarded a German draft of proposed implementing instructions to USAREUR, together with a letter of transmittal for the Federal Ministry of the Interior, in which it was indicated that the enclosed draft did not have the final approval of several German agencies. USAREUR completely rewrote the German draft and forwarded the revised version to HICOG with the request that the authorities of the Federal Republic be pressed for early acceptance of the USAREUR draft without change. USAREUR also desired that the representatives of the Federal Republic indicate an effective date for issuing the instructions in order to make possible simultaneous issuing of instructions to the U.S. units concerned and to the West German border police forces.²⁹ The Federal

²⁶Ibid., Incl 2, 4 Aug 52, sub: German Implementation of HICOG-EUCOM Policy on Border Operations.

²⁷C/N 1, USAREUR COFS to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 25 Aug 52, and C/N 2, USAREUR DCOFS Opns to Dir USAREUR OPOT Div, 26 Aug 52, sub: German Implementations of HICOG-EUCOM Policy on Border Operations. SECRET. In file cited above.

²⁸Ibid., and C/N 3, Dir USAREUR OPOT Div to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 4 Sep 52.

²⁹Ltr, Maj Gen E. T. Williams, USAREUR COFS, to Mr. E. W. Debevoise, Act Dep HICOG, 30 Oct 52, sub: Proposed Draft of German Implementing Instructions on Border Operations. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1952), Vol. I, Item 6A atchd.

Minister of the Interior in December finally signified his general concurrence with the USAREUR draft but indicated that a few changes and enlargements had been made in some of the provisions in order to avoid misunderstandings in actual operations. He indicated that if the plan met with the approval of HICOG, it would be put into effect on 1 January 1953.³⁰

238. Re-marking of the Berlin Boundaries

a. U.S.-Soviet Decisions. U.S. and Soviet representatives met on 30 October 1952, at a point on the U.S. Sector-Soviet Zone border, to determine the proper location of certain signs which marked this border. The U.S. representative, the provost marshal of the Berlin Military Post, and the Soviet representative from the Berlin branch of the Soviet Control Commission, inspected two points along the border. At one (Ostdorferstrasse), the border marking sign was found to be correctly placed, but at the other (Andreezeile), it was found that the U.S. Sector border marking signs had erroneously been erected on Soviet Zone territory. Approximately twenty-five meters of this road, which had been used unhindered by the West Berlin population, although actually in the Soviet Zone, would presumably be closed by the Soviets. At the request of the U.S. representatives, however, the Soviet representative agreed not to close the road before 2400 hours on 1 November. Both representatives tentatively agreed to the minutes of the meeting, but they did not officially sign them. It was agreed to hold further meetings to inspect other areas where location of the border marking signs was in dispute. After this meeting it was announced by the cartographic experts of the Berlin Military Post that they were convinced that investigations would reveal that in several places important errors in favor of the Soviets had been made in previous markings of the Berlin border.³¹

b. Border Marking Incidents. Although the re-marking of the Berlin border was carried out by mutual agreement between the U.S. and Soviet authorities, it was not accomplished without the occurrence of incidents. An example was the arrest of M/Sgt. William T. Rice, of Headquarters Company, 7780 Composite Service Battalion, by the East German Volkspolizei, at 1500 hours 16 December 1952, at Grenzstrasse, Buckow West, Berlin, while standing approximately one meter inside the Soviet Zone. Sergeant Rice, who was in charge of a crew moving misplaced border marking signs to their correct positions, was arrested when he stepped into the Soviet Zone to survey the newly erected marker on that spot. Since the sergeant was on duty status performing a mission which had been previously agreed

³⁰Ltr, Dr. Lehr, Fed Min of Interior, to Mr. Debevoise, 22 Dec 52.
SECRET. In file cited above.

³¹Cable, no number, HICOG Berlin to HICOG Bonn (748), 31 Oct 52.
RESTRICTED. In USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1952), Vol. II, Item 26.

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upon by U.S. and Soviet authorities, his arrest and detention was unjustified. Sergeant Rice was eventually returned to the control of U.S. authorities in Berlin at 2030 hours, 18 December, without comment by the Soviets. Before his release Sergeant Rice was required by the Soviets to sign a statement in Russian admitting illegal crossing of the Berlin border.³²

239. Night Observation of the Soviet Borders

Since the fall months of 1952 were considered to be a critical period for the launching of an attack by an aggressor force, the Seventh Army determined during June and July that night observation by light aircraft of certain critical approaches to the U.S. Zone of Germany was a requisite for adequate vigilance during that period. The critical areas along the eastern border of the U.S. Zone where such observation was considered necessary were as follows: (1) Nordhausen-Kassel; (2) the Eisenach-Hersfeld Autobahn; (3) the road net south of Meiningen; (4) Eisfeld-Coburg; and (5) the Autobahns entering the U.S. Zone in the vicinity of Hof. In order to effect such night observation, either on call, or subsequent to the assumption of simple or reinforced alert conditions, the Seventh Army requested the installation of certain required safety facilities for night flying in the areas named. Most necessary was the installation of electrically operated runway and obstacle lights on and in the vicinity of the airfields at Kassel, Hersfeld, Fulda, Coburg, and Hof. In addition, it would be necessary to provide orientation points to enable aircraft to conduct their observations without violating the zonal boundaries. For this purpose the Seventh Army requested seven portable searchlights from EUCOM.³³ The USAREUR Intelligence Division objected that night flights might have a nuisance impact which would generate incidents with the resident German population. Then, too, the lighting of only certain airfields might indicate that the U.S. defensive positions were keyed to expected courses of action in certain areas. To prevent this, the intelligence division recommended that the Seventh Army investigate the feasibility of lighting additional airstrips in the border area.³⁴ It was determined in USAREUR, however, that night aerial observation of the critical areas would provide an additional important source of

³²(1) Cable D-2048, Berlin Comd to CINCUSAREUR, 16 Dec 52. RESTRICTED.
(2) Cable D-2050, Berlin Comd to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Dec 52. RESTRICTED.
(3) Cable 78 HICOG Berlin to HICOG Bonn, 19 Dec 52. RESTRICTED. All in USAREUR SGS 250.2 (1953), Vol. I, Item 1 and atchd.

³³Ltr, CG Seventh Army, to CINCEUR, 10 Jul 52, sub: Night Observation of U.S.-Soviet Zone Borders, AG 350.07. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1952), Vol. I, Item 18A.

³⁴C/N 6, Dir USAREUR Intel Div to Dir USAREUR OPOT Div, 25 Aug 52, to C/N 1, EUCOM SGS to Dir EUCOM OPOT Div, 10 Jul 52, sub cited above. SECRET. In file cited above.

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information on Soviet build-up and intentions during critical periods. For this reason USAREUR approved the Seventh Army's requests and designated the USAREUR Logistics Division as the staff agency to implement the required construction projects included in the Seventh Army planning for this operation.³⁵

240. Security at Railway Border Crossing Sites

The crossing of the "Czech freedom train" from Soviet-controlled Czechoslovakia into the U.S. Zone of Germany on 11 September 1951 drew attention to the existence of a number of unused rail lines crossing from the Soviet Zone and Czechoslovakia into the U.S. Zone which were considered as constituting a hazard to the security of the U.S. Forces in Germany. Even before that incident, however, the Seventh Army had recommended that the rails be cut at thirteen railway border crossing points into the U.S. Zone. The apparent ease with which the Czech engineer piloted the "freedom train" across the Czech border into Germany at Wildenau, illustrated the fact that these rail lines could be used as easily by trains carrying aggressor troops especially since these crossing points were only intermittently observed by the German border police and the U.S. Army border patrols.³⁶ In September 1952 the matter was once again brought to the attention of HICOG. USAREUR recommended that a gap of no less than five hundred yards be created on each of the thirteen unused rail lines within approximately one mile of the border. Each gap would be accomplished by removing the track and destroying the road-bed. HICOG was requested to approach the appropriate Federal Republic authorities to clear the way for USAREUR to proceed with its plan for rendering these rail lines unusable for military purposes. In view of the political implications involved, HICOG decided that this was a matter for tripartite action before the initiation of talks with officials of the Federal Republic and referred the question to the Transport Subcommittee of the Allied High Commission for discussion.³⁷ At this time, the Allied General Secretariat was preparing for a tripartite conference to discuss the broader problem of security measures for engineering

³⁵(1) Ibid., C/N 7, Dir USAREUR OPOT Div to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 29 Aug 52. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG Seventh Army, 4 Sep 52, same sub. AG 350.07. SECRET. In file cited above.

³⁶C/N 1, Dir USAREUR OPOT Div to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 27 Aug 52, sub: Security at Railway Border Crossing Sites. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1952), Vol. I, Item 22A.

³⁷(1) Ltr, Maj Gen E. T. Williams, USAREUR COFS, to Mr. S. Reber, Dep HICOG, 3 Sep 52, sub: Blocking of Railway Border Crossing Points. SECRET. (2) Ltr, Mr. Reber to Gen Williams, 2 Oct 52, same sub. Border Crossing Points. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 091.311 (1952), Vol. I, Item 22A atchd.

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structures in the Federal Republic. Since USAREUR believed that the question of blocking the unused railway border crossing points rightfully belonged in a discussion of this border problem, it agreed with the HICOG decision that the question be considered at the proposed tripartite meeting. This problem would then be presented to the Federal Republic as a part of an over-all program for security of the Forces of the Three Powers in the Federal Republic, a procedure that offered greater assurance of approval than if it was presented as a separate problem.³⁸ At the close of the year, tripartite action on this problem had not been completed.

241. Procedure for Treating Alleged Air Violations of Corridor and Zonal Boundaries

The problem of the proper procedure for processing Soviet protest letters concerning alleged violations by aircraft of corridor boundaries was raised in 1952. The Soviet practice was to forward all such letters to EUCOM/USAREUR headquarters. Soviet protest letter No. 245 addressed to the EUCOM deputy chief of staff for operations protested an alleged violation of the Soviet Zone by an American Douglas C-54 aircraft on 19 June 1952 in the vicinity of Behrungen. The Commander in Chief, USAFE, and the Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force, were requested to investigate the matter and to forward information to EUCOM upon which a reply to the Soviet protest could be based.³⁹ The reply from CINCSAFE, recommended that any further correspondence concerning Soviet protests of air corridor violations be referred to the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC) for investigation and direct reply in order to avoid duplication of investigative effort and possible embarrassment should conflicting replies be made.⁴⁰ USAFE had previously issued a directive to its subordinate commands stating that in the event that a protest was received by USAFE headquarters or any other USAFE organization, the Soviet agency initiating the protest would be requested to refer the incident to the Berlin Air Safety Center. USAREUR preferred to follow this recommended policy until more definite decisions on procedure could be made.⁴¹

a. Berlin Meeting Decisions. The HICOG Berlin Element called a meeting for 16 September 1952 to discuss in particular the method of handling written Soviet protests of violations of the Soviet Zone territory

³⁸Ltr, Gen Williams to Mr. Reber, 16 Oct 52, sub: Blocking of Railway Border Crossing Points. SECRET. In file cited above.

³⁹C/N 1, Dir USAREUR CAD to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 25 Aug 52, sub: Reply to Soviet Protest Letter #245. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1952), Vol. I, B/P 10, Item 4.

⁴⁰1st Ind, Hq USAFE to CINCEUR, 13 Jul 52, sub: Hq EUCOM AG 350.09 CAD, sub: Soviet Protest Letter #245, EOOTA 360.112. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

⁴¹C/N 1, Dir USAREUR CAD to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 25 Aug 52, cited above.

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by U.S. aircraft. The meeting was attended by representatives of the following: the Berlin Element of HICOG; the HICOG Civil Aviation Division; the Office of Political Affairs, HICOG; Headquarters, USAFE; the Civil Affairs Division, USAREUR; the U.S. Commander, Berlin; and the Berlin Air Safety Center. The representatives at the meeting determined that USAFE did not have the authority to establish the policy of referring Soviet protests to the Berlin Air Safety Center since that agency was not under the jurisdiction of USAFE. The conference overlooked the fact that the policy had not been established by USAFE, but by USAREUR on the recommendation of USAFE. On the basis of this determination, however, the Berlin meeting drafted three recommendations with regard to the processing of written Soviet protests concerning border violations of any type, including the corridors or the zonal borders, whether by civil or military aircraft: (1) a central agency should be designated to investigate and draft a co-ordinated answer to written Soviet protests of any type; (2) the most logical agency to assume the duties of this central agency was the HICOG Civil Aviation Division, Frankfurt; and (3) all U.S. written protests regarding air violations of any type by Soviet aircraft should be initiated by the central agency so designated.⁴²

b. The USAREUR Position. The recommendations of the Berlin meeting did not meet with the full approval of USCOB. Since the problem of aircraft violations of borders appeared to be primarily military rather than civil, USCOB stated that his dual capacity as the representative in Berlin of the U.S. High Commissioner and the Commander in Chief, USAREUR, placed him in a unique position of being able to investigate all alleged air violations, regardless of the type of aircraft involved. For this reason he contended that it was more logical to designate USCOB as the agency to investigate and answer Soviet written protests of air violations of all types rather than the HICOG Civil Aviation Division. Likewise the selection of Berlin Air Safety Center was not logical, since that organization would require the support of zonal agencies in conducting the required investigations in order to obtain the factual information on which to base its replies.⁴³ USAREUR did not concur in the designation of the HICOG Civil Aviation Division as the central agency responsible for processing alleged violations of the air corridor and air border by U.S. and Soviet aircraft, and recommended that USCOB be so designated. In support of this recommendation USAREUR pointed out that, because of USCOB's geographical location and the advantage of having the investigating agencies at his disposal, and because of his unique position as representative of both HICOG and CINCUSAREUR, USCOB could most adequately fulfill

⁴²C/N 1, Dir USAREUR CAD to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 23 Sep 52, sub: Recommendations for Processing Alleged Violations of the Air Corridor and Border by Aircraft of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1952), Vol. I, B/P 10, Item 4.

⁴³Cable COB-241, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR for Gen Uncles, 7 Oct 52. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 360.33 (1952), Vol. I, Item 25A atchd.

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the requirements of the proposed central agency. In support of naming a military rather than a civil agency, USAREUR stated that the Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany, had obviously considered all air violations of both civilian and military aircraft as a military responsibility which represented a potential threat to the security of the Soviet forces. Therefore, all Soviet correspondence concerning alleged air violations by U.S. aircraft into the Soviet Zone had been addressed to the Commander in Chief, USAREUR.⁴⁴

c. HICOG-USAREUR Decisions. At the regular monthly HICOG-CINCUSAREUR meeting on 27 October 1952, an agreement was reached by General Eddy and Mr. Donnelly with the concurrence of Lt. Gen. L. Norstad, Commander in Chief, USAFE, and Maj. Gen. D. C. Strothers, Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force, on procedures for the handling of Soviet protests alleging air violations by U.S. military or civil aircraft of the Berlin air corridors and the zonal boundaries. This agreement provided that the HICOG Civil Aviation Division, Frankfurt, would be designated as the central agency for all written and oral Soviet protests, with the responsibility of conducting and co-ordinating an investigation of the affair in question and drafting a co-ordinated reply to the Soviets. It was decided that HICOG should have an opportunity to review the reply before its dispatch. The HICOG Civil Aviation Division would co-ordinate and expedite the required investigation with the agencies concerned and prepare a draft reply based on the investigation which would be forwarded to HICOG for approval and dispatch if civil aircraft were involved, or to USAREUR, with a copy to HICOG for comment, if military aircraft were involved and USAREUR would dispatch the final reply through the usual channels. Routine protests received by Berlin Air Safety Center would be answered in the same manner as before. The following procedure was developed with regard to protests to be made to the Soviets concerning boundary violations by Soviet and satellite aircraft: (1) all such violations were to be immediately reported to HICOG, with a copy to the HICOG Civil Aviation Division, Frankfurt; (2) all required investigations would be carried out and co-ordinated by the HICOG Civil Aviation Division; (3) oral routine protests would be made by the chief U.S. Controller, Berlin Air Safety Center, as directed by HICOG; and (4) written U.S. protests would be forwarded to HICOG, for such action as might be appropriate. Finally, the Berlin Element of HICOG, at a meeting on 4 November of the representatives of all of the agencies concerned, established the details of the procedures and the implementation of the HICOG-USAREUR agreement.⁴⁵

⁴⁴Memo, Dir USAREUR CAD to CINCUSAREUR, 23 Oct 52, sub: USAREUR's Position Relative Alleged Violations by U.S. and U.S.S.R. Aircraft. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1952), Vol. I, B/P 10, Item 4.

⁴⁵(1) Cable 378, HICOG Bonn to CINCUSAREUR, 30 Oct 52. RESTRICTED. (2) Cable 52, HICOG Berlin to HICOG Bonn, 27 Oct 52. RESTRICTED. Both in USAREUR SGS 360.33 (1952), Vol. I, Item 25a atchd.

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d. Final Approval. On 10 November HICOG signified its concurrence with the implementing procedures adopted at the 4 November meeting and agreed that these procedures should be made operative at once. HICOG also agreed that both USAREUR and USAFE might be authorized to make certain minor modifications in the procedures after they were implemented provided that such modifications would not in any way alter the general character of the procedures.⁴⁶ USAFE concurred with the decisions of the Berlin meeting on 25 November 1952 and USAREUR took similar action on the following day. Since both concurrences recommended immediate implementation of these agreements, the new procedures for processing U.S. and Soviet protests concerning violations of the air corridor and the zonal boundaries by aircraft of the United States and the Soviet Union were put into effect.⁴⁷

SECRET

242. U.S. Military Liaison Mission, Potsdam

The U.S. Military Liaison Mission to the Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany, had been established as the result of an agreement signed on 2 April 1947 between Lt. Gen. C. R. Huebner, Deputy Commander in Chief, EUCOM, and General Malinin, Deputy Commander in Chief and Chief of Staff, Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany, which provided for the reciprocal establishment of missions at Potsdam and Frankfurt am Main.⁴⁸ In accordance with this agreement, the U.S. Military Liaison Mission, Potsdam, during 1952 was composed of fourteen officers and enlisted men accredited to the Soviet commander in chief, including one representative each from the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy. In addition the mission included one officer and five enlisted men stationed in Berlin who were not accredited. The accredited members of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission were provided with Soviet travel and identification cards which were supposed to guarantee freedom of travel in the Soviet Zone of Germany. All accredited enlisted personnel and the duty officer of the mission resided on the mission grounds in Potsdam, which enjoyed the rights of extraterritoriality. The German service personnel at the Potsdam mission were supplied by the Soviets and a Volkspolizist was stationed at the entrance to the mission grounds. Because the headquarters of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission was located in the Soviet Zone, classified documents were not carried by its members nor were they filed in the Potsdam headquarters. A rear echelon office was maintained

⁴⁶Cable 399, HICOG Bonn to HICOG Berlin, 10 Nov 52. RESTRICTED. In file cited above.

⁴⁷(1) Cable EOOT-10436, CINCUSAFE to HICOG Civ Avn Div, Frankfurt, 25 Nov 52. RESTRICTED. (2) Cable SX-5507, CINCUSAREUR to HICOG Bonn, 26 Nov 52. RESTRICTED. Both in file cited above.

⁴⁸A Survey of Soviet Aims, Policies, and Tactics, pp. 290 - 97. SECRET. In Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1947 - 1948. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

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in Berlin to effect liaison with USCOB and to file all classified documents in the mission's possession under security regulations. The telephone service provided to the mission was operated through the Potsdam civilian exchange and, since it might be tapped by the Soviets, a radio telephone was installed in the mission headquarters early in 1952 as a precautionary measure. The mission premises were thoroughly examined by a signal expert during 1952 in order to determine if any secret or hidden microphones had been installed there. This thorough check disclosed that no means for outside communications existed, except through the civilian telephones. For this reason the mission discontinued the use of the Soviet provided telephones, except in case of an emergency.⁴⁹

243. Difficulties Encountered by the U.S. Military Liaison Mission

The harassing actions to which the U.S. Military Liaison Mission at Potsdam had been subjected by the Soviets since its inception were continued during 1952. Active measures of harassment consisted of certain overt acts instituted against the mission and its members, in order to restrict their movements and to prevent them from carrying out their mission. Included in this category were: trailing and surveillance of mission personnel and vehicles; detentions of mission personnel; withdrawal or delay in the issuance of mission papers; and difficulties created by the documentation issued to the mission personnel. Passive measures which indirectly added to the troubles and difficulties of the U.S. mission consisted of actions instituted by the Soviets in connection with their exercise of authority in the Soviet Zone of Germany. This category included: the creation of an excessive number of restricted military areas; the erection of unnecessarily high fences around Soviet installations; the erection of an excessive number of road barriers, road blocks, and check points throughout the entire Soviet Zone; and the scarcity of usable gasoline stations (the mission was restricted to the use of twenty-two stations in the Soviet Zone, fourteen of which were in Leipzig).⁵⁰ Perhaps the most important of these harassing activities was that of trailing and surveillance of the mission personnel and vehicles. This type of action served to limit the travel of the mission personnel and curtailed their gathering of intelligence and was a flagrant violation of the spirit of the Huebner-Malinin agreement. The Soviets, however, refused to admit that they trailed mission personnel and they intimated that they had no control over the German police or their actions. At a meeting between Colonel Schanze, chief of the mission, and Colonel Tveretnikov, of the External Relations Branch, Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany, the Russian officer

⁴⁹Unit History, 7893 USMLM, Potsdam, Germany, 1952. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

⁵⁰Ltr, Col A. E. Schanze, Chm USMLM, Potsdam, to Col H. C. Burgess, Dep Dir USAREUR CAD, 28 Oct 52, sub: Activities of the USMLM. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 500 (1952), Vol. I, Item 64C.

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declared that any trailing of the U.S. mission personnel was unofficial and alleged that it was being done by Germans. He stated, moreover, that while he could control the acts of the Soviet military, he could not control the actions of the German police agencies.⁵¹

a. Retaliatory Actions. At a tripartite meeting held in the EUCOM Intelligence Division on 28 April 1952, it was determined by the representatives of the Three Powers that countermeasures would have to be taken in the three Western Zones of occupation in order to counteract the restrictions placed against the missions of the Three Powers in the Soviet Zone. They agreed that the countermeasures would be more impressive if they were applied tripartitely rather than unilaterally, as had been done in the past. It was decided, however, that the countermeasures could not be any stronger collectively than those already applied against the missions of the Three Powers located in the Soviet Zone.⁵² In accordance with the decisions of this meeting, EUCOM notified all post commanders that, effective 27 June 1952, the military police highway patrol detachments in their commands would overtly trail all Soviet mission vehicles when observed traveling through their areas of jurisdiction. Information as to the license number, the color of the vehicle, and the number of persons in the vehicle were to be relayed by teletype or by radio to the highway patrol detachment in the adjacent military post in the direction of travel.⁵³ Within a short period a strong protest against this activity was received from General Ivanov, Chief of Staff, Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany. General Williams informed General Ivanov that he was at a loss to understand this protest against alleged surveillance of Soviet Liaison Mission personnel while traveling throughout the U.S. Zone, particularly in view of repeated protests by USAREUR in the past concerning the surveillance of U.S. Military Liaison Mission personnel accredited to the Soviets.⁵⁴

b. Soviet Proposal to the British. The first evidence of the effectiveness of this type of action on the part of the Three Powers came on 28 August when a Soviet representative, speaking on behalf of General Chuikov, Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany,

⁵¹Ltr, Col A. E. Schanze, Chm USMLM, Potsdam, to Dir EUCOM CAD, 18 Apr 52, sub: Meeting Between Col Schanze and Col Tveretnikov. UNCLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 500 (1952), Vol. I, Item 27B.

⁵²C/N 1, Dir EUCOM Intel Div to EUCOM Act COFS, 8 May 52, sub: Retaliatory Measures to be Taken Towards the Soviets. 350.09 (GID/OPS/COLL). SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 500 (1952), Vol. I, Item 27B atchd.

⁵³Cable SX-6493, CINCEUR to All Mil Post Cmdrs, 25 Jun 52. SECRET. In file cited above.

⁵⁴Ltr, Maj Gen E. T. Williams, EUCOM COFS to Col Gen Ivanov, 14 Jul 52, sub: Soviet Protest Letter. UNCLASSIFIED. In file cited above.

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approached the British with a definite offer that if all restrictions were lifted in the British Zone, the Soviets would reciprocate in their zone. The British stated that they were in accord with the proposals and planned to notify General Chuikov in a formal communication on 1 September that all restrictions on the movements of the Soviet mission in the British Zone would be removed. It was believed in USAREUR that the Soviets were using the British as a possible sounding board to determine Allied reaction to a return to the spirit and letter of the Huebner-Malinin agreement. Accordingly, the British on 29 August were apprised of USAREUR's concurrence in the acceptance of the Soviet proposal.⁵⁵

c. U.S. Proposals. On 29 September the Soviets invited Colonel Schanze to attend a conference at the Soviet headquarters at Karlshorst in order to "settle certain questions." The meeting with Colonel Tveretnikov, however, resulted merely in the repetition of old charges against the United States. Colonel Tveretnikov was not prepared to discuss any countercharges made by Colonel Schanze but stated that any information received would be transmitted to General Chuikov. At a second meeting between the two colonels on 4 October, it was proposed that surveillance of both Soviet and U.S. vehicles and personnel should be terminated. On the basis of the Tveretnikov proposals at this meeting USAREUR developed a series of proposals which it transmitted to Colonel Schanze for presentation to the Soviets on 8 October. USAREUR expected a reply by 11 October as to whether the Soviets would implement the following actions in the Soviet Zone by 15 October: (1) remove surveillance of the U.S. mission; (2) permit the mission free egress from Berlin; and (3) notify the United States in writing and furnish marked maps of the restricted areas. Simultaneously with the implementation of these actions by the Soviets, USAREUR would undertake the following measures: direct that there be no interference by U.S. personnel with the freedom of travel of the Soviet mission in the unrestricted areas of the U.S. Zone; and provision of marked maps to the Soviet mission concerning restricted areas. USAREUR believed that chances of acceptance of these propositions by the Soviets were slight but that the gesture, nonetheless, should be made.⁵⁶

d. Agreed Action. USAREUR did not reckon with the evident Soviet desire to terminate the overt trailing of the Soviet mission vehicles in the U.S. Zone, which was curtailing the usual activities of their mission.

⁵⁵Memo, USAREUR Intel Div to Brig Gen M. McClure, Dir USAREUR Intel Div, 29 Aug 52, sub: Notes for Commander in Chief's Conference. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1952), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd.

⁵⁶Cable SX-4074, CINCUSAREUR to HICOM Wahnernheide, CCFFA Baden-Baden, US CINCEUR, 8 Oct 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322.01 (1952), Vol. I, Item 30.

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On 10 November Colonel Schanze was again called to a meeting with Colonel Tveretnikov at Karlshorst at which the Soviets verbally accepted the USAREUR proposals. It was agreed at this meeting that, effective 0001 hours 19 November 1952, the Soviet and U.S. authorities would implement the following actions: (1) terminate all trailing in the U.S. and Soviet Zones; (2) notify respective Soviet and U.S. authorities in writing accompanied by marked maps of the restricted areas in each zone; and (3) eliminate incidents involving mission personnel in the respective zones. The USAREUR proposal with regard to free egress from Berlin for the personnel of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission was deferred for discussion until the return of General Chuikov from Russia.⁵⁷ In implementation of this agreement, USAREUR notified the Seventh Army and all military posts that, effective 0001 hours, 19 November 1952, all trailing of personnel of Soviet Military Liaison Mission, Frankfurt, by military police or any other military personnel would be discontinued.⁵⁸

e. Results of Agreement. The trailing of Soviet mission vehicles in the U.S. Zone was terminated as agreed but the Soviets terminated only the trailing of the U.S. mission vehicles by police, either Soviet or German. Trailing of the mission vehicles by civilian vehicles was continued throughout the remainder of the year. During the latter months of the year when the Soviets obtained a fleet of late American-make automobiles for trailing activities, a more concerted attempt was made to hamper travel by the U.S. mission vehicles. Since American-make cars were a rarity in the Soviet Zone, these trailing vehicles were easily spotted, and the U.S. mission vehicles were able to elude the trailing tactics of the Soviets on numerous occasions.⁵⁹

244. Violation of the Extraterritoriality of the U.S. Mission

Under the Huebner-Malinin agreement, the compounds of the U.S. and Soviet missions were accorded the right of extraterritoriality in their respective zones of location. Notwithstanding this fact, the U.S. mission compound was invaded by two Soviet officers and sixty Soviet soldiers armed with submachine guns on 15 August 1952. This armed Soviet band made a casual search of the area and the unoccupied buildings in the compound. Repeated orders to leave were ignored by the Soviet officers in charge, but they departed of their own volition within fifteen minutes

⁵⁷(1) Ltr, Col A. E. Schanze, Chm USMLM, to Col H. C. Burgess, Dep Dir USAREUR CAD, 11 Nov 52, sub: Meeting with Col Tveretnikov, 11 Nov 52 SECRET. (2) Cable SX-5240, CINCUSAREUR to COFSA, 15 Nov 52. SECRET. Both in USAREUR SGS 500 (1952), Vol. II, Items 69A and 70 atchd.

⁵⁸Cable SX-5226, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army, FMP, MMP, NMP, & WMP., 15 Nov 52. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 500 (1952), Vol. II, Item 70 atchd.

⁵⁹Unit History, 7893 USMLM, Potsdam, 1952. SECRET. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br.

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after arrival. General Williams dispatched a strong letter of protest to General Ivanov, who rejected the allegations as unfounded. It was felt in USAREUR that this move was undertaken by two overly zealous and irresponsible Soviet officers. Nonetheless, the information concerning this affair was not publicized during 1952 for fear of unduly alarming the U.S. public.⁶⁰

245. Establishment of the USAREUR Soviet Relations Advisory Committee

By September 1952 it had become evident that a more expeditious method of handling staff action in USAREUR in regard to matters concerning the Soviet and U.S. military missions was necessary. A USAREUR Intelligence Division study of the problem concluded that actions involving the Soviet and U.S. missions should be processed by a committee to be composed of representatives from each of the interested staff divisions of Headquarters, USAREUR. Whenever an action involving one or both missions occurred, the committee would be called into session to handle the matter. This procedure would facilitate sound and expeditious handling of cases of this type. Upon becoming operational the committee could immediately prepare a statement of policy with regard to both the Soviet and U.S. missions, clearly outlining the extent to which USAREUR should conduct offensive and retaliatory actions against the Soviet mission. This statement would also serve as a guide for the overt activities of the U.S. mission in Potsdam. Upon approval of the proposed statement of policy, the committee would prepare plans within the framework of that policy to counter the various actions open to the Soviets. It would be incumbent upon the committee to co-ordinate with the Office of the Political Adviser, USAREUR, such actions as might have a political aspect. The committee, moreover, should be empowered to develop plans and policy on such matters for the USAREUR deputy chief of staff for operations, and its members would act as staff advisers for the deputy chief of staff.⁶¹ The staff study was approved by the deputy chief of staff for operations on 25 September and the interested staff divisions of USAREUR were directed to form a committee in order to co-ordinate the action required to establish the Soviet Relations Advisory Committee.⁶²

⁶⁰(1) Ibid. (2) Memo, USAREUR Intel Div to Brig Gen M. McClure, Dir USAREUR Intel Div, 29 Aug 52, sub: Notes for Commander in Chief's Conference. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1952), Vol. I, Item 1 atchd.

⁶¹Memo, Dir USAREUR Intel Div to USAREUR COFS, 17 Sep 52, sub: Establishing Mechanism for Handling Soviet Mission Problems. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322.01 (1952), Vol. I, Item 28 atchd.

⁶²C/N 1, USAREUR DCOFS Opns to USAREUR CAD, et al., 25 Sep 52, sub: Proposed Staff Memo. SECRET. In file cited above.

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a. Composition of the Committee. The USAREUR staff memorandum which established the Soviet Relations Advisory Committee assigned staff supervision of the committee to the Director, Civil Affairs Division. The committee was to be composed of the Director, Civil Affairs Division, as chairman; the Director, Intelligence Division; and Chief, Public Information Division. The Director, USAREUR OPOT Division, was to have the status of a full-time member of the committee, upon the call of the chairman, with regard to his responsibilities as outlined in Section III, EUCOM Staff Memorandum 1, 1952, as amended. The USAREUR Political Adviser (POLAD) was to be an ex-officio member of the committee, subject to the call of the chairman. In addition, the heads of the staff divisions, indicated as members of the committee, with the exception of POLAD, were authorized to designate one additional officer each to sit as a full-time member. A revision of this staff memorandum raised the number of additional members to be appointed by the head of each member staff division to two.⁶³

b. Proposed USAREUR Policy. The first meeting of the USAREUR Soviet Relations Advisory Committee was held on 21 October 1952. Two separate actions were accomplished. Staff Memorandum 9, which established the Committee, was changed and forwarded to the chief of staff for approval and republication.⁶⁴ A more important result of this meeting was the development of a statement of policy containing the following provisions: (1) Since the 7893 U.S. Military Liaison Mission, Soviet Zone of Germany, was an essential element in USAREUR relations with the Soviets, the preservation of the mission was desirable and no action would be taken which would provide a valid reason for the Soviets to request a withdrawal of the mission; (2) conversely, the committee believed that the maintenance of the Soviet mission in Frankfurt was considered just as desirable by the Soviets; (3) action on the part of the committee would, in general, be reciprocal in nature; (4) while USAREUR, as a general policy, would not seek publicity, certain publicity aspects would have to be considered concerning incidents involving the Russians; (5) protest letters would be answered, and protests made, only when in the best interests of USAREUR; deliberate delay in answer to certain protests would be considered; and (6) any action against the Soviet Military Liaison Mission, Frankfurt, would be taken only with the full knowledge and approval of the committee.⁶⁵ The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, USAREUR, added the following

⁶³USAREUR Stf Memos 9 and 16, 7 Oct 52, 6 Nov 52, sub: USAREUR Soviet Relations Advisory Committee. SECRET.

⁶⁴C/N 1, Dir USAREUR CAD to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 21 Oct 52, sub: Report of Meeting #1, USAREUR Soviet Relations Advisory Committee. SECRET. In USAREUR SGS 322.01 (1952), Vol. I, Item 28 atchd.

⁶⁵Memo, USAREUR Soviet Relations Advisory Comm, 21 Oct 52, sub: Proposed Policy of USAREUR Soviet Relations Advisory Committee. SECRET. In file cited above.

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sentence to (5): "The Committee Chairman would inform the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations whenever the Committee recommended no answer or a deliberate delay in answer to a protest." Likewise, an additional sentence was added to (6), substantially as follows: "No action would be taken with respect to the status of personnel of the Soviet Military Liaison Mission without the approval of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations." Finally, the following provision was added to the statement of policy: "The Committee Chairman would be responsible for keeping the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations informed of all contemplated actions." ⁶⁶ This proposed USAREUR policy was approved by the USAREUR chief of staff on 31 October 1952 together with the new version of USAREUR Staff Memorandum 9. This approval made possible the implementation of the statement of principles by the committee and the publication of the revised version of Staff Memorandum 9 as USAREUR Staff Memorandum 16, on 6 November 1952. ⁶⁷

c. Purpose and Functions of the Committee. The purposes of the USAREUR Soviet Relations Advisory Committee, as outlined in USAREUR Staff Memorandum 16, were twofold: to prepare the USAREUR policy on matters affecting the relations with the Soviet military occupation authorities in Germany, with regard to the Huebner-Malinin agreement of 1947 and incidents involving the Soviet forces which might be referred to the committee by the Commander in Chief, USAREUR; and to take certain implementing actions within the framework of this policy. Operationally the functions of the USAREUR Soviet Relations Advisory Committee would consist of: (1) preparing for approval USAREUR statements of policy on matters pertaining to relations with the Soviet occupation authorities; (2) formulating a series of plans within the framework of that policy to counter the various actions open to the Soviets; (3) preparing answers to letters of protest received from the Soviet authorities; (4) preparing letters of protest to the Soviet authorities, whenever appropriate; and (5) preparing news releases, whenever appropriate. ⁶⁸

246. Repatriation of Soviet Citizens from the U.S. Zone

While the repatriation of Soviet citizens from the U.S. Zone was chiefly a HICOG responsibility, EUCOM derived an interest in the matter from the fact that the chief of the Soviet Military Liaison Mission, Frankfurt, an agency accredited to EUCOM, was designated by the U.S. High

⁶⁶Memo, Col J. O. Seaman, USAREUR Asst DCOFS Opns, to Brig Gen J. F. Uncles, USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 27 Oct 52, sub: Approval of Proposed USAREUR Policy. SECRET. In file cited above.

⁶⁷C/N 4, USAREUR DCOFS Opns to Dir USAREUR CAD, 31 Oct 52, to C/N 1, Dir USAREUR CAD to USAREUR DCOFS Opns, 21 Oct 52, cited above.

⁶⁸USAREUR Stf Memo 16, 6 Nov 52, sub: USAREUR Soviet Relations Advisory Committee. SECRET.

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Commissioner for Germany as the Soviet representative in the U.S. Zone of Germany to act on Soviet repatriation cases. On 12 February 1952, Maj. Gen. G. P. Hays, Deputy U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, dispatched a letter to Mr. I. Semichastnov, First Deputy Chairman, Soviet Control Commission for Germany, which outlined new HICOG procedures for Soviet repatriation.⁶⁹ A copy of this letter was forwarded to EUCOM with a request that EUCOM rescind the implementing instructions previously issued to the Soviet liaison mission by EUCOM. EUCOM rescinded the instructions on 23 February 1952. The EUCOM letter of rescission the chief of the Soviet liaison mission stated that the new HICOG procedures for repatriating Soviet citizens from the U.S. Zone rendered unnecessary the issuance of new implementing instructions by EUCOM.⁷⁰

⁶⁹C/N 1, Dir EUCOM CAD to EUCOM DCOFS Admin, 20 Feb 52, sub: Soviet Repatriation. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322.01 (1952), Vol. I, Item 9.

⁷⁰Ltr, EUCOM DCOFS Admin, to Chief, Soviet Mil Ln Msn, Frankfurt, 23 Feb 52, sub: Procedures to be Followed in Connection with Soviet Repatriation. CONFIDENTIAL. In USAREUR SGS 322.01 (1952), Vol. I, Item 9 atchd.



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APPENDIX A

Organizational Changes in EUCOM/USAREUR Technical and
Administrative Services During 1952.

<u>Installation or Activity</u>	<u>Change Effected</u>	<u>Effective Date</u> (1952)
<u>CHEMICAL</u>		
Hanau Chemical Laboratory	Establishment as EUCOM Class II Activity	1 Mar
Bussac Chemical Depot	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec
Sampigny Chemical Depot	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec
<u>FINANCE</u>		
7754 Finance Office, Paris	Establishment as USAREUR Class II Activity	1 Oct
<u>ENGINEER</u>		
Engineer Advance Section Map Depot, St Ay	Establishment as EUCOM Class II Installation	1 Mar
Engineer Bridge Depot Schwetzingen	Discontinuance	10 Apr
Engineer Intelligence and Survey Center, Schwetzingen	Redesignation as Engineer Intelligence Group, a EUCOM Class II Installation	20 Aug
Engineer Base Map Repro- duction Plant, Bordeaux	Establishment as USAREUR Class II Installation	15 Aug
Etain Engineer Depot	Discontinuance and assumption of its functions by Toul Engineer Depot	30 Sep

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Installation of Activity

Change Effected

Effective Date
(1952)

ENGINEER (cont'd)

Chinon Engineer Depot

Redesignation as COMZ
Class I Activity

1 Dec

Toul Engineer Depot

Redesignation as COMZ
Class I Activity

1 Dec

Engineer Procurement
Center, Frankfurt

Establishment as USAREUR
Class II Activity

25 Nov

MEDICAL

US Army Hospital,
Baumholder

Establishment and assignment
to Rhine Military Post

2 Jun

La Pallice Medical
Subdepot

Establishment as EUCOM
Class II installation and
designation as subdepot of
Fontainebleau Medical Depot

15 Jun

US Army Hospital,
Captieux

Establishment and assignment
to COMZ

1 Aug

US Army Hospital,
Verdun

Establishment and assignment
to COMZ

15 Aug

US Army Hospital,
Fontainebleau

Establishment and assignment
to 7961 USAREUR Detachment

15 Aug

US Army Hospital,
La Chapelle

Establishment and assignment
to COMZ

15 Aug

US Army Hospital,
La Rochelle

Establishment and assignment
to COMZ

15 Aug

US Army Dispensary,
Bordeaux

Establishment and assignment
to COMZ

15 Aug

Vassincourt Medical
Subdepot

Establishment as USAREUR Class
II Installation and designa-
tion as a subdepot of Rhine
Medical Depot

1 Sep

Fontainebleau Medical
Subdepot

Redesignation as COMZ Class
I Installation

1 Dec

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<u>Installation or Activity</u>	<u>Change Effected</u>	<u>Effective Date</u> (1952)
<u>MEDICAL (cont'd)</u>		
La Pallice Medical Subdepot	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec
Vassincourt Medical Subdepot	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec
<u>ORDNANCE</u>		
53d Ordnance Service Company, Wordwell, England	Reorganization	20 Apr
Mainz Ordnance Depot	Redesignation as EUCOM Class II Installation	1 Jul
Fontenet Ordnance Depot	Redesignation as EUCOM Class II Installation	1 Jul
Trois Fontaines Ordnance Depot	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec
Captieux Ordnance Depot	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec
Braconne Ordnance Depot	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec
Fontenet Ordnance Depot	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec
Nancy Ordnance Depot	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec
St Hubert Ordnance Subdepot	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec
Rhine Ammunition Depot	Reassignment to Seventh Army	1 Jan
<u>QUARTERMASTER</u>		
7855 EUCOM Property Disposal Service	Establishment as EUCOM Class II Activity	1 Feb

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<u>Installation or Activity</u>	<u>Change Effected</u>	<u>Effective Date</u> (1952)
<u>QUARTERMASTER (cont'd)</u>		
Advanced Section Quartermaster Depot	Redesignation as Metz Quartermaster Depot, a EUCOM Class II Installation	1 Feb
Amyilly POL (French Depot)	Redesignation as subdepot of Metz Quartermaster Depot	1 Feb
Cosne (France) POL	Redesignation as subdepot of Metz Quartermaster Depot	1 Feb
Fontainbleau (France) POL	Redesignation as subdepot of Metz Quartermaster Depot	1 Feb
Mailley Le Camp (France) POL	Redesignation as subdepot of Metz Quartermaster Depot	1 Feb
Montereau (France) POL (French Depot)	Redesignation as subdepot of Metz Quartermaster Depot	1 Feb
Pouilly (France) POL	Redesignation as subdepot of Metz Quartermaster Depot	1 Feb
Sens (France) POL	Redesignation as subdepot of Metz Quartermaster Depot	1 Feb
Woippy (France) Quarter- master Subdepot	Redesignation as subdepot of Metz Quartermaster Depot	1 Feb
Woippy POL (French Depot)	Redesignation as subdepot of Metz Quartermaster Depot	1 Feb
Rhine Quartermaster Depot I at Rhine Ordnance Depot	Establishment as EUCOM Class II Activity	1 Feb
Buzy (France) POL Subdepot	Establishment as EUCOM Class II Installation and designation as subdepot of Metz Quartermaster Depot	1 Mar
Landes de Bussac POL Subdepot	Establishment as EUCOM Class II Installation and designation as subdepot of Perigueux Quartermaster Depot	1 Mar

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<u>Installation or Activity</u>	<u>Change Effected</u>	<u>Effective Date</u> (1952)
<u>QUARTERMASTER</u> (cont'd)		
Ffeddersheim Quartermaster Subdepot	Establishment as EUCOM Class II Activity and designation as subdepot of Giessen Quartermaster Depot	10 Mar
Ingrandes Quartermaster Subdepot	Establishment as EUCOM Class II Installation and designation as subdepot of Perigueux Quartermaster Depot	1 Jun
Ingrandes Quartermaster Subdepot	Redesignation as Ingrandes Quartermaster Depot	1 Sep
Perigueux Quartermaster Depot	Redesignation as Perigueux Subdepot and designation as subdepot of Ingrandes Quartermaster Depot	1 Sep
Paris Quartermaster Cold Stores	Establishment as USAREUR Class II Installation and designation as subinstallation of Metz Quartermaster Depot	1 Sep
Woippy POL Subdepot (French Depot)	Discontinuance	3 Sep
Cosne POL Subdepot	Discontinuance	1 Oct
Perigueux Quartermaster Subdepot	Redesignation as Perigueux Quartermaster Depot as USAREUR Class II Installation	1 Nov
Metz Quartermaster Depot	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec
Ingrandes Quartermaster Depot	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec
Perigueux Quartermaster Depot	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec

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<u>Installation or Activity</u>	<u>Change Effected</u>	<u>Effective Date</u> (1952)
<u>QUARTERMASTER (cont'd)</u>		
Woippy Quartermaster Subdepot	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec
Paris Quartermaster Cold Stores	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec
Buzy POL Subdepot	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec
Fontainebleau POL Subdepot	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec
Mailly Le Camp POL Subdepot	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec
Pouilly POL Subdepot	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec
Landes de Bussac POL Subdepot	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec
La Gord POL Subdepot	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec
St Sulpice POL Subdepot	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec
Amilly POL Subdepot (French Depot)	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec
Montereau POL Subdepot (French Depots)	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec
Sens POL Subdepot (French Depot)	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec
Agen POL Subdepot (French Depot)	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec
St Herblain POL Subdepot (French Depot)	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec

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<u>Installation or Activity</u>	<u>Change Effected</u>	<u>Effective Date</u> (1952)
<u>QUARTERMASTER (cont'd)</u>		
Samur POL Subdepot (French Depot)	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec
<u>SIGNAL</u>		
Cherbourg Cablehead Office	Establishment as EUCOM Class II Activity	15 Jan
Tape Relay Center (Orleans) comprising the Tape Relay Activity and Radio Transmitter Station (Saran) and the Radio Receiver Station (St Lye)	Establishment as EUCOM Class II Activity	15 Mar
Saumur Signal Depot, La Perriere-St Cyr-en- Bourg	Establishment as EUCOM Class II Installation	15 May
Verdun Signal Depot	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec
Saumur Signal Depot	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec
<u>TRANSPORTATION</u>		
Frescaty Ordnance Depot Frescaty Airfield, Metz	Redesignation as Frescaty Transportation Depot	1 Oct
USAREUR Transportation Depot, Landes de Bussac	Redesignation as Bussac Transportation Depot	25 Oct
Frescaty Transportation Depot	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec
Bussac Transportation Depot	Redesignation as COMZ Class I Installation	1 Dec
<u>MISCELLANEOUS</u>		
Karlsruhe Mobilization Designation Detachment	Discontinuance	7 Feb

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Security Information

Installation or Activity

Change Effectuated

Effective Date
(1952)

MISCELLANEOUS (cont'd)

Bad Nauheim Mobilization
Designation Detachment

Discontinuance

10 Mar

Giessen Mobilization
Designation Detachment

Discontinuance

6 May

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Glossary

This glossary contains all abbreviations used in this volume, except those listed in SR-320-50-1, 28 October 1949, and changes thereto.

<u>Term</u>	<u>Definition</u>
AAFCE	Allied Air Forces Central Europe
Actvs	activities
ADSEC	Advance Section
AER	Army Emergency Relief
Aff	affairs
AFGA	Armed Forces Germany Austria
AFN	American Forces Network
AHC	Allied High Commission
AID	Act for International Development
ALFCE	Allied Land Forces Central Europe
ALFSEE	Allied Land Forces Southeast Europe
AMEMB	American embassy
AMGER	American military-German relations
APG	Allied Planning Group
ASAE	Army Security Agency, Europe
ATAF	Allied Tactical Air Force (NATO)
ATAG	Air Training Advisory Group (NATO)
Aud Agcy	Audit agency
Aug	augmentation
BAOR	British Army of the Rhine

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<u>Term</u>	<u>Definition</u>
BASC	Berlin Air Safety Center
BASEC	Base Section
B&F	Budget and Fiscal
BFG	Belgian Forces in Germany
BGS	<u>Bundesgrenzschutz</u> (German Federal Border Police)
BMP	Berlin Military Post
B/P	bulky package
BPE	Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation
BPO	base post office
C/	Chief (in combination)
CAA	Civil Aviation Authority (USAREUR)
CAD	Civil Affairs Division
CAG	Central Army Group
CAO	civil affairs officer
CCFFA	Commandant en Chef, Forces Francaises en Allemagne (Commander in Chief, French Forces in Germany)
CDU	Christian Democratic Union
Chm	chairman
CINCAAFCE	Commander in Chief, Allied Air Forces Central Europe
CINCAIRCENT	Commander in Chief, Allied Air Forces Central Europe (Fontainebleau)
CINCALFCE	Commander in Chief, Allied Land Forces Central Europe

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<u>Term</u>	<u>Definition</u>
CINCALFSEE	Commander in Chief, Allied Land Forces Southeast Europe
CINCEUR	Commander in Chief, European Command
CINCLANDCENT	Commander in Chief, Allied Land Forces Central Europe (Fontainebleau)
CINCNELM	Commander in Chief, Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
CINC SOUTH	Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (Naples)
CINC SUBCOMNELM	Commander in Chief, Subordinate Command Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
CINCUSAFE	Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Forces in Europe
CINCUSAREUR	Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe
CINCUSFA	Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Austria
COMAIRSOUTH	Commander, Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (Florence)
Comm	committee
COMNAVGER	Commander Naval Forces Germany
COMNAV SOUTH	Commander, Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe (Naples)
COMSTSELM	Commander, Military Sea Transportation Service, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
Ctl	control
CWS	continental wage scale
DCINC	deputy commander in chief
DEO	Dependents Education Organization

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<u>Term</u>	<u>Definition</u>
DM	Deutsche Mark
DP	displaced person
DRC	Defectors Resettlement Center
DSD	Dependents School Detachment (Division)
DSP	<u>Deutsche Soziale Partei</u> (German Social Party)
EAC	European Advisory Commission
ECA	Economic Cooperation (Act) Administration
ECIC	European Command Intelligence Center
EDC	European Defense Community
EDF	European Defense Force
EES	European Exchange System
ELLA	European Long Lines Agency
EMCCC	European Military Communications Co-ordinating Committee
EMPS	European Motion Picture Service
<u>et. al.</u>	<u>et alii</u> (and others)
EUCOM	European Command
EWI	East-West trade
EXCON	international designation for telegrams on export control
ExO	executive officer
FDP	Free Democratic Party
FECOM	Far East Command

Security Information

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<u>Term</u>	<u>Definition</u>
FFA	Forces Francaises en Allemagne (French Forces in Germany)
FLAGCENT	Flag Officer Central Europe (Fontainebleau)
FMP	Frankfurt Military Post
FOCE	Flag Officer Central Europe
FONMIN	foreign minister
GAO	general alert order
GARIOA	Government and Relief in Occupied Areas
Gd	guard
GDR	German Democratic Republic (East)
GEOREF	World Geographic Referencing System
Ger	German
GFR	German Federal Republic (West)
GFY	German fiscal year
Gp	group
GYA	German Youth Activities
HACOM	Headquarters Area Command
HICOG	U.S. High Commission(er) for Germany
HICOM	Council of the Allied High Commission for Germany
HMP	Heidelberg Military Post
IBC	illegal border crosser
<u>Ibid.</u>	<u>Ibidem</u> (in the same place)
ICGB	Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee, Berlin

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<u>Term</u>	<u>Definition</u>
ICCG	Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee, Germany
INTEX	intelligence extracts
IP	industrial police
IRO	International Refugee Organization (UN)
IRS	internal route slip
IZT	interzonal trade
J-2	US EUCOM Intelligence Division
JAMAG	Joint American Military Advisory Group
JAMMAT	Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey
Jnl	journal
JRSO	Jewish Restitution Successor Organization
JSB	Joint Supply Board
JSCRE	Joint Chiefs of Staff Representative, Europe
JTR	joint travel regulation
JUSMAG	Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (to Greece)
KRO	<u>Kreis</u> resident office(r)
LC	<u>Land</u> commissioner
LCM	landing craft medium
Lib	library
LRO	<u>Land</u> relations office(r)
LSD	Labor Service Division
LWOP	leave without pay

<u>Term</u>	<u>Definition</u>
LWR	local wage rate
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAD	Military Assistance Division (EUCOM)
MAPAG	Military Assistance Program Advisory Group (under JAMAG)
MDAA	Mutual Defense Assistance Act
MDAP	Mutual Defense Assistance Program
MFNG	Military Facility Negotiating Group (Paris)
MICC	Military Information Control Committee
MID	Military Intelligence Detachment
MILREP	U.S. Military Representative for Military Assistance to Europe
Min	minimum, minutes, minister
MMP	Munich Military Post
MPB	Military Personnel Branch
MPC	Military Payment Certificate
MPCU	Military Police Customs Unit
MRO	military relations office(r)
MSA	Mutual Security Agency
Msn	mission
MSP	Mutual Security Program
MSTP	Mutual Security Training Program
Mthly	monthly
NACOM	Northern Area Command

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<u>Term</u>	<u>Definition</u>
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
n.d.	no date
NEIM	Headquarters, Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
NEO	noncombatant evacuation order
NIS	National Intelligence Surveys
NMP	Nuernberg Military Post
NOFORN	not releasable to foreign nationals - <u>special handling required</u>
NYPE	New York Port of Embarkation
OEa	Office of Economic Affairs (HICOG)
OLC	office of <u>Land</u> commissioner
OMA	Office of Military Assistance
OPOT	Operations, Plans, Organization, and Training
ORA	order for reinforced alert
ORO	Operations Research Office
OSA	order for simple alert
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSP	off-shore procurement
PAO	Public Affairs Office(r) (State Department)
POLAD	Political Adviser
PP&T	Plans, Policy, & Training (branch of EUCOM Intelligence Division)
Pres	president

<u>Term</u>	<u>Definition</u>
Prog	progress
RAdm	rear admiral
RAFCC	Royal Air Force Cinema Corporation
RAS	Reactions Analysis Staff (HICOG)
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
Rep	Representative
Rev	revised
Ry	railway
S-2	intelligence staff division
S-5	civil affairs staff division
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe (NATO)
SACOM	Southern Area Command
SAD	Special Activities Division
SCC	Soviet Control Commission for Germany
SD	Secretary of Defense
SG	Standing Group (NATO)
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe
SIRA	Strategic Intelligence Research and Analysis
SMC	staff message control
SOB	supply over beaches
SPD	<u>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands</u> (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
SRE	Special Representative Europe (Paris)

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<u>Term</u>	<u>Definition</u>
Stf	staff
Sum	summary
SUSREP	Senior U.S. Representative North Atlantic Treaty Defense Production Board
TID	Technical Intelligence Detachment
TRUST	Trieste United States Troops
TWX	teletypewriter exchange service, message
USAFE	U.S. Air Forces in Europe
USAREUR	U.S. Army, Europe
US CINCEUR	Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command
USCOB	U.S. Commander, Berlin
US EUCOM	U.S. European Command
USFA	U.S. Forces Austria
USLO	U.S. Liaison Officer, SHAPE
USMLM	U.S. Military Liaison Mission (to the Soviet Zone)
USNAVGER	U.S. Naval Forces, Germany
UTM	Universal Transverse Mercator Grid System
VOPO	<u>Volkspolizei</u> (People's Police, Soviet Zone)
VHF	very high frequency
WACOM	Western Area Command
WIFO	<u>Wirtschaftliche Forschungsgesellschaft</u> (Economic Research Organization)
Wkly	weekly
WMP	Wuerzburg Military Post

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Chronology

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Paragraph Reference</u>
1 Jan 52	Orleans Area Command established.	20a
3	Rebuilding of World War II vehicles in EUCOM to MDAP standards directed by Department of the Army	127
4	Revised EUCOM Supply Distribution Plan published.	112
6	Civilian personnel administration of the 7887 Graves Registration Detachment transferred from the 7961 EUCOM Detachment to the Frankfurt Military Post.	56a(1)
	New system of graduated leave for Federal employees became effective.	56b
8	EUCOM designated as executive agency for co-ordination of Department of Defense activities in OSP at third U.S.-European Military Procurement Co-ordination Conference in Paris.	167
	EUCOM Operations Research Office Field Team instituted in Operations Branch of OPOT Division.	97
9	Presidential directive issued outlining stepped-up program of furnishing military assistance and equipment to NATO countries.	164
	Program authorizing personnel to volunteer for service in infantry units in the command and in Korea implemented by EUCOM.	48a
10	Restrictions placed by Department of the Army upon voluntary extensions of foreign service tours for certain categories of enlisted personnel.	44a
15-17	Command post exercise NORTHWIND held.	101c
21	EUCOM-HICOG housing agreement signed.	176a

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Paragraph Reference</u>
23-24 Jan 52	Training objectives of ALFCE defined.	100b
24	Negro On-Duty Education Program renamed Special Education Program; and transferred from OPOT Division to Armed Forces I and E Division.	63a(1)
28	EUCOM MSTs Passenger and Cargo Space Assignment Committees established.	34
1 Feb	Paris Liaison Group initiated to co-ordinate noncombatant evacuation plans of chiefs of diplomatic missions and military commanders in European area.	90
2	1st Division transferred from VII Corps to V Corps.	101g
7	EUCOM-HICOG budget conference held at Garmisch.	173 174 209a
11	Reduced airlift plan for Berlin published	95
12	New HICOG procedure for Soviet repatriation dispatched to Soviets	246
13	Lt. Col. Leo Gilbert named as Headquarters Commandant vice Col. George P. Lynch.	18
15	German Federal Border Guard (<u>Bundesgrenzschutz</u>) made operational.	228
	Liaison Bureau between Seventh Army and German Federal Border Guard established in Stuttgart.	228
18	Preparations for withdrawal of EUCOM Military Police support of Bonn Enclave made by arrival of detachment of U.S. Marines in Bonn.	181
19	Maj. Gen. William W. Eagles named as Director, Military Posts Division; Maj. Gen. Paul W. Rutledge named as Inspector General vice Maj. Gen. William W. Eagles.	18

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Paragraph Reference</u>
19 Feb 52	EUCOM budget of DM 3,277,000,000 for GFY 1953 submitted to HICOG.	209b
23	Previous implementing instructions on procedure for Soviet repatriation rescinded by EUCOM.	246
26	Closing of illegal border crosser screening points at Hof, Ulm, and Hersfeld directed by Intelligence Division and permanent screening teams established at Giessen.	73a
28	Enlisted Reserves Corps and National Guard personnel informed by EUCOM that reserve obligations could be discharged by serving 33 consecutive months on active duty.	44b
5 Mar	Agreement authorizing stationing of Belgian forces in U.S. Zone of Germany signed.	161
10	Col. Theodore G. Bilbo, Jr. named as Chief, Budget Division, vice Col. Maynard N. Levenick.	18
13	U.S.-French agreement concluded providing for USAREUR tax exemptions on purchases in France.	147
14	U.S. expenditures from 1 April to 31 July limited by HICOG-EUCOM agreement to average of DM 255 million per month.	111a 209d
19-21	Department of the Army conferences held to determine EUCOM capabilities for supporting MDA Materiel Program.	164b
21	EUCOM-ALFCE meeting on infrastructure held at Fontainebleau, France.	157
24	Mandatory full-time education program begun for personnel below fifth grade educational level.	63a(1)
	EUCOM-NEIM-USAFE Interservice Logistic Support Agreement for Metropolitan France signed, effective 6 May.	136a

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Paragraph Reference</u>
25 Mar 52	EUCOM directives published concerning provision of logistical support to certain international headquarters of NATO.	150b
	EUCOM Passenger Space Requirements Committee established.	35
27	British grid replaced by Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid for EUCOM.	99
28	EUCOM Training Circular No. 1 published.	100a
31	Emergency plan for Central Army Group published.	81b
1 Apr	Phased program of racial integration to end segregation initiated in EUCOM.	4 45b
2	Plan for support of USFA concurred in by EUCOM.	138
4	<u>Bundestag</u> resolution calling for negotiations on property requisition adopted.	216a
14	Operation Drive-Away implemented.	128c
14-18	Command post exercise SPRINGTIME held.	101c
15	EUCOM General Alert Order 1-52 published.	82
20	EUCOM COMZ Labor Services Liaison Detachment organized to assist in administration of Polish labor service units in France.	49d
23	Tour of duty for certain Organized Reserve Corps, Regular Army, and National Guard personnel extended for nine months.	44b
28	Order prohibiting hiring of Allied/Neutral civilians in COMZ due to critical shortage rescinded.	56c
1 May	Military Level Agreement signed releasing certain installations to Belgian forces in Germany.	161

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Paragraph Reference</u>
6 May 52	Effective date of EUCOM-NELM-USAFE Interservice Logistic Support Agreement for Metropolitan France.	135a
12	EUCOM dependent housing procedure for naval personnel altered.	137
13	U.S.-French Construction Procedures Agreement, Metropolitan France, signed.	154
	Johnson Construction Agreement, relating to COMZ construction and negotiated by Military Facilities Negotiating Group, concluded.	147a 154
15	Lt. Col. Frederic W. Boye, Jr., named Secretary of the General Staff vice Col. Howard M. Snyder.	18
19	Initial plan for 30-day evacuation of dependents published.	89
19-22	Command post exercise MAYTIME held.	101c 103b
20	Revised letter of instructions for 7961 EUCOM Detachment published.	153
	New letter of instruction redefining specific missions and responsibilities issued by 7961 EUCOM Detachment.	26
	EUCOM instructions on release of classified information to European governments, including Federal Republic of Germany, issued.	229
21	Col. Leonard H. Sims named as Chief, Finance Division, vice Col. Ernest O. Lee.	18
24	Headquarters, Soviet Group of Occupation Forces, Germany, transferred from Babelsberg-Potsdam area to area near Wunsdorf for internal security reasons.	77b2
26	Contractual agreements signed by Federal Republic of Germany and the three Western occupying powers, subject to ratification.	7 110 204

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Paragraph Reference</u>
28 May 52	U.S.-French agreement concluded to permit use of certain beach sites in France for supply-over-the-beaches operations.	105a
31	Brig. Gen. Edward T. Williams named as Chief of Staff vice Maj. Gen. Daniel Noce.	18
	150-day level of supply stockage in Berlin completed; two special supply projects for Berlin completed, excepting two items.	117
1 Jun	HICOG field organization terminated; EUCOM assigned responsibility for military liaison activities with the <u>Laender</u> and the German local authorities.	8
3	Garmisch Military Post directed to release Luttensee Caserne to German authorities after illegal occupation by German Federal Border Police.	219
5	Responsibility for conduct of civil affairs at <u>Kreis</u> and local levels, initiating phase-out of HICOG field organization, transferred from HICOG to EUCOM.	13d 182b 213a
	Command of U.S. Naval Forces, Germany, assumed by Rear Adm. Howard E. Orem vice Rear Adm. Carl F. Holden.	22
10	169th RCT (43d Div) transferred from Munich-Bad Tolz area to Nuernberg-Fuerth area.	94
12	Brig. Gen. Frederic J. Brown named as Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations vice Brig. Gen. Edward T. Williams.	18
13	Agreement for logistical support of light Army aviation units of USFA by Twelfth Air Force concurred in by EUCOM.	138
16-18	Command post exercise GRAND ALLIANCE held.	101c 103b

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Paragraph Reference</u>
19 Jun 52	Two towns of Untermuehle and Obermuehle in <u>Land</u> Hesse reported occupied by Soviets in zonal boundary dispute.	233
21	U.S.-French agreement transferring five airfields in French zone of Germany to U.S. forces signed.	156
22	2d Armored Cavalry Regiment and 18th Field Artillery Group attached to VII Corps.	101c
23	22d RCT (4th Div) relocated from Schweinfurt to Giessen, awaiting encampment at Kirsch-Goens; 16th RCT (1st Div) moved from Nuernberg-Fuerth area to Schweinfurt.	94
25	EUCOM Committee on the NATO Status of Forces Agreement established.	38
27	Three Power countermeasure of surveillance of Soviet Liaison Mission personnel put into effect.	243a
28	Intelligence Division study on sensitive border areas prepared.	232
30	CINCEUR-HICOG agreement to provide civil support of military emergency preparations and to co-ordinate politico-military efforts of U.S. governmental agencies in Germany adopted.	91
1 Jul	Consuls general designated as <u>Land</u> commissioners by HICOG.	8
	3333 Labor Services Liaison Detachment organized to help supervise labor service in Rhine Military Post area; 3334 Labor Services Liaison Detachment organized to provide liaison between Engineer Division and Latvian labor service engineer units.	49d
	Responsibility for U.S. and Allied/Neutral civilian payroll accounting transferred from P&A Division to EUCOM/USAREUR Comptroller.	56a(1)

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Paragraph Reference</u>
1 Jul 52	German payroll function transferred from EUCOM to German Federal Republic.	56a(3)
	Wage rates scaled upwards for Allied/Neutral employees whose quarters allowances or free living quarters had been discontinued.	56b
	Payment of quarters attendants from EUCOM Deutsche Mark budget eliminated.	68b(2)
	Contractual agreements ratified by the United States.	207
	Responsibility for conduct of civil affairs at <u>Land</u> level assumed by EUCOM; three EUCOM <u>Land</u> relations offices opened in the capitals of the three <u>Laender</u> of the U.S. Zone of Germany; consuls general designated as <u>Land</u> commissioners for various <u>Laender</u> until effective date of contractual agreements.	213a,f,g
7	Col. Theron D. Weaver named as Chief of Engineers vice Col. Willis E. Teale.	18
15	Office of Paris Representative under the Special Assistant for International Negotiations to Commanding General, EUCOM COMZ, established.	20b
	Mr. J. J. McCloy resigned HICOG post.	184
16	Travel rates on German state railways for American personnel increased.	68b(4)
17	Space control of I.G. Farben Building transferred to Frankfurt Military Post commander.	177
24	Seventh Army directed to conduct survey to determine U.S.-Soviet zonal borders.	235a
25	Col. Fred McManaway named as Headquarters Commandant vice Lt. Col. Leo Gilbert.	18
29	Promotion ceiling abandoned by Department of the Army; a system of monthly promotion allocations to each major command for all enlisted promotions above grade E-2 initiated.	43

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Security Information

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Paragraph Reference</u>
29 Jul 52	New EUCOM internal security directive published.	92a
1 Aug	Headquarters, U.S. European Command (US EUCOM), established in Frankfurt with Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway as commander and Gen. Thomas T. Handy as deputy commander; the former European Command (EUCOM) redesignated United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), with headquarters remaining in Heidelberg under the temporary command of General Handy.	1a 13a 114
	Col. Charles R. Hutchison named as Comptroller vice Brig. Gen. John J. Binns.	18
	Brig. Gen. John F. Uncles named as Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations vice Brig. Gen. Frederic J. Brown.	18
	Psychological Warfare Section created in US EUCOM's J-3 Division Support Plans Branch.	98c
	Functions of MILREP, JCSRE, and implementation of Off-shore Procurement and MDAP in Europe assumed by US EUCOM.	170a
	Contractual agreements ratified by the United Kingdom.	207
8	Col. Bruce Palmer, Jr. named as Secretary of the General Staff vice Lt. Col. Frederick W. Boye, Jr.	18
10	3332 Labor Service Liaison Detachment organized and assigned to Medical Division.	49d
12	Command of USAREUR transferred from Gen. Thomas T. Handy to Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy; command of Seventh Army transferred from General Eddy to Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolte.	1a 13a 21
15	Former USAREUR function of sponsoring monthly meeting of Joint Indications of Imminence of Hostilities Committee in Europe assumed by US EUCOM J-2.	71

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Paragraph Reference</u>
15 Aug 52	Extraterritoriality of U.S. Military Liaison Mission violated by Soviets.	244
16	Re-employment leave for Department of the Army civilian employees working overseas discontinued.	56b
21	Maj. Gen. Claude B. Ferenbaugh named as Director, Operations, Plans, Organization and Training Division vice Maj. Gen. Robert M. Montague.	18
27	Command-wide curfew established prohibiting off-duty enlisted personnel below first three grades from loitering on streets or in public places between 0001 and 0600 on weekdays and between 0100 and 0600 on Sundays and holidays.	64a
1 Sep	Shipment overseas at government expense of personally owned automobiles of civilian employees discontinued.	56b
	Restrictions placed on sale of coffee, tea, and cocoa, and ration allowances cut to reduce black market operations.	64b
6	Civil-Military Relations Office in HICOG Office of Deputy High Commissioner created by HICOG.	213g
6-8	Exercise ROSEBUSH held.	103g(1)
12	USAREUR Intelligence Division's Training Section of Plans, Policy and Training Branch renamed Training and G-2 Air Section; Scientific and Technical Section of Analysis Branch renamed Special Projects Section.	74
15	Supply Branch added to Labor Services Division.	49b
	1st Division headquarters moved from Darmstadt to Wuerzburg.	94
	Combat Developments Branch of OPOT Division established; EUCOM Operations Research Office Field Team transferred to Combat Developments Branch.	96 97

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Paragraph Reference</u>
17-19 Sep 52	Exercise EQUINOX held.	103c(2)
24	Policy for tourist-dependents revised by EUCOM directive.	68c
25	Lt. Col. Mary L. Milligan named Staff Advisor, Women's Army Corps, vice Lt. Col. Irene O. Galloway.	18
1 Oct	Foreign service tours extended by Department of the Army from 36 to 42 months, with certain categories of personnel exempted.	44a
	Civilian personnel administration at Wuerzburg Military Post transferred to USAREUR headquarters.	56a(1)
	Function of controlling and allocating civilian manpower spaces transferred from Comptroller's Budget Division to OPOT Division.	58b
	Free space available passenger travel between U.S. and Europe discontinued. Cost set by MSTIS at \$50.00 for officers and \$20.00 for enlisted men.	68b(4)
2	Col. Edgar H. Snodgrass named as Judge Advocate vice Col. Damon M. Gunn.	18
7	USAREUR Soviet Relations Advisory Committee established to perform USAREUR staff action involving the Soviet and U.S. Military Liaison Missions.	39 245a
13	EUCOM Committee on NATO Status of Forces Agreement discontinued.	38
13-18	Exercise BELL HOOK held.	103c(3)
14	Special Troops, Hq USAREUR, reorganized under new table of distribution.	25
22	513th Military Intelligence Service Group authorized by Department of the Army.	73g

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Paragraph Reference</u>
26 Oct 52	Civilian personnel administration of 7754 FOUSA, Paris, assumed by USAREUR COMZ.	56a(1)
28 Oct - 1 Nov	Exercise BLOW TORCH held.	101c 103c(4)
30 Oct	U.S.-Soviet meeting held to re-mark Berlin border.	238a
	Kirch Goens firing range closed.	101b
31	Liaison Bureau between Seventh Army and German Federal Border Guard discontinued.	228
1 Nov	USAREUR COMZ designated as a major command.	13c
	7751 Military Police Customs Unit relieved of export control activity at eastern inter-zonal and international borders of Western Germany.	225b,c
6	USAREUR Staff Memorandum 9, containing revised statement of policy of Soviet Relations Advisory Committee, published.	245b
12	USAREUR Budget Advisory Committee reorganized.	36
14	USAREUR Board of Educational Advisers established to advise CINCUSAREUR on operation of dependents' education program.	37
15	Dependents Education Organization (DEO) organized and assigned educational responsibilities formerly exercised by commander of 7755 DSD.	29b 69a
	Limits placed on shipments of household goods from U.S. to Germany.	68b(3)
	Termination date of EUCOM logistical support to certain Air Force units in EUCOM.	136e
17	Brig. Gen. Robert G. Gard named as Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations vice Brig. Gen. John F. Uncles.	18

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Paragraph Reference</u>
18 Nov 52	Transportation Annex of USFA support plan published after concurrence by USAREUR.	138
19	All trailing of Soviet mission in U.S. Zone terminated; only trailing of American mission by Soviet or East German police terminated.	243e
20	Establishment of Joint Construction Agency authorized by JCS.	147b
	USAREUR Special NEO Planning Group established for 30-day period to study effective evacuation plans and methods.	85
25	New procedures for processing protests of violations of air corridors and zonal boundaries put into effect.	241d
28	Col. David H. Tulley named as Chief of Engineers vice Col. Theron D. Weaver.	18
1 Dec	Military posts of USAREUR consolidated into Northern, Southern, Western and Headquarters Area Commands.	1b 13b
	35 USAREUR supply depots and subdepots in France returned to Class I status under USAREUR COMZ commanding general.	20g 115
3	USAREUR Branch, Army Emergency Relief established.	61a
4	Col. Geo. W. White named as Chief of Ordnance vice Brig. Gen. Ray M. Hare.	18
5-6	Christmas clemency plan for war criminals at Landsberg prison adopted and executed.	223c
15	Military Posts Division, Hq USAREUR, discontinued.	13b
16	Establishment of Joint Construction Agency in USAREUR COMZ by 15 Jan 53 and its transfer to US EUCOM by 15 Apr 53 directed by DA.	147b

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Paragraph Reference</u>
20 Dec 52	66th CIC Detachment reorganized and redesignated as 66th CIC Group	27 73b
31	7792 HICOG Detachment discontinued.	182a
	7792 Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany discontinued.	32

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EXCLUDED FROM THE GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE